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ABSTRACT '
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has been subjected to widely
differing interpretations. This work concentrates on trying to
understand what Hegel himself meant, and addresses itself more to
the purpose and the structure of his argument than to its letter.
Hegel's Phenomenology is an essay on the value of classical
thought, written in opposition to the evaluation of the ancients
by the two dominant schools of thought of the day, Enlightenment
and Romanticism. On the one hand, Hegel seeks to establish the
value of the classical approach, which sees truth as something
existing independently of human reason in a world of forms, and
reason as only a method of discovering this truth. This is to be
contrasted to the Enlightenment view which equates reason with
truth. On the other hand, Hegel holds that if truth exists as a
fact, we should nevertheless accede to the more modern view which
insists that if the truth is to be known, this knowledge cannot be
merely empirical, but must also be capable of being shown to be
necessary. This is to be contrasted to the Romantic view which
equates truth with perfection, beauty, harmony, and so on, but not
with rational necessity.
The structure of the Phenomenology reflects the structure of
Plato's Republic. Plato presents the notion of justice (a) in the
individual as a balance between the three component parts of the
soul, and (b) in the state as the balance of the cardinal virtues.
Hegel presents Spirit to consciousness (a) in the individual as
consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, and (b) in the
state or "objectively", as ethical order, culture (or law), and
morality. The primary exigetical concern of this work is to show
how Hegel adopts and adapts the Platonic scheme, and in particular
to show the extent to which Hegel modifies Plato's views in points
both of detail and of generality to accord wih his doctrine of the
self-development of the concept.
At a more general level, it is hoped to present Hegel's ideas as
both independent and orthodox, and in particular as having little
in common with those on the European left who claim to draw inspir¬
ation from him. At the same time, it is hoped to contrast usefully
the orthodoxy Hegel draws upon with the rather different orthodoxy
which has been established in Britain in this century.
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I have set out in this work to give an interpretation of Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit. It falls to me first to explain why I should
have chosen to do something which is both so ambitious, and yet at the
same time has been done many times before.
In the first place, although in other circumstances it would be prudent to
spend more time getting to know specific aspects of a philosopher's thought
in detail before attempting anything like a general interpretation of a
central, and in this case extremely difficult work, this cannot be said
of Hegel. Hegel's work is above all systematic, and it simply is not
possible to grasp the full significance of any particular aspect of his
thought or passage of his writing without understanding its relation to
the whole system in which it participates.
If the system were of Hegel's invention only, this would put the student
in the apparently impossible position of needing to know the whole before
the parts. If Hegel is right, however, the system is a real existence
which is implicitly present in any "natural consciousness", in much the same
way as, for example, the "archetypes" are implicitly present in every
individual as part of the "collective unconscious" in Jung's work} In
order to understand and judge Hegel, therefore, the student must interpret
each stage of his thought as an attempt to reveal to conscious knowledge
something which is implicitly present in all experience, or, in plainer
language, he must always seek to view the whole through the parts.
1. C.G.Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. Routledge
and Kegan Paul 1959.
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In one sense, then, the .major weakness of this work is not that it is
too general, but that it is not general enough. In focussing on Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit, I am abstracting away from at least two major
aspects of his system, namely logic and philosophy of nature, and arguably
also from important aspects of philosophy of Spirit, such as, for example,
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anthropology and psychology. I am very aware of this weakness in this
work, and I have tried so far as possible (which may not be very far)
to avoid prejudging issues which should be resolved only on the basis
of a firm knowledge of other aspects of Hegel's system, especially his
Science of Logic.
In the second place, although a good deal of work has been done on Hegel
recently, much of it focussing on the Phenomenology, it is not the case
that there is even broad agreement about the significance and general in¬
tention of his work. If we consider, for example, some of the work done
around the period of the last war, that is, at the beginning of the recent
revival of interest in Hegel, we can discern at least three quite distinct
pictures of Hegel. There is the marxist view, which interprets Hegel as
nearly - but not quite - a marxist. Then there is the existentialist view
which sees Hegel as nearly, but again, usually, not quite an existentialist.
Thirdly, there is the British view, which regards Hegel like all things con¬
tinental with deep suspicion, and defensively proclaims that he is totali¬
tarian, historicist, deliberately obscure - in short, anything which will
excuse us from having to study him. Each of these views is, as will be
argued in due course, not simply partial or overstated, but completely
and directly opposed to Hegel's own meaning.
2. Comparing the Phenomenology of Spirit to the most complete exposition
of Hegel's system, the Berlin Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences
See Ch. 3 below.
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More recent work on Hegel, of course, has almost always gone beyond the
boundaries of these limited approaches.. However, it has not been unaffected
by them, and perhaps - to risk another generalisation - this goes some way
towards explaining the fact that the post-war revival of interest in Hegel
has often been accompanied by a decline in the standard of Hegel scholar¬
ship. Whereas earlier Hegel was studied in the context of his position
in post-Kantian philosophy in Germany, more recently students have often
been sidetracked into defending Hegel against certain more one-sided inter-
pretationsof his work and applications of his thought which have little
to do with his own intentions, rather than engaging with more substantial
issues.
The present work is no exception, and I too came to study Hegel through
the influence of such writers as Kojeve (especially), Lukacs and Popper,
and this background necessarily influences my approach to Hegel. However,
although I have felt it necessary to engage with the interpretetations
of such writers, I have tried to keep this to a minimum. Given the wide
discrepancies between the various interpretations of Hegel, and the ideolo¬
gical motivations which may sometimes be imputed to them, it has seemed
to me more important to stay as far as possible with the question simply
of what Hegel actually did say. The current needs of Hegel scholarship
in general, so it seems to me, are summarised by this statement of L&uer's:
"The question with which we are faced ... is neither whether Hegel
is correct in what he says nor whether his interpreters are
justified in what they say of him. Rather the question is one of
finding out just what Hegel does say and of determining what impact
that can have on our own thinking". (Quentin Lauer, Hegel's Concept
of God, State University of New York Press, 1982, p.2)
In focussing on what Hegel actually says, however, I do not mean to examine
the texts by chapter and verse, or to suggest that other interpreters
have misrepresented or falsified the letter of Hegel's views. On the
contrary, with one or two notable and well known exceptions, Hegel
scholars have generally been extremely faithful to the letter of Hegel's
work. Rather, the point is to interpret the meaning of the letter of
Hegel's work for Hegel by asking (a) why he chooses to say certain things,
and not others, and (b) why he chooses to say them in a particular con¬
text and at a particular place in his writing. This means focussing
especially on the purpose and structure of the Phenomenology, and only
subsequently and in this context on its detail.
My experience leads me to conclude that this is in fact the only way to
make sense out of Hegel's work, and by saying this I do mean to imply the
strong conclusion that any other approach which does not properly account
for the ultimate purpose and the structure of Hegel's work - should such
an approach exist - will literally not make sense. On the other hand, I
should emphasise that Hegel's goals are neither esoteric nor particularly
idiosyncratic. They are simply the goals of philosophy itself, in the
orthodox sense of that word in the platonic and christian traditions.
It follows that to give an account of Hegel's goals is also to give a "
general account of the purpose of philosophy. This was not my intention
as I set out, and I have not entered into debates about the purpose of
philosophy in any polemical way. Nevertheless, I have been impressed by
Hegel's strong and direct sense of the justification of his discipline,
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and I have also come increasingly to feel that this sense is strikingly
absent in contemporary British thinking.
3. As Martin Walker argued in a recent series of articles in
The Guardian, 9th, 10th and 11th January, 1984.
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Recent American work on Hegel seems to endorse this conclusion, perhaps
because in America philosophy has a stronger sense of its own purpose.
Anne and Henry Paolucci, for example in the introduction to their selection
of Hegel's writings on tragedy, that
"When philosophy is emptied of its high aesthetic and religious
content,it becomes - Hegel never wearies of saying - an.empty
intellectual exercise" (Paolucci and Paolucci, Hegel on Ihragedy
Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1975)
Similarly, the central importance of Hegel's view, which may be summarised
abstractly as that the true purpose of philosophy is knowledge of God,
is increasingly being acknowledged. Lauer, for example, writes
"Only in the light of "absolute Spirit" is anything Hegel says
intelligible. It will be the contention of all that follows that,
in Hegel's view, "absolute Spirit" is in fact to be identified
with God and that therefore, only if Hegel's "Concept' of God" is
intelligible will anything Hegel says be intelligible. It will not
be necessary to claim that Hegel's concept of God does indeed
correspond with the Christian concept of God. I am convinced,
however, that Hegel indeed thought it did. More than that, I am
also convinced that, if he did not think it did there is no way
to make sense out of Hegel's philosophy". (Lauer, Hegel's Concept
of God, op.cit. p. 19).
I do not think I would have accepted this point of view when I embarked
on this work. However, now that it is complete, I must report the accuracy
of another judgement of Lauer's: "Nor can our own thinking remain unaffected
4
if we have reflected long and seriously on Hegel's concept of God". My
own conclusion is that not only is Lauer right about Hegel, but that Hegel
is probably right about philosophy in general, and that if there is any
justification for the pursuit of philosophy at all it must be along the
.lines- he suggests.




The first part of this work deals specifically with the aim and
structure of the Phenomenology. It is not to be inferred from this,
however, that parts two and three, which deal with some of Hegel's
specific arguments in more detail, are no longer concerned with the
aim and structure of the whole work. I have tried hard to be concerned
with nothing else. Indeed, I have come close to the conclusion that
Hegel himself is concerned with little else. Anyone who has tried
to write about Hegel must have had the unnerving experience that the
closer one comes to understanding Hegel, so the closer one's own
exegesis comes to Hegel's original; and I have certainly found that
the more I have tried to emphasise only the parts of the Phenomenology
which relate the parts to the whole, the more I have found myself
emphasising the entire work, and the more the proportion of the work
which can be regarded as accidental detail has been whittled away to
nothing. Like Aristotle, Hegel deals only with essentials.
The first part, therefore, should be regarded as an introduction to and
a prerequisite of the later sections, and not as a separate topic. It
deals first with Hegel's notion of "the absolute" secondly with his
conception of "spirit", and thirdly with the specific approach to spirit
designated by the term "phenomenology"
8
CHAPTER ONE : The Absolute
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is quite often regarded as what Quentin-
Skinner^ has called an 'eternal text' of philosophy. That is to say, it
is expected that it should contain a truth which transcends historical cir¬
cumstances and the particular intentions of its author. In order fully to
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understand it,it is necessary only to read it very carefully. Up to a
point, this is also the approach offered here. However, I do not think it
is possible to understand the Phenomenology (or any other work of philosophy)
without giving due attention to the circumstances of its composition. I
want therefore to begin by considering some of the major questions which
preoccupied Hegel while he was composing the Phenomenology. Thht is, to
use Aristotelian language, I want to account for its 'final cause'; hope¬
fully avoiding the superficiality Hegel associates with this approach, if
it is used as a substitute for a real engagement with the substance of a
3
philosopher's thought.
In preparing for the republication of the Phenomenology before his death in
1831 Hegel wrote a note which indicates that he held its polemical aspect
to be very important. He described it as:
1. Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas"
in History and Theory 1959 pp. 5-53 and Machiavelli .
N
2. See P. Singer, Hegel OUP 1983 p. ix or A.Kojeve, Introduccion to the
Reading of Hegel for examples of a 'Sacred Text' approach to Hegel.
3. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. J.B.Miller, Clarenden Press
Oxford, 1977 (Cited hereafter as Phenomenology) p.3.
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"a peculiar earlier work which ought not to be revised, since it
related to the time at which it was written, a time at which an
abstract absolute dominated philosophy". (J.N.Findlay in Hegel,
Phenomenology, p.v.) 4
Far from containing an eternal truth, the Phenomenology appears al¬
ready to be out of date in Hegel's own lifetime, at least in terms of
direct polemical relevance. So what is this relevance?
By the 'abstract absolute' Hegel seems to mean the idea which had ominated
philosophy since Descartes, that rational speculation, empty in itself,
can generate truth if it can be grounded in a single indubitably true pro¬
position, an absolute premise. In Descartes this is the cogito3 since I
cannot rationally doubt my own existence. Spinoza, on the other hand finds
the absolute not in the ego but in God or nature, which as .ens causa sui,
is the sole ground of its own existence. In Hegel's day these two conceptions
of the absolute appear respectively in Fichte's philosophy as the formula
of identity Ego = Ego, and in Schelling's philosophy as the 'point of in¬
difference" A = A.
What is less clear is what Hegel counterposes to this conception of the ab¬
solute. Certainly he does not abandon the idea of absolute truth itself,
5
since he finds the idea of relative truth absurd, and he opposes only the
abstract conception of truth which was fashionable in his day. However,
4. It was also at this time that Hegel suppressed the subtitle "First
part of Science", as he records in a preface to the 1831 edition
of the greater Logic. See Hegel, Science of Logic, Allen and Unwin
1969, p.29 and J.Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Pheno¬
menology of Spirit, Northwestern University Press, 1974, p.48.
5. Hegel Phenomenology, p. 47-8.
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since he has abandoned the idea that the truth can be expressed in a single
syllogistic proposition in favour of the idea that "The true is the whole"
it is no longer possible to say in simple terms just what the Absolute or
True is. Modern commentators are not always helpful on this point. Richard
Norman, for example, comments that the "portentious-sounding term the Abso¬
lute ... seems to mean simply 'reality' or 'things as they are in themselves'.
This is scarcely an adequate account of a concept which is almost by defin¬
ition the centre of a philosopher's work, that is, his conception of truth.
If the true is the whole, we might conclude that we should first get to know
the parts of the Hegelian system, and only then attept the final ascent to
the overall view which alone is true. Ho wever, although we certainly need
to know the individual parts of Hegel's system, it is not the case that the
0
Truth is simply the sum of these parts, like the Hobbesian watfch. On the
contrary, it is necessary to grasp each part at each stage as a moment of
the Absolute, so that it is necessary at each stage to have some preconception
of the Absolute. It is, in fact, a central contention of this work that it
is impossible to understand Hegel without taking on board his notion of the
Absolute, and that he has been widely misinterpreted by those who neglect
to do so.
I want to begin in this chapter by giving a very brief and sketchy account
of the way Hegel came to see the abstract Absolute as the dominant issue
6. Hegel Phenomenology, p.11.
7. Richard Norman, 'Hegel's Phenomenology' Sussex University Press, 1976
p. 27 n2.
8. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive or the Citizen, S.P. Lamprecht (ed), New York,
1949, pp. 10-11. Quoted by C.B.Macpherson in his introduction to
Hobbes' Leviathan. Pelican 1968, p. 27.
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in philosophy in hi.s. day. I hope thereby to show, some of the wider impli¬
cations, of this idea and hence of the issues Hegel will have to raise in
opposing it. I am by no means attempting anything like a general account
of the development of Hegel's thought, which would be well beyond the
scope of this work, but selecting only material which I consider to be of
direct relevance for elucidating the notion of the Absolute which guides
9
the Phenomenology.
Hegel was born on 27 August 1770 in Stuttgart, a protestant enclave in
catholic southern Germany. In 1788, destined by his family to the church,
he went to the theological seminary - the 'Stiff - at Tubingen. He seems
to have got through the prescribed course of study, two years of philosophy
followed by three years of theology,"'"0 with the minimum effort. He was dis¬
missed in 1793 with a certificate saying, that he was
"a man of good parts and character, somewhat fitful in his work, with
little gift of speech; and that he was fairly well acquainted with
theology and philology, but had bestowed no attention whatsoever on
philosophy" (E.Caird, Hegel, W. Blackwood, 1883, p.12).
This last judgement is scarcely accurate, and Hegel was in fact very active
outside of the curriculum of the Stift. He formed a political club with
Schelling and others to discuss the ideas of the French Revolution, and
9. For studies of Hegel's early period see R.Plant, •Hegel , Allen &
Unwin, 1973, which gives an excellent account of the intellectual
atmosphere of the period, and for more detailed scholarly accounts
Harris Hegel's Development Oxford 1972 or Lukacs - The Young Hegel
Merlin 1975. Although it is true that Hegel's early works do not
display the quality of the Phenomenology and later works, they are
invaluable for the student of these latter works, if only because
Hegel is so reserved about explaining his intentions and a study of
his juvenalia is virtually the only way of discovering them. For
comments on the value of Hegel's juvenalia see Plant, op. cit,
p. 15-16, S. Rosen, G.W.F.Hegel, Yale. University Press, 1973, p. 3,
or W.Kaufmann, Hegel Wiedenfeld:. and . Nicolson 1965, p. 12.
10. Hegel had apparently originally intended to do law, and later settled
on theology, in his own words "by natural inclination on account of
its connection with classical literature and philosophy". (Harris
op. cit. p. 57).
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developed a reputation as a defender of Liberty and Fraternity."''1 The
atmosphere in the University of Tubingen is summarised in this now famous
story.
"A bust to Liberty was placed on a Balcony between busts of Brutus
and Demosthenes; the room resounded with patriotic speeches. Two
young students, members of the club, left the town to plant a
Liberty tree: they were called Schelling and Hegel". (Plant, op. cit.
p. 51, taken from Leon, Fichte et son temps). 12.
Hegel's reading at this time, though subordinated to his theological
and to a lesser extent politicaliinterests,includes a good deal of
philosophy. He certainly studied Rousseau, and Kant's ethical works, and,
together with his friend Holderlin, Plato and Sophocles.11 On the other
hand, there is little evidence that at Tubingen he felt to any great degree
the tension between enlightenment and romantic ideas which was to become his
preoccupation throughout the next decade.
Hegel left Tubingen in 1793 and spent the next six years working as a pri¬
vate tutor, first for three years at Berne, and then at Frankfurt. This was
probably the most volatile period of his development, and produced the essays
on "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" and "The Spirit of Christian-
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ity and its Fate", published in the 'Early Theological Writings'.
11. Caird, op. cit. p.10.
12. Caird disputes the details of this story. Caird op. cit. p. 10. See
also W.Kaufmann, op. cit. p. 37.
13. Caird loc„ cit. Harris op-cit. p. 57 ff.
14. G.W.F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings (cited hereafter as ETW)
Pennsylvania Paperback, 1981» edited by Nohl (1907) and translated
by T.M.Knox. These were not published until collected by Nohl a
century after they were written. Hegel - as he once said disparagingly
about Schelling who published profusely in his youth - disapproved of
carrying out his education in public. (Caird op. cit. p. 14). Knox's
translation leaves out some of the writings published in Nohl's edition
of the 'Thedldgisohe Jugendstihriften', notably Das Leben^Jesu.
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The ' Positivity of the Christian Religion, composed at Berne, records Hegel's
preliminary attempts to apply the ideas of his contemporaries to the ortho¬
dox theology he had learned at the Stift. It is composed in two parts. The
first is recognisably an application of Kant's ideas to interpretation of
the New Testament, with fairly sharp criticism of some interpretations
associated with Catholicism. The second part draws on Romantic ideas and
shows Hegel's early commitment to the idea of a ' VoZkreligion'^~~' as a solu¬
tion to various problems of contemporary German culture. There is also a
third part written at Frankfurt, which expands the opening sections of Part
I - indicating that in spite of the vast development of Hegel's thought at
Frankfurt, he did not turn his back on the Berne essay.
The essay opens with a contrast between the teaching of the Old and New
Testaments."*"^ Hegel interprets the judaic tradition of the Old Testament
as a teaching of "positive law", that is, of law which is obeyed because it
is authoritatively commanded by God through the decalogue. The New Testa¬
ment then teaches that this, though not wrong, is immoral, since the indivi¬
dual does not choose for himself to follow the ethical law, but does it
only because it is commanded. Christ, in Hegel's view, takes the step Of
introducing the (kantian) principle of individual autonomy which is the
precondition for true morality, thus "restoring to morality the freedom
15. See Plant, Hegel Ch. 2. for the notion of 'folk religion' in Hegel's
early work.
16. We will see later it can be argued that Hegel's hostility to the Old
Testament remains to affect his ideas in the Phenomenology, and is
open to the criticism that Hegel looses sight of much of its positive
value. (See below p.73 and pp. 273 ff.) or M. Foster, Political
Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, Oxford, 1935 p. 180 ff.
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which is its essence". Having thus made Christ into a Kantian, Hegel
then has to explain why positive ethical law remains so large a part of the
teaching of the catholic church. He places the blame with the Apostles
themselves, who never succeeded in fully escaping their Jewish background
in spite of the impetus given by Christ.
The second part of the essay draws more on Romantic ideas, probably under
18
the influence of Holderlin, and idealises the warm harmony of Greek life
in contrast to the rigidity of Judaic traditions. It is headed with a blunt
retort to Klopstock's dismissal of Romanticism, "is Achaea, then, the Teutons'
fatherland?", to which Hegel replies simply "Is Judea then the Teutons'
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fatherland?". He then goes on to rate christian traditions for divorcing
religion from the political and cultural life of the people, in distinction
from pagan religions.
"Christianity has emptied Valhalla, felled the sacred groves, ex¬
tirpated the national imagery as a shameful superstition, as a
devilish poison, and given us instead the imagery of a nation whose
climate, laws, culture and interests are strange to us and whose
history has no connection whatever with our own". (ETW, p. 146).
A little later he laments
"Who could be our Theseus, who founded a state and was its
legislator? Where are our Harmodius and Aristogiton to whom
we could sing scolia as the liberators of our land?"(ibid).
However, Hegel, perhaps in common with many writers associated with "Sturm
und Drang", does not show any awareness of a tension between the ideas in
the two parts of his essay, that is between customary ethics (Sittlichkeit)
17. ETW, op. cit, P. 69. Hegel's reading of Kant comes from Critique of
Practical Reason and Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.
See Kroner's introduction to ETW, p. 4.
18. Cf. Holderlin, Hyperion. Holderlin was composing Hyperion at the same
time as Hegel was writing this essay, presumably with Hegel's knowledge.
19. ETW, p. 145. The Klopstock quotation is from his 'Odes'. See Harris,
op. cit. p. 36n.
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and moral duty (Moralitat) . Indeed, he manages, to interpret Greek
ethical life along lines which have more in common with Kant or Rousseau
than any classical writer:
"As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws layed down by
themselves ... They neither learned nor taught Qa moral system]
but evinced by their actions the moral maxims which they could
call their very own. In public as in private and domestic life
every individual was a free man, one who lived by his own laws"
(ETW p.154) .
Perhaps it is because Hegel was so blithely happy to interpret ancient
teaching along such modern lines in his youth that he reacted so vehemently
against it at Jena. The Phenomeno1ogy, as we will see, is directed against
precisely such ideas as these.
20. On Movatitat and SittUchke-it in Hegel's early work see W. Kaufmann,
op. cit, Ch. 1. esp. pp. 49-50.
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At Frankfurt, Hegel wrote a second essay on religion titled The. Spirit' of
Christianity and its Fate. Like the first essay, it is, in the words of one
commentator, "full of sarcastic and then still unpublishable contrasts of
21
the glorious Greeks and the wretched Christians". Nevertheless, it finds
a good deal more of positive value in the New Testament, and shows Hegel
moving away from the abstract Kantian notion of autonomy which pervades his
22
earlier writing, towards the more concrete notion of freedom as Spirit
which finds its home in the Phenomenology. Christ's teaching is no longer
23
represented as Kantian, but as 'raised above morality', Morality here
24 . ..
meaning the Kantian domination of passion by reason. Movalltat and
sittlichkeit are distinguished, and Hegel looks to Christian teaching in
order to reconcile the two - an aim which hennever quite gives up, but
which he will discover to be much harder to achieve than he had anticipated.
A large part of this essay is devoted to a consideration of the 'moral
teaching of Jesus', and Hegel revises his earlier Kantian interpretations.
He takes some examples from the Sermon on the Mount which Kant had also
25
discussed. "The commandment to love thy neighbour as thyself", he writes
"was quite wrongly regarded by Kant as a command requiring respect for a
2 6
law which commands duty". Love in Hegel's view is above law and cannot
21. Kaufmann op. cit. , p. 41.
22. In his Leb&rt J&su and earlier fragments Hegel's defence of autonomy
is of an even more radical and atheistic tone. See Kaufman op. cit.
p. 58 ff.
23. ETW, p.212.
24. Ibid. Translators note.




"His Qcant'sJ remark that "love", or to take the meaning which
he thinks must be given to this love, "liking to perform all
duties", "cannot be commanded" falls to the ground by its own
weight, because in love all thought of duty vanishes", (ibid).
Hegel describes love not as a duty or a dictate of reason, but as a "modi-
27
fication of life". He uses the term 'life' in its biblical sense, and
to designate (more or less) what he would later call Spirit. The term
'modification' means, according to Knox,"expressing itself in a particular
2 8
mode", and corresponds to the term 'moment' in Hegel's later work:
Love is a moment of Spirit. Since Spirit is free, this means that love is
sovereign over duty, in much the same sense as a sovereign or sovereign
29
body in politics is above the law. Comparing Christ's teaching with
Moses' (who is now more or less identified with Kant), Hegel writes
"Over against the dutiful fidelity in marriage and the right to
divorce a wife, Jesus sets tove. Love precludes the lust not
forbidden by duty and, except in one eventuality cancels this
leave to divorce, a leave contradictory to duty. Hence, on the
one hand, the sanctity of love is the completion of the law against
divorce ... On the other hand love cancels the leave to divorce
and in face of love, so long as it lasts, or even when it ceases,
there can be no talk of leave or rights ... But in the eventuality
which Jesus made an exception (ie. when the wife has bestowed her
love on another) the husband may not continue as a slave to her.
Moses had to give laws and rights about marriage to the Jews
'because of the hardness of their hearts', but in the beginning
it was not so". (ETW p. 217; all emphasis in quotations is the
author's).
Laws, in other words, are made for men, and not men for laws.^0
f.1. Ibid, p. 212.
28. Ibid.
29. Cf. Aristotle Politics, Penguin 1972 p. 61, Bk II Ch. 4, or Plato
Republic, 425 c - which pasage is referred to directly by Hegel
in his Jena essay on Natural Law p. 102. Hegel's notion of the
priority of love gives it sovereignty only in the sense implied
by these authors, not the modern sense in which sovereignty is
essentially individual. It is the form of love, not the loving
person, which is supreme. Hegel, as we will see, rejects this
romantic view later. The sovereignty of love is expressed by
Bernard Crick in In Defence of Politics (Pelican 1964, p.26):
"Politics and love are the only forms of constraint possible be¬
tween free people". We may also cite the expression "all is fair
in love and war."
30. Phenomenology, p..387.
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To make love, or any other 'modification of life' sovereign over duty is to
invert Kant and to introduce a new notion of the Absolute? Precisely in
being sovereign, and therefore independent, not relative to any other being,
life becomes Absolute. The Absolute is no longer the empty autonomy of
31 32
Fichtes 1=1, but the concrete freedom of life and its modifications,
or what Hegel later terms Spirit. Love, for example exists, but is not com¬
pelled to exist, and nor is there any reason for it to exist (at least not
in Hegel's view, since if there were it would become relative to this reason
and loose its sovereignty). This in turn means that it is something both
ethical and Divine (unless it is absurd, which is not Hegel's intention).
In the Jena essay on Natural Law Hegel criticises Fichte's system for having
33
no need for religion and ethics, and he seems to hold the same view here.
I do not therefore agree with commentators who play down the religious con¬
tent and aim of the Early Theological Writings or, for that matter, of
34
Hegel's later works. It may be true that Hegel always retains an element
31. Fichtes 1 = 1 is, of course, a version of the nuomenal self in Kant.
It also reappears in another guise in Sartre's work as the "Pre-
Reflective Cogito". See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Methuen 1969,
pp. xxvi - xxxii. Many of Hegel's criticism of Fichte are equally
applicable to Sartre.
32. The term 'concrete freedom', though widely used by Hegel and his
followers, is not easy to define. Hegel gives a characteristically
cryptic definition in Natural Law (p. 90), calling it simply "the
freedom of the individual".
33. Hegel, Natural Law, p. 85. Later, in the Aesthetics, Hegel wrote that
"the ethical (sittUch) is the divine of religion as action". See
Kaufmann, op. cit. p. 274.
34. Lukacs for example, describes Hegel's early theological period as "a
reactionary legend created and fostered by the reactionary apologists
of imperialism" (Op. cit. p. 16), and Kaufmann also more or less denies
any serious theological intent in the Early Theological Writings (Lukacs,
The Young Hegel, Merlin 1975, Part I, Ch I; Kaufmann, Hegel op. cit. Ch.I).
Lauer and Harris agree that in his early years Hegel's ideal was a
religious one. See Q. Lauer, A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit, New York, 1976, p. 23.
of paganism, but except perhaps in his youth he is always profoundly reli¬
gious , and his work cannot be understood except as having a religious pur¬
pose.
In Part (iii) of the Spirit of Christianity, titled"Love as the Transcendence
of Penal Justice and the Reconciliation of Fate", Hegel tries to put some
flesh on his new conception of the Absolute, contrasting virtue and duty -
as he did later in Natural Law,"^^ and again in the Phenomenology. In con¬
trast to the Kantian view which sees freedom as self-determination in con¬
trast to being determined by one's inclinations, that is as duty, Hegel
3 6
defines Freedom as "the 'or' in 'virtue or vice'". He goes on to explain
the contrast between his view and Kant's as follows:
"In the opposition of law to nature, of the universal to the
particular, both opposites are posited, are actual, the one
is not unless the other is. In the moral freedom which con¬
sists in the opposition of virtue to vice, the attainment of
one is the exclusion of the other; and, hence, if one is
actual the other is only possible". (ETW p. 225).
Virtue, then, allows the real possibility of good actions, while duty only
37
produces a conflict with its opposite, passion. What is absolute is not
duty, a form of reason, but the good, which is, as Hegel was to argue more
38
explicitly later, a form of the divine.
Of course, Hegel does not rest his case here. Religion is subordinate to
philosophy, and what religion dictates, philosophy must be capable of knowing.
That is, knowledge of the good must not be a passive acceptance of a positive
39
teaching, but must include what Hegel later calls 'the subjective element'
35. Hegel, Natural Law, pp. 114-115. Phenomenology, pp. 365-409.
36. ETW p. 225.
37. ETW p. 225.
38. In the Aesthetics. See note 13 above.
39. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.Knox, O.U.P. 1967, p. 74.
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of conscience. It is in order to establish this that Hegel goes on to dis¬
cuss punishment and Fate. In the Kantian scheme of things, punishment is
an unfortunate necessity. In a perfect world all men would be reasonable
40
and therefore moral, and there would be no need for any use of force.
However, while all would be harmony so long as men consent to be reasonable
it is also the case that men are always free to be unreasonable and to
follow the dictates of passion. In Kant's own words, "Man is an animal who
41
needs a master". Power, therefore, is added in as an adjunct to and ser¬
vant of reason, which itself has no power, indeed, as pure abstract thought,
is the exact opposite of power.
Hegel has argued that love is above the Mosaic version of moral law. He now
argues that it is above penal law too, so that moral and penal law become
likewise moments of love. Rather than being the opposite of moral law,
penal law becomes its essential concomitant, so that reason and power become
friends.^
The proof of this lies for Hegel in the representation of punishment as the
reconciliation of Fate. If we consider punishment superficially, that is,
from the standpoint of penal law only, we find that the criminal and the
law are directly opposed to one another. In being punished
"The trespasser is not reconciled with the law, whether (a) the
law is in his eyes something alien or whether (3) it is present
in him subjectively as a bad conscience". (ETW, p. 227).
40. See 'Perpetual Peace' in Kant's Political Writings, edited by Reiss,
O.U.P. 1970.
41. I.Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose"
in H.Reiss ed. Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge U.P. 1970, p. 46.
42. Later in Natural Law, Hegel counterposes to the rationalist view that
punishment can only be justified if it produces a rational and moral
result i.e. reform, the idea that retribution is not only a good
ground for punishment, but also constitutes its "rational element"
(Natural Law, p. 92).
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In the first case, like Ismene in Sophocles' Antigone, he respects the law
only out of fear of punishment, and will be inclined to break the law if he
thinks he can evade detection. In the second case, he may suffer guilt for
his transgression, since he acknowledges that it offends moral as well as
penal law. In this case, however, punishment serves only to confirm his
own feeling of guilt. If moral and penal law are to be reconciled as
modifications of love, it is necessary that punishment be capable of making
men, good, of reconciling the individual to the universal law.
"There can be no other cancellation (of punishment) so long as
punishment has to be regarded solely as something absolute, so
long as it is unconditional, or so long as it has no aspect from
which both it and what conditions it can be seen to be subordinate
to a higher sphere. Law and punishment cannot be reconciled, but
they may be transgressed if fate can be reconciled". (ETW, p. 228).
Hence the importance of Fate. Fate, like punishment, inspires fear, but
"this is a feeling quite different from the fear of punishment.
The former is a fear of a separation, an awe of one's self; fear
of punishment is fear of something alien, for even if the law is
known as one's own, still in the fear of punishment the punishment
is something alien unless the fear is conceived as fear of being
unworthy". (ETW p, 229).
The 'awe of one's self' is the subjective element we are looking for, but
it is not quite the same as what is ordinarily understood by conscience.
Rather than being purely subjective, if it is represented as fate it implies
a recognition of a higher ethical power than one's own subjective conscience.
Banquo's ghost is not simply a product of Macbeth's guilty conscience, in
43
Hegel's reading, but represents "the power of life made hostile". Antigone,
to cite another example, buries her brother not simply because her conscience
tells her to do so, but because she knows she pleases where she must please
43. ETW, p. 231. Banquo's ghost, on the other hand, exists only for Macbeth.
In this fact we see the subjective principle which is found only in the
modern conception of tragic fate; but Hegel has not yet distinguished
the ancient and modern notions of fate.
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the most, that is, presumably, with the gods of the divine law. In short,
Hegel argues that if we accept the notion of Fate which we find in the great
tragedies, it/is possible for the individual to be reconciled with the law,
while if we do not we are left in a Hobbesian world where law is merely uni¬
versal and self-willed particular individuals are always opposed to it.
To accept the notion of Fate, therefore, is to reject reformative views of
45
punishment associated with enlightenment rationalism. However, as Hegel
argues later in his essay, it is not necessarily to accept the romantic view
46
expressed by Holderlin in the notion of the 'beautxful soCil' . The beauti¬
ful soul acknowledges the power of fate but attempts to escape it by holding
aloof from mundane things, in order to be able to maintain a good conscience.
This view Hegel holds to be little better than Kant's, being simply the direct
opposite of a guilty conscience. It is not capable of recognising sin in it¬
self, and therefore it is not open to forgiveness, so that there can be no
reconciliation. Hegel counterposes to this hard-heartedness the Christian
view "judge not that ye be not judged; with what ye measure ye mere, it
47
shall be measured to you again."
Fate, then, is the principle of conscience represented as something real,
not as the abstractions of duty or the beautiful soul. It is a recognition
44. Sophocles, Antigone. 1. 89.
45. See note 42 above.
46. ETW p. 236. Hegel returns to this theme in the closing pages of the
chapter on Spirit in the Phenomenology in a section titled 'The
beautiful soul; evil and its forgiveness'.
47. ETW p. 237; Matthew, vii, l-2<
by the individual of the Absolute, and it becomes a central notion of the
Phenomenology. It is never represented as an alien power, but always as
something subjective, and without the subjective element it is of no value.
To interpret Hegel's notion of reconciliation with fate as simply an accept-
48
ance of the inevitable, a mere 'fatalism', is to misunderstand the posi¬
tive value of reconciliation - and to go so far as to say that in Hegel's
view "the absolute moral authority of the state ... overrules all personal
49
morality, all conscience", as Karl Popper does, is to display an extra¬
ordinary ignorance of Hegel's work, since the notion of conscience is always
one of Hegel's central concerns.
The essay on the Spirit of Christianity and its Fate contains a number of
themes which stay with Hegel throughout its life. However, there are also
a number of important questions which it does not raise and which Hegel does
not raise until he left Frankfurt. In particular, we should note (1) that
he has made no distinction as yet between the ancient and modern conceptions
of fate:"*0 (2) that he talks of moral and penal law, and has not yet dis¬
tinguished the ancient and modern versions of this, that is human and divine
law from natural and civil law; and (3) that although he distinguishes
Moralitat from-*Sittliohkeit he nevertheless maintains that a morality of
48. Lukacs, The Young Hegel, p. 98, p. 502, and elsewhere, and Plant,
Hegel p. 71, seem to suggest this line of interpretation.
49. Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, London 1966, Volume 2
p. 31. Kaufmann has effectively argued the case against taking Popper
at all seriously on Hegel in an essay titled "The Hegel Myth and its
Method" in A. Maclntyre (ed,\ Hegel, University of Notre Dame Press*
50. Hegel gives a concise summary of his mature view of the difference
between ancient and modern conceptions of Necessity, as Fate and
Consolation respectively in a Zusatz to §147 of the Lesser Logic
(Logic, Clarendon 1975, pp. 209-10).
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conscience is compatible with a pagan folk religion, whereas he will later
abandon folk religion in favour of a revised version of Christainity, and
51 52
will argue bluntly that the Greeks "had no conscience". '
In January 1801 Hegel moved to Jena, "to take up his place beside Schelling
. 53
as a champion of the Philosophy of Identity". He had lived through the
crucial years of the formation of his thought and had in his last year at
Frankfurt produced the first sketch of his system. He had not achieved this
without great effort. His sister records that he had become silent and
54
self-absorbed, and Hegel later referred to this period as a five year
55
depression which went "to the paralysis of all powers". In a letter of
1810 he wrote:
"I know from my own experience this state of mind or rather the
moral reason once it has ventured with its interest and its fears
into the chaotic realm of the phenomenal world ... inwardly certain
of its goal but as yet unclear and unspecific about it as a whole.
I suffered from this hypochondria for a number of years to the point
of total exhaustion; no doubt every man experiences such a turning-
point in his life, the nocturnal point where his whole being con¬
tracts and he must force himself through the narrows until he becomes
51. Hegel, Philosophy of History, trans. Sibree, Dover Publications Inc.
1956, p. 253.
52. In the essay on Natural Law (Pennsylvania 1975 p. 105 ff)written at
Jena in 1802 Hegel makes all these distinctions, except for human
and divine law, but is still a long way from the developed views
set out in the Phenomenology. Since my aim here is not to chronicle
Hegel's development, but to discover in more general terms what his
preoccupations were in the period leading up to the production of
the Phenomenology, I do not intend to discuss exactly what Hegel
has and has not established by 1802, but to move more directly
to his mature view, which is established by the publication
of the Phenomenology. Some of Hegel's positions in Natural Law are
set out in Ch. 2 below.
53. E.Caird, Hegel, W. Blackwood & Sons 1883, p. 47.
54. Ibid p.45.
55. Koj^ve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books Inc. 1969,
p. 168.
secure and certain of himself, secure in ordinary daily life,
and if he has already made himself incapable of being fulfilled
by that, then secure in a more inward, more noble existence".
(Lukacs, The Young Hegel, op. cit. p. 102)
At Jena from 1801 to 1803 Hegel published seven essays - his first public¬
ations."^ They cover quite varied themes, and each of them consoli¬
dates and develops in some way ideas which will recur in the Phenomenology.
He then published nothing until the Phenomenology itself in 1807. I do not
57
intend to discuss any of these essays in any detail here. Instead, I
want to record some of the details of Hegel's association with Schelling
which was finally and abruptly ended by Hegel's criticism of Schelling in
the Preface to the Phenomenology. I hope in this way to follow more
directly the development of Hegel's notion of the Absolute, which is my
main concern here.
56. Except for an anonymous translation which was published while Hegel
was at Frankfurt. See Kaufmann, op. cit, p. 65.
57. Kaufmann, op. cit, Ch. II, gives a brief account of the content of
each of these essays. Natural Law which is probaly the most important
if least clearly written of these essays has been translated by Knox
and published by the University of Pensylvania Press, 1975.
The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy
and Faith and Knowledge have both been translated by W.Cerf. and
H.S.Harris, and published separately by Albany Press, 1977.
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Hegel's essay on the 'Difference of the Fichteari and Schbllingean System of
Philosophy" was first published in 1801, very shortly before Schelling and
Fichte, who had been close associates, abruptly fell out with each other -
just as abruptly as Fichte had earlier fallen out with Kant, and Schelling
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would later fall out with Hegel. Kaufmann attributes the emotional nature
of this series of friendships to the ambition Kant had set for his followers
in the last sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason. This reads:
"If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to accompany me along
this path, he may now judge for himself whether, if he cares to lend
his aid in making this path into a high-road, it may not be possible
to achieve before the end of the present century what many centuries
have not been able to accomplish; namely, to secure for human reason
complete satisfaction in regard to that with which it has all along
so eagerly occupied itself, though hitherto in vain (Kant, Critique
of Pure Reason, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, MacMillan 1933, p.669).
Certainly there is a strong millenarian tendency in Fichte, Schelling, and
Hegel which could account for their ambivalent relationships with each other.
Fichte's work has been described as a step away from Enlightenment towards
the philosophical romanticism of Schelling via the Storm and Stress rrtovement.
In the 'Difference' essay, which is ostensibly a review of Reinhold, Hegel
compares Fichte to Schelling quite neutrally, finding merit in both views,
though perhaps tending to support Schelling.The issue centres on the
philosophy of Nature. Fichte has retained the Enlightenment principle of
/
individual autonomy in philosophy of Nature by asserting that 'Vthe Ego is




Kaufmann op. cit. p.121 ff.
Kroner,Introduction to ETW p.14.
Kroner, op. cit. p. 22, Caird, op. cit. p. 48.
i~n
is, "that nature is no unreal shadow of the movement of subjective thought,
but has manifested in it the very principle which constitutes the Ego in
,.61
man
Just before he left Frankfurt, Hegel showed that he was reluctant to take
62
sides on this issue, though also implying that he tends towards Schelling.
However, by the next year, when he began publishing the Critical Journal
in conjunction with Schelling, he is less ambivalent. The programme of the
Journal (which was written mostly by Hegel, though individual authorship
was not usually credited) states unequivocally that
"the great immediate interest of philosophy is to put God again
absolutely at the head of the system as the one ground of all,
the principium essende et cognoscend-i, after He has for a long
time been placed, either as one finitude alongside of other fini-
tudes, or at the end of them all as a postulate - which necessarily
implies the absoluteness of the finite". (Caird, op. cit. p. 50).
Hegel now sides with Schelling taking up the Spinozist view (which Hegel
6 3
criticised explicitly later in the lesser Logic) in which the Absolute
is Substance,3 not, as in Fichtes view, Subject. Nature and Ego are not so
much opposites, as two moments of the divine.
Hegel maintained this view throughout his life, to the annoyance of some
64
commentators who see in it an absurd anthropomorphism, and to the delight
of others who find in it a preview of Engels' Dialectic of Nature.^ How¬
ever, he soon begins to find Schelling's version of the philosophy of Nature
superficial, just as he earlier criticised Fichte's philosophy of nature on
61. Caird, opj-cit. p. 50.
62. ETW, p. 319, in the 'Fragment of a System".
63 Hegel, Logic (of Encylopaedia) Oxford 1975, p. 213 §151.
\
64. See Alexandre Kojeve, op. cit. p. 212.
65. G. Lukacs, op. cit, p. 440.
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the same grounds.^ His Jena lectures and aphorisms make some fairly sharp
67
criticisms of Schelling's ideas, though they were directed more at
Schelling's followers than Schelling himself - which Hegel also claimed,
implausably, to be true of his comments in the Preface to the Phenomenology.
68
Specifically, he begins to see SchellinglE notion as increasingly formal,
and that his representation of the absolute as substance is just as much an
abstraction from reality as Fichte's representation of it as subject,
Schelling's philosophy of nature therefore becomes empty and pretentious.
Where there is a real phenomenon, Schelling seeks to distinguish this from
the element of the absolute manifested within it and to say that it is not
knowledge of the phenomenon itself which is true, but only the recognition
of the substantial absolute within it. It is easy in this way, Hegel jibes,
to sound profound. 'For example, instead of saying something is long, say it
has length, and that this length is magnetism; instead of saying broad,
69
say it has breadth and that is electricity ... and so on."
Schellincjs absolute, then, though substantial, remains equally rational. It
is supposed that substance may be deduced from the abstract absolute expressed
in the formula A=A. In Hegel's view, even if any such deduction were
possible, it could never go beyond pure reason to become a true knowledge
of phenomenal reality, and remain at best an explanation of reality which
reduces to a tautology, such as "long is length" in the above quotation.
Thus he writes in the Preface to the Phenomenology:
I
66. Hegel, Natural Law, p.56.
67. See Rosenkranz, Hegel's Leben, supplementary volume to Werke Berlin 1844
Some of these remarks can be found in translation in Lukacs, op cit,
p.428, and Kaufmann, op cit, p.179 ff.
68. "Formal" - see Phenomenology p.30.
69 From Jena Lectures. See Lukacs: p.428. This theme is repeated more
concisely in the Phenomenology p.30 §51.
"Dealing with something from the perspective of the Absolute (in the
modern view) consists merely in declaring that, although one has
been speaking of it just now as something definite, yet in the Absolute,
the A=A, there is nothing of the kind, for there all is one. To pit
this single insight, that in the Absolute everything is the same,
against the full body of articulated cognition, which at least seeks
and demands such fulfilment, to palm of its Absolute as the night
in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black - this is cognition
naively reduced to vacuity". (Phenomenology, p.9)
A little further on Hegel expresses his aim of transcending both Fichte's
and Schelling's views in the direction of reality in a well known passage:
"In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the
system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True
not only as Substance, but also as Subject". (Phonomenology, p.10)
This unity of Substance and Subject, Hegel remarks later, is found in the
need to express the Absolute as God, that is as a subject which absolutely
requires but is equally distinct from predicates, that is a substantial
being which is known.^
This represents formally Hegel's final view of the matter. Hegel has moved
beyond Fichte and Schelling to a position which is both more and less ration¬
alist. That is, Hegel has rejected the idea that there can be any analytical
deduction of the world from some absolute premise, so is less rationalist,
but instead holds that the world is itself nothing but reason and that reason
71
is prior to phenomenal existence. He later described his Greater Logic
(to which the Phenomenology was conceived as an introduction) as " the account
of Gods as he -is in his eternal essence before the creation of the world and
. . . . 72
any finite Spirit". Because of this view of logic Hegel has been called
70. Phenomenology, p.12
71. We will return to the question of whether the Phenomenology can be
said in any sense to be a deduction in Chapter 3 below. Michael Rosen
in Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticsm, C.U.P. 1982 discusses this
question in some detail.
72. In the Introduction to the Science of Logic, op. cit. p. 60;
Kaufmann, p.195.
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an archrationalist, but Glockner's term 'panlogist' better captures the
73
flavour of Hegel's position. Hegel's rationalism is quite different from
what is ordinarily understood by the term. The "Logos" of "panlogosim"
is not what is merely logical or abstractly rational, but something much
more concrete, the "word", or "Nous , as Anaxagoras first recognised the
74
essence of things to be".
Thus Hegel argues that the Absolute is not so much a premise, as it is for
rationalism in general, as it is a result.
"The True is the Whole. But the whole is nothing other than the
essence consummating itself through its development. Of the
Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that
only in the end is it truly what it is" (Phenomenology, p. 11) 75
The statement may seem contradictory. How can something which is Absolute
be the result of something else without at the same time being dependent
on and relative to that which caused it, and therefore no longer Absolute?
How can Hegel escape either on the one hand a historical relativism which
asserts that what is true is what happens to exist, or on the other hand
an essentialism which interprets the 'result' as predetermined by a specific
and structured essence? Hegel has been criticised for holding both these
73. On Panlogism see Hyppolite op. cit. p. 50, Kaufmann op. cit. p. 435.
and John 1,i.
74. Phenomenology, p. 34. Nous is normally translated as Spirit, but
Hegel always leaves it untranslated, presumably to distinguish it
from his own view. See Kaufmann, op. cit, p. 160. In the Philosophy
of History (op. cit. p.11) Hegel equates Nous with "Understanding
generally, or Reason", and distinguishes this from "intelligence as
self-conscious Reason - Spirit as such".
75. Since the Absolute is essentially a result, we must reject Charles
Taylors interpretation, that Hegel's Absolute generates all reality.
This separates reality and the Absolute too sharply for Hegel. Even
Plato holds only that his world of forms makes reality possible, not




Perhaps Hegel never reconciles these two alternatives. However, there can
be no doubt but that he is trying and is aware of the pitfalls of each al-
77
ternative. In order to judge we need first to see the problems that are
thrown up. Schellings philosophy of Nature, in common with the general
trend of romanticism, looks back to classical Greek philosophy which regards
nature as a realisation of an ideal form, and holds at the same time that
it is purely rational in the sense of Spinozist Substance. This implies
that he has misunderstood the classical notion of ideal form, since though
it holds form to be rational it absolutely opposes the notion that it may be
deduced in some quasi-mathematical way, and holds instead that form exists
prior to reality, and may be known or discovered by reasonable men, but not
deduced.
In order, therefore, to get further with Schelling's mixing of ancient and
modern principles in the philosophy of nature, it is first necessary to
distinguish better the two views, in order to attempt a synthesis which is
not just a romantic revival of greek idealsf and which does not presuppose
the compatibility of greek ideas with modern ones. The relationship of
greek to modern ideas and the dangers of anachronism involved in attempting
to use both becomes a central question, and a thorough reappraisal of the
meaning of ancient philosophy is necessary.
76. Karl Popper criticies Hegel vociferously on both counts, seemingly
unaware that the two views are opposed 'to each other. (K. Popper.
The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 2)
77. See Phenomenology, p.11, §20.
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Hegel begins to tackle this problem by introducing, in a passage which
immediately fallows his assertion that the 'True is the whole1, a terminology
which he believes is capable of accommodating ancient ideas within a modern
framework. In particular he introduces the notion of "mediation", (which
as several commentators have pointed out characterises Hegel's method much
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more aptly than the often cited term 'dialectic') and the related ideas
of immediacy, being-in-itself, and being-for-itself. These terms allow
Hegel to adopt the classical doctrine of essence, but without the notion
of determinism which is normally associated with it, and including certain
subjective dimensions required by modern thought. The term being-in-itself,
for example, has obvious connections with Kant's thing in itself, but it is
by no means a 1nuomenal' existence, but rather an 'immediate' one. On the
other hand, if it is not nuomenal, it is not exactly what the ancients meant
by 'essential' either. In the ancient view, essence is prior to existence,
which implies that it is not part of the essence of an idea that it should
exist. There is not just form, but a world of forms which has no innate
need to exist, and yet which is the cause of any real existence. Hegel's
being-in-itself is not essential in this sense, but 'implicit' or as he says
'immediate'. For Hegel, essence must exist. Being-in.itself has no priority
over being-for-itself, and it is included in the notion of being-in-itself or
immediate being that it must also be for itself or mediated. Further, the
relationship between being-in-itself and being-for-itself is not one of deter¬
minism, but of mediation, that is of the opposite of determinism, thought or
freedom. Hegel expresses his view in the following passage.
78. See Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, Ch. 7,
and W.Kaufmann, op. cit. Section 37, pp.167-175, and pp. 433-5.
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"Mediation is nothing beyond self-moving., self-sameness* or is reflection
into self, the moment of the 'I' which is for itself pure negativity
or, when reduced to its pure abstraction, simple becoming. The 'I'
or becoming in general, this mediation, on account of its simple
nature is just immediacy in the process of becoming, and is the
immediate itself. Reason is therefore misunderstood when reflection
is excluded from the True, and is not grasped as a positive moment
of the Absolute. It is reflection that makes the True a result,
but it is equally reflection that overcomes the antithesis between
the process of its becoming and the result, for this becoming is
also simple, and therefore not different from the form of the True
which shows itself as simple in its result; the process of be¬
coming is rather just this return into simplicity. Though the
embryo is indeed in itself a human being, it is not so for itself;
this it is only as cultivated Reason, which has made itself into
what it is in itself. And that is when it for the first time is
actual. But this result is itself a simple immediacy, for it is
self-conscious freedom at peace with itself, which has not set the
antithesis on one side and left it there, but has been reconciled
with it." ^Phenomenology, p. 12.)
The difficulty of relating ancient to modern ideas without anachronism is
not just to be found at this metaphysical level. Indeed, the impetus
moving Hegel to consider the problem in philosophical terms probably came
from elsewhere. In 1799 he wrote to Schelling thus:
"In my scientific education, which began with the endeavour to
to satisfy humbler wants, I have been driven onward to philosophy,
and the ideal of youth has thus of necessity had to take on the
form of reflection and transform itself into a system". (caird,
op.cit, p.46)
Hegel does not forget these humbler wants, and before going on to consider
the Phenomenology more directly I want to look specifically at the impetus
towards reconsidering the relationship of ancient and modern ideals which
1
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comes from romantic views of politics.
¥
79. And from ethics, in so farj^ethics and politics are only vaguely dis¬
tinguished in both enlightenment and romantic thought. Politics is
generally accounted as an application of ethical principles in govern¬
ment - as if government had no ethics of its own and needs a philosopher
to provide it. See for example Kant's essay on Perpetual Peace, which
prescribes ethical principles for diplomacy while happily acknowledging
that politicians are very likely to ignore them, and which Hegel jibes
at in Natural Law, op cit p.93. (Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Reiss (ed)
Kant's Political Writings, p.93).
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The political event which dominated Hegel's youth was, of course, the French
80
Revolution. However, in spite of his initial support for the Revolutionaries,
Hegel seems fairly quickly to have qualified his support quite extensively,
81
especially after the experience of Thermidor 1794. In any case, in the Jena
article on Natural Law we find a sharp criticism of the political theory which
lay behind the revolution (and "we should not contradict the assertion that
82
the Revolution received its first impulse from Philosophy"), that is, the
83
notion of the 'general will'.
The political theory of the general will must be accounted as a reaction to
the rationalist political theories of, say, Hobbes or Kant, which has much
in common with romantic reactions to enlightenment thought in other areas.
RO. It is well known that Hegel finished the Phenomenology on the same day
and virtually in the same place as Napoleon ("the World-Soul on Horse¬
back") finished the Holy Roman Empire by defeating the Prussan army
at the Battle of Jena.
81. Lukacs, perhaps wanting to portray Hegel as a good Stalinist, disputes
this. "He welcomed the reprisals directed against the followers of
Robespierre, but this does no more than confirm the distance separating
him from the extreme plebian ring of the French Revolution. But we
cannot detect any change in his republican and revolutionary views
after Thermidor". (Lukacs op. cit. p. 93) Cf by contrast R. Plant,
Hegel op. cit. p. 72.
82. Hegel, Philosophy of History, Dover 1956, p. 446. Of course, the extent
to which this is actually true has been disputed, and certainly one must
generalise to reach the interpretation of the French Revolution which
Hegel suggests. See Knox's note in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, op. cit.
p. 263.
83. Although this theory is most often associated with Rousseau, whom Hegel
had read with enthusiasm at Tubingen, Hegel discusses only Fichte's version
of it in Natural Law. However, in the relevant passage of the
Phenomenology he appears to have Rousseau in mind.
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In Rousseau's writing, for example, we find a typically romantic idealisa¬
tion of classical virtues of citizenship and the harmonious community of
the poti-S, and a corresponding deprecation of the fragmentation of the
modern community. Thus he writes
"We have amongst us physicians, geometers, chemists, astronomers,
poets, musicians and painters, but no citizens". (Rousseau, Discourses,
Quoted by R.Plant, op. cit, p.25.)
And in T.he Social Contract he has this to say about modern political theory,
perhaps with Hobbes' resolutive-compositive method especially in mind:
"It is said that Japanese montebacks can cut up a child under the
eyes of spectators, throw the different parts up in the air, and
then make the child come down all of a piece. This more or less
the trick our political theorists perform - after dismembering the
social body with a sleight of hand worthy of the fairground, they
put all the pieces back together again anyhow. (J.J.Rousseau, The
Social Contract, Penguin 1968 p.71.) y
Holderlin used very similar language later in Hyperion, comparing the con¬
temporary Germany to ancient Greece.
"I can think of no people so torn apart as the Germans. Craftsmen
are to be seen, but no human beings ... masters and men, but no
human beings; young people and old, but no human beings. Is it not
like a field of battle where hands and arms and other limbs lie
scattered in pieces, while the blood of life drains away in the soil?"
(From Hyperion, quoted in Plant, op. cit. p.19) 83b
The ideal of the general will is more or less self consciously an attempt
to recapture the unity and harmony of greek life - or in Rousseau's case,
more specifically of the life of early republican Rome, and to a certain
extent of the small independent Swiss cantons in which he was brought up.
In essence, the theory suggests that if in an active political community
people discuss and promote actively the good of the community as a whole,
rather than any private or factionalised interests, then a truly democratic
and harmonious community will result.
This line of argument, however, has more in common with enlightenment think¬
ing than may at first appear to be the case. It opposes the universal will
83b. Cf. Natural T,aw, p. 151.
Zb
to the particular will in just the same way as Kant opposes reason to inclina¬
tion, and argues, in distinction from Hobbes' view, that it is in willing the
R4
universal, not the particular, that true freedom is achieved. This Kantian
esteem of the autonomy of reason is also seen in Rousseau's esteem of demo¬
cracy. Democracy, which is understood in the classical sense of sovereignty
of the people rather than in any modern sense of representative democracy, is
to be valued because within it the citizens of a polity are sovereign over
themselves, or autonomous. Rousseau's popular sovereignty is, of course,
just as abstract as Kant's notion of autonomy, since if all people are sov¬
ereign over themselves, there is no particular sovereign body, no polity.
According to the political theory of the general will, then, it is argued
that so long as men remain reasonable, that is, consider only the universal
interests of the community as a whole, and hold their irrational private
interests in check, then a harmonious polity will result. If instead they
further private interests, they demonstrate that they are not truly free,
or
since they are allowing themselves to be determined by their passions.
Rousseau stresses that the general will is universal, not merely an
aggregate, not the will of all, "There is often a great difference
between the will of all and the general will; the general will
studies only the common interest while the will of all studies private
interest, and is indeed no more than the sum of individual desires"
(Rousseau, The Social Contract trans. Cranston, Pfenguin 1968,p.72) In willing
the general man achieves "moral freedom" (ibid, p.65) , while in wrll-
ing the particular he gains only a worthless "natural freedom" (ibid,
p.60).
85. Only gods in fact could govern themselves democratically. "A govern¬
ment so perfect is not suited to men." ibid. p.114.
86. See below Ch.6 for a discussion of Hegel's conception of reason as
interested, which allows reason and passion to coexist.
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It follows that they must be "forced to be free". This well known lesson
of Rousseau's philosophy is one that Robespierre, whom Heine described as
87
"merely the hand of Jean-Jaques Rousseau" learned well and with conse-
88
quences which Hegel discusses in a central passage in the Phenomenology.
In his essay on Natural Law, Hegel criticises the notion of the general
will on two counts. Firstly, he puts foward the ad honrinem argument that
government by the general will cannot in fact be achieved. In the dis¬
tinction between the general and the particular will, both moments are
as real as each other. If they are then set up in opposition to each other
there is no ground for asserting that one side can or should win, since
they both have the power of being real on their side, and they will there¬
fore simply cancel each other out. 89 ^ theory of the particular will would
be just as good, or just as bad as a theory of the general will, and simply
expressing a preference for one or the other does not constitute a valid
political theory.
Secondly, Hegel moves on to contrast the general will to the SittHchkeit of
classical Greece. He repeats and develops90 some of the arguments he made
in The Spirit of Christianity and.its Fate concerning punishment and Fate.
I do not want to rehearse these, but only to note that Hegel opposes Sittlichkeit
to the general will, whereas supporters of the general will tend to identify
Q7# Quoted in Ian Gilmore, Inside Right Quartet 1977, p.113.
gg_ Phenomenology, pp. 355-363.
gg# Hegel's Natural Law, op. cit, pp. 84-88.
g,j. See note 52 aboye.
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it with classical Sittlichkeit
It is possible to interpret classical Sittlichkeit as a dominance of reason
over the passions. Plato in particular is open to being read as a rationalist
in this modern sense. He argues in favour of self-discipline and against
granting any value to purely personal interests, in favour of reason and
the good of the community, and so on. However, Hegel strongly contests the
idea that this is a result of Plato's adhering to a modern conception of
reason - and I have no doubt that he is right. He distinguishes the
Sittlichkeit of the Greeks and the MoraZitat of the Englightenment as ob¬
jective and subjective moments of the good, which is prior to both. The
moves or custom of the polis is not a result of rational deliberation of
its members, but is something which exists objectively within the community
itself. Rational deliberation can help to know it, but it exists prior to
being known in this way.^2 The custom of the community, while not separate
from the community, is nevertheless itself an independent living thing;
and, just as Hegel earlier argued that love, as a modification of life (or
Spirit) was above law and duty, so the custom of the poZis is above the
reasoning of its individual members. As Aristotle put it, with his usual
the Individual"93
91. For example Judith Shklar in Men and Citizens, a study of Rousseau's
Social Theory. Much contemporary discussion of the notion of demo-
cracry also associates thd
notion of the general will or the utilitarian greatest good with a
'classical theory of democracy' and then counterposes it to the modern
'elite theory' in which democracy is a system of maintaining oligarchy
through elections. See for example J. Schumpeter's essay in Quinton,
(ed), Political Philosopy, London 1967, or his book Capitalism, Social¬
ism and Democracy (Allen and Unwin 1943), and Carole Pateman,
Participation and Democratic Theory, C.U.P, 1970.
92. This is why in Meno,Plato suggests that it may not be possible to teach
virtue. It is prior to knowledge. See Plato, Protagoras and Meno,
trans W.K.L. Guthrie, Penguin, 1956.
e conomy,
II It is both natural and prior to
g^ Aristotle, Politics, Penguin 1962, p.29.
3?
The general will, however, cannot ever achieve this independence, since it
is always the result of the individual wills of the members of the community.
It is, as Hegel argued later, not the absolutely rational will, but simply
94
the individual will universalised. It is simply universal, while the
rational will must be individual, that is include also a moment of particu¬
larity, or, better, it must be sovereign. Hegel therefore rejects the
metaphor of the social contract altogether, since by making Sittlichkeit not
natural but artificial and subsequent to the wills of the members of the
community, it is quite unable to grasp the notion of the will of the community
as a sovereign will. Yet without a sovereign will the community is only an
abstract existence, aggregation or group with no specific limits,such as a
business or any other form of association, but with no individuality or life
95
of its own. The general will is an abstraction which cannot aspire to the
living unity of the polis, since it remains entirely subjective.
Nevertheless, Hegel has sometimes been interpreted as following'Rousseau in
holding that a state governed by a general will would constitute a revival
of classical Sittlichkeit. Judith Shklar, in her book on the Phenomenology,
argues that"the core of Hegel's argument is the identity of the personal goals
96
of the individual citizens and the public ends of the polity as a whole". '
94. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.Knox, OUP 1967 p.33 and p.156-7.
Thus, in Hegelian parlance, Rousseau should be reckoned a theorist of
subjective freedom, not objective freedom as is sometimes suggested.
His conception of freedom is universal/ in contrast to the purely par¬
ticular notion found in Hobbes (eg Leviathan1, op. cit. p. 261), but is
none the less subjective for this.
95. Carole Pateman, in Participation and Democratic Theory (C.U.P. 1970)
carries this notion to its conclusion by applying ideas derived from
Rousseau and others - what she terms a 'classical theory of democracy'
to organisation of 'the workplace' thus divorcing it entirely from
government, or rather, indicating that she sees no distinction between
the government of a sovereign state and the organisation of a process
of work.
96. Judith Shklar, Freedom and Independence A Study of the Political Ideas
of Heael's Phenomenology of Mind, C.U.P. 1976 p.xiv.
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She accounts for Hegel's criticism of Rousseau by arguing that he has mis¬
understood him, taking the general will to be simply "a sum of capricious
private wills". Hegel however clearly sees the difference between a
majority will and a universal will, and complains only that a universal will
is not yet absolutely rational or sovereign. She then argues that Hegel's
position is distinguished from Rousseaus only in being more pessimistic.
97
The phenomenology becomes a "Lament for Hellas" ■- that is a lament for that
time when universal and particular wills happily coincided, which, in spite
of Rousseau's hopes, will never be recovered. Hegel is simply a dis¬
illusioned romantic.
In fact, Hegel has no need to be so pessimistic. Precisely because he has
distinguished SittticKkeit and Moralitat, which Rousseau had failed to do
98
and which he himself had failed to do at Berne, Hegel is in a position
to consider how it may be possible to get the best of both worlds. This is
more or less exactly his aim in the chapter of the Phenomenology on Spirit
However, Hegel also seems to have had history on his side, the French
revolution having tested out the theory of the general will in practice.
Perhaps this is why he thought, over-optimistic&lly, that the days of the
dominion of the 'abstract Absolute' were over in 1831. In the Philosophy
of History he distinguishes three moments of the French revolution which
fairly clearly support his criticism of Rousseau. In the first place, he
sees in the ancien regime a merely 'existing Right', that is the objective
power of the absolute monarch, with no subjective element of consent. The
97. Ibid. p. 74.
98. See esp. the quotation from ETW p. 154 cited above p.15.
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revolution then introduces the exact opposite, government based on the
subjective will, which principle Hegel always supports. The revolutionary
constitution is
"in harmony with the conception of Right, and on this foundation
all future legislation was to be based. Never since the sun stood
in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been
perceived that man's existence centres in his head, ie in Thought,
inspired by which he builds up the world of reality. Anaxagoras had
been the first to say that nous governs the world; but not until now
had man advanced to the recognition of the principle that Thought
ought to govern spiritual reality. This was accordingly a glorious
mental dawn." (Hegel, Philosophy of History, trans. Sibree, Dover 1956
p. 447.)
One vital moment, however, is missing, the moment of power. The fate of
the revolutionaries was to learn from experience "the absolute necessity
of a governmental power." This moment was provided by Napoleon's Coup
d'etat.
"Napoleon restored the revolutionary constitution as a military
power, and followed up this step by establishing himself as an
individual will at the head of the state, he knew who to rule, and
soon settled the internal affairs of France. The advocats, ideologues
and abstract-principle men who ventured to show themselves he sent
'■to right about' and the sway of mistrust was exchanged for that of
respect and fear". (ibid. p. 451.)
1 do not want to labour the point further. At every level,in politics,
theology, ethics, metaphysics and no doubt elsewhere, the young Hegel turns
up very similar problems and is led towards similar conclusions. This occurs
on two fronts. Firstly, pace Enlightenment, Hegel finds that Reason, not
Spirit is taken to be the absolute, and that reason is nevertheless cut off
from true reality, and especially from the two dimensions of passion and
power, which are included in the notion of Spirit. Secondly, pace Romanticism,
Hegel finds that classical thought is being appropriated by admirers who do
not properly understand what they are appropriating, and do not see that
classical thought is in many respects quite different from their own, both
in terms of its content, and in terms of the questions it is addressing.
The Phenomenology of Spirit is by no means purely a polemical work. Its
aim is quite general, as Hegel implied when he described his aim in the
Preface of the Phenomenology: "To help bring philosophy closer to the
form of science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title "love of
knowing" and become "actual knowing" - that is what I have set myself to
do" Nevertheless, I want to argue, the path he takes on this road is
conditioned considerably by the perceptions Hegel had of the way in which
philosophy was most likely to be led away from this goal - that is, via
the abstract Absolute. In order to establish his notion of Truth, Hegel
needs to criticise the Enlightenment view, and in order to do this he needs
to turn to classical philosophy. In order to do this he need?to evaluate
classical philosophy both more accurately and discriminately, and more
hermeneutically (in terms of its specific intentions and historical
situation), than did his romantically inclined countemporaries. As I will




CHAPTER TWO : Spirit
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit sets out, amongst other things, to provide
a thorough reworking of classical philosophy and to reinterpret its ideas
in light of the requirements of a modern world. It focusses especially on
the notion of justice, understood as the good in the individual and in the
state, and for this reason I want to argue in this chapter that Hegel's
Phenomenology is a reworking of Plato's Republic.. '
I do not mean this argument to be taken very literally."'" Hegel certainly
has other intentions, and his interest in classical philosophy is very broad
and by no means restricted to Plato, and in fact he seems to have admired
2
Aristotle more. However, where Hegel's contemporaries (and perhaps our
own too) tend to see oppositions within classical thought which paralleled
divisions in modern thought, Hegel prefers to emphasise the unity of classical
thought in opposition to modern thought which is expressed in its collective
adherence to the classical doctrine of form. For example, he writes in the
History of Philosopy that
1. It is certainly tempting sometimes to find a hidden intention lurking
behind Hegel's often darkly obscure writing and to hold this up as a
key to illuminating his meaning - but in general this procedure is at
best speculative, and often very misleading. See for example Kaufmann's
comments on some of Royce's interpretations of the Phenomenology, in
Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit. p. 139-142. On the other hand, as A.N.
Whitehead said, "The safest general characterisation of the European
philosophical tradition is that it consists in a series of footnotes
to Plato", so my thesis is scarcely arcane.
2. Hegel, in Philosophy of History, trans. Sibree, Dover 1956 p. 272,
described Aristotle as "the deepest and also the most comprehensive
thinker of antiquity". In 1810 the second review of the Phenomenology
described Hegel as the "German Aristotle", with some justice. See
Kaufmann op. cit. p. 130.
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"In the popular misconception, Plato is said to have made the ideal
his principle, so that the inward idea creates from itself; according
to Aristotle, on the contrary, we are told that the soul is made a
tabula "rasas receiving all its determinations qui te passively from
the outside world; and his philosophy is thus mere empiricism -
Locke's philosophy at its worst. But we shall see how little this
is the case. In fact Aristotle excels Plato in speculative depth,
for he was acquainted with the deepest form of speculation -
idealism - and in this upholds the most extreme empirical development".
(Lectures on the History of Philosophy, London 1894, Volume 2,
p. 119)
In arguing that Hegel is focussing on Plato's Republic, I do not therefore
mean that he does so to the exclusion of other aspects of classical thought
but rather as an example of classical thought applied systematically and
3
rigorously to the field he is concerned with in the Phenomenology.
3b
Hegel's concept of Spirit, I want to argue, is substantially equivalent to
Plato's notion of justice. We will see below the extent to which this fact
conditions the structure of the Phenomenology - and the Phenomenology is a
work which, for reasons which will become apparent, must be understood in
terms of its overall structure. However, although the notions of Spirit
and justice are substantially equivalent, there is nevertheless a great
difference - literally a world of difference - between them. This
difference is expressed in the fact that for Hegel Spirit is above all
3. M.D. Foster, in his excellent study of the Political Philosophies of
Plato and Hegel,( Oxford 1935) has investigated the connections between
Plato's Republic and Hegel's Philosophy of Right in some detail, and
I am greatly indebted to him for much of the material in this chapter.
To my knowledge, nobody has investigated the connection between the
Republic and the Phenomenology along the same lines; and Foster's work
seems not to have achieved the recognition it deserves.
3b. A useful discussion of the usages of the term Getst, translated here
as Spirit, can be found in C.G.Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Un-
conscious, Vol. 9 part 1 of The Collected Works of C.G.Jung, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London 1959, p. 208ff. The entire essay, titled
"On the Phenomenology of Spirit in fairytales" is of interest here.
4- S
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Freedom, and only subsequently justice} While Plato's notion of justice
does not necessarily include the subjective element of freedom at all.
This difference conditions Hegel's interpretation of Plato at every level.
However, in order to see this it is first necessary to set out the sub¬
stantial parallel in more detail.
Let us first consider how for Hegel we are to know Spirit. Hegel explicitly
rules out two ways in which it might be known, and which ways are held by
some philosophers to be the only ways in which anything may be known, that
5
is by analytic or synthetic connection. Synthetic connection, which would
define Spirit by attaching to it a finite predicate is ruled out by the
notion that the "True is the Whole", and any finite predicate is only a part
of the whole, and therefore not true. Analytic connection, which would show
what is implied in the notion of Spirit is equally ruled out, since the
notion of Spirit in general does not imply, any specific manifestation.
Hegel makes this point sharply against Schelling in the Preface to the
Phenomenology.
4. Hegel is disinclined to define Spirit, presumably because he does not
wish to reduce it to any particular predicate. However, in the
Philosophy of History, after expressing some reservation and before
adding many important qualifications, he says "the essence of Spirit
is Freedom". (Hegel, Philosophy of History, Dover inc. 1956, p. 17).
Similarly, in the Philosophy of Mind he says that "the essential, but
formally essential, feature of Spirit is Liberty" (Philosophy of Mind;
trans. Wallace, Oxford, 1971 p. 15 §382 . This is the third volume
of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and its
German title is Philosophie des Geistes. To be consistent with pre¬
sent usage this should be translated as Philosophy of Spirit.)
5. David Hume, Enquiries, ed. L H. Selbey-Bigge Clarendon Press, 1975,
p. 25. "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be
divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of
Fact".
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"Just as when I say 'aZZ animals', this expression cannot pass
for a zoology, so it is equally plain that the words 'the Divine"
'the Absolute', 'the Eternal', etc., do not express what is
contained within them; and only such words, in fact, do express
the intuition as something immediate". (Phenomenology, p. 11).
If there is to be a knowledge which is neither the result of deduction nor
the result of observation, it must involve some notion of recognition;
that is, there must be some truth which is not empirically observable as
truth, but which can nevertheless be recognised and acknowledged as such.
This then generates the 'eristic paradox' which Plato examines for example
in Meno. If I am capable of recognising the truth, I must know what it
is in the first place, since otherwise I will not be able to distinguish
truth from error. On the other hand, if I know the truth already, I should
have no reason to look for it, and there should by rights be no such thing
as error.
Plato accommodates this paradox by introducing a third category between
truth and error, which he calls doxa, that is, opinion or belief.
"as knowledge corresponds to the real, and absence of knowledge
necessarily to the unreal, so, to correspond to this intermediate
thing, we must look for something between ignorance and knowledge"-
(Republic, 477b) 6
And a little further on he concludes
"And now what we have found between the two is the faculty" we
call belief." (Republic, 478d).
6. Plato, Republic, trans. Cornford, Oxford, 1941, p. 180. Cornford,
whose translation I have used throughout, translates doxa as belief,
while I have preferred to use opinion. Where I have given references
directly to the Republic I have used the conventional system of
referring to the Stephanus edition, whose pagination is included
in most later editions of Plato's works.
Opinion is not necessarily inferior to Knowledge. If it is a wrong opinion
it certainly is, but right opinion (ortho doxa) is in practical terms just
as valuable as true knowledge. Plato illustrates this in the closing pages
of Meno by pointing to virtuous Athenians who must certainly have had a
true opinion of what was good and acted in accordance with it, without
exactly knowing what it was and being able thereby to pass it on to others.
Nevertheless, philosophy, as the etymology of the word implies, is not
satisfied even with right opinion and wishes to replace this with knowledge
Plato gives an illustration of what this means by contrasting opinion and
7
knowledge of beauty. All people hold a more or less right opmron of
beauty - that is they recognise certain things to be beautiful. Knowledge
of beauty, however, is not aquaintance with beautiful things, but an
aquaintance with the form of beauty itself. It is, in Plato's view, the
form of beauty itself which is truly real, belonging as it does to the
world of forms, while particular beautiful objects belong to the illusory
world of appearance. How, then, is it possible to know the form of beauty?
It cannot be reduced to any of its predicates or appearances, because in
this case the appearance would be what is real, not beauty itself. If, for
example, we say that what is beautiful is what gives aesthetic pleasure,
then all we have done is to reduce beauty to a modification of pleasure,
and we might just as well substitute the term aesthetically pleasurable
Q
wherever we find the word beautiful and excise beauty from our language.
On the other hand since beauty does not appear except in beautiful objects
we cannot know it without knowing those objects.
7. Republic, 478-9.
8. Cf Phenomenology, p. 5, and p.12-13.
What philosophy - as opposed to philo doxa - must therefore do is first of
all believe in the form of beauty, that is accept that beauty itself exists,
and is not simply a manifestation of some more prosaic and definable
existence, and then seek to know this form of beauty through acquaintance
with beautiful objects. This may seem an abstract procedure, and is
certainly one which can never perfectly be completed, or which is infinite.
However, it probably allows a more concrete true knowledge than any theory
which rejects the notion of form. Plato's Republic itself is an example of
the knowledge it can produce - just as many of Plato's earlier dialogues
establish how little can be produced by methods which are apparently more
straightforward and down to earth. The Republic seeks from the beginning
to know the notion of justice, and finally does so by setting out the ways
in which it may appear, so that the philosophical observer who seeks to
know justice can become acquainted with its many manifestations and recognise
the unitary principle of justice within them. Knowledge, in this way of
looking at things, is not the production of something new, but the discovery
of what already exists, and Plato therefore argues that "seeking and learning
9
are in fact nothing but recollection."
Hegel operates with exactly this procedure. Each stage in the argument of
the Phenomenology is presented as a movement from certainty - which I take
to be parallel to right opinion in Plato - to true knowledge. Hegel des¬
cribes the whole process as recollection,''"0 and in the final paragraph of
the Phenomenology he reminds us that it is not enough to have understood the
moments of the Phenomenology separately. Indeed, this is impossible.
9. Plato, Meno, on p. 130 of the Penguin edition of Protagoras and Meno
translated by W.K.C. Guthrie 1956. The notion of recollection is dis¬
cussed in more detail in Chapter 3 below.
10. Phenomenology, p. 17 and p. 492. See also Lukacs op.cit. p. 508;
Kojeve op. cit. p. 142.
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To understand them it is necessary to understand each moment as a moment
of Spirit, to recognise Spirit in each and to gather together and .re-
11
collect the whole 'gallery of images' of Spirit into a unitary form.
This form is not created by the knowledge of it, but is distinct from
12
knowledge, which is simply conscious awareness of it. In this sense,
the form is "formal" in the Platonic sense of that expression, or in
Hegelian language it is the Idea (Idee)^. It is possible to be acquainted
with it ( as das Bekannte) without yet knowing it philosophically or com-
14
prehending it ( as das Erkannte). It is presumably for this reason that
in Faith and Knowledge Hegel includes the notion of faith in truth:
"But in philosophical intercourse 'truth' deserves to be used, not
of empirical fact, but solely of the certainty of the eternal,
and 'faith' has indeed been generally so used". (Faith and Knowledge,
Albany, 1977, p. 124).
If Enlightenment limited true knowledge to Reason, and relegated knowledge
of the absolute to faith, Hegel takes the more platonic view that faith
and reason need not be regarded as direct opposites, and that both are in
-i
fact and in a certain sense essential to true knowledge.
11. This is Hegel's term. See Phenomenology, p. 492. "Gather together"
translates "Versammlen", and "re-collect" "Er—inneren".
12. It is quite wrong, therefore, to attribute to Hegel the Berkeleyan re¬
duction of being to being known, as Sartre for example does when he
accuses Hegel of identifying being and knowledge (Sartre, Being and
Nothingness, Methuen 1969, p. 238: cf Phenomenology, p. 144, where
Hegel criticises this view. Hegel explicitly rejects "subjective
idealism" in several places, and terms his own view by contrast not
"objective idealism", but "absolute idealism". See for example the
lesser Logic, p. 73.
13. See note 1 to Ch. 3 on the contrast between Platonic form and the
Hegelian "Idea".
14. Phenomenology, p.18. See also M. Rosen op. cit. p. 55.
14b. Hegel also expresses this idea in the Differenz essay, where he argued
that Philosophy presupposes "the absolute itself; this is the goal
that is sought. It is alread there; how else could it be sought?"
(Kaufmann op.cit. p. 75).
SO
In the Republic, it will be recalled, Plato describes justice first in the
community or state,^ and then in the individual. He divides the state
into three classes. These are the Guardians, the gold class according to
the 'magnificent myth' or 'convenient fiction'^ of the myth of the metals,
who rule in the deliberative sense; the Auxiliaries or silver class, whose
function is to defend the state and to enforce the rule of the Guardians;
and finally the productive class of farmers and craftsmen, the iron and
bronze classes in the myth of metals.
There are in Plato's view four cardinal virtues which ought to be present
in a good state: wisdom, courage, discipline or temperance, and justice.
Plato locates these in his ideal state in connection with the three classes
and their relationship. Wisdom in the state is found in the Guardian class,
17
since if they are wise then the state will be wise. Courage is likewise
the property of the Auxiliaries, since their cowardice or bravery is also
18
the cowardice or bravery of the state. Discipline is not exactly a
quality of the third class, but consists in its subordination to the other
two, since the state, like an individual, is master of itself where the
19
better part rules the worst. Finally, the state is just in proportion
15. Throughout this discussion of Plato the term 'state' is used in the
classical sense of polis, meaning the objective structure of the
whole community, and not merely that part of it involved in govern¬
ment.
16. 'Magnificent myth' is Sir Desmond Lee's translation, 'convenient
fiction' Cornford's: both object explicitly to the previous rendering
'noble lie'„




as the parts of the state are kept distinct.
"Where there are three orders ... any plurality of functions or
shifting from one order to another is not merely utterly harmful
to the community, but one might fairly call it the extreme of
wrong doing." (Cornford, op. cit. p. 126; Republic 434c.)
Justice in the individual is in Plato's view analagous to justice in
the state. The two in fact go together. By presenting justice in the
state first Plato is perhaps implying that the individual can be just only
within a just state, which would accord with the general classical notion
of the priority of the state over the individual. Nevertheless, he has
not been able to describe the just state without borrowing terms normally
used to describe individuals, ie. the virtues.^0 The just individual
should not be regarded simply as a citizen of a just state. Rather, the
just individual and the just state should be regarded as equally valid
manifestation of the good. To know the latter is the final aim of the
21
Republic, and in Plato's view of all philosophy, since "the highest
22
object of knowledge is the essential nature of the Good."
Justice in the individual appears as the organisation of the dimensions of
the state conceived of as dimensions of the individual soul. The soul has
three essential parts. It must have appetite, (Epithumia),courage {Andveia),
and reason {Logos) - the characteristics, that is, which defined the pro¬
ductive, Auxiliary and Guardian classes respectively. In proportion as
these three moments are kept in their proper place in relation to each other,
23
so the individual soul is just.
20. eg. Republic, 430e - 431b.
21. As Cornford says, the discussion extends beyond the human good "to the
supreme Form, 'Goodness itself'". (Cornford op.cit. p. 211).
22. Cornford, p. 210, Republic, p. 505a.
23. Republic, 443c.
In his essay on Natural Law, Hegel attempts to interpret modern ethical life
24
along more or less exactly these lines. He identifies three classes, each
defined by an element of the Platonic soul. Firstly, there is a warlike class,
which class alone constitutes the community as an individual entity above the
individual, for "the individual proves his unity with his people unmistakably
25
through the danger of death alone". Hence, if the community which has
ethical life is to be a real individual entity, there is a necessity for both
26
peace and war, and for the "absolutely formal virtue of courage" - which
Hegel (whose language is at its most perverse in this ess ay),describes as
27
"the rational relation as subjugation taken up into its concept".
Secondly, corresponding to the appetitive element of the soul, there must be
a class of producers and a system of wants - the science of which is
political economy. Hegel stresses that this class, in which in¬
dividuality finds it strongest expression, must not be allowed to become a
"self-constituting and independent power", and "must remain subject to the
28
domination of this relation" - that is of the relation of the system of
wants to the community as it serves.
Thirdly, the relation between producing and governing classes must be regu¬
lated by law, by universal principles which we may presume, though Hegel
is not explicit, correspond to the rational element of the soul.
24. This important passage occurs on pp. 93-105 of Natural Law (op.cit.)
25. Natural Law, op.cit, p. 93
26. It is in connection with this argument that Hegel rejects Kant's
notion of 'Perpetual Peace'.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. p. 94.
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Finally, Hegel goes on to stress that in a just community it is not enough
to have rational laws, These are simply formal and universal, and they
must be applied by individuals who function not just as bureaucratic
executors of law, but as individual interpreters, judges, and rulers. Here
Hegel quotes directly from Plato:
"It is clear that the art of legislation belongs to kingship. But
the best thing is that the man who is wise and kingly, and not the
law should rule ... because the law could not completely prescribe
with precision what would be most excellent and most just for
everybody always". (Natural Law, p. 97) 29
Hegel then goes on to discuss some differences between classes defined in
terms of the elements of the soul in the ancient and modern worlds. A
central issue is freedom. For Plato and for Aristotle it was clear that
only the ruling class has freedom, while the productive classes, who were
in any case commonly slaves, had no freedom. Hegel wants to maintain this
also of the modern 'bourgeois' class, as he calls it, since "its work
concerns the individual and thus does not include the danger of death".
Clearly, however, a bourgeois has a freedom which slaves do not enjoy.
However, though Hegel certainly recognises this, he does not follow this
line of thought much further. He laments the erosion of the distinction
between classes in the Roman Empire, and speaks of a reconciliation of the
29. Hegel also cites Plato to the same effect on p. 103 and three more
times in a slightly different connection in the passage we are con¬
sidering. We should note, however, that the platonic rulers are
not sovereign in the modern sense, since they do not have the power
of constitution making, but only of applying and interpreting law
which already exists in the world of forms. Hegel appears in
Natural Law to be content with this view. The extent to which he
later goes beyond it and distinguishes Nomos from Gesetz in terms
of sovereignty is a question we will return to. See p. *77 ff
below, note 81 to this chapter, and Foster op. cit. p. 25.
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new bourgeois class to necessity, but there is little sign of his developing
the kind of arg\:ment which he was later to present in the Philosophy of
Right, and which I want to argue he develops in Phenomenology. His com¬
parison of the ancient and modern ethical ofders seems to be little more
than an attempt to juggle with Platonic ideas to try and fit them into an
interpretation of a world quite different from the one in which they were
developed.
In the Phenomenology, Hegel's position is advanced considerably. In place
of the "Platonic language we find in Natural Law we find a new terminology
which owes as much to Kant as it does to Plato, and it is quite easy to miss
the Platonic resonances altogether. Nevertheless, these are still strong.
In place of justice in the individual we find what Hegel later termed
"subjective Spirit.^0 Like the Platonic soul, subjective Spirit has
three moments. These however, appear in a modified form as consciousness,
31
self-consciousness, and Reason. In place of justice in the state we find
32
the notion of "objective Spirit" . As in Plato's view, objective Spirit
is the ethical in the objective form of a structured ethical community, and
30. Hegel does not use this term exactly in the Phenomenology, but does
in later works such as the Propadeutic (see Outlines of Hegel's
Phenomenology in Jacob Lowenberg (ed.) Hegel Selections, New York
19 29 - cited hereafter as Propade;utic) and the Philosophy of Mind.
I do not believe that Hegel substantially altered any of his major
positions after he wrote the Phenomenology, and therefore treat it
and later works here as equally valid representations of his mature
thought.
31. That is, in the Phenomenology. The same devision appears in the
Encyclopaedia, but does not exhaust subjective Spirit which has
three moments, vis, The Soul in itself, the soul realising itself
in the individual (the area covered by the Phenomenology and termed
"phenomenology" in the Encyclopaedia) and the soul realised in and
for itself as Spirit, the knowledge of which Hegel calls psychology.
32. Termed simply 'Spirit' in the Phenomenology.
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involves a harmony of the papts of that community. Hegel discusses in
particular the relation of men and women, defined as classes \_Klassen~\
in relation to the Human and Divine Law which they each respectively
follow, and the relations of modern "Stands" or "estates", which he also
terms spiritual "Massen" or "spheres".
However, while we must not miss the derivation of this, the basic structure
of the whole Phenomenology, from Plato's philosophy, we must equally notice
the significance of the way Hegel has altered Plato's ideas. At every level,
Hegel has allowed for the inclusion of a subjective element which is not
present in Plato's thought. This is particularly evident at the level of
objective Spirit, where Hegel discusses not only the Sittlichkeit of the
ancient ethical community, but also the moments of Law and Conscience (in
later works) or Culture and Morality (in the Phenomenology) both of which
involve a degree of subjective freedom absent in the potts, since Law lets
me go free and I no longer have to participate to gain its benefits, as was
the case in Plato's time, and since Conscience demands that I be my own
master, rather than passively accepting the moves of the potts. However,
it is equally true at the level of subjective Spirit, and as we will see
shortly Hegel's revision of the platonic doctrine of the soul allows pre¬
cisely for the inclusion of a principle of subjective freedom at each level.
This implies a complete revision of the classical theory of forms,
because now in Hegel's view form is not something natural, but something
33
which is self imposed and which must be realised in an individual. And,
33. See Foster, op.cit. p. 73. Foster's characterisation of form as
"natural" is perhaps problematic. Plato does not call form natural,
but this may be because the contrast to the modern idea of form as
artificial or self-imposed has not occurred to him. Instead, he refers
to form as "fixed and immutable" (Republic 500c). Aristotle, on the
other hand, uses the term 'natural' in more or less the sense implied
here, when he describes the state as natural and prior to the individual;
though it is perhaps debatable whether it has the same sense when he
describes slavery as natural. (Aristotle, Politics. Book I). See also




"This difference can be expressed properly by saying that the essence
of both polis and Soul is not in reality form at all, but Spirit,
and their virtue or perfection accordingly not Di1<ai0SKne [justice]
but freedom. Plato, of course, could not either express it or
conceive it thus". (M.D.Foster, op. cit. p. 40).
We will examine the significance of this for both subjective and objective
Spirit.
Subjective Spirit
At the beginning of the chapter of the Phenomenology on Spirit, Hegel
explains that consciousness, self-consciousness and Reason are to be under¬
stood as abstractions from Spirit as a whole, while only Spirit as a whole
is real. It is the only place in the Phenomenology where he explains this,
and tells us effectively for the first time what he has been doing for the
first half of the book, and since it also explains the all important structure
of the argument so far in some detail, I will cite it in full.
"Spirit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous
shapes are abstract forms of it. They result from Spirit analysing
itself, distinguishing its moments, and dwelling for a while with each.
The isolating of these moments presupposes Spirit itself and subsists
therein; in other words, the isolation exists only in Spirit which is
a concrete existence. In this isolation they have the appearance of
really existing as such; but that they are only moments or vanishing
quantities is shown by their advance and retreat into their ground
and essence; and this essence is just this movement and resolution
of these moments. Here, where Spirit or Spirit's reflection into
itself is posited, we may briefly recall this aspect of them in our
own reflection: they were consciousness, self-consciousness, and
Reason, Spirit then is consciousness in general, which embraces
sense-certainty, perception, and the Understanding, in so far as
in its self-analysis Spirit holds fast to the moment of being an
objectively existent actuality to itself and ignores the fact that
this actuality is its own being for self. If on the contrary, it
holds fast to the other moment of the analysis, viz, that its object
is its own being-for self, then it is self-consciousness. But as
immediate consciousness of the being that is in and for itself, as
a unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, Spirit is conscious¬
ness that has Reason; it is consciousness which, as the word 'has'
indicates, has the object in a shape which is implicitly determined
SI
by Reason or by the value of the category, but in such a way that
it does not as yet have for consciousness the valine of the category.
Spirit is that consciousness which we were considering immediately
prior to the present stage jfe. the attitude of Antigone who rather
than attempting rationally to deduce or to test laws, holds firm to
the fact that they are right objectively, not because of her
judgement3. Finally, when this Reason which Spirit has is intuited
by Spirit as Reason which exists, or as Reason that is actual in
Spirit and is its world, then Spirit exists in its truth; it is
the ethical essence that has an actual existence. (Phenomenology
p. 265).
In this passage, Hegel makes it clear that subjective Spirit is not to be
understood as prior to objective Spirit. He has not discussed Spirit in
the individual first in order subsequently to be able to understand what
happens when we get a plurality of individual Spirits, or a social Spirit.
He is not, for example, following the procedure of Sartre's Being and
Nothingness, which procedure Sartre also appears to attribute to Hegel, of
examining the being-for-self of individuals first, in order later to
examine their being-for-others. It is quite misleading, therefore, to say
that in the chapter of the Phenomenology on Spirit Hegel discusses Spirit
34
in its 'social' form, as some commentators have done.
It is in contrast to this individualist view that Hegel stresses that the
analysis of Spirit into its component parts in the individual is a self-
analysis. The whole which is analysed - the self - is prior to its parts,
and is not exhausted by them. The whole of Spirit is greater than the sum
of its parts. The analysis, therefore, is not of the type which Hegel would
34. For example, Richard Norman in Hegel's Phenomenology, Sussex U.P. 1976
p. 24. Or, G.Armstrong Kelly in A.Maclntyre ed Hegel University of
Notre Dame Press London 1972, p. 194: "collectivemind does not
become a reality until Reason achieves intersubjectivity and passes
into Spirit". Intersubjectivity is not objectivity, and Spirit is
not merely collective, a mere aggregation of subjects, but is
individual in its own right.
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attribute to the attitude of Understanding and which we find for example,
in Hobbes, which would view the parts of the soul as discrete entities,
like the cogs of a machine. Spirit is not like a machine, and its parts
are not thus separable. As Hegel says, -citing Aristotle, "A hand which
35
is cut off still looks like a hand, and exists, but without being actual."
If it were possible to create consciousness, self-consciousness and Reason,
and perhaps programme them into a computer, the result would not be Spirit.
The isolation of the moments, as Hegel says with emphasis "presupposes
Spirit itself and subsists therein". It is for this reason that Hegel always
refers to the parts of Spirit as "moments", since they are always part of
something else, and not individual "component parts" which have no innate
36
need to belong to a greater whole.
Hegel defines the moments of the subjective Spirit as different relationships
between subject and object. Consciousness is a relationship of a simple or
passive Ego to an object; self-consciousness a relation of the Ego to
itself; and Reason or relation of a self-conscious Ego to an object. Each
of these moments exists for a self, or is a moment of Consciousness. As
Hegel says in the Propadeutlc,
"Consciousness has in general three phases, according to the
diversity of the object. It (the object) is namely either the
object standing in opposition to the Ego, or it is the Ego itself,
or something objective which belongs likewise equally to the Ego,
Thought. These moments are not empirically taken up from without,
but are moments of consciousness itself. Hence it is
(1) Consciousness in general;
(2) Self-Consciousness;
(3) Reason." (Propadeutic op. cit. p. 70).
35. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, OUP 1967, p. 283; Aristotle,
Politics, 1253a 19.
36. There has been some debate about the extent to which the parts of the
platonic soul also are to be considered separable component parts or
as moments of a whole. See Desmond Lee's note in the Penguin Classic
edition of the Republic, p. 207.
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Finally, when these three moments are understood as a whole, we have not
so much a complete individual soul, as "real Spirit, the ethical essence
37
that has an actual existence", which I will refer to as objective Spirit.
Let us now compare these moments of subjective Spirit to the elements of
the platonic soul. We will take the correspondence to be as follows.
Consciousness in Hegel corresponds to the appetitive element of the soul
(To Epithumetikon) and to the virtue of wisdom (Sophia); self-consciousness
to the spirited element of the soul {To Thumoeides) and to the virtue of
courage (Andveia); Reason to the rational element (To Logistikon) and to
the virtue of discipline (Sophvosune); and finally Spirit to the soul as
a whole and to the virtue of justice (Di-kaiOsune ).
We will begin with the level of self-consciousness, since here both the
similarities and differences between Hegel and Plato are most obviously
apparent. In Plato, the spirited element of the soul is that which impells
us to do things which cannot be explained as the result simply of desire,
since their consequences may well be physically unpleasant. Courage in
the military sense is perhaps the most obvious example, but we should note
that there are other senses of Andreia. For example, Plato argues that
the motivation for any involvement in politics cannot, or at least should
not be desire, and must therefore also be Andreia.
37. This division of the mind into three parts is also found for example
in Freud's work, where it appears as Id, Egg,and Super-Ego. Freud's
work, which as Hegel would no doubt have said takes the standpoint
of consciousness, sees these elements as more or less discrete en¬
tities, and he therefore lacks a conception of justice or spirit,
the soul taken as: a whole. His super-ego, however, is parallel to
reason and discipline in Plato and Hegel, and his Ego to self-
consciousness and courage. As we will see shortly, there is an
apparent divergence between Plato's view of the first element of
the soul as desire and Hegel's as consciousness. This divergence is
important and significant; however, it is worth also noting that
Freud's concept of the Id accommodates the apparently opposed no¬
tions of desire, on the one hand, and the un-seIfconscious conscious¬
ness of the infant who has not yet achieved self-awareness but still
identifies with his parent on the other. See Freud, The Ego and the
Id. "
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Self-consciousness in Hegel's account has an innate need for recognition
from other self-conscious beings. This leads it first of all into a life
and death struggle which results in the relationship of master to slave, the
latter 'recognising' the former in virtue of his courage, which the slave
38
showed himself to lack by his submission. Subsequently, in a sublimated
form, this desire for recognition takes a universal form as the desire for
honour - which in Plato's view too is the end of spirited action. In the
Propadeutic Hegel concludes his discussion of self-consciousness as follows:
"Self-consciousness is, according to this its essential universality,
only real in so far as it knows its echo (and reflection) in
another (I know that another knows me as itself) and as pure
spiritual universality (belonging to the family, the native land
etc.) knows itself as the essential self. (This self consciousness
is the basis of all virtues, of love, honour, friendship, bravery,
all self-sacrifice, all fame, etc). (Propadeutic op. cit. p. 78).
38. I use the idea of sublimation more or less in its Freudian meaning,
discussed in Ch.5 below. Sublimation occurs when a desire is directed
towards an object not naturally suited to its satisfaction. This
occurs in practice (at least, significantly so) only in connection
with the sexual instinct. Sublimation thus "consists in the sexual
trend abandoning its aim of obtaining a component or a reproductive
pleasure and taking another which is related genetically to the
abandoned one but is itself no longer sexual but social". (Freud,
Introductory Lectures on Pscychoanalysis. Pelican 1973, p. 390.
See also ibid p. 47f, and Freud, The Ego and the Id, and
Civilization and its Discontents) This is not to be confused with
Kaufmann's use of the term sublimation to translate Hegel's aufheben,
(Kaufmann, op. cit. p. 52) which Bailey in his translation of the
Phenomeno1ogy renders 'sublate'. In both cases the word carries
no other meaning than being a rendering of Hegel's aufheben, and
does not at all carry the connotation 'make sublime', and therefore
serves little purpose. Millers translation which uses various
English words (e.g. 'supersede') is to be preferred.
(, I
However, while it is, thus, clear that self-consciousness, with its desire
for recognition is. meant to account for those things which Plato associates
with the spirited element of the soul, precisely what is absent from Plato's
idea is the notion of recognition. As Foster puts it
"To translate Plato's Thimos as self-respect is to go too far;
all the concepts of reflection - self-knowledge, self-government,
self-realisation - ^re foreign to Greek thought, and the Greek
philosophers attain only here and there and in moments of supreme
insight to recognition of them. It is the essence of Plato's
conception of honour (honour is the end of spirited action) to
lie midway between these two extremes and to be differentiated
clearly from neither. Whfen Plato's warrior rejects an unworthy
impulse, that is certainly not merely the blind following of a
natural 'instinct', but neither is it identical with, say, the
action of a French gentleman under the ancien vegdme, who is
moved by a conception of what his honour demands; and when he
lays down his life 'for the sake of the noble' (^Aristotle's
phrase] , his end does not indeed stir in him quite unconsciously,
as the demands of the species stir in the stickleback defending
its young, but neither is it fully present to his consciousness
as an end". (Foster, op. cit. p. 55).
In other words, both Hegel's and Plato's brave men are motivated by some
conception of courage, but while Plato's brave man acknowledges courage
itself as a virtue which he should realise because it is a virtue, Hegel's
brave man acknowledges not only this, but in addition has a purely per¬
sonal motivation for being courageous, which is to achieve the recognition
of other men. It is this subjective element of recognition which differ¬
entiates Hegel's view; and it is in order to include it that he abandons
the platonic language he used in Natural Law, where courage was a virtue
of men who were free in the platonic sense of fearing slavery more than
39
death, and replaces it with the vocabulary of recognition. Here men
are all free in a more modern sense of being causa sui and therefore need
39. Plato, Republic, 387b. Natural Law op. cit. p. 93.
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the recognition of others., are of necessity more or less courageous. Here
as elsewhere we observe that while according to the classical doctrine of
form, it is not essential to a form that it take on an individual existence,
in the Hegelian version form must be realised. Man's perfection, as Foster
puts it "is no longer to be the substance of a form, but the subject of an
40
activity".
It is possible to apply more or less the same argument in connection with
Reason, the third moment of Subjective Spirit and of the platonic soul.
That the two are parallel is evident enough, though Hegel, since he is
41
keen to avoid opposing Reason to passion would probably dispute that
42
the virtue of reason is exactly self-discipline; but this involves an
argument which we will come to shortly in connection with consciousness.
The central difference we may express briefly as follows. To Logistikon
in Plato is essentially a faculty of deliberation perfected in the art of
40. Foster, op. cit. p. 59.
41 There are many places where Hegel discusses his view of the relation
of Reason to passion, - and as Foster comments "I suppose there is
no reader of Hegel who has not felt in his heart that the argument
for the identity of these opposites is a tour de force" (op.cit.
p. 88). See Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, 1971, p. 235 ff.
or Philosophy of History, op. cit., p. 9 and p. 23 ff.). We should
also take care to note that Hegel uses the term Reason in two
senses, both of which can be seen in the paragraph quoted above (pSfcf)
from the Phenomenology, These are Reason in the abstract
sense of being a faculty which Spirit possesses, corresponding
to Reason in Kant, and Reason which exists, which is identical
to objective Spirit. It is in the latter sense only that Hegel
uses the word in speaking of the rational state, of Reason causing
History, and similar formulations.
42. In any case it is not absolutely clear that Plato has made a direct
parallel between the cardinal virtues and the elements of the soul
- perhaps due to the mismatch between desire and wisdom, which is
discussed below.
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dialectic, whose purpose i.s. to know the forms. ~ In Hegel, reason certainly
has some such, function. Its. essence, however, is. different. It is the
attitude of a self-conscious or free man towards phenomenal objectivity, in
distinction to the passive attitude of a merely conscious observer. In
this sense Reason stands in the same relation to consciousness in Hegel
as it does to Understanding in Kant. However, the freedom of self-
consciousness in Hegel is not equivalent to the freedom of pure reason in
Kant, which consists in being unconstrained by the phenomenal world, in
distinction from Understanding which is constrained to understand what
exists. It is a freedom in relation to the world, and which is essentially
involved in it. If consciousness is disinterested in the world, then Reason
is the opposite, an -interested attitude. Again, therefore, we see that
in Hegel's view the subjective element has become essential so that as a
free being or as Spirit, I am constrained of necessity to be interested
44
in the world, or reasonable. Reason is not a device, a faculty which
45
I may or may not use, as it is explicitly in both Plato and Kant, but
essential to all human individuality.
If the second and third moments of Subjective Spirit can thus be seen as
the second and third elements of the platonic soul modified to include a
subjective principle, the same cannot exactly be said of consciousness,
43. Plato, Republic, 532 ff.
44. Thus, when the mafioso in Mario Puzzo's ,Godfather says 'be reasonable'
he does not mean "be logical" or "apply universal rational standards",
but "pay attention to your interests". His conception of reason coin¬
cides with Hegel's but not Plato's or Kant's.
45. I.Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, MacMillan,
1933, p. 300 f.
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the first moment of subjective Spirit. There may perhaps be some connection
46
between consciousness and desire, but certainly cons.ciousness cannot be
characterised simply as a modification of platonic desire. Hegel, presumably
consciously, seems radically to have altered Plato's view of the first
element of the soul, and we must ask why he has done this.
Let us note firstly the extent to which Plato and Hegel are on common
ground in talking about the first element of the soul. This may be ex¬
pressed by saying that the first element of the soul is unfree, but in
different senses for Plato and for Hegel. For Plato, desire is unfree
because it constrains us to satisfy it. In so far as we desire we are
moved by a purely natural compulsion, while the spirited and rational
elements of the soul are not governed by anything natural, but are freely
taken up by the individual of his own accord. Since for Plato freedom -
47
in the limited sense in which he uses the word - is to be valued over
unfreedom, it follows that desire must always be subordinated to courage
and reason.
Consciousness in Hegel is likewise unfree. Unlike Reason, which can
follow its own trains of thought where and when it pleases, consciousness
48
is constrained to be knowledge of the object which is present to it.
46. See note 37 to this chapter.
47. Freedom is a term Plato uses rarely. When he does it has two
significances. Firstly, freedom means fearing slavery more than
death, and is thus related to courage. Secondly, the citizen is
free, in so far as he is his own master, or is rational. There is
no freedom in desire. See Republic, 387b, 430c.
48. Here, of course, Hegel follows Kant's distinction between Reason
and Understanding. Hegel sometimes, but not always, uses the
terms Understanding and Consciousness interchangeably (see Ch. 4
below).
It is in this, sense that wisdom, which is true knowledge, is a virtue of
consciousness rather than reason, even though reason is essentially in¬
volved in it. However, while Kant was happy with the idea that understand¬
ing was unfree, and Plato with the unfreedom of desire, Hegel includes
a subjective element even at this level of the soul. Consciousness for
Hegel is not conceivable except as a property of a free being, ie. Spirit.
All consciousness is equally self-consciousness, since I cannot, be con¬
scious of something without being conscious of that consciousness, or
49
self-conscious.
However, if this accounts for the subjective element in consciousness
and distinguishes Hegel's view from Kant's, it does not go any way towards
reconciling consciousness and desire. Hegel, in fact, does not attempt
to do this at all, and instead he makes desire into an element of self-
consciousness, thus considerably revising Plato's view. If we consider
Plato's view of the first element of the soul further, we will find that
there are good reasons for doing this.
If we presume that the cardinal virtues in Plato are connected respectively
to the elements of the soul, and to the classes in the state, we then
find that by a process of elimination, the virtue of Sophia belongs to
desire and to the productive class. It may be the case that Plato does not
wish to make this connection, but if this is true we must point out (a)
that Hegel, who wishes in the Phenomenology to demonstrate Spirit as a
50
necessity will want to make such a connection, while Plato may be happy
simply to record what he observes to be the case, and (b) that we should
have to reject some of Foster's interpretations of Plato, for example,
that Plato's classes are defined by possession of their own specific virtue.
49. Phenomenology, p. 99, see Ch. 4 below.
50. Which he does in Natural Law, op. cit. p. 93ff.
51. Foster, op. cit. p. 65.
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It makes sense therefore for us. to question the connection whether Plato
directly intends i.t or not.
Sophia, however, is hard to pin down in Plato. In the Symposium, Plato
presents a hierarchy of desire from physical desire through the love of
beauty to the love of knowledge, which latter of course is the highest
point. However, the desire which leads ultimately to wisdom in this
picture is not Epithumea - but Eros, and Eros is not a discrete element of
the soul. In the Republic even this connection seems to be lacking. If
Sophia is connected to any element of the soul it seems to be to the
52
rational Logzstikon, and To Logistikon therefore has two cardinal virtues,
Sophia and Sophvosune or temperence. Epithwnea is then without virtue.
This difficulty is compounded if we attempt to connect the virtues to
the classes. Here Plato is, to begin with, quite specific. The Guardians
have Sophia, the auxiliaries Andreia, and everyone is capable of Dikaiosune
in so far as he 'minds his own business'. It is the virtue of Sophrosune,
now, not Sophia , whose position is uncertain. Sophrosune is found in the
state, according to Plato, in so far as the lower classes in the state are
subordinated to and controlled by the higher classes. This means that the
productive class has no virtue of its own, just as desire in the soul is
53
without virtue.
52. This is Foster's position : op. cit. p. 56.
53. This is presumably connected to Greek attitudes to productive work
and to the existence of slavery - but we will not follow this
connection here, except to suggest that Hegel has an historical
advantage over Plato, in so far as slavery no longer exists and
work is acknowledged to have a value of its own.
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By making des.ire into an element of self-consciousness, Hegel is able to
make more sense of this: pi.cture. Sophia, to begin with, relates clearly
to consciousness, and there is no longer any difficulty in locating it.
Desire, on the other hand, ceases to be a discrete moment of the soul, and
instead is only a moment of self-consciousness. This means both that there
is no longer any need to find a specific virtue for desire, and that it is
nevertheless capable of partaking of the virtue of self-consciousness, of
Thumos or spiritedness, and there can therefore be some virtue in its
satisfaction. Since it is no longer a discrete moment of the soul it is
not directly opposed to reason. It is consciousness rather than desire
that is the opposite of reason, and, as Hegel often argues, passion and
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reason do not have to be seen as in direct opposition to eachother.
There are further advantages of this relocation of desire which will be
mentioned in the appropriate place. For the moment we will be content to
conclude that Hegel's accommodation of the principle of desire makes his
view of the soul fundamentally different from the platonic view which is
unable to reconcile desire with reason and spirit except by suppressing
it. As Foster comments in connection with the Philosophy of Right,
"Hegel will be found to repeat again and again as his fundamental
criticism of the platonic political philosophy that Plato's Potis
was based upon the suppression of this element of the soul [Desirej
which therefore when it could be suppressed no longer burst out
in manifestations hostile to lawful order and eventually destructive
to it; and in contrast to this defect the might of the modern
state, which can afford to tolerate this freedom within itself,
and even draws vitality to itself from its exercise". (Foster,
op. cit. p. 62)
54. e.g. Philosophy of History, p. 23.
We should add to this only that it is because Hegel does not make desire
a discrete element of the soul that this is possible. Even in Natural Law,
Hegel has gone some way towards this position, since his bourgeois class,
which corresponds to the productive class in Plato is no longer defined
simply by desire. Instead it is related to a generalised system of needs
and these needs belong not to one class but to all classes. Further,
Hegel can be seen to connect the bourgeois class both with consciousness^
and with wisdom.However, in discussing classes we are going beyond
Subjective Spirit into the realm of Objective Spirit, and we should first
say what is meant by this latter term.
Objective Spirit
In the Philosophy of Mind of the 1817 Ehcylopaedia Hegel divides Spirit
into Subjective, Objective, and Absolute Spirit. However, while it is
clear that Subjective and Absolute Spirit correspond to the sections of
the Phenomenology on Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and Reaslon (Sections
A, B and C) and to the sections on Religion and Absolute Knowledge (CC,
and DD) respectively, it is not immediately apparent that there is such a
correspondance between Objective Spirit and Section BB of the Phenomenology
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titled simply Spirit. The difference between the two versions is partly
55. Natural Law, p. 94
56. Ibid, p. 104. The virtue of the bourgeois class is found in a
"reconciliation which lies in the knowledge of necessity".
57. There has been some discussion of the significance of the way the
Phenomenology is variously divided up into chapters and headings,
and of why, for example, Spirit should be headed 'BB'. Since the
disignations 'BB' and 'CC' were added not by Hegel but by later
editors, and apparently intended to emphasise the correlation with
the Encylopaedia we are discussing,we should not take it directly
as evidence of that correlation. See J.Hyppolite, Genesis and
Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Northwestern U.P.
1974, p. 54 ff.
to be accounted for in terms of the differing aims and methods of both works,
which will be discussed in Chapter three. Here we will consider only the
question of what, substantially, Hegel means by "Objective Spirit" in his
later works and "Spirit" in thd Phenomenology.
Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopaedia is divided into three moments. It is
(a) immediately the soul, which Hegel following Aristotle calls the sleep
58
of Spirit, (b) the appearance of the soul in the individual as conscious¬
ness, self-consciousness, and Reason, the science of which Hegel calls
phenomenology, and (c) this appearance as an actualised totality, still in
59
the individual, called Spirit, the science of which is psychology. The
second of these moments is in substantial terms more or less exactly parallel
to Sections A, B and C of the Phenomenology. Absolute Spirit in the
Encyclopaedia covers Art, Religion, and Philosophy, and though Art and
Religion are discussed together under the headings of Religion in the
Phenomenology, not separately as in the Encyclopaedia,^ there is little
difficulty in concluding that Religion and Absolute knowledge in the
Phenomenology are moments of what Hegel later terms Absolute Spirit.
Absolute Spirit is the ground of both Subjective and Objective Spirit, and
corresponds to 'the good itself' in Plato. It is known in the form of
beauty, in art; God;in religion,' and as a self-conscious unity of both
58. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 29. "Soul is only the sleep of Spirit,
the passive nous of Aristotle, which is potentially all things".
59. Translated by Wallace as 'Mind' - a translation I have always
altered to Spirit, except in quoting the title "Philosophy of Mind".
See Kaufmann, pp. 160-2 for the relative merit of both translations.
60. Perhaps in the Phenomenology Hegel ranks philosophy higher than
Absolute Spirit, since it appears as a transition to Logic, which
as we have seen ( p. T.9 above) is not part of Spirit but an expression
of the Absolute Idea, of which nature and Spirit are mere moments.
61. Though even in the Encyclopaedia Absolute Spirit is in general
Religion (Philosophy of Mind, p. 292).
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in Philosophy. It is itself only one moment of the Absolute Idea, which
also contains Nature and exhibits itself freely in Logic. Nevertheless, it
is free in a sense in which both Subjective and Objective Spirit are not.
Subjective Spirit is limited to the individual, and cannot achieve any real
existence except in relation to an objective world. This world, even when
it is understood as Spirit, is still a fact, and even the most unwilling
are forced to recognise it. It is impossible, in other words, to go through
life without acknowledging the family, law, and so on, since each not only
exists but has the power to make sure that this fact is acknowledged and
respected. Absolute Spirit, however, is to be respected in its own right;
and it is quite possible to go through life without ever noticing beauty or
God. It is only in these forms, therefore, that Spirit is presented to it¬
self in a form which is truly adequate to its essential nature, that is,
to
Freedom, for only in these forms is one free to acknowledge or^deny it.
Absolute Spirit, however, cannot exist even in the forms adequate to its
nature without also existing in reality in the forms of Subjective and
Objective Spirit. It needs both free individuals and an objective order;
and these, if they are not to be seen as simply in opposition to eachother
as freedom and necessity, must be each intuited as moments of the Absolute.
Hegel therefore defines Objective Spirit not so much as an existing social
order in which the subjective can express itself, but as "the Absolute Idea,
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but only existing posse" It is subsequently structured in conformity
with the three moments of subjective spirit, in both the Encyclopaedia and
62. That is, as something enforced. p>-26Z.)Philosophy of Mind, op. cit. p. 241.
II
in the Philosophy of Right which does little more than expand the section
of the Encyclopaedia on Objective Spirit. Thus it becomes Law, Morality
and Sittliehkeity Law relating to consciousness as the element in which
the individual as a single being or person knows right as something formal
and abstract (the Gezetz of Understanding); Morality relating to the purely
subjective will of self-consciousness, the principle of conscience; and
Sittlichkeit to their actual and rational unity in a 'totality of necessity'
63
in the family, civil society and the State.
In the chapter of the Phenomenology on Spirit we find at first sight a
different content. It begins with a discussion of Greek ethical life which
is almost entirely taken up with a discussion of Sophocles' Antigone and
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Oedipus Rex, and to some extent Aeschylus' Eumenides. This is followed
by a discussion of Culture (Bildung)^ which consists essentially in an
account of the origins of the French Revolution, and which has an historical
63. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 243, §487. Family, Civil Society and
State also divide according to the divisions of Subjective Spirit,
and in Hegel's view there are many ways in which the structure of
Objective Spirit mirrors the structure of the individual soul; while
in Plato this seems to be the case only of class divisions.
64. Which Hegel had translated into German prose at school, into verse
at Tubingen, and which he, like Aristotle, appears always to regard
as a paradigm of Greek tragedy.
65. A.C. Bradley, "Hegel's Theory of Tragedy" in Paolucci and Paolucci
(eds.), Hegel on Tragedy, Harper Torchbooks 1962, p. 371.
66. Bildung is translated by Kojeve as 'proces formatif-et-educatif' -
formative and educative process. Foster's use of the Platonic notion
of 'informing' as both 'giving form to' and 'educating', though
not explicitly linked by him to Bitdung, shows the link of Bildung
to the classical theory of form.
7 2.
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slant absent from the Encyclopaedia . Finally, there is a discussion of
Morality, in which Hegel returns to more familiar ground, and treats Morality
much as he did in his earlier writings and would do in later works. We are
left therefore, with the question of whether and in what sense Hegel's dis¬
cussion of Greek tragedy and of the French Revolution fit into the notion
of Objective Spirit.
As we have presented Objective Spirit so far, it has appeared directly parallel
to Plato's justice in the state. It is the good, realised in an objective form,
and corresponding to the nature of the soul, which as we know Hegel had re¬
defined as consciousness, self-consciousness and reason, in order to include
within it a subjective element. However, in both the Encyclopaedia and the
Philosophy of Right he insists upon the inclusion of a subjective element
6 8
equally with the state (understood in the broad sense of the word) itself.
This subjective element, he argues, is absent not only from Plato's philosophy,
but also from the polis as a whole, which has achieved substantive freedom,
but not yet subjective freedom. Hegel defines these two terms in the
Philosophy of History as follows:
67. Both the Philosophy of Right and Encyclopaedia end with a very brief
discussion of History. This presents the view of the Philosophy of
History rather-than the Phenomenology, and is an appendage - if an
essential one - to the text. The main discussion of Objective Spirit
itself is not historical.
68. Using the term "the state" in connection with Hegel I mean to include
everything included in the German term Recht An Hegel's interpretation.
The state in this sense is objective spirit, and corresponds more to
the ancient community or potis than the modern state. Hegel's term
"Staat" on the other hand sometimes means the state in the more
restrictive and modern sense, the third dimension of SittZichkeit
which is counterposed to both Family and Civil Society. I qualify
this as the state 'in the narrow sense', since the alternative
of rendering Recht as "Right" or "Law" is linguistically clumsy and
potentially misleading.
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"Substantial freedom is the abstract undeveloped Reason implicit
in volition, proceeding to develop itself in the State. But in
this phase of Reason there is still wanting personal insight and
will, that is subjective freedom; which is realised only in the
individual, and constitutes the reflection of the individual in
his own conscience". ' (Philosophy of History, op.cit. p. 104).
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel constantly criticises Plato for having
no room for what he calls variously the right of "subjective freedom", the
"subjective element", the "freedom of the individual", "the right to satis-
69
faction of the particularity of the subject", and so on. To cite one
example, he says
"In Plato's state, subjective freedom does not count, because
people have their occupation assigned to them by the Guardians.
In many oriental states this assignment is determined by birth.
But subjective freedom, which must be respected, demands that
individuals should have free choice in this matter". (Philosophy
of Right, p. 280). 70
Subjective freedom, we may therefore presume, is to be respected in Hegel's
state. We will return shortly to the question of how this is to be done.
Hegel's criticism of Plato here, then, is not unlike that of the many
71
modern writers who accuse Plato of totalitarianism, ;> in so far: as totali¬
tarianism is an incursion upon the freedom of the individual. However,
in Hegel's view it is just as much an anachronism to apply this criticism
directly to Plato as it would be to apply Plato's ideas directly to the
modern world. This is because the principle of subjective freedom was only
just beginning in Plato's time to appear on the scene. It found no expression
69. Foster, op. cit. p. 72.
70. See also Philosophy of Right, op. cit, pp. 42, 124, 133, 195.
71 E.g. RHS Crossman in Plato Today, Allen & Unwin, 1963.
in the objective element of the polis, and appeared only in various forms
as a difficulty to be coped with, so that it makes more sense to praise
Plato for the extent to which he recognised the problem and attempted to
suppress it, than to criticise him for this suppression.
"In his Republic, Plato displays the substance of ethical life
in its ideal beauty and truth; but he could not cope with the
principle of self-subsistent particularity, which in his day had
forced its way into Greek ethical life, by setting up in opposi¬
tion to it his purely substantial state. He absolutely excluded
it from his state, even in its very beginnings in private property
and the family, as well as in its more mature form as the sub¬
jective will, the choice of a social position, and so forth. It
is this defect which is responsible for the usual view of it as a ^
dream of abstract thinking, as what is often called a 'mere ideal1,
The principle of self-subsistent inherently.infinite personality
of the individual, the principle of subjective freedom, is denied
its right in the purely substantial form which Plato gave to Spirit
in its actuality. This principle dawned in an inward form in the
Christian religion and in an external form (and therefore one
linked with abstract universality) in the Roman world. It is
historically subsequent to the Greek world, and the philosophic
reflection which descends to its depth is likewise subsequent to
the substantial Idea of Greek philosopy". (Philosophy of Right,
p. 124).
In the Phenomenology, this question of the historical emergence of sub¬
jective freedom assumes central importance, especially in the first two
sections on Si-tttichkei-t and Culture. It may be the case that Hegel em¬
phasises this out of proportion. Certainly it is true that the chapter
73
was originally intended to be much shorter, and it also seems quite
plausible that Hegel would have felt it worthwhile to spend a good deal
of time criticising anachronistic readings of Plato in view of the in¬
fluence of Romantic ideas in the unstable political situation in 1806,
72. Cf Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 10 "Plato's Republic, which
passes proverbially as an empty idea, is in essence nothing but
an interpretation of Greek ethical life".
73. Kaufmann op. cit. p. 51. Hyppolite p. 54 ff.
while this might have seemed less important a decade later.
The account of Spirit in the Phenomenology, however, shares one important
factor in common with the account of the Encyclopaedia. In both works the
inclusion of the principle of subjective freedom is not just an addition
or footnote to Plato's political theory, but entails a whole new approach
to the philosophy of the state - just as we saw earlier the inclusion of
a subjective element in the soul entailed a redefinition of the parts them¬
selves. Foster summarises this by saying that while for both Plato and
Hegel there is a 'dialectic' which will determine the nature of a just state,
this dialectic is for Plato only a process of thought, while for Hegel it is
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"immanent in the being or idea which is his object". This is because for
Plato the just state is an ideal which thinking men may strive for, while
for Hegel it is an ideal which must be realised in the individual, ^ or
16
because the form of the good state is not natural, but self-imposed.
While Plato therefore has only to demonstrate the goodness of the just state,
it falls to Hegel to demonstrate the necessity of its existence. Thus in
the Phenomenology in the paragraph immediately following the one which was
quoted in full on page 56f above Hegel says
"Spirit is the ethical life of a nation insofar as it is the immediate
truth - the individual that is a world. It must advance to the
consciousness of what it is immediately, must leave behind it the
beauty of ethical life, and by passing through a series of shapes
attain to knowledge of itself. These shapes, however, are distinguished
from the previous ones by the fact that they are real Spirits, actualities
in the strict sense of the word, and instead of being shapes merely of
consciousness are shapes of a world".(Phenomenology, p. 265).
74. Foster, op. cit. p. 122.
75. Ibid, p. 58.
76. Ibid, p. 41
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This real dialectic of Spirit has. two connotations, which are respectively
the bases of Spirit in the Phenomenology and Objective Spirit in the
Encyclopaedia and which will be examined further in Chapter 3 below. It
firstly has the connotation that a form exists in the full sense (in and
for itself) only in being known, so that the process of the development of
knowledge is equally a historical process of the realisation of implicit
being. This is the sense Hegel wants to demonstrate in the Phenomenology
and it can also be seen clearly in the Philosophy of History, where
history is characterised not as is sometimes said as a development of
freedom, from the ancient despotisms where one man is free, through Greek
society where many are free to the present day where all generally are free,
77
but as a development of the knowledge of freedom. The dialectic of know¬
ledge is a historical dialectic, and in the Phenomenology the dialectic of
the knowledge of subjective freedom is therefore of necessity a historical
dialectic; and this is because it is not so much a form which may be realised,
as an idea which must be self-imposed. On the other hand, the notion that
the dialectic of Spirit is real has the connotation that the individual
must be capable subjectively of grasping reality as thought, and of being
able freely to grasp its rational necessity as a manifestation of the
absolute idea. This is the approach of the Encyclopaedia and Philosophy of
Right, and is summarised in the epigram "What is rational is actual and
7 8
what is actual is rational". Although this approach presupposes that the
idea is already actual, not merely implicit but explicit or known, and there¬
fore that it has developed historically or 'become', this approach need not
77. Philosophy of History, op. cit, p. 18.
78. Philosophy of Right, op. cit. p. 10 and Lesser Logic, op. cit. p. 9.
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itself be his.tori.cal, and can proceed directly to account rationally for
what exists in and for itself.
If the methodical implications of the inclusion of a subjective element in
the philosophy of the state are thus clear enough, it must also be said that
Hegel is less clear about what the inclusion of the subjective element means
in more concrete terms. In the Philosophy of Right (we will consider what
he has to say in the Phenomenology in Chapter 7 below) while he is strong on
the importance of the inclusion of subjective freedom, he remains
vague on the question of just where it is to be found. -Attempting to clarify
this, Foster argues that there are two dimensions of subjective freedom,
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which he calls ethical and economic . Economic subjective freedom relates
to desire, and is satisfied by (a) the limitation of the state, so that one
is free from it in a sphere of private life, while in Plato's thought it is
80
all embracing and (b) the choice of one's position in the class structure.
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Ethical subjective freedom relates to Reason, and is satisfied (a) by the
fact that law is general and positive and (b) by the inclusion of the
principle of conscience. Foster goes on to point out that while Hegel has
included a subjective element in connection with two elements of the platonic
soul, he has omitted to include it in connection with the third element, the
spirited element. The correct place for this would in Foster's view be in
connection with what he terms a 'sovereign will'. That is, a rational state
79. Foster, p. 110 ff.
80. Hence the 'totalitarian' charge.
81. Foster contrasts the ancient and modern conceptions of reason through
their conception of Law. For the ancients form is the principle of
reason and order, and law in Nomos or custom; while for Hegel and the
modern view in general which includes subjective freedom, Law (Gesetz)
is the principle of Reason and order, and is distinguished by the fact
that it is universal (ie general, non-specific) and that it is posited
or commanded - as for example in Hobbes' philosophy. Foster, op. cit,
Ch. IV.
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which included s.ubjectiye freedom, as it must, would haye to include a
mechanism by which the will of the people can be expressed through some
representative body as the will of the state. Hegel's state lacks such a
democratic institution, and its representative assemblies can only advise
the government and educate the people, since the state must remain sovereign,
and the people subject.
This in its turn is due to the fact that Hegel has failed ultimately to
escape the classical theory of forms, and he therefore still sees the ideal
state as a representation of a form and not something which a free people
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can actively create through their own free will. Finally, Foster connects
this inadequacy with what he perceives as a related inadequacy in Hegel's
theology. In his enthusiasm for the New Testament and his distaste for the
positive doctrines of the Old Testament, Hegel has failed to grasp the im¬
portance of the Old Testament idea of an all powerful creative God. In per¬
ceiving God as essentially perfect and indifferent to the world rather than
as essentially creative and therefore sovereign ruler of the world, his
theology remains pagan and has missed an important insight provided only by
83
christian theology.
There are a number of weaknesses in Foster's argument. To begin with, his
account of sovereignty in Hegel seems incomplete. It is true that for
Hegel sovereignty should lie with the monarch, and that the legislature
84
functions essentially only as an advisory body. However, if Hegel were
to go beyond this view and make the representative assemblys as representatives
82. Foster, p. 134.
83. Ibid, p. 138 ff.
84. Philosophy of Right p. 195, §300 and §301.
of the people sovereign, he would run the risk of losing the sovereignty
of the state altogether. It is only by maintaining for itself the moment
of ultimate decision that the state retains the characteristic of being
a concrete individual. In Plato's view, by contrast, this aspect is
absent: the rulers are not free, but constrained to realise the form of
justice, and the state, correspondingly, is not an individual entity,
but merely an aspect of the community. The Hegelian state retains the
aspect of its independent individuality through the crown. "The power of
the crown", Hegel writes
"contains within itself the three moments of the whole (see paragraph
272), viz. (a) the universality of the constitution and the laws;
(3) counsel, which refers the particular to the universal, and (y)
the moment of ultimate decision, as the self-determination to which
everything else reverts and from which everything else derives the
beginning of its actuality". (Philosophy of Right, p.179, §275).
It does not follow from this, in Hegel's view, that the individual free
will of the citizen is excluded from the state. The purely abstract
general will of the people - what is called public opinion - is indeed,
rightly, subordinated to the sovereign will which is expressed in the
crown. Nevertheless, the people are more than the generalisation of
their ideas and prejudices in public opinion. They, like states, are
concrete individuals; and their individuality is expressed in the fact
that they have not only ideas, but also concrete interests, and further,
a certain power or energy at their disposal to realize these interests.
It is this element of subjectivity which in Hegel's account is capable
of being incorporated within the state without threatening its ultimate
sovereignty. It is expressed through the Estates, each of which has a
concrete interest in the function of the state. Hegel says
SO
"the specific function which the concept assigns to the Estates is
to be sought in the fact that in them the subjective moment in
universal freedom — the private judgement and private will of the
sphere called "civil society" in this book - comes into existence
integrally related to the state". (Philosophy of Right p. 197. §301)
It is clear, then, that in Hegel's view the dimension of subjective freedom
of the citizen's will is indeed included in his conception of the state,
through the functioning of the Estates. It may perhaps be contended that
the idea of the Estates is outmoded. Charles Taylor, for example, feels
able to comment on Hegel's view of the Estates simply that it is "clearly
untenable today".However, if this is so, it may well be only because
of the fashion for rational thinking, which regards anything which has to
do with private interest and power as essentially irrational, and there¬
fore to be excluded at least from political theory, if not from politics
altogether. Foster's view, which seems to see the only alternatives to
be either that the general will - which in his view is explicitly the
rational will - is sovereign, or that it is not and some particular and
therefore irrational will is sovereign, is perhaps also guilty of this
one-sidedness. In any case, it is clear that he ought to reckon with
Hegel's account of the way the subjective freedom of the citizens will
is "integrally related to" the sovereign state through the Estates of
the realm; and this he fails to do.
Secondly, although Foster is certainly right to say that Hegel's notion
of subjective freedom in the Philosophy of Right is not clearly defined,
his attempt to clarify it by specifying economic and moral dimensions of
subjective freedom
84b Charles Taylor, Hegel, C.U.P. 1975, p.186.
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is open to objection. Though there are different aspects of subjective
freedom for each, moment of subjective spirit, it does not follow that there
should be specific institutions to satisfy each aspect. If the elements
of the platonic state correspond to elements of the soul, the same one to
one correspondance is not found in Hegel. Hegel's state embodies the
elements of the soul taken as a whole, as Spirit, and though the elements
of the soul may be found at various levels within the state, the state is
not simply a mirror image objectification of the soul. 'Further, in so far
as it is possible to locate elements of the soul in the state, we should
alone Iracrete
have to point out that desire^is not in Hegel's view a ^element of the soul.
'Economic' subjective freedom is therefore problematic, and we should rather
look for subjective freedom in connection with consciousness (or knowledge),
self-consciousness, and reason.
Thirdly, Foster's characterisation of Hegel's theology, while acceptable as
an appraisal of the Early Theological Writings, is not compatible with Hegel's
later theological views, especially those expressed in the Lesser Logic.
Hegel is clearly aware of the significance of the contrast between the jealous
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Judaic God and the merely good Greek God, and explicitly contrasts to both
the christian notion of a creative God.^ He does not, it is true, take the
notion of a Creator to the extreme which is found in some protestant theology,
where it is argued that since God is all powerful and creative, man is a
powerless creature. In contrast to this alien view of God, Hegel prefers
the more pagan notion of God as an ideal or as an essence. However, he modi¬
fies the pagan view precisely in order to include the subjective element,
85. Philosophy of Mind p. 298, Lesser Logic p. 198
cf. also Plato's Republic, 380c.
86. Lesser Logic, p. 185, p. 227
$x.
and sees God not as indifferent to the world, but, as Singer puts it, as
87
"an essence that needs to manifest itself in the world".
Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties in reconciling Foster"s
criticism with what Hegel actually says, we will find when we return to
Objective Spirit in Chapter 7 below that it is by no means without value,
and points to an important weak point in Hegel's system.
Absolute Spirit
In what follows I do not intend to discuss absolute Spirit in and for itself
- the object which is freely presented to consciousness in art, religion
and philosophy. Instead, I have limited myself to a discussion of the sub¬
jective and objective modes of its appearance. However, as I hope is clear
from what has been said, it is of the greatest importance to understand these
latter as moments of Absolute Spirit, and to understand Absolute Spirit it¬
self as a moment of the Absolute Idea. As Hegel says, "it is the Absolute
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which makes philosophy a genuine science" - which is really just another
way of saying philosophy seeks truth - and it is impossible to understand the
Phenomenology without interpreting every stage as a moment of the Absolute.
In order to emphasise the importance of this, and in place of a discussion
89
of 'Absolute being as such", I want to conclude by mentioning two inter¬
pretations of the Phenomenology which offer subtly different views of its




P. Singer, Hegel, OUP 1983, p. 83.
Natural Law, op. cit. p. 55.
Phenomenology, p. 410.
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The first of these interpretations, is often found in association with marxism,
and can be seen for example in G.Lukacs' book "The Young Hegel". Its most
general characteristic is that it substitutes for Hegel's Absolute the notion
of 'totality'.'. This is not exactly contrary to Hegel's view, since
asbolute spirit is indeed a totality of consciousness, self-consciousness,
90
Reason, and Spirrt. However, in Hegel's view this totality is an indepen¬
dent entity, not just an 'overview' of the parts: while Lukacs explicitly
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contradicts this, saying that "no new content emerges at this point".
This conception slips gently into an interpretation in which (a) only-
Spirit as a whole or totality is real, and yet (b) Spirit has no existence
except through its parts. This makes the notion of Spirit as a totality
extremely hard to pin down, since it is both everything and no particular
thing, and in fact the notion of 'totality' in general is for this reason
ultimately mysterious.
Following the first side of this ambiguity, that is, viewing only the totality
of Spirit as real and its parts as illusory, Lukacs draws a parallel between
Hegel and Marx. He begins by quoting the following passage from the final
chapter of the Phenomenology:
90. Ibid, p. 412-3.
91. Lukacs, op.cit, p. 508. This refers to the chapter on Religion, and
commits Lukacs to the view that religion is not an independent idea,
but only the totality of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason,
and Spirit. His argument might be stronger if it were made in
connection only with the chapter on Absolute Knowledge, but seems
prima facie to be an absurd view of Religion, arguing effectively
that Religion does not exist. Lukacs' position is also shared by
Kojeve. "According to Hegel - to use the Marxist terminology -
Religion is only an ideological superstructure that is born and
exists solely in relation to a real substructure" (op.cit. p. 32).
<z<+
"It is only Spix.it in its entirety that is in time, and the shapes
assumed, which are specific embodiments, of the whole of Spirit as
such, present themselves. in sequence on after another. For it is
only the whole which properly has reality, and hence the form of
pure freedom relatively to anything else, the form which takes ex¬
pression as time. But the moments of the whole, consciousness,
self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, have, because they are
moments, no existence separate from each other" (Hegel, Phenomenology,
quoted in Lukacs op. cit. p. 466).
He then goes on to compare this favourably with a passage from Marx's The
German Ideology.
"Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their
corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the sem¬
blance of independence. They have no history, no development; but
men, developing their material intercourse, alter along with this
their real existence, their thinking and the products of their
thinking". (Marx, The German Ideology, quoted in Lukacs op.cit. p. 467).
The implication of this comparison is that every real phenomenon is actually
an illusion, and to overcome the illusion real phenomena must be reduced to
Spirit, just as for Marx in order to overcome 'ideology' everything must be
reduced to matter- (in so far asnotions such as 'intercourse' are conceived
of by Marx as 'material'). Once Hegel is interpreted in this way, there is
indeed little difference between him and Marx, and it is easy to interpret
Marx as having put Hegel back on his feet. Luk&cs concludes his comparison
of the two passages saying
"They make it particularly clear just how necessary it was to
translate Hegel's dialectic into a materialistic one". (Ibid).
To account for the divergence in content between Hegel and Marx, Lukacs goes
on to explain that
"Marx's action in putting Spirit "back on its feet", in asserting
the priority of means of production over ideology did not simply
mean putting the plusses for the minuses; it meant a thorough
revision of all the substantive and ideological moment of history".
(Ibid) . 92
92. This interpretation of the relation of Hegel to Marx is not universally
accepted by Marxists. See Louis Althusser, Contradiction and Overdeter-
mination in For Marx trans. Ben Brewster. New Left Books, 1977 pp.89ff.
The question of the relation of Hegel's ideas to Marx's is much com¬
plicated by the fact that Marx claims both to have been greatly influ¬
enced by, and greatly to have improved upon Hegel's ideas, whereas in
fact his understanding of Hegel is at best impressionistic, and often
quite wrong.
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In contrast to this kind of interpretation, we must assert that the moments
of Spirit are not in Hegel's view false in themselves, as ideology is for
Marx, not something to be overcome, but are necessary to the existence of
Spirit, and only false if they are taken to have an independent existence of
their own. It is perhaps easy to lose sight of this fact since Hegel's
discussions of the parts of Spirit in the Phenomenology are very critical.
It is tempting to conclude, for example, from Hegel's discussion of Under¬
standing that Understanding is a type of thinking which should be abolished
entirely. This, however, is not Hegel's view. His argument is only that
Understanding must be understood as a moment of Spirit, and it is only
thinking which limits itself to understanding or which holds that under¬
standing itself is adequate to true knowledge of Spirit which is false. As
a moment of Spirit, Understanding can and must exist, and in the Preface to
the Phenomenology he describes it as "the greatest and most astonishing power
93
that exists, or rather absolute power", and he stresses that we must recog-
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nise its "true value and position". When Hegel stresses that the moments
of Spirit have "no existence separate from each other" we should not conclude
that this means that they have no right to exist at all, but only that they
must be taken not as independent entities, cogs in a machine, but as
essential parts in a harmonious unity.
If on the other hand we follow the other side of the ambiguity of the notion
of "totality", and hold that only the parts of the system are truly real,
and that the whole is no independent entity but only the sum of its parts,
93. Phenomenology, p. 18. Cf. Hyppolite op. cit. p. 384,and lesser Logic, p.114.
94. G.D.O'Brien. Hegel on Reason and History, University of Chicago Press,
1975, p. 73.
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it is possible to arrive, at a different conclusion, viz., that Spirit is
95
history. The Phenomenology becomes an account of history of Spirit from
the point of view of totality, that is from the end of history. Spirit is
96
now simply the positive result of a process of evolution. Lukacs cites
Engel's view of the Phenomenology to support this view:
"One may call it a parallel of the embryology and paleontology
of the mind, a development of individual consciousness through
its different stages, set in the form of an abbreviated repro¬
duction of the stages through which the consciousness of man
has passed in the course of history" (F.Engels, Feuerbach quoted
in Lukacs op. cit. p. 468).
One implication of this would have to be that consciousness, as the first
moment of subjective spirit, must have existed prior to self-consciousness
which results from it, and likewise self-consciousness prior to reason,
and so on. This implies both that the elements of Spirit are capable of
an independent existence which Hegel denies them, since he is explicit
97
that the moments of subjective Spirit presuppose Spirit as a whole;
and that Spirit is not merely realised in history, but is actually generated
by it. Hegel is now open to the other standard Marxist objection, that he
closed his system, whereas he should have left it open, on the grounds that
since Spirit has evolved so far in history, it is probable that it will
98
evolve further. Hegel in point of fact does not deny this in connection
95. This view is held widely, and particularly in connection with the
existentialist tendency to identify human reality with time or
temporality. Kojeve writes "Time is Man and Man is Time" and in
the same breath quotes from Hegel's Jena lectures "Spirit is Time"
(Kojeve, op. cit. p. 138). Cf. also Heidegger, Being and Time (whence
Kojeve derives many of his interpretations: see Kojeve op. cit. p.259);
and Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Part 2, Ch.2.
96. Lukacs op. cit. p. 472.
97. Phenomenology, p. 264
98. Michael Rosen, in Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism CUP 1982 p.24,
relates the question of the open or closed nature of the system to
what he calls the post festum paradox, and associates it particularly
with Marx and Engels. Cf. note 4-9 t° Chapter 3.
sn
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with history. However, there is, no suggestion in the Phenomenology that
Spirit evolves in the sense that something new emerges which did not exist
before. ^^In so far as. Hegel's argument is historical (which is the case
only of certain stages, notably Culture and Religion), it presents a move¬
ment from Spirit in itself or implicit to explicit Spirit for itself, or a
movement in which Spirit which exists becomes known, and not a movement in
which Spirit is generated from nothing.
The second interpretation I want to mention is often found in connection
with existentialism, and sometimes also Marxism: when Marxism and existen¬
tialism attempt to join hands Hegel is usually somewhere in the background.
The best example of this approach is undoubtedly Alexandre Kojeves much
admired Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Its defining characteristic
102
is that it takes as the Absolute not the Idea, but self-consciousness.
It thus takes up the position which Hegel associates especially with Fichte,
and with the abstract Absolute generally: that is to say, it takes up the
position which Hegel wants to criticise in the Phenomenology more than any
other.
99. Philosophy of History, op. cit, p. 86.
100. That is, in the sense defined by Kojeve (op.cit, p.87): "there is pro¬
gress from A to B, if A can be understood from B but B cannot be
understood from A". This, Hegel would no doubt comment, is the
attitude of the Understanding, which is satisfied only with explana¬
tion in terms of efficient cause. (See Ch. 4 below).
101. Basic Books, New York, 1969. Kojeves article on "Tyranny and Wisdom"
in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, Macmillan, London 1963 is also relevant
here, especially for its discussion of "mutual recognition".
102. Kojeve does not explicitly make self-consciousness the Absolute,
but the implicit identification is strong, and visible even in the
first sentence of his book which reads simply "Man is Self-Consciousness"
(op. cit, p.3). The explicit identification of ('pre-reflective"j '
self-consciousness with the Absolute is made, for example, by Sartre
in Being and Nothingness, Methuen 1969 p. xxxii.
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The result of this i.s that one element of subjective Spirit is made into
the turning point of the whole book. The structure of the argument is then
roughly as follows. Consciousness is the relation of man to nature, and
since nature is the opposite of Spirit there is little of interest to say
about it. The story gets off the ground only with self-consciousness. Here
in contrast to the inert being of consciousness, we find an immense con¬
tradiction which is expressed in a fight resulting in the relationship of
master and slave. Lordship and Bondage thus becomes the centrepiece of
the Phenomenology, and sets up the dilemma that although in self-conscious-
ness I depend only upon myself and am therefore free, and this essential
freedom would be contradicted by any relationship to any other being, it
is nevertheless the case that in order to experience this freedom I need
other being both in the sahpe of a world which I can shape according to my
free will, and in the shape of other self-conscious beings who can recog¬
nise my free will. The rest of the Phenomenology is then an account of the
working out of this contradiction, in which the essential antagonism of
self-consciousnesses towards one another is finally resolved through the
French Revolution and Napoleon's establishment of a "universal and
homogeneous state" where hostility is resolved into "mutual recognition".
The chapter on Religion becomes virtually redundant.
The notion of "mutual recognition" which Hegel mentions only oncfe in
Lordship and Bondage and very rarely elsewhere, then becomes exaggeraged
out of all proportion, and the central aim of the Phenomenology becomes
103. Phenomenology, p. 112: "They recognise themselves as mutually
recognising each other": this sentence looks forward to the
result of the battle and the phase Hegel later terms universal
self-consciousness (see Propadentic, op. cit. p. 78).
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to establish this notion. There is an immense literature on the idea.
Sartre suggests that Hegel was too optimistic, and argues that self-consciousnes
104
will always behave imperialistically towards one another. Simone de
Beauvoir argues, though not with great conviction, that mutual recognition
should be attainable.Christian existentialists have argued against
this that not Lordship and Bondage, but the Unhappy Consciousness should be
taken to be the centre of self-consciousness and thus of the Phenomenology,
reasoning that if mutual recognition is to be more than a universal 'hallo!'
it must be a recognition in each individual of something substantial, and
this becomes what Hegel terms the Unchangeable and which these interpreters,
mistakenly, take to be God. Judith Shklar's book, though not explicitly
existentialist, also makes mutual recognition a central category in an
interpretation of the Phenomenology, and we could cite further examples.
The idea of mutual recognition as a panacea, however, is quite foreign to
Hegel's thinking, and is much closer to the notion of the general will, for
example, than to Hegel's notion of Spirit. Spirit cannot be reduced to self-
consciousness. More to the point, Spirit cannot be reduced to anything
else, except in a sense to a moment of the Absolute Idea to which it is
partial. To attempt to explain it in terms of self-consciousness, or reason
or any other less elusive term, is to negate the central proposition which
Hegel shares with the ancients, that Spirit is Absolute. The Phenomenology
attempts neither to explain nor analytically to deduce Spirit, but to know
it: and it is this fact which gives the lie ultimately to any interpretation
of the Phenomenology which neglects Hegel's conception of the Absolute, and
of its appearance in the Phenomenology as absolute Spirit.
104. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit. p. 240 ff.
105. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, Penguin, 1972, p. 172.
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CHAPTER THREE : Phenomenology
In the preceding chapter it was argued that Hegel's conception of Spirit
corresponds to Plato's notion of justice, but defines it instead as Freedom.
This, we saw, involved Hegel not only in modifying some of Plato's ideas,
but also in revising the classical doctrine of form. For the ancients, the
task of philosophy was to know the world of forms, and their existence in
this illusory world was regarded perhaps as desirable, but not An any way
as essential to the forms themselves. Hegel, by contrast, because of his
inclusion of the subjective element, holds that existence in an individual
form is essential, that is, necessary to an ideal form. Ideal form thjis
becomes what Hegel calls the 'Idea';"'" and Hegel is committed to demonstrating
its necessity.
This leads Hegel to the well-known, and perhaps notorious notion of the
self-development of the concept. We encountered this idea earlier in
Foster's characterisation of Hegel's dialectic as a dialectic of the object,
2
in contrast to Plato's dialectic of thought only. Hegel expresses it in
1. "The Idea is the concept (Begriff) in so far as the concept gives
reality and existence to itself". (From Knox's preface to his
translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (op. cit), which con¬
tains a useful discussion of some of Hegel's terminology. Note,
however, that as A.Kojeve and others have stressed, Hegel rebels
against his contemporaries' specialised use of language, and tries
to use words in their everyday meaning. To do the contrary is to
assume a superiority of knowledge over the certainty of opinion,
which Hegel does not want to do. See Heckman's note in Hyppolite,
op. cit. p.xi). Lauer, in his Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology
Fordham U.P. 1976 p. 21 comments that "Not.since Plato, one might
say, has anyone stressed the primacy of the 'idea' ... as did
Hegel"; but in the same breath he negates the notion that differ¬
entiates Hegel's Idea from Plato's - that it must be real - by
interpreting the 'primacy of the idea' as the primacy of 'ought-
to-be-ness over is-ness'.
2. Foster, op.cit. p. 121f : p.75 above.
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the Philos.ophy of History/ for example, as follows:
"Philosophy {contrary to the. model of merely logical deductioiij
understands something quite different by the concept? here con¬
ceptualisation is the activity of the concept itself, it is no
mere concurrence of matter and form which has come from some¬
where else" (Quoted in G.D.O'Brien, Hegel on Reason and History,
University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 37).
The notion that Spirit is Freedom, then, implies the apparently contradictory
idea that it must be real and that we must be able to demonstrate the
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necessity of this though the self-development of the concept. It is this
idea which lies behind Hegel's notion of phenomenology, which he expounds
in the Introduction to the Phenomenology, and which will be the topic of
this chapter.
(a) Phenomenology in General
Elements of Hegel's idea of phenomenology can be found widely in the
writings of his immediate predecessors, including Herder, Lambert, Schiller,
Kant, and Fichte. The idea of phenomenology has also been taken over by
Husserl and later writes in the so-called phenomenological movement. How¬
ever, in Hegel's writing it has a meaning which is distinct both from prior
and later usage.
3. Hegel often counterposes freedom andi necessity in this apparently
paradoxical way, but in his view, and in contrast to the existentialist
view discussed at the end of the last chapter, when freedom and
necessity are understood rationally, rather than from the stand¬
point of consciousness, they do not in fact contradict each other.
See, for example, Hegel's Lesser Logic, op. cit. p. 51f and p. 219f;
Philosophy of Spirit, op. cit. p. 241; or Philosophy of History, op.
cit. p. 39. Schelling also held that 'Necessity must be in Liberty":
see Hyppolite op. cit. p. 28. On the notion of the self development
of the concept, see also Phenomenology, p.44.
In the Encyclopaedia, as we have seen, phenomenology appears only as the
second moment of subjective spirit. It is the moment of the appearance of
subjective spirit to consciousness, which lies between subjective spirit
in itself,or the soul, and subjective spirit in and for itself, actual
individual Spirit. Phenomenology is thus defined in terms of the attitude
of consciousness.
"The subject, more definitely seized, is Spirit. It is Phenomenal
when essentially relating to an existent object; in so far as it is
Consciousness. The Science of Consciousness is, therefore, called
The Phenomenology of Spirit" (Propadeutic, op. cit. p. 69).
The notion of phenomenology as the science of consciousness comes more or
less directly from Kant. As Hoffmeister has argued,
"the position of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the whole of
Hegel's system ... corresponds precisely to that which Kant
assigned to his Critique of Pure Reason", (quoted in Kaufmann
op. cit. p. 164).
Hegel acknowledges his debt to Kant in the Philosophy of Mind.
"Kantian philosophy can be described most precisely as envisaging
Spirit as consciousness; it contains essentially the determina¬
tions of phenomenology and not of the philosophy of Spirit"
(Philosophy of Mind, op. cit. p. 156).
This, however, is also to be taken as a criticism of Kant's position, Kant
correctly analyses Spirit into its three essential subjective moments, but
views these only from the standpoint of consciousness. This means that the
moments of Spirit become objects, since consciousness can only be con¬
sciousness of an object. This in turn contradicts Hegel's fundamental
assertion that the moments of Spirit are not parts, or to use Kant's word,
faculties, which have an autonomous existence, but which exist only as
4
moments of Spirit. A 'philosophy of Spirit' views Spirit not only from
4. cf. Hyppolite, op. cit. p. 61.
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the standpoint of consciousness, which after all is only one moment of
Spirit, hut also from the stand point of Spirit as a whole.^ It thus
grasps Spirit itself as a whole, and not simply as an aggregation of parts
or faculties.
It is partly also in distinguishing phenomenology from philosophy of Spirit
in terms of their respective standpoints of consciousness and Spirit that
Hegel differs from Husserl and his followers.^ Husserl's phenomenological
reduction, which
"puts, as we say, the world between brackets, excludes the world
which is simply there! from the subjects field, presenting in
its stead the so-and-so-experienced-perceived-remembered-judged-
thought-valued-etc., world, as such the "bracketed" world. Not
the world or any part of it appears but the sense of the world"
(E.Husserl, Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1929, p. 700) 7.
could be taken without too much difficulty as a description of the way Spirit
appears to consciousness in Hegel. Husserl however, goes further than Hegel
and asserts that all objective existence is essentially relative to a subject.
"For all objective existence is essentially "relative", and owes
its nature to a unity of intention, which being established
according to transcendental laws, produces consciousness with
its habit of belief and its conviction", (ibid p. 702). 8
5. This may be usefully compared with Hegel's comments on Empiricism
in Natural Law p. 58 ff, or Lesser Logic pp 60-65.
6. In so far as it is possible to generalise about such a diverse body
of thought. See Kaufrnann, op. cit. p. 165.
7. Husserl's article on Phenomenology does not appear in later editions
of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica.
8. Husserl may not consistently be a subjective idealist. His philosophy
however is in general so widely removed from Hegel's that further to
contrast their respective views would be of little value here. See
It I' j
Q. Lauer, Phenomenology: Hegel and Husserl in Beyond Epistemology
Weiss (ed.) Nighoff, The Hague, 1974, pp. 174-197.
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Th is implies that there is, only consciousness, and that the "unity of
intention" to which objective existence is relative is itself in some
sense absolute. Hegel, by contrast, holds that there is more than con¬
sciousness, namely Spirit; and that Spirit, not the subject of conscious¬
ness, is absolute.
However, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the term phenomenology has an
additional meaning which is not included in the later works, to wit, that
9
it serves as an introduction to the system of philosophy. In Hegel's
later work the idea of an introduction to philosophy is separated from
the notion of phenomenology, and for example in the "Doctrine of Spirit as
an Introduction to Philosophy", which Hegel wrote at Nuremburg, there
is no mention of phenomenology. However, in the Phenomenology the two
ideas are closely related to each other, in so far as both are related to
10
the central notion of expevvence.
The Phenomenology deals always with two levels of awareness. The first is
"phenomenal knowledge'.' This is usually labelled "for us" in the Phenomenology
and corresponds to the later meaning of phenomenology which Hegel uses in
the Encyclopaedia and Propadeatic. The second is "natural consciousness".
This is a knowledge which restricts itself to the standpoint of conscious¬
ness. While phenomenal knowledge is already philosophical, accepting the
notion of the absolute and taking up the standpoint of spirit, natural con¬
sciousness does not recognise the Absolute, and is aware only of things.
9. This idea can be found in Kant, and also owes must to Schiller's
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man - see especially the 23rd
Letter.
10. The Phenomenology is the "science of the experience of consciousness"
(Phenomenology p. 56). The same cannot be said of the phenomenology
of the Encyclopaedia and Propedeutic, where the notion of experience
in the sense discussed below is absent.
Everthing it observes it treats, as. a discrete independent entity, not as
something which, is. essentially relative to the Absolute. It has the
attitude of subjectivity which Hegel attributes to Kant, Jacobi and Fichte
-'-n Faith and Knowledge, which
"turns the beautiful into things - the grove into timber, the images
into things that have eyes and do not see, ears and do not hear".
(Faith and Knowledge, Albany, 1977, p. 58) .
The crucial notion of experience, as we shall see, is a combination of
both these attitudes.
Phenomenal knowledge can be characterised as a revision of Plato's recollection.
Up to a point it is directly parallel to it. Phenomenal knowledge presupposes
an acceptance of the Absolute, or a philosophical attitude. If it considers
the Absolute in the form of the soul, for example, it may reason as follows.
Is it possible to conceive of a being which has soul, which is not, for
example courageous? If this is inconceivable, then it follows that courage
must be acknowledged to be a component of the soul. This is essentially the
Platonic procedure. Hegel then adds to this the stronger notion - which if
it is present in Plato is present only in a weak form - that reason must not
only be able to discover components of the soul, but to establish more pre¬
cisely what are the essenti-at moments of the soul. This means that it must
discover what in a stronger sense is necessary to the soul. Phenomenal
knowledge must therefore be able to demonstrate the necessity of the parts
to the whole and to each other, and to demonstrate that the whole is
necessary to the parts.
Hegel explains how his use of the notion of recollection or Er—innerung
differs from Plato's in the History of Philosophy.
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"In one sense recollection (Erinnerung) is certainly an unfortunate
expression, in the s.ense, namely, that an object is. reproduced which
already existed at another time. But recollection has another sense,
which, is. given by i.ts etymology, namely that of making oneself inward,
and this is the profound meaning of the word in thought. In this
sense it may undoubtably be said that knowledge of the universal is
nothing but a recollection, a going within self, and that we make
that which at first shows itself in an external form and determined
as a manifold into an inward, a universal, because we go into our¬
selves and thus bring what is inward into consciousness. With Plato,
however, as we cannot deny, the word recollection has constantly
the first and empirical sense" (Hegel, Lectures on the History of
Philosophy, Vol. 2, London 1894, p. 34).
Referring to the Meno, Hegel goes on to argue that this leads Plato to
see knowledge not so much as an internalisation, that is as something with
an essential subjective element, but instead as a remembering of something
which already exists in quite a full sense, and has merely been temporarily
forgotten. This then leads Plato to view the soul as the repository of
this forgotten knowledge, and thus to view the soul as a sensuous thing
belonging to the individual, not as a universal which belongs to Spirit.
Thus recollection, in Plato's view,
"is not thought, for recollection refers to man as a sensuous "this",
not as a universal!' (ibid, p. 35),
Finally, Hegel argues that since the soul in Plato becomes a thing, it is
appropriate that he should represent it ultimately through a myth - the myth
which he desires from Egyptian culture, according to Hegel, of the immortality
of the soul.
In order to transcend this conception in Hegel's view, it is necessary to
12
present the soul as a rational necessity, or as something which is thought.
11. Plato, Republic, 608c - 621d - that is, to the end; Plato Phaedo,
and Hegel loc. cit.
12. History of Philosophy, Vol II, p. 37.
97
It is not sufficient simply to be content to find the elements of the soul,
or to find all empirical men to conform to the idea of the soul. It is
necessary to transcend this finite judgement to the universal judgement that
the soul is in itself necessary. Thus Hegel's criticsm of Plato here is
formally identical to his criticism of Kant for merely finding his categories
and his contrasting of Fichte's attempt to deduce them as necessary.
"But to pick up the plurality of categories as a welcome find,
taking them e.g. from the various judgements, and complacently
accepting them so, is in fact to be regarded as an outrage on
Science. Where else should Understanding be able to demonstrate
a necessity, if it is unable to do so in its own self, which is
pure necessity?"" (Phenomenology, p. 143).
However, if phenomenal knowledge is thus platonic recollection but repre¬
sented as thought or as necessary, and if this adequately describes the
phenomenology of the Encyclopaedia, the Phenomenology itself includes the
quite separate notion of natural consciousness. This inclusion is also in
a sense a modification bf Plato's view. If Hegel interprets recollection
in a way which makes it more subjective than it could befor . Plato, through
natural consciousness he returns to the side of substance and views it in
a way which differs significantly from Plato's. This difference may be
expressed by saying that natural consciousness has certainty rather than
opinion, and, more importantly, that this certainty is based not so much on
13 14
an intuitive grasp of the forms, but on an Entausserung of consciousness.
13. Entausserung may be translated "objectification", "externalisation"
or sometimes as"alienation".
14. Lukacs (op. cit. p. 537 ff) argues that Entaus&erung is "the central
philosophical concept of the Phenomenology", and if by this we under¬
stand its most original contribution rather than its most dominant
idea, we may certainly agree. However, Lukacs emphasises Entausserung
for reasons which differ from those set out in this chapter. In
particular, Entausserung becomes especially associated with the Marxist
interpretation of it as alienation. Thus, rather than seeing Entaus¬
serung as essentially a moment of consciousness, Lukacs connects it
rather with one of its specific and limited forms, Bildung, and hence
with history and creative labour rather than with phenomenal knowledge
as a whole.
9 8
In natural consciousness the object is present in an alien or objective form,
that is as a thing. By definition, since it is consciousness, it cannot
be anything other than an awareness of things, and it is therefore prevented
precisely from seeing things as an externalisation of its own thought. It
is a purely passive receiver of knowledge, and exerts no critical judgement
- this belongs to reason, not consciousness. It is therefore incapable of
experience in the strict sense of the word, because, since it never questions
its awareness, it learns nothing from it. The challenge of the Phenomenology
then, becomes to demonstrate to this consciousness the necessity of recog¬
nising that what it takes to be things are in fact moments of Spirit, and in
this sense of its own self. This will constitute experience, which is there¬
fore the result of neither natural consciousness nor phenomenal knowledge
separately, but of their combination.
If natural consciousness is thus to be demonstrated to be inadequate, it is
nevertheless also the case that Hegel holds it to be an essential moment in
knowledge. Knowledge, that is, must be knowledge of an object which takes
or has taken a phenomenal form: all knowledge is consciousness. In other
words, unless we are to accept the Platonic view that what is known exists
"really" in a world which is distinct from phenomena, it is necessary to
see knowledge not only as Evinnerung, but equally as its direct opposite,
as Entcusserung.
Before we go on to see how Hegel defends this approach in the Introduction to
the Phenomenology, we may note that the account offered differs from one
common interpretation of the difference between natural consciousness and
phenomenal knowledge. This views natural consciousness not so much as an
attitude which is an essential moment of phenomenal knowledge, as a real
being which in virtue of its ignorance is the target the Phenomenology sets
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out to destroy, much as. Socrates, sets, out to destroy Thrasymachus1 sophism
in the Republic. This, interpretation can lead to a view of the Phenomenology
as containing a hierarchy of levels of knowledge. Thus Werner Marx,^ for
example, distinguishes three levels of knowledge, (not two as we have done).
Natural consciousness is the level of the uninitiate who has not yet read
the Phenomenology. Phenomenal knowledge is the level of the person reading
the Phenomenology for the first time. Finally, when we have read and fully
digested the Phenomenology we move to the attitude of Science and are ready
to proceed to Hegel's Science of Logic.
In contrast to this view we may note firstly that it is not clear that in
Hegel's view the last two levels are distinguishable, since he holds that
16
"the way to science is itself already science". More importantly, however,
we should note that although we, the readers of the Phenomenology are ex¬
pected to take the philosophical standpoint of phenomenal knowledge, rather
than the certainty of natural consciousness, it is nevertheless the case
that both standpoints are essential to the Phenomenology. Natural conscious¬
ness does not relate to phenomenal knowledge as error to truth, but as
certainty to truth; and in taking up a philosophical attitude we do not
leave natural consciousness behind, but understand it as a necessary part
of knowledge, and therefore of ourselves.
15. W.Marx. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Harper & Row 1975.
16. Phenomenology p. 56.
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This conclusion may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, Hegel is arguing
that a premise of phenomenal knowledge is. natural consciousness. On the
other, he holds that in order for natural consciousness to have experience,
it needs an independent stimulus from phenomenal knowledge, which knows
the Absolute. The Absolute, which Hegel sets out to demonstrate as a
necessity, is equally presupposed. It emerges from natural consciousness,
but only if that consciousness is brought into contact with another which
knows the Absolute. However, there is no doubt that Hegel is aware of
this difficulty. In the following discussion of the Introduction to the
Phenomenology we will question the extent to which he overcomes it - and
at what price.
(b) Hegel's Introduction
Hegel explains how he intends to overcome this difficulty in the Phenomenology
in the Introduction to that work. The Introduction was written before the
main text of the Phenomenology, unlike the Preface which was composed later
and which is difficult to understand without some knowledge of the text it¬
self. The Introduction, therefore, not the Preface, is the logical beginning
of the Phenomenology; and in it Hegel sets out his intentions as much for
his own benefit as for his readers. As Hyppolite comments "Hegel thought
18
first for himself".
In Hyppolite's view, the Introduction is to be interpreted literally as an
introduction to subjective spirit only, that is, to the phenomenology which
reappears in the Philosophy of Spirit.
17. M.Rosen, in Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism, C.U.P 182 has especially
drawn attention to this paradox. See e.g. p. 26 of that work.
18. Hyppolite, op.cit. p.57.
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"It is literally an introduction only to the first three moments
of the book, that is, consciousness, self-cons.ciousness., and
reason. The content of the last part of the work, which contains
the especially important arguments on Spirit and on religion,
exceeds the Phenomenology as the latter is defined stricto sensu
in the introduction. Hegel seems to have inserted something into
the framework of phenomenological development which he had not
at first intended to include" (Hyppolite op. cit. p. 4) 19
Hbwever, it will be argued in what follows that the approach outlined in
the introduction is an approach which is suitable not just for phenomenal
knowledge, but also for natural consciousness, and that a phenomenology
which involves natural consciousness is consistent with Hegel's entire
book, and not just the first three sections. The introduction should
therefore be read as an introduction to the entire book; though it may
be admitted that Hegel expanded the later sections well beyond his
.... . 20
orrgrnal rntentions.
The Introduction divides naturally into two parts. The first gives "some
preliminary and general remarks about the nature and necessity of the
progression", and the second covers "the method of carrying out the enquiry"
We will consider each separately.
19. Cf. also Hyppolite, op. cit. p. 57.
20. Hegel was apparently working on a revision especially of these
parts when he died in 1831. (G.R.G.Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel,
OUP 1965, p. 65.)
21. Phenomenology, p. 52.
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Hegel begins the Introduction, with a discussion of a view held by Reinhold,
which he had already criticised in the Difference essay. Reinhold argued
that knowledge must be conceived of either as an instrument which we use in
order to achieve knowledge of the Absolute, or as a medium through which
the Absolute appears to us. In either case, knowledge is something which
is liable to affect or alter the Absolute in presenting it to us, and it
follows therefore that before we claim to know something we ought first
to examine the mechanism through which we know it, so that we may add or
subtract anything which is omitted or added on to knowledge by that mechanism.
Schelling commented that in Reinhold's philosophy "the whole of his force
is wasted in the run, and nothing left for the jump". Hegel, on the other
hand, he described by contrast as "a downright categorical kind of being,
who tolerates no ceremony with philosophy but, without waiting for such
22
grace before meat, falls to at once with a good appetite". As Caird
comments,in philosophy in Hegel's view it is necessary "a corps perdu
23
hznetnzusturzen" , that is, roughly/, to dive in head first. Hegel ex¬
plains the reason for this in terms simply of what is meant by truth.
"To be specific, it [Reinhold's^ viewj takes for granted certain
ideas about cognition as an instrument and a medium, and assumes
that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition.
Above all it presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side and
cognition on the other, independent and separated from it, and
yet is something real, or in other words it presupposes that
cognition which, since it is excluded from the Absolute, is
surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true, an
assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals itself
rather as fear of the truth." (Phenomenology, p. 47).
22.
23.
Quoted in E. Caird, Hegel, Blackwood 1883, p. 56.
Ibid.
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Though this argument i.s directed specifically against Reinhold's view of
knowledge, it can also be. and often is taken as a criticism of any pro-
24 25
padeiitic, or 'organon' theory of knowledge and especially of Kant's.
Hegel can be found directing much the same kind of argument against Kant
in the lesser Logic;
"We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument,
before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed;
for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be
spent in vain ... Unless we wish to deceived by words, it is
easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instru¬
ments, we can try and criticise them in other ways than by
setting about the special work for which they are destined.
But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an
act of; knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the
same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know
is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to
venture into the water until he had learned to swim". (Lesser
Logic, p. 14 §10) 26
It is true that from a certain point of view Hegel's argument is intended
to apply quite generally. It presupposes Hegel's conception of the
Absolute, depending as he puts it upon "the fact that the Absolute alone
is true, or the truth alone is absolute". (Phenomenology, p. 47).
This statement can be taken as a romantic defense of the classical approach
to philosophy, for only within such an approach is such a position self-
evident. Only classical philosophy is certain both that the truth is in¬
dependent, and at the same time capable of being known. In modern philosophy
24. 'Organon' is a term used by some commentation on this passage
(eg. Hyppolite p.5, Babermas op. cit. p.10), derived from the
title of Aristotle's logical writings, used to designate an instru¬
ment of knowledge.
25. E.g. Richard Norman, Hegel's Phenomenology, S.UR, 1976, p. 11
J.Habermas, Knowledge & Human Interests, Heinemann 1978, Ch. 1.
26. Hegel uses this metaphor again in the same context in the
History of Philosophy. See Habermas, op. cit. p. 7.
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lt is commonly held either that the absolute is in some way unknowable,
or alternatively that it may be known by reducing it to some less vague
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idea (such as for example happiness or utility) , so that the absolute in
being known loses its independence. In so far as the Absolute is known,
it is known literally into oblivion, since it can everywhere be replaced
by whatever more concrete notion it has been reduced to or explained by.
It is in this sense that only classical philosophy is philosophy in the
true sense of the word, since only it is a love of knowledge which respects
the independence of its object, while modern philosophy can better be
described as mere desire for knowledge, a desire which would be satisfied
29
by the consumption, that is destruction of its object.
Hegel, however, does not merely dismiss the claims of modern philosophy,
but goes on to ask how the apparently 'adventitious and arbitrary' ideas
associated with the Absolute are to be defended. To one who simply rejects
the idea of the Absolute out of hand - Hume, for example - it is scarcely
27. In Hume for example, statements about the Absolute, such as God exists,
are absurd since they are neither matters of fact nor pure relations
of ideas. Similarly, in Kant, certain manifestations of the Absolute
(eg. God, the thing-in-itself, sublime beauty) are relegated to the
unknowable world of nuomena (See S. Korner, Kant, Penguin, p. 167).
Hegel makes this point in explicit connection with Kant, Jacobi, and
Fichte in Faith and Knowledge trans. Cerf & Harris, Albany 1977 p. 56.
28. Hegel in his earlier works is particularly concerned to oppose
"Eudaemonism", in which happiness is the anchor for rational thought.
However, the argument suggested here could equally be applied to
"freedom" in J.S.Mill's essay On Liberty, or to "prudence" or "Life"
in HobbeS' Leviathan, or any of the various interpretations of the
notion of "utility" in utilitarian thought.
29. Hegel takes this view especailly of what he calls "Eudaemonism" in
Natural Law and Faith and Knowledge. "Locke and the Eudaemonists
transformed philosophy into empirical psychology". (Faith and Knowledge
p. 63.)
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enough to say that knowledge of the absolute is simply different, and that
we may choose it in preference to an ordinary or empirical way of looking
at things. On the other hand, we can hardly locate the seeds of Absolute
within such an ordinary view, since if we reduce it to the ordinary view
it is no longer different from it, while if we do not reduce it to the
ordinary view, then we must say in what sense it is different and deal with
it as such, as "what it is in and for itself
"It is for this reason that an exposition of how knowledge makes
its appearance will have to be undertaken". (Phenomenology, p. 49).
It is in virtue of this conclusion that we must note that it is significant
that Hegel has chosen to direct his criticism specifically at Reinhold, not
Kant. In proposing a return to the point of view of consciousness, that is
to the appearance of knowledge, he is effectively taking up a Kantian posi¬
tion. In place of the view of the Absolute as substance, Hegel is stressing
also the essential importance of the Absolute as subject, ie. of consciousness.
As Hyppolite writes,
"jjn SchellingJ phenomenal knowledge remains cut off from absolute
knowledge. Hegel, by contrast, returns to phenomenal knowledge, that
is, to the knowledge of common consciousness, and claims to show how
it necessarily leads to absolute knowledge, or, even, how it is an
absolute knowledge which does not yet know itself as such. But this
implies a return to the point of view of consciousness, the point of
view that was Kant's and Fichte's. Having formally criticised all
propadeutics, Hegel now insists on the need to place oneself at the
point of view of natural consciousness and to lead it gradually to
philosophic knowledge: one cannot begin with absolute knowledge".
(Hyppolite op. cit. p.6f) .
It is mistaken, therefore, to read the Phenomenology as in any fundamental
30. Phenomenology, p. 49.
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sense a criticism of Kant. Thi.s. is not to deny that there are a number of
arguments in the. phenomenology which are either directed against Kant or
which can be taken as criticisms of Kant. Nor is it to deny that Hegel's
position is fundamentally different from Kant's. However, as we have seen,
Hegel's central criticism of Kant is that he gives only a phenomenology and
not a philosophy of Spirit. Hegel's Phenomenology is also only a pheno¬
menology, and to get a full sense of his opposition to Kant it is necessary
to understand his Phenomenology as only one moment of his system, the
system seen from the (Kantian) standpoint of consciousness. The major
difference between Hegel's and Kant's phenomenologies, then, is that Hegel's
proceeds to a Logic which presents the Absolute in its truth, or in and for
itself. Hegel's phenomenology both assumes the existence of and sets out
to demonstrate and to know this Absolute; while Kant's holds the absolute
31
to be unknowable. One conclusion which follows from this is that if it
is true, as was argued earlier, that it is misleading to emphasise any
particular moment of Spirit at the expense of others, it may be equally
misleading to emphasise the Phenomenology over other parts of Hegel's
system - whether we are considering the earlier system of a Phenomenology
followed by a Logic or the later system which consisted of a Logic, a
Philosophy of Nature, and a Philosophy of Spirit. ,The Phenomenology is
only an introduction to Hegel's system, and views it only from the standpoint
31. See Faith and Knowledge, p. 61
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of consciousness.
However, if the Phenomenology is thus limited, we should also note that it
is by the same token broader than the Kantian phenomenology. The Critique
of Pure Reason can be characterised as a presentation of consciousness to
consciousness,in so far as the whole discussion is of the content of an
individual consciousness. This is exactly what Hegel does in the section
of the Encyclopaedia on Phenomenology. The Phenomenology of Spirit, by
contrast, is a presentation of spirit to a consciousness which is itself
already implicitly not just consciousness but Spirit. The Phenomenology
thus rightly includes a phenomenological discussion of all of Spirit, that
is of subjective, objective, and absolute Spirit, and there is no reason
why it should be constrained to subjective Spirit as Hyppolite suggests.
Hegel himself summarises the position in the lesser Logic as follows:
"In my Phenomenology of Spirit, which on that account was at its
publication described as the first part of the System of Philosophy
the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase
of Spirit, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage
gradually of necessity worked onward to the philosophic point of
view, the necessity of that view being proved in the process. But
in these circumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to
the mere form of consciousness. For the stage of philosophical
knowledge is the richest in material and organisation, and there¬
fore, as it came before us in the shape of a result, it presupposed
the existence of the concrete foundations of consciousness, such
as individual and social morality, art and religion. (Lesser Logic,
op. ci t, p. 4 5 f) .
32. The idea that Phenomenology contains the whole of Hegel's thought is
supported particularly by those who (like the existentialists) wish
to put the stress on the freedom of the individual, which, if it is
to be found anywhere in Hegel's thought, must be found within Spirit.
This attitude then fails to find freedom in other dimensions of Hegel's
work. In particular it is unable to combine the notions of freedom
with either nature or with law. Thus Kojeve, for example, rejects
Hegel's philosophy of nature (Kojeve, op. cit. p. 146 and 133n) . Also in
so far as he describes Hegel's ideal state as "universal and class¬
less", Kojeve effectively rejects the Philosophy of Right,which
makes diversity and class essential to the state. This attitude,
much like Rousseau's, can lead either to authoritarianism or anarchism,
depending upon whether the emphasis is put on "universal" or "class¬
less", and has little in common with Hegel's view.
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When Hegel goes, on to describe the way knowledge appears to consciousness,
then, his view seems, to have little in common with Kant, and has more of
the imagery of Plato's cave or of Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress than of
critical philosophy. He says
"Now, because it has only phenomenal knowledge as its object, this
exposition seem not to be science, free and self-moving in its own
shape; yet from this standpoint it can be regarded as the path of
the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge,
or as the way of the soul which journeys through the series of its
own configurations as though they were stations appointed for it
by its own nature, so that it may purify itself for the life of
the Spirit, and achieve finally, through a completed experience
of itself, the awareness of what it really is in itself".
(Phenomenology, p. 49).
This journey, naturally enough, will only be undergone by someone who
wants to make it. The 'natural consciousness', therefore, must be a
sceptic, otherwise he will not bother to enquire after the truth. Further,
his scepticism must be profound. The modern sceptic with his 'shilly-
33
shallying' about such questions as whether we can assume the sun will
rise tomorrow is not serious in his scepticism. .The ancient sceptic, by
contrast, is one who has discovered to his utter dismay that that which
34
he held to be truth is in fact illusion. To be capable of philosophical
education (Bitdung) natural consciousness must be a sceptic in the latter
sense. It must have experienced the "loss of its own self", perhaps through
the Socratic elenchus. "Bifurcation is the source of the need for philosophy",
33. Phenomenology, p. 49.
34. Hegel discusses the relation of ancient to modern scepticism in his
Jena review article on Schulze titled 'Relation of scepticism to
philosophy, account of its various modifications and comparison of
the most modern with ancient scepticism', and also in the lesser
Logic, p. 64 §39.
35. Quoted, e.g., by Kaufmann, op. cit, p. 74.
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as Hegel said in a wall known passage in the Difference essay. Philosophy
presupposes for its very existence not mere academic doubt, but experiential
despair; and later in the section of Spirit dealing with tragedy Hegel
will attempt to give an account of the origins of this despair.
Scepticism alone, however, is still not enough. There is no necessary con¬
nection between the proof that what was held to be true is false, and that
something else is in fact true. The Socratic etenchus may shake fixed
opinion, but it does not necessarily give rise to knowledge, except to one
who chooses also to seek knowledge. In Plato's Republic for example,
Thrasymachus experiences the eZenchus, but it is then left up to Aedimantus
and Glaucon, Socrates' supporters and friends, to go on to seek the true
view.~^ Similarly, when scepticism appears as a "universal form of the
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World-Spirit", as Hegel puts it, in the Roman Empire, it is an attitude
which holds the truth to be that everything can be reduced to absurdity, or
that there is no truth. It is a viewpoint which is not opinionated, but
which nevertheless is not yet philosophical.
It is in order to overcome the separation between the negative criticism
of scepticism and the positive aim of philosophy that Hegel introduces what
is perhaps the most original, and certainly the most controversial idea in
his Introduction: the idea of determinate negation. Speaking of the
scepticism of the Roman period, he comments
36. Republic, 336b-367d.
37. Phenomenology, p. 121 - referring in fact to stoicism, of which
scepticism is the direct counterpart.
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"This, is just the scepticism which only ever sees, pure nothingness
in its. results, and abstracts. away from the fact that this nothingness
is. specifically the nothingness, of that from which it results. For
it is only when it is taken as the result of that from which it
emerges, that it is, in fact the true result; in that case it is
itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content. The
scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness
or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to
see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to
throw it too into the same empty abyss. But when, on the other
hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely as a
determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen,
and in the negation the transition is made through which the pro¬
gress through the complete series of forms come about".
(Phenomenology, p. 51).
Finally, to complete the circle, Hegel remarks that only full knowledge of
the Absolute will satisfy a consciousness which has begun this journey.
"But the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial
progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to
go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself,vtffcgre Notion
(Begriff) corresponds to object and object to Notion. Hence the
progress towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it no
satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations on the way".
(Phenomenology, p. 51)
The notion of determinate negation, and the associated notion of experience,
or what commentators have often and perhaps misleadingly dubbed the method
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of "immanent critique", is quite central to Hegel's thought. Nevertheless,
38. The notion of immanent critique seems to have originated in the
'Frankfurt school'. It perhaps also has resonances with a debate
about the nature of Marx's Capital, insofar as the latter is held
either to be scientific political economy in relation to the pre-
scientific work of Smith, Ricardo, et al. (Althusser Ftor Marx, NLB
1977) or essentially a critique of political economy or of the very
idea of political economy (eg. John Holloway and Sol Picciotto,
The State and Capital, London, Edward Arnold 1977) or both at the
same time (e.g. Coletti "Marxism and the Dialectic" in New Left
Review No. 93). It is not fruitful, however, to look to Hegel for
a solution of that debate. Capital's basic structure is of an
analytical deduction from a first (and quite indefensible) premise,
that abstract labour time is the source of all value, and criticises
other positions in view of this absolute truth. Hegel is funda¬
mentally opposed to such analytical deductions, for many reasons
some of which will be pointed but in due course here.
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it has, been interpreted in a wide variety of ways. Before we. go on to see
how Hegel defends i.t in. his: discussion of the method of the Phenomenology,
we will consider some of these interpretations and some corresponding
criticisms: of Hegel's position. How and in what sense can a negative
criticism produce a positive result? And in what sense can this result
be said to be necessary?
One fairly widespread line of interpretation gives what we might call a
39
minimal reading of determinate negation. Hegel is not making the strong
and apparently incomprehensible assertion that negation can of itself pro¬
duce a positive result, but only that it can distinguish truth from error.
Harris, for example, characterises the Phenomenology as
"a sequence in which the breakdown of each form of consciousness
leaves the germ of the next one as its natural residue" (H.Harris,
Hegel's Development, OUP 1972, p. 321)
Peter Singer expresses a similar view, adding in the idea that the various
stages of the Phenomenology are progressively less wrong, and that we
finally arrive at absolute knowledge, which is right. The Phenomenology
in his view describes
"the development of consciousness as a development towards forms
of consciousness that more fully grasp reality, culminating in
absolute knowledge" (P. Singer, Hegel, OUP 1983, p. 48). 40
39. In the following discussion I mention a number of authors, but do
not mean to suggest that there is a consistent school of thought on
the matter, or that there is a strong logical progression between
the various ideas mentioned.
40. This may also be connected with the idea that the Phenomenology is
'evolutionary'. Kaufmann (op. cit. p. 148), as well as some others
authors already cited, gives another version of this interpretation.
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The notion of absolute knowledge in this kind of interpretation generally
has a double meaning. It is, either what is. not wrong, or it is the totality
of all the previous modes of knowledge, and often both. The idea that
Absolute knowledge is not wrong can be found for example in Norman's writing.
Absolute knowledge is a coincidence of subject and object, or as Hegel says,
41
of object and notion. It is arrived at through an "internal critique"
which like Platonic dialogue criticise false standpoints not by comparing
them to a true position, but by using their own criteria and allowing them
to fall by their own weight as a result of their internal contradictions.
The residue then, by implication is true. Kojeve also takes this view of
absolute knowledge, and dares to push it to its limit. In his view absolute
knowledge is something which vanishes as soon as it is achieved, since it
consists only in the knowledge that man is free, in relation to which there
is no other truth, since to assign any further predicate to man is to make
him dependent on that predicate, and this would contradict the truth of
his freedom, or as Sartre puts it, would be in 'bad faith'.^2/43 ^j-,soiute
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knowledge then appears either as mere contingency or as positive absurdity,
41. Norman, op. cit, p. 22.
42. Kojeve, op. cit. p. 160n (this is a note added to the second French
edition)
43. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Part I Ch. 2, or Existentialism and
Humanism.
44. It is worth noting in connection with this that Kojeve, like Hegel,
sees absolute knowledge or wisdom as a kind of satisfaction, (see
p. 3/ above). However, unlike Hegel, he connects this satisfaction
directly to natural desire, so that it is achieved precisely through
the consumption of its object. The satisfaction Hegel has in mind,
however, is, like Plato's, Erotic rather than merely desiring. Natural
consciousness is satisfied when it finds and recognises the absolute,
not when it consumes it. It finds the object of its love, which is
truth, and thence it becomes a philosopher, a lover of truth, and
this satisfies it. Kojeve does not ever achieve a philosophical
attitude in this Hegelian sense of the world, since he finds in
truth not an independent object worthy of respect, but only a de¬
pendent thing, whose dependence is proven precisely in its destruction
or consumption. The removal of the sense of independence from the
object is equivalent to the end of history mentioned in Kojeve's note.
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and its. virtue li.es. in the fact that by communing only with itself and
being indifferent to (or free from) any objectivity, it avoids positive
error.
Conversely, it is possible to identify in both Kojeve and Norman the idea
that absolute knowledge is to be understood as the totality of all other
types for claims to knowledge. Thus Norman comments
"Hegel does not regard Absolute Knowledge as some new and
qualitatively different mode of cognition which consciousness
is to reach by leaving behind all its previous forms of ex¬
perience. On the contrary, Absolute Knowledge is nothing but
the totality of these previous forms" (Norman, op. cit. p.107).
This view, however, raises an obvious difficulty, because all previous forms
of experience have been shown by internal critique to be false. If there
is to be any content to Absolute knowledge, then there must be some 'residue',
as Harris said, left over after criticism, which is the True. Thus Lauer,
for example, who characterises the Phenomenology as a series of worthwhile
dead ends, comments that
"As the Phenomenology progresses, not only will the dead ends
become tantalizingly numerous, but we shall have to resist the
temptation to skip any of them. In doing this we shall note,
as we have already, that the phenomenological dead-end street
is any "certainty" which is inadequate to its own content or "truth"
This will mean not only successively negating certainties for the
sake of truth, but also making sure not to loose the truth con¬
tained in each certainty". (Q. Lauer, A Reading of Hegel's
Phenomenology, Fordham U.P. 1976, p.90).
Broadly then, and perhaps at risk of doing injustice individually to the
authors cited, we may say that in this general line of interpretation
Hegel's argument is very much like Plato's, but while the only knowledge
which Socratic critical dialectic produced was a knowledge of ignorance,
Hegel dares to go beyond Plato and argue that he can achieve a positive
result using what appears to be the same method. This argument is then,
as Popper has pointed out, clearly objectionable. To refute a position
is in Popper's view to confront it with a logically incompatible observa-
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tion. This results, in a theory which is, acknowledged to contain a contra¬
diction. This can indeed produce some further result, but in Popper's view
it is possible to deduce anything from a theory which contain a contradiction
so that no positive or specific result may be deduced. Refutation, there¬
fore, is at best an heuristic device for suggesting better theories, but
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cannot be a logical one for inferring them.
However, those who are acquainted with Hegel's logical precision will find
it hard to believe that he has not at least considered this objection,
especially since it seems to correspond more or less to the problem he
himself set up in the fourth paragraph of the Introduction. There is every
reason to adopt, at least temporarily, the attitude Kaufmann said he took
up on first reading the Phenomenology
"the point was to comprehend the incomprehensible, not to read
unsympathetic criticism; and the presumption was that his
critics had not understood Hegel, which was true enough in most
cases". (Kaufmann op.cit. p.10).
Hyppolite anticipates Popper's criticism and forestalls it by arguing that
Hegel does not attempt to generate the whole, that is Spirit, from the
criticism of its parts, but rather presupposes the whole. Determinate
negation then has the function of referring a partial view to the (concrete)
whole to which it is partial, and negates only the negative aspect of its
partiality, the arrogance which supposes a partial view to have its own
independent reality.
"If we assume a term A, can its negation, not - A, engender a
new term B? It seems not. In our opinion we must assume that
the whole is always immanent in the development of consciousness.
Negation is creative because the posited term has been isolated
and thus was itself a kind of negation. From this it follows
45. K.Popper, "What is Dialectic?" in Mind, 49 (1940) p. 403 ff.
See also, M. Rosen, op. cit. p. 33 and p.39.
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that the negation of that term allows the whole to be recaptured
in each of its. parts. Wexe it not for the imminenece of the
whole in consciousness, we should be unable to understand how
negation can truly engender a content". (Hyppolite, op. cit. p. 15).
There can be no doubt that if determinate negation is to be defended, it
must be along these lines. However, we cannot be satisfied simply to pre¬
suppose the whole, since Hegel has implied that he will demonstrate its
necessity. If he fails to do this he does not get beyond Plato. We must
ask in what sense the whole can be said to be necessary - and we will not
be satisfied with Kaufmann's minimalisation of Hegel's position, which
explains away the notion of necessity by arguing that "Hegel often uses
46
the term 'necessary' quite illicitly as the opposite of 'utterly arbitrary''.'
Kojeve interprets the necessity of the Phenomenology as historically retro¬
spective. History - for in Kojeve's view Spirit and history are identified
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- is as Hegel says, a free contingent process./and since it is comp'osed of
individual free actions it cannot be said to be necessary. However, each
action is intelligible in terms of the intentional structure of human action,
and history therefore while not necessary is not arbitrary either, but has
a sense, and can be understood in terms of the goals of historical individuals
46. Kaufmann, op. cit. p. 371, cf. Lauer, op. cit. p. 32
47. Phenomenology, p. 492,
48. Thus the 'World Historical Individual' in Hegel's Philosophy of History
is not one who furthers the development of reason as opposed to passion
in history, as a comparable figure in Kant's 'Idea for a Universal
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, but one who is just as arbitrarily
passionate as he is reasonable; and yet at the same time is 'great' in
a larger sense than merely powerful. Cf. S. Avineri , Hegel's Theory
of the Modern State, CUP 1974, p. 233, and G.D.O'Brien, Hegel on Reason
and History.
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The Phenomenology is. thus necessary only in a limited sense, that since we
are where we are it is necessary that certain historical developments should
49
have taken place. We may note in this approach (a) that unless there is
said to be a hidden purpose in history according to a 'cunning of reason',
necessity disappears in contingency, and (b) that it. nevertheless has the
virtue of pointing away from a rational or causal conception of necessity
towards a more hermeneutic kind which stresses interpretation over causal
explanation.
Findlay characterises the necessity of the Phenomenology in various ways,
some of which are similar to Kojeve's, others not. In his Foreword to
Miller's translation of the Phenomenology he compares it to the necessity of
a mathematical proof. He is well aware that Hegel has specifically rejected
50
this possibilrty, but argues that just as there may be several ways of pre¬
senting a mathematical proof, while in each particular presentation each
step must be logically necessary, so the Phenomenology is also only one way
of presenting a proof of Spirit, but that Hegel chooses this way because
"it was the path that had been taken by the World Spirit in past
history, and that he been rehearsed in the consciousness of Hegel,
in whom the notion of Science first became actual". (Phenomenology,
p. vi).
49. When Marx commented that the limits of dialectical method were seen
in the fact that it could only interpret, not predict, he must have
had the same kind of reasoning in mind. "Man's reflection on the
forms of life, and consequently, also, his scientific analysis of
those forms, takes a course directly opposite to that of their actual
historical development. He begins, post festum, with the results of
the process of development ready to hand before him. (Marx,
Capital, Vol I, Lawrence and Wishart, 1974, p.80. Cf also p. 668, and
p.551.).
50. Phenomenology, p. 34.
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Elsewhere Findlay has offered an apparently different yiew of the sense of
the necessity of the Phenomenology.
"A study of Hegel's dialectical practice will show, further, that
in spite of anything he may say regarding their necessary, scientific
character, his transitions are only inevitable in the rather indefinite
sense in which there is necessity and inevitability in a work of art"
(Findlay, Hegel; a Re-Examination. Collier 1962, p.71).
Lauer comments on this:
"What we need, perhaps, is something akin to but stronger than
Findlay's notion of artistic necessity. In the contemplation of
a great work of art - a statue, a painting, a poem, a symphony -
there is an awareness on the part of one who looks with taste and
looks long and hard that "nothing else will do"; each detail
demands each other detail" (Lauer, op. cit. p.33).
In so far as Spirit is beautiful, we must confirm that this is true. As
Haym commented in 1857 of the Phenomenology,
"I call it a work of art of knowledge ... it .iSj 1 say, the
presentation of the universe as a beautiful3 living cosmos.
After the manner of Greek philosophy it wants to show how in
the world as a whole all parts serve and write into a har¬
monic order". (quoted in Kaufmann, op. cit. p. 130).
Haym's comment, however, gives only half the story. Hegel wants not just
to portray the universe as a harmony and a manifestation of a living Spirit,
but also in addition to Greek philosophy and in accordance with the sub¬
jective demands of the modern age to demonstrate its necessity. Thus the
weakness of Lauer's argument also becomes apparent. The notion of beauty
he describes is precisely the Greek notion in which the beautiful work of
art is the most perfect representation of an ideal form and in which the
fact that it was executed by an individual person is most effectively hidden.
In the modern view, by contrast, the individual artist and his subjective
intentions are essentially part of the work of art, and far from appreciating
it as perfect, we appreciate it as essentially individual, perhaps even as
unique. Thus, by making necessity into something intuited, Lauer avoids
51. In so far$the reproduction is inferior to the original, and loses its
individual touches, and perhaps has the effect precisely of making the
work too perfect, and hence uninteresting.
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the central point that this, necessity is. not just objective perfection,
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but also subjectiye thought . Spirit is not only a substance to be
appreciated, but also a subject to be realised and it must therefore be
possible to know it in subjective terms, that is, not so much as a harmony
as a necessity.
An alternative to the point of view of Lauer et. al. has been proposed by
Michael Rosen, in his book Hegdl'S Dialectic and its Criticism, which is
perhaps the best discussion available of the sense of the necessity of
Hegel's work. Unfortunately, since it focusses on the two Logics it
discusses the issue in slightly different terms than we need to here, and
is not especially helpful on the central notion of experience which appears
only in the Phenomenology■ Nevertheless it will be worth rehearsing some
of his central arguments here.
Rosen sees the central aim of Hegel's philosophy as transforming representa¬
tions (Vorste1 lungen) into thoughts which are known cognitively, and there¬
fore rationally and as necessary rather than merely intuitively. He then
w
distinguishes two ways in which this move.- which fie encountered earlier
as a move from certainty to truth - can be interpreted. In the first place
it may be taken to be transformative.Hegelian philosophy warrants opinion
through a process involving two steps:
"(a) We have a Vorstellung of X. That is to say we perceive
an object X only imperfectly rationally, or we have only
an abstract or reflective"judgement of X.
(b)/
52. See note 1 to Ch. 3 above.
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(b) Dialectical philosophy treates the VorsteZZung of X
in such a way that it is transformed into a Thought,
and hence our vision of X becomes a fully cognitive
one". (M.Rosen op. cit. p. 63).
This is the common view. Rosen then contrasts the generative approach,
which has three steps:
"(a) We have a VorsteZZung of X.
(b) An autonomous cognition of X is developed out of the notion.
This occurs either unconsciously (as in the course of the
development of the sciences) or, when Spirit has reached
the possibility of 'pure knowledge', as the free evolution
of thought in the Science of Logic.
(p) In virtue of the knowledge developed in step (b) our con¬
ception of X is transformed." (ibid. p. 64).
As Rosen points out, there are a good number of passages in Hegel's
writings which can be cited in support of both views. Rosen himself,
however, finds fault with both. The first version is committed to the
VorsteZZungen it actually perceives, and has difficulty in portraying
these in any strong sense as necessary, as Plant for example has pointed
out. The second version then appears to be closer to Hegel's true intention
since it takes on board the idea of the self-development of the concept
independently of any VorsteZZung. Hegel appears to adopt a notion which
he in other circumstances rejects, namely that pure thought is capable
of generating a real content.
"We acknowledge thereby that the Thought, and specifically the
notion is the infinite form - that free creative activity which
can realise itself without the need for a material present outside
itself". (Hegel, lesser Logic, quoted by Rosen, p. 68).
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Rosen ultimately rejects this notion as a "sheer Neo-Platonic fantasy".
53. Ibid, p. 179.
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In terms, of Hegel's Science of Logic, which is. beyond the scope of this work,
he may penrhaps he right. However, in terms of the Phenomenology we shall
have to ask whether it is in fact accurate to portray Hegel's aim as either
simply Platonic or alternatively as 'hyperintuitionist' (as Rosen terms the
notion of self-generating logic). Hegel, after all, is dealing not with mere
VovsteHungen or representations in the Phenomenology, but with certainties
which are themselves intuitions of a whole, which is Spirit. Thus we are
referred back to Hyppolite's suggestion that the whole is presupposed by the
entire Phenomenology, and we must, as we turn now to examine Hegel's own
description of his method, attempt to understand what is meant by this.
54
Hegel begins his discussion of the "method of carrying out the enquiry",
which method he stresses is appropriate only "since our object is phenomenal
knowledge","''' by reposing his original question about the possibility of
true knowledge in terms now of truth criteria. If we are to examine phenomenal
knowledge, by what criteria will we judge the validity of our examination?
If we import our own, there is no reason why phenomenal knowledge should
accept our criteria, but if we do not then our examination will be uncritical,
and we will only understand, not judge. This contrast between understanding
and interpreting is one which has more recently been brought to academic
54. Phenomenology, p. 52.
55. Ibid. The Introduction should not, in other words, be taken as an
expression of a generalised Hegelian method but only of the method
of the Phenomenology, which he does not in fact use anywhere else.
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attention through the. hermeneutio tradi.tion. The problem arises in the
examination of any other consciousness,in so faras I can only understand
a consciousness through sharing and identifying with, its own viewpoint,
yet since consciousness is essentially a passive awareness, I am thereby
committed to suspending my own judgement. I can criticise only h5y ceasing
to identify and thereby to understand. The problem is doubled, however,
if I try to interpret the consciousness of a world which is historically
remote, which like ancient Greece displays different politics, ethics,
religion, and art. That is to say, it is especially relevant to anyone
who is considering the revival or revision of ancient ideas.
Hegel firstly argues firmly for identification and suspension of judgement.
We are after all examining consciousness, and there is no difficulty in
arguing that we must take up its standpoint, which is the uncritical one.
It may perhaps seem that if we describe consciousness, there is also
necessarily involved a subjective judgement that this description is a true
one. Hegel does not deny this, but argues that the distinction between
what an object is in-itself and what it is for consciousness, upon which
this judgement is based, is a distinction which falls within consciousness
itself.
56. See W. Dilthey, The Rise of Hermeneutics, in P.Connerton, (ed.),
Critical Sociology, Penguin 1976. I do not mean to argue that
hermeneutics in general insists that identification with the sub¬
ject of a meaning is essential to understanding this meaning.
This position does however seem to be taken by some writers -
Quentin Skinner, for example. See Rosen, op. cit, Ch. 1 for a
discussion of ways the hermeneutic tradition has attempted to re¬
solve or develop this question.
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"Consciousness provides, its onw criterion from within itself, so
that the investigation becomes, a comparison of consciousness within
itself, for the distinction made above falls within it".
(Phenomenology, p.53).
It is this idea which commentators seem to refer to as the notion of immanent
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or internal critique. It is, as Hegel has presented it so far, barely dis¬
tinguishable from the negative moment of Platonic dialectic. However, Hegel
goes on to explain how he thinks it is possible to extract a positive result
from this simple comparison of consciousness with itself. This possibility
is found in the double nature of consciousness, of being both passive re¬
flection of an object and yet as essential to and constitutive of the object,
that is consciousness of a being in itself and a being-for us.
"Something is for it the in itself; and knowledge, or the being
of the object for consciousness is, for it, another moment.
Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination
rests. If the comparison shows that these two moments do not
correspond to one another, it would seem that consciousness must
alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object. But, in
fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object alters for
it too, for the knowledge which was present was essentially a
knowledge of the object, as the knowledge changes, so too does
the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge. Hence
it comes to pass that what it previously took to be the in itself
is not an in itself, or that it was only an in itself for con¬
sciousness" (Phenomenology, p. 54)
Hegel concludes
"In as much as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical
movement which consciousness exerts on itself and which affects both
its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience
[Erfahrungj " (Phenomenology, p. 55).
We must distinguish the way this movement appears to us and to natural con¬
sciousness. Natural consciousness takes itself to be purely passive reflection,
and does not therefore see the object as something constituted by its con-
57. For example, Charles Taylor, Hegel, CUP 1977, p. 129; Habermas,
op. cit. Ch. I; Richard Norman, op. cit. p. 22.
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sciousness, whose being lies at least in some partial sense in being
perceived. Therefore, when i.t comes across a new object it is merely
passively conscious of it too, and it does not imagine that it has anything
to do with this new object. It is not seeking anything or questioning its
awareness, so it can learn nothing from it, and it cannot strictly be said
to experience anything. Experience, in Hegel's view, is not something
which happens to us (as in 'I had an experience') but something which we
(
create for ourselves, ('I experienced' , in the active voice), so long as
we have enquiring or sceptical minds. Natural consciousness is, in point
of fact, by definition unaware of 'determinate negation', that is of pro¬
ducing a new object through its own thought, and this awareness can be in-
58
troduced into the phenomenology only by US or through the attitude of
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phenomenal knowledge. Determinate negation m practice is experience.
"This exposition of the course of experience contains a moment in
virtue of which it does not seem to agree with what is ordinarily
understood by experience. This is the moment of transition from
the first object and the knowledge of it, to the other object,
which experience is said to be about. Our account implied that
our knowledge of the first object, or the being for-consciousness
of the first in-itself, itself becomes the second object. It usually
seems to be the case, on the contrary, that our experience of the
untruth of the first notion comes by way of a second object which we
came upon by chance and externally, so that our part in all this is
simply apprehension of what it is in and for itself. From the present
point of view, however, the new object shown itself to have come
about through a reversal of consciousness itself. (Phenomenology, p. 55)
It is this latter interpretation that is contributed by 'us', the philosophers
who adopt the standpoint of Spirit.
58. For this reason it is mistaken to characterise Hegel's phenomenological
method as merely descriptive of reality. On the contrary, Hegel
explicitly contributes a special ordering and interpretation of ex¬
perience, and the Phenomenology is inconceivable without this. (Cf.
Kojeve, op. cit. Ch. 7 and Kenley Royce Dove's article on "Hegel's
Phenomenological Method", in Review of Metaphysics, June 1970,
vol. xxiii, No. 4).
59. Phenomenology, p. 56.
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"This way of looking at the matter is something contributed by us,
by means of which the succession of experiences through which
consciousness, passes, i.s, raised into a scientific progression - but
it is not known to the consciousness that we are observing" (ibid).
The necessity which the Phenomenology wants to demonstrate is the
necessity of the whole, seen as a process of becoming or from the stand¬
point of consciousness by us, who already have an intuition of the whole.
"For it, what has thus arisen it exists only as an object;
for us it appears at the same time as a movement and a process
of becoming.
Because of this necessity, the way to Science is itself already
Science, and hence, in virtue of its content, is the science
of the experience of consciousness". (Phenomenology, p. 56).
Hyppolite, in other words, was right in arguing that the whole is pre¬
supposed by the Phenomenology, and that the necessity of the Phenomenology
lies in the necessity of the parts to the whole. If we cannot demonstrate
this necessity to natural consciousness, we will have no grounds for dis¬
puting that they are independent entities, and will have to abandon the
notion of Spirit as their ground. Let us conclude this discussion by
asking once again, firstly, what does this mean for Hegel's method, and
secondly, what ultimately is the rational ground of the necessity of the
whole?
In answer to the first question, we should recall that although the notion
of experience is derived partly from Plato's recollection, Hegel's
(Erinnerung), it also includes the exact opposite, that is externalisation,
objectification, or alienation (Entaus&evung). Recollection is the work of
the philosophers who grasp the whole, and it is parallel to the task of
Plato's philosophers in seeking knowledge of ideal forms. However, as we
have already noted, Plato holds that form exists independently and can be
known by anyone who cares to take up a philosopher's attitude. Hegel denies
this and holds that form is not merely substance, but also is essentially
subject or for consciousness. This dimension is included in the Phenomenology
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through natural consciousness, for which the object appears essentially as
an object, or in itself. This is an Entaussevung in a double sense.
For us, it is an objectification, since we know the object to belong
essentially to consciousness and we therefore see the object as conscious¬
ness made into an object. For the natural consciousness it is an alienation,
since the object appears to it to be independent and therefore alien, not as
its own possession.
This, it seems to me, constitutes a methodological proposition which is
different from both the possibilities offered by Michael Rosen. Rosen
offers an account of Hegel's method which is quite consistent with Hegel's
view of Erinnevung, but which omits the notion of Entausgerung.
Thus, what Rosen calls the 'transformative' approach is effectively no
different from Evinnevung as it appears in Plato. Rosen then rightly points
out that Hegel's claim is stronger than Plato's and that rather than merely
transforming Doxa into Sophia, certainty into truth, or Vorstellungen into
Begriffen, Hegel wishes to demonstrate the necessity of the latter independently,
in some sense, from the former. That is, rather than regarding the truth as
a substance grounded in an other world, Hegel insists on regarding it as
equally grounded in the subject. It is reasonable, then, to call this
approach "generative", since it attempts to generate the truth, which is
acknowledged to exist also in the phenomenal world, purely subjectively and
(at least in some formulations) without any reference to this world. It is
also reasonable to conclude that such an attempt to reconcile two independent
truths, the one purely subjective and the other objective, is indeed a
'sheer Neo-Platonic fantasy
60. Rosen, op. cit, p. 179; p. I'9 above.
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However, if we allow that the notion of Entausserung is as essential to
the Phenomenology as Erinnerungthen the need to force this dichotomay
between subjective and objective approaches falls - or.at least is shifted/ to
different ground. By making Entaussevung essential to phenomenal knowledge,
Hegel counterposes to the Platonic transformative approach the idea that Spirit
not the substance of a form which it merely copies, but rather makes itself
into what it is. On the other hand, in contrast to a Neo-Platonic generative
approach, the Entausserung of natural consciousness insists that nothing may
be known except in so far as it takes an individual or objective form:
only so is it present to consciousness.
If it is thus clear at least that Hegel is attempting to avoid the dichotomy
which Rosen presents him with, it is not, of course, by that token evident
that he succeeds. If Hegel is simply insisting that at every level our
approach must be both subjective and objective, is it not perhaps the case
that he is simply trying to get the best of both worlds and trying to con¬
vince us that this is possible through a dialectical sleight of hand? This
brings us back to the second question me-.ntioned above. If the necessity of
the Phenomenology is neither purely subjective, ie. logical, nor purely
objective, resting on the received idea that the true exists, then what else
is left? What is the necessity of the Phenomenology?
To answer this question we must begin by acknowledging that there is a
"generative" element in Hegel's thought. This may be observed particularly
in Hegel's Logics,in so far as they attempt to demonstrate the necessity of
the Absolute without reference to phenomena. However, we must stress that
at least in Hegel's earlier system (that is, the Phenomenology followed by
the Science of Logic), this generative approach is preceeded by an intro¬
duction which makes it essential to knowledge that it appears in a phenomenal
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form. If we are. not mistaken, then this, phenomenological introduction to
Hegel's system is not something which could be dispensed with, but is
absolutely presupposed by the later work.^ There can be no knowledge which
is not in some sense consciousness.
It is true that this view seems to be contradicted by Hegel's well known
characterisation of his Science Of Logic as
"the account of God as he is in his eternal essence before
the creation of the world and any finite Spirit". (Science
of Logic, p. 60).
However, if this account appears to allow God and Logic to exist in logical
and temporal priority over Spirit and nature, their objective forms, we
should note that Hegel also argues that they need these objective forms.
God, in Hegel's view, is not absolutely independent, like a platonic form,
62
but is both 'Inner and Outer', as he comments in the lesser Logic, and
must therefore manifest himself in an external form.
"All that God is, he imparts and reveals" (Lesser Logic, p. 198,
§140).
In fact, if God were truly separate from the world, there would be no grounds
for describing apurely subjective Logic as His thought. Nevertheless, if
this subjective Logic is to be supposed to generate the thought of God from
nothing, that is purely subjectively, then it is not clear how this approach
can overcome the objection that it is still unclear how purely subjective
thought can engender a true content.
61. Phenomenology, p. 21f.
62. Lesser Logic, p. 198, §140.
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In the end, it seems to me, it is possible for Hegel to resolve this
difficulty only through a panlogistic identification of Logic and God.
It is only possible to avoid an oscillation between the substantive and
subjective by seeing both as equally moments of the Absolute Idea. The
Absolute Idea cannot and is not intended to be explicable in terms of the
merely subjective or objective. On the contrary, it is their ground. As
such it is divine, and is God. Thus, if we seek to find the necessity of
Hegel's system in terms of a rational explanation of the system, which
satisfies us completely and makes perfect logical sense, we will be dis¬
appointed. From this point of view, Hegel's position is that there is no
reason for absolute being, and that is why it is absolute. To this extent,
Hegel agrees with Sartre, that in answer to the metaphysical question "why
is being?', we must answer that there is no reason and the question is
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invalid. The world simply is not rational in this formal sense. "The
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Absolute is no more against reason than it is for it; it is beyond Reason"
The world, however, makes sense. Sartre accounts for this in terms of the
intentional structure of the activity and thought of those who create it;
and since they are essentially free, their world is essentially contingent.
Hegel, by contrast, does not explain the rationality of the world in terms
of the rationality of the subject who perceives and creates it, but in terms
of the rationality of the Absolute Idea. The world therefore makes sense
and is rational in the quite different sense, that it exhibits God's purpose.
63. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Methuen 1969, p. 297.
64. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans Cerf & Harris, Albany 1977, p. 56.
Here, Hegel appears to share this position with the philosophy of
subjectivity of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte. The argument is often
associated with Thomas Aquinas.
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We cannot explain it, but in it we can find reason, and this reason is divine.
Thus Hegel closes the Philosophy of History, which set out to show Reason
to be the cause of history with these words:
"That the History of the World, with all the changing scenes which
its annals present, is this process of development and the realiza¬
tion of Spirit - this is the true Theodicea5 the justification
of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the
History of the World - viz., that what has happened, and is happen¬
ing every day, is not only not "without God", but is essentially His
work". (Philosophy of History, p. 457).
The Phenomenology likewise closes with an image of God in the world:
"Their preservation £of the moments of Spirit] , regarded from
the side of their free existence appearing in the form of con¬
tingency, is History: but regarded from the side of their
comprehended organisation, it is the Science of Knowing in the
sphere of appearance: the two together, comprehended History,
form alike the inwardizing and the Calvary of absolute Spirit,
the actuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, without
which he would be lifeless and lone. Only
from the chalice of this realm of Spirits ^
foams forth for Him his own infinitude" (Phenomenology, p. 493)
In a certain sense, then Hegel's philosophy is ultimately mystical. That
is, insofar as it holds the Absolute to be absolute, and therefore beyond
explanation in terms of formal reason, it makes into something which is
mysterious to that reason. The Phenomenology cannot give any reason for
Spirit taking the form it does, other than that it is a manifestation of
the Absolute Idea. Nevertheless, because Spirit is a manifestation of the
65. Theodicy: the attempt, often associated with Leibniz, to reconcile
the notion of a good God with a world which contains evil, which
L
was satirised by Voltaire in Candide.
66. The quotation from Schiller is amended. Kojeve, op.cit, p. 166
discusses the significance of the alteration. The most important
change is that "Seele" (soul) in Schiller's verse is replaced by
"Geist", (Spirit) in Hegel's rendering. No pun appears to be in¬
tended by Hegel, but, as Jung has pointed out, the german word
Geist "probably has to do with something foaming, effervescing,
or fermenting; hence affinities with Gischt (foam)) Gascht (yeast),
ghost..." (The Collected Works of C.G.Jung, Vol 9 (i), Routledge 1959,
p.209).
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Absolute Idea, it must be possible to demonstrate its relationship
to the Absolute Idea as a relationship of necessity. The Absolute
Idea, in other words, is a result of the Phenomenology only because
it is a presupposition. Its necessity, ultimately, is Divine, as,
ultimately, is Reason itself. In so far as consciousness is free to
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acknowledge or to deny the existence of the Divine, I suppose that
it is appropriate that the reader should judge for himself the ultimate
worth of this viewpoint.




So far we have considered the general aim and the structure of the
Phenomenology. If these are its final and formal causes, there then
remain according to Aristotle's theory of causality its material and
efficient causes to be accounted for. If the Phenomenology is an edifice,
we have accounted for its proposed use and its architecture, and we have
still to consider its builder and his bricks."^ To account for the
builder would be to show what in Hegel's life and personality led him
to write a Phenomenology - unless there are other factors which
2
efficiently cause the Phenomenology. Thxs would certainly be necessary
for a proper account of the Phenomenology■ It is by no means incompatible
in Hegelian terms that the Phenomenology should be both true, and yet
3
not impersonal but essentially the produce of an individual. However,
1. This analogy is also used by Kojeve op. cit. p.32. Hegel himself
sometimes consciously used Aristotle's scheme. (See G.D.O'Brien
Hegel on Reason and History, University of Chicago Press 1975,
p. 45 and below, Ch.5,p.204.
2. It is possible, for example, to view the Phenomenology as a pro¬
duct not so much of Hegel's as of Hegel's times. This 'sociology
of knowledge' approach can be found especially in Lukacs, who in
his own estimation knows not only what Hegel thought but also what
in the circumstances it was possible for him to think,as if
thought were not infinite. (Lukacs, op. cit.).
3. This conception of truth may be seen, for example, in the New
Testament. The Gospel truth consists in four different accounts
by four individual men; while earlier scriptures were directly
communicated by God.
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such an account is beyond the scope of this work. In Parts Two and
Three below we will consider only some of the bricks of the Phenomenology,
fitting them as far as possible into Hegel's purpose and design.
In Part 1 above it was argued that the Phenomenology adapts the classical
theory of forms in order to include the notion that, as Hegel put it in
the Berlin Aesthetics, "... appearance itself is essential to essence"
(Introduction to Aesthetics, ed. Karelis, Trans. Knox, Oxford, 1979, p.8)
This, we said, involved him in replacing the classical doctrine of the
harmony of the whole with his own more modern view of the necessity of
the whole. The Phenomenology is concerned especially with this necessity;
but this must be understood as a modification not a rejection of the
classical view. Hegel presupposes that "we" somehow grasp the harmony
of the whole and sets out only to demonstrate this as a necessity to
natural consciousness. The aspect of harmony which is presupposed is thus
4. For those interested in Hegel's personality, I include the following
details from his natal horoscope, cast at noon, since I do not know
the precise time of his birth, and using the placidian system of
houses. The ascendant is I24°31^ 2> at rr^, 27°191, £3 at -V7 00°501,
and at/14 °361 are all in the 1 house. VJK is retrograde at
V5 16°251 in the 2n house. ^ , which is ret^grade at ^ lG0!?1
is in the 6 house, a* at H O0°271 is in the 7 house. ^ at ^10°351, O at hjj 04°091 , and at rrjj. 10°141, are all in theQ9 1
house (which governs wisdom). ^ at nj 13 561 and ^ at ^ 13 021
are both in the 10 ^ house. The f*\.C is wjl 13 551.
While we are on the subject of astrology, we may note that the
twelve major subdivisions of subjective and objective Spirit
correspond to the twelve signs of the Zodiac - though since there
is no indication that Hegel was aware of this connection it would
be out of place to follow it further here. Tie correspondence would
be: "T to Sense-certainty, K to Perception, 3T to Understanding,
o> to Desire, to Self-consciousness, to free Self-consciousness.
to Observing Reason, rrfr to the actualisation of Reason, especially
Pleasure, ,V to real individuality, to Sitttichkeit, cCfi? to Culture,
H: to Morality, and finally the Zodiac as a whole to Religion as
the atonement of all the previous moments of Spirit.
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easily forgotten or lost in the demonstration of its necessity. In order
to counteract this I will follow here the procedure Hegel adopts in the
Philosophy of Mind, but not in the Phenomenology, and precede the dis¬
cussion of the experience of natural consciousness of each moment of sub¬
jective Spirit with a brief discussion of how that moment of Spirit appears
'for us' or in the aspect of its harmony with the whole of Spirit. We will
begin, therefore, not with sense-certainty, but with consciousness in
general.
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CHAPTER FOUR : CONSCIOUSNESS
(a) Consciousness in General
Hegel's use of the term consciousness may appear confusing. In particular,
he appears to use the term in two different senses. On the one hand con¬
sciousness is a limited attitude, only one moment of Spirit; and this
attitude, which is the attitude of natural consciousness, is described
in the chapter on Consciousness. On the other hand it is a much broader
attitude, the attitude of phenomenal knowledge which characterises the
whole Phenomenology and includes all the moments of Spirit. However,
both of these attitudes are aspects of consciousness, and in so far as we
consider consciousness in general there is no need to distinguish them.
Phenomenal knowledge is consciousness, and as we will see it conforms
precisely to the pattern described in the chapter on consciousness. The
object of phenomenal knowledge always has precisely the characteristics
of an object of consciousness. All knowledge must be knowledge of some
thing.
On the other hand, if Hegel's use of the term consciousness is in this
respect precise, we should note also that he is sometimes less precise
in distinguishing consciousness from Understanding. In the Phenomenology
Understanding is only one dimension of consciousness, which also includes
the moments of sensation and perception. However, elsewhere, and to an
extent also in the Preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel uses the term
Understanding to mean consciousness in general. When he uses the term
Understanding in this sense, it carries, more or less the same meaning
as it does in Kant's distinction between Reason and Understanding. In
citing comments Hegel makes about Understanding in this discussion of
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consciousness in general, the assumption is made that Hegel's comment
either is intended to apply generally to consciousness, or in the few
cases where this is not Hegel's direct intention in the context, that
it may be taken also to apply generally.
Consciousness for Hegel is a relation of the simple Ego to an external
world. The Ego is essentially part of it. We say "I am conscious", not
"there is consciousness". The Ego of consciousness, however, is not con¬
scious of itself. This in turn means that consciousness is unable to
take up the self conscious attitude to the world which Hegel calls Reason.
This does not mean that the Ego of consciousness is passive. On the con¬
trary, the whole experience of consciousness is guided by consciouness'
preoccupation with the question of who is the active partner in the re¬
lationship of Ego to Object, or in Hegelian language, of which moment is
essential. Rather, what is implied is that the Ego is uncritical. Con¬
sciousness is exhausted in the relationship of Ego to Object, and this
means that anything which involves a relationship of the Ego to itself
is barred from consciousness. The Ego of consciousness is empty, without
possessions, and therefore the tools of criticism, such as interest,
opinion, judgement, and so on, are all absent from consciousness.""
1. Freud's work - which fairly consistently takes up the standpoint
of consciousness, exhibits clearly this absence of criticism. For
example, Freud quotes approvingly the French proverb "tout corrrprendre
c'est tout pavdonrter" - to understand is to forgive. Forgiveness,
however, is not quite what is meant, for to understand is to be
aware without judgement. We should rather say that understanding
simply refrains from having an opinion in the matter, indeed, denies
itself the right to any opinion, seeking instead - as some social
scientists would put it - to be "value-free". This attitude cannot




This may be seen in the distinction between consciousness and empiricism .
Consciousness is in a sense empiricist, and empiricism, like consciousness
3
and in Hegel's view rightly, limits itself to knowledge of what exists.
Empiricism, however, does not by any means refrain from judgement, and
on the contrary, it knows only what it judges to be worth knowing, and
it holds its interests to be essentially part of its knowledge. This may
4
be expressed by saying that empiricism knows facts (Sache) , while Con¬
sciousness knows only things. A fact is something which I choose to be
interested in, which I hold to have a certain value or relevance, while
a thing is simply there, and my own estimation of it is irrelevant.
C
Empiricism is in this sense an attitude of Reason which, as we saw earlier"
is a relationship of self-consciousness to an object, rather than an
attitude of consciousness. Consciousness is essentially a relation of
the Ego to an object, and this means that it is not free from the object.
Empiricism, by contrast, involves a dimension of freedom.
"it is right to notice the valuable principle of freedom involved
in Empiricism. For the main lesson of Empiricism is that man must
see for himself and feel that he is present in every fact of
knowledge which he has to accept". (Lesser Logic p. 61 §38)
2. In Natural Law (p. 58; see also Hyppolite op. cit. p. 103)
Hegel distinguishes the Empiricism of the man of action from the
Empiricism of Understanding. The Empiricism meant here is true
or rational empiricism (see below, Ch 6 p. 50ff). In the discussion
of the notion of 'analysis' referred to later in this section the
Empiricism Hegel refers to is the one-sided Empiricism of understanding.
3. Lesser Logic, p. 61 §38 cf also Philosophy of Mind, p. 162
§420 (Empiricism knows that "everything must be experienced").
4. Phenomenology, p. 237ff
5. P. £Q above.
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Hegel will go on to argue that in truth all consciousness is in fact self-
consciousness, and that it can be defined as a relation simply of Ego to
Object only by abstracting it from Spirit as a whole, and viewing it in
an analytical isolation which, as he will show, cannot correspond to a
real isolation of consciousness as a discrete entity. Nevertheless,
Hegel judges that one of the major problems for modern philosophy, which
did not exist for ancient thought, is that philosophy adopts the stand¬
point of consciousness only, and accepts in particular its compartmentali-
sation of thought into discrete and fixed things. 6
"The manner of study in ancient times differed from that of the
modern age in that the former was the proper and complete formation
of the natural consciousness. Putting itself to the test at every
6. Most commentators have noted that in the section on Consciousness Hegel
draws especially heavily on ancient dialectic. Hyppolite writes
"Without exaggerating, as Purpus, does, the specificity of all the
allusions to Greek philosophy in this chapter, we cannot but notice
similarities between this first dialectic of the Phenomenology and
that of such ancient Greek philosophers as Parmenides and Zeno -
and, especially, Plato". (Op.cit. p. 83). Gadamer goes so far as to
say that Hegel "is the first truly to grasp the depth of Platonic -
dialectic. He is the discoverer of the truly speculative platonic
dialogues, the "Sophist", "Parmenides" and "Philebus", which did not
even exist for eighteenth century philosophy and which only because
of him were recognised as the real core of Plato's philosophy in
the following period. (Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University
Press 1976 p.7). Glockner comments that "Future monographs will show
how Hegel, in the years from 1802-1815 worked innumerable passages
from Plato and Aristotle, partly in literal translations, into his
philosophy", and Kaufmann (op. cit. p.118) comments that this is
especially true of "Consciousness" in the Phenomenology■ However,
Hegel does not acknowledge his debt to classical thought in this
chapter, and we may conclude that if he is not being deliberately
obscure, he does not think that the reference to classical thought
is especially important for understanding his argument. His attitude
to classical thought, as it expressed in the passage quoted directly
after this note, shows that he takes a knowledge of classical thought
for granted, and that what is important for him is the way in which
he has added to that body of thought, and reinterpreted it to serve
a modern purpose. Taking for granted the classical notion of per¬
fection or harmony, ■Hegel sets out to supplement this notion with
a demonstration of its necessity. For this reason, in what follows,
if we acknowledge some of the classical sources of Hegel's argument,
we will be careful also to treat Hegel's argument as it is presented
in its own right, and not to reduce it to a simple restatement of
classical ideas which does not fundamentally alter them.
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point of its existence and philosophising about everything it
came across, it made itself into a universality that was active
through and through. In modern times, however, the individual
finds the abstract form ready-made; the effort to grasp and
appropriate it is more the direct driving force of what is within
and the truncated generation of the universal than it is the
emergence of the latter from the concrete variety of existence.
Hence the task nowadays consists not so much in purging the
individual of an immediate, sensuous mode of apprehension, and
making him into a substance that is an object of thought and
thinks, but rather in just the opposite, 'in freeing determinate
thoughts from their fixity so as to give actuality to the
universal, and impart to it spiritual life". (Phenomenology, p.19)
The task of ancient philosophy, in other words, was to replace doxa with
a consciousness of the forms, or of what Hegel here calls "universality".
The problem for Hegel is that consciousness of the universal is not
7
enough, for in consciousness the universal appears as fixed and finite.
It is necessary to show how this standpoint can and must be transcended
g
towards the more fluid, living, infinite standpoint of Spirit.
7. Hegel accuses Kant, Jacobi and Fichte of making the finite absolute
in Faith and Knowledge (eg p.60). There he characterises their
attitude in general as one of subjectivity, but the meaning of
"subjectivity" in that early essay is very close to the meaning
of "consciousness" in Hegel's later thought. In the History of
Philosophy, however, Hegel characterises virtually all philosophy
since Descartes as the philosophy of thinking understanding; but
excludes Kant, and subsequent German thinkers, who now play the
role of bringing back the objectivity to the subjectivity of
modern thought. (eg. History of philosophy, Vol.3 London, 1896,
p. 408).
8. Cf. lesser Logic, p.53 §32.
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The attitude of consciousness is essentially lifeless - and we will
see that it is through confronting it with the notion of life that
Hegel finally demonstrates that it must abandon its position, Hegel
criticises this lifelessness in the Preface to the Phenomenology in
connection with Fichte's "Sun-Clear Report to the Public about the
True Essence of the Newest Philosophy":
"What results from this method of labelling all that is in heaven
and earth with the few determinations of the general schema, and
pigeon-holing everything in this way, is nothing less than a
'report clear as noonday' on the universe as an organism, viz.
a synoptic table like a skeleton with scraps of paper stuck all
over it, or like the rows of closed and labelled boxes in a
grocer's stall. It is as easy to read off as either of these;
and just as all the flesh and blood has been stripped from this
skeleton, and the no longer living 'essence' \SacheJ has been
packed away in the boxes, so in the report the living essence
of the matter [fZesen dev Sache] has been stripped away or boxed
up dead". (Phenomenology, p. 31).
In the lesser Logic Hegel connects this attitude to the analytical
approach of the empirical natural scientist, whose attitude to nature,
like that of consciousness, claims to be entirely disinterested. It
divides everything, separating it into parts, and although it is true
that "Spirit itself is an inherent division", we must not forget that
"this is only one half of the process, and that the main point is the
9
reunion of what has been parted". Hegel goes on to quote a well
known passage from Goethe's Faust.
Mocking the Cottegium Logician, Mephistopheles says:
9. Lesser Logic, p. 63, §38 Zn.
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"Encheiresin Naturae neurit's die Chemie
Spottet ihver selbstj and weiss nieht, wie:
Hat die Theile in ihren Hand3
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band"
fLesser Logic, p. 63 §38) 10
Consciousness, in so far as its awareness of things is analytical,"'"''" is
a deathly attitude.
"... it labours under a delusion if it supposes that while analys¬
ing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really transforms
the concrete into an abstract. And, as a consequence, the living
thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete and one",
(ibid) .
Kojeve puts it more bluntly.
"The conceptual understanding of empirical reality
is equivalent to a murder" (Kojeve, op. cit. p. 140).
10. This may be translated, very roughly and without any attempt at
versification, as follows:
'Chemistry calls it Natures Laboratory;
It mocks itself, without knowing how:
It has all the parts in its hand,
All that's missing is the spiritual bond.'
Since Faust appeared after the Phenomenology in 1808 there has
apparently been some speculation that the passage cited from the
Preface influenced Goethe: but this is not only unlikely but also,
as Kaufmann points out, impossible, since the lines in question
appear in more or less the same form and context in Goethe's
Urfaust of 1775, and if there is any influence it is of Goethe
upon Hegel. See Kaufmann op. cit. p. 433. Wallace, in his notes
to his translation of the Logic, compares the passage cited to
the following passage from Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre^
iii, 3: where it is remarked in connection with some anatomical
exercises: "You will learn ere long that building up is more
instructive than tearing down, combining more than separating,
animating the dead rather than killing what was killed already.
... Combining means more than separating: re-constructing more
than onlooking". (Lesser Logic, p. 309. Wallace also gives an
alternative translation of the lines from Faust). Hegel's quota¬
tion from Faust is, incidentally, inaccurate. As is usually the
case, Hegel appears to be quoting from memory. The original lines
may be found at Z-.1938 of Faust.
11. This is more strictly the attitude of perception only.
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However, if Hegel maintains this romantic distaste for the analytical
attitude of 'disinterested' science, it is nevertheless also the case
that, as we have seen, he characterises the first three moments of the
12
Phenomenology as an analysis of Spirit into its parts. Analysis is
objectionable only if it is taken in isolation, but it is nevertheless
essential to phenomenal knowledge; and since the Phenomenology is
written from the standpoint of consciousness, it is appropriate that
it too should analyse its experience. In the Preface to the Phenomenology
Hegel comments that
"The analysis of the idea, as it used to be carried out, was, in
fact, nothing else than ridding it of the form in which it had
become familiar. To break up an idea into its original elements
is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the form
of the given idea, but rather constitute the immediate property
of the self. This analysis, to be sure, arrives only at thoughts
which are themse]ves fapiiliar, fixed, and inert determinations.
But what is thus separated and non-actual is an essential moment:
for it is only because the concrete does divide itself, and make
itself into something non-actual, that it is self-moving. The
activity of dissolution is the power and work of the Understanding,
the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the
absolute power." (Phenomenology, p.18) 13
The attitude of consciousness, then, is both an attitude which Hegel
wants especially to criticise for its lifeless formalism, and yet at
the same time an attitude which is essential to knowledge, without which
knowledge has no power, and which is therefore appropriately the atti-
14
tude of the entire Phenomenology,
What is crucial then, and what Hegel sets out to demonstrate in the
section on Consciousness, is that consciousness is essential to Spirit,
and vice-versa. He does not do this directly, as a platonic dialogue
12. Phenomenology, p. 264; above p. 56 ff
13. As in the lesser Logic, Hegel here proceeds from the notion of
analysis directly to the notion of Death.
14. cf lesser Logic p. 114 §80.
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might do, for example, by asking whether or not consciousness may be
15
conceived of as an entity which is independent of Spirit as a whole.
It is presupposed, or at least hoped, that we already understand that
consciousness cannot be so understood. Instead, Hegel sets out to de¬
monstrate the necessity of moving not to Spirit, but only to self-
consciousness. His conclusion is that
"not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a
self-consciousness, but also that self-consciousness alone
is the truth of those shapes" (Phenomenology, p. 102)
This then refers to self-consciousness, and the Ego may then be developed
into the independent or free being which is the subject of Reason. Only
then, having demonstrated the necessary connection of the moments'of
subjective Spirit to each other does he go on to consider Spirit itself
as a whole and as the ground of these parts.
15. An entertaining version of this approach can be found in David
Lindsay's novel Voyage to Arcturus. Though Lindsay apparently
had not read Hegel (though he did know and admire Nietzsche and
Schopenhauer), the first half of this novel reads quite neatly
as a translation of the Phenomenology of subjective Spirit
into fictional form, though it looses intranslation precisely
the differentia specifica of Hegel's phenomenology, that is,
its notion of necessity. The latter half of the novel does
not follow Hegel's line of argument. Lindsay's account is in¬
dividualistic, and moves hastily from the subjective soul to
religious concerns which could be associated with absolute




The little chapter on sense-certainty should be taken as an initiation
ceremony, and, as we will see, there is a certain sense in which because
of this it differs from the argument of the rest of the Phenomenology.
Nevertheless, it is certainly a "good first lesson in dialectic",^
and it will be worth examining it in some detail here. It is directed
against two distinct non-philosophical positions, which correspond to
the respective tasks of ancient and modern philosophy which Hegel dis-
17
tinguished in the Preface. The first of these is the position of the
naive soul which has not yet learned the meaning of philosophical thought,
and the second is the contemporary philosophy of common sense, which is
not naive but which claims the certainty of the senses alone to have the
status of truth.
In so far as itpursues the first aim, it is very similar to the early
platonic dialogues, and in a sense is the most platonic passage in the
entire Phenomenology. It is intended to liberate consciousness from
the most stubborn and simple form of doxa or certainty, the certainty
of the senses. As such it gives the impression of being more of a
ritual than a real engagement, perhaps because Hegel finds it hard to
take seriously the idea that this should still be necessary. Appropriately,
then, he closes the argument with a reference to the Eleusinian Mysteries,
18




G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel, OUP 1965, p. 65.
Phenomenology, p. 19; p. |3gp above.
Eg. Plato, Meno, in Protagoras and Meno, Penguin 1956, p. 123.
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In pursuing the second aim Sense-Certainty is more distinctly Hegelian,
in so far as it is directed against the rigidity of understanding rather
than the less tutored solidity of doxa. Hegel seems to have in mind
particularly Krug, who succeeded to Kant's chair at Konigsburg, and
whom Hegel had criticised at length in an article in the Critical
19
Journal. Krug was well known in his day as a leading exponent of the
"philosophy of common sense". He is virtually unknown now. A similar
figure familiar to English speaking readers today might be Bertrand
Russell, and Richard Norman explicitly uses Hegel's argument here in
20
order to criticise Russell.
Hegel, unlike Scholasticus, plunges straight into his argument, opening
the chapter with the following words:
"The knowledge which is at the start or is immediately our know¬
ledge can be nothing other than immediate knowledge itself,
knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is". (Phenomenology,
p. 58).
Exactly what this immediate knowledge is, however, and why we should have
to begin with it, is not immediately clear, and has been the object of
, . 21
some speculation.
If we consider the parallel passage in the Philosophy of Mind, titled
Sensuous■Consciousness, the position seems fairly clear. Consciousness
emerges from the unconscious of 'sleeping' soul of anthropology, and its
most general characteristic is sensuous awareness.
19. Hegel, Werke, FMVH, Vol. 4, pp. 174-188.
20. Norman, op. cit. p. 36ff.
21. Eg, Norman, op.cit. p. 29, Hyppolite op. cit. p. 84.
I U-b
"Sense-consci.ous.nes.s therefore is aware of the object as an
existent, a something, an existing thing, a singular, and so
on. It appears as wealthiest in matter, but as poorest in
thought. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations:
they are the material of consciousness, the substantial and
qualitative, what the soul in its anthropological sphere is
and finds in itself. (Philosophy of Mind, P- 159 §418)
Sense consciousness, therefore, is not so much a single starting point,
as the most general characteristic of all consciousness. Here, as in
the Logic, Hegel begins with the most abstract and general determinations,
and proceeds towards the concrete and specific. Sense consciousness in
the Phenomenology is by no means left behind at the end of the chapter.
22
On the contrary, as Hyppolite has pointed out, sense consciousness
appears as a moment even of absolute knowledge in the closing pages of
the book.
"For the self-knowing Spirit, just because it grasps its Notion,
is the immediate identity with itself which, in its difference,
is the certainty of immediacy or sense-consciousness - the beginning
from which we started. This release of itself from the form of its
Self is the supreme freedom and assurance of its self-knowledge".
(Phenomenology, p. 491)
Sense-consciousness, then is the starting point in virtue of being the
most abstract determination of consciousness, and equally its most general
characteristic. All consciousness is sensation.
However, as Hegel himself goes on to point out in the Philosophy of Spirit,
sense-consciousness is not quite the same thing as sense-certainty, which
latter concept appears only in the Phenomenology. Sense-certainty involves
intuition which is absent from sense-consciousness.
22. Hyppolite, op. cit. p.85.
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"Spatial and temporal singularness, here and now (the terms by
which in the Phenomenology of Spirit I described the object of
sense-consciousness) strictly belong to -intuition. At present
the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation to
consciousness, i.e. as something external to it, and not yet
as external on its own part, or as being beside and not of itself".
(Philosophy of Mind, p. 159, §418) 23
Sense-consciousness in other words is a description of a state of
consciousness. As Hegel points out later in the Philosophy of Mind
it is only once we get to the level of perception that consciousness
24
is capable of experience. For this reason,in so far as sense-certainty
is sense-consciousness, it is outside of the phenomenological development,
since it has no experience. Sense-certainty, however, includes a dimension
absent from sense consciousness. It involves a claim that it is true,
which it expresses by saying not that it is conscious of its senses, but
that it is certain of them, in so far as it is thus subjectively involved
in its senses it is what Hegel calls intuition. It is in this sense also
that natural consciousness is not simply passive, but always sceptical,
and without this sceptical attitude the experience which is traced and
recollected in the Phenomenology (and which is absent from the Philosophy
of Mind ) would not be possible.
23. In the Propadeigtic, however, Hegel does not make this distinction,
and presents sense consciousness in terms of a dialectic of Here
and Now. Even Hegel is capable of being inconsistent.
24. Philosophy of Mind ., p. 161, §420. Hegel mentions the notion
of experience have only in passing and does not make it in any 'W^iy
central to his analysis as he does in the Phenomenology.
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To begin with, however, sense-certainty takes itself to be sense-consciousness,
and denies that it involves any intuition. We,in so far. as we have phenomenal
knowledge, know that it is necessarily intuition, and the problem is to de¬
monstrate this to natural consciousness. Hegel expresses this in the title
to the section through a pun on the german word "meinen", which can be both
the dative case of mei-n, meaning the possessive "mine", and "to think",
25
or "to mean", or "to intend" - in a word, to intuit. The suggestion to
us, then, is that what sense-certainty takes to be purely private, its own
personal consciousness, in fact just the opposite, something which is in¬
tended or thought and which therefore refers to a system of meanings which
are universal and public. The ritual of sense-certainty initiates it into
recognition of this fact.
25. Later, in the chapter on Reason, Hegel makes a complementary pun
on the double meaning of "Sein" and "sein", the capitalised
form meaning 'being', and the non-capitalised form being the
third person possessive, his, hers, or its. In the opening
sections of Reason, then, we find the opposite movement to that
of sense-certainty. Observing reason makes Sein sein, that is
makes objective being its own property (Phenomenology p. 145).
On mein and meinen, we may compare also a comment Hegel makes
in the History of Philosophy and eslewhere, that the expression
"I think" (Iah meine)is a pleonasm: "Who, after all, can do
your thinking for you?" (From Shklar, op. cit. p. 3).
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Hegel confronts sense-certainty in three stages, setting a pattern which
is repeated often and at many levels in the Phenomenology. In the first
stage, the object is taken to be essential, and the apprehending subject
to be inessential; so that the object exists and is the same whether or
not it is apprehended, and the apprehension is a passive reflection which
alters nothing. Hyppolite relates this stage to the "being" of an object
2 6
which Parmenides opposed to our "opinion" of it. In the second stage,
this is reversed, and the observer becomes the essential moment. That
is to say, the observation becomes essentially subjective, and the object
exists only in being perceived. This echoes Berkeley's "esse est percipi
and parallels may also be found in Plato's Protagoras and Theaetetus.
Finally, the process is regarded as a whole, so that neither subject nor
object alone, but their relationship is taken to be essential.
2 8
This threefold division, as Hegel explains in the Propadeutic, is a
general characteristic of consciousness. As we saw earlier, the three
moments of subjective Spirit, in so far as they appear to consciousness
or as phenomenology, are also defined in terms of these three ways of
looking at the relation of subject to object. We may also note that this
division is also echoed in Hegel's general characterisation of Logic.
"With regard to its form, logic has three aspects: (a) the abstract
or understandable aspect; (b) the dialectical or negatively
rational aspect; (c) the speculative or positively rational aspect"
(Logic, p. 113).
26. Hyppolite op. cit. p. 88ff. Giovanni della Volpe in Logic as a
Positive Science, NLB 1969, p. 41, also makes this connection.
27. Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. G.J. Warnock,
Collins/Fontana 1962, p.66.
28. Propadeutic, in J.Lowenberg ed. Hegel Selections, New York 1929,
pp. 68-79: p. 69f especially.
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We should, as most commentators, have pointed out, be extremely wary of
29
attempting to fit Hegel's views into any abstract logical scheme.
Hegel himself criticises this view in the Preface to the Phenomenology:
"Of course, the triadic form must not be regarded as scientific
when it is reduced to a lifeless schema, a mere shadow, and when
scientific organisation is degraded into a table of terms. Kant
rediscovered this triadic form by instinct, but in his work it
was lifeless and uncomprehended ..." (Phenomenology, p. 29).
We should not, however, go so far as to argue that Hegel entirely rejects
the idea of a formal structure.^0 Indeed, he completes the last sentence
of the above quote as follows:
"... since then it has, however, been raised to its absolute
significance, and with it the true form in its true content
has been presented, so that the Notion of Science has emerged"
(ibid) .
While we should not attempt to fit an abstract scheme onto Hegel's argu¬
ments, where in any case it will often fail to fit, we should not assume
that it has no formal structure. In the Phenomenology, we may say,
Spirit is presented to consciousness, and it follows that distinctions
which are characteristic of consciousness and of the object of consciousness
will therefore also be made in Spirit in so. far as it is an object for con¬
sciousness. Accordingly, we will follow these three aspects in the dialectic
of sense-certainty separately.
29. This view has been especially associated with the British Hegelian
J.M.E.M. McTaggart (Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, CUP, 1896)
See also Michael Kosok's article on 'The Formalisation of Hegel's
Dialectical Logic' in A.MacIntyre (ed.), Hegel, Notre Dame Press
1976.
30. Kaufmann, op. cit. p.168 appears to take this view.
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To begin with, then, sense-certainty has for its object a particular
sense impression. This object for it
"is the essence. It is regardless of whether it is known or not;
and remains even if it is not known, whereas there is no
knowledge if the object is not there. (Phenomenology, p.59).
It claims to know this object directly and immediately, as "This",
"Here", and "Now" - taking these terms to express the absolute singularity
of its object. In order to test the Truth of this claim - in its own
terms, of course - Hegel says "a simple experiment will suffice". We
ask sense-certainty to write down its truth: "a truth cannot loose any¬
thing by being written down". Let it write, for example, "Now is Night".
"If now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to
say that it has become stale". The same procedure may be applied to the
"here". That which is 'here' is only here so long as 'here' is where I
am looking. I have only to turn around for here to become somewhere
else, and to say that what is true is what is here is only to say that
everything is true, since everything is here, and this means equally that
31
nothing (in particular) is true.
Through this experience sense certainty discovers that what it took to
be the most concrete particular, "This", "Here" and "Now", is in fact
the exact opposite, the most abstract universal, since everything sense
certainty sees is "This", "Here", and "Now". What sense-certainty "meant"
was something uniquely particular, but what it said was the exact oppo¬
site, the emptiest universal, and what it means is in fact quite ineffable.
31.All passages in quotation marks in this paragraph come from
Phenomenology, p. 59f.
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Thus it discovers, that language "has the divine nature of directly
32
reversing the meaning of what is said". This experience is the first
'determinate negation' of the Phenomenology, and also the most simple
and lucid, and should be considered carefully by those who are uncertain
or critical of the notion of determinate negation.
The recognition that the truth of the object is universal is equally
a reference back to the subject. It is now not the object which is
simply meant, but the subjective Here and Now which is taken to be true.
The original relationship of subject to object, therefore, has been
reversed:
"certainty is now to be found in the opposite element, viz in
knowing, which previously was the unessential element. Its
truth is in the object as my object, or in its being mine
pWeinenJ ; it is, because I know it". (Phenomenology, p. 61).
Hegel effectively applies the same argument to this as to the previous
position. 'I' hold this to be true, another 'I' holds another 'this'
to be true, and so on, so that "each truth vanishes in the other". The
only thing which does not vanish is the universal 'I'. Sense certainty
thus learns that what it took to be absolutely singular this time, that
is, itself, turns out to be universal, and to be essentially present in
any example of consciousness.
At this point Hegel pauses to make a critical allusion to Krug, of whom
32. Phenomenology, p.66. Hegel gives language a similarly exalted
position in his discussion of Conscience later in the Phenomenology
Language is the medium of the reconciliation of universal and
particular self, of evil and forgiveness (See Hyppolite op. cit.
p. 510 ff). In the System der Sittlichkeit Hegel calls language
"both the instrument and the offspring of intelligence", (ibid).
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he had written in the Critical Journal that he "could not refrain from
understanding the thing fi.e. Critical philosophy ) like the commonest
33
plebs". Krug had responded to the Cartesian notion that the world
could be deduced from reason alone by challenging it to deduce any
particular thing, such as for example the pen he was writing with. The
challenge became known simply as "Krug's pen", and Hegel alludes to it
34
directly in the Philosophy of Nature, and though he does not mention
Krug by name here his allusion is, as commentators agree, clear enough.
His response is to say that Krug ought to say which particular thing
he means us to deduce, but, because of the "divine nature of language"
he cannot do this, and can only utter the universal concepts "this" and
35
"thing".
"When Science is faced with the demand - as if it were an acid
test it could not pass - that it should construct, deduce, find
a priori, or however it is put, something called "this thing"
or "this one man" it is reasonable that the demand should say
which "this thing" or which "this particular man" is meant;
but it is impossible to say this".. (Phenomenology, p. 62)
Having learned that both the Here and Now and the I which I mean do not
have a continuing being, or "are not", "we reach the stage where we
have to posit the whole of sense-certainty itself as essence, and no
longer one of its moments". Sense certainty thus takes itself to be a
"pure act of intuiting", taking the immediate relationship between itself
33. Werke, FMVH, Vol 4, p.178.
34. Philosophy of Nature, §250.
35. We may compare this to a story told of Bertrand Russell and reported
by Richard Norman. Russell was asked after a lecture how he could
maintain that a sensation could be true when even in the time it
took to describe it the sensation it could pass away and be replaced
by another. He replied that to avoid this difficulty it is necessary
to speak very fast.
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and its object to be true. In doing so it becomes very like the sense-
consciousness of the Philosophy of Mind. That is to say, it abandons
public claims to truth and retreats into silence, seeking certainty only
privately in pure intuition. Since it will not speak to us, Hegel pro¬
poses that we identify ourselves with it, and ask ourselves whether we
can find truth in this pure intuition.
The result is more or less the same as before. We may in our silence
'point to' the particular truth we intend. If we point to something
'now', this particular now ceases to be in the act of pointing to it.
It becomes a now that has been.
"But what essentially has been^gewesen ist\ is not in fact an
essence that is jj<ein WesenJ; it is not, and it was with being
that we were concerned'.' (Phenomenology, p. 63) .
Even in our purely private intuition, therefore, the 'now' is universal.
Hegel makes the same argument concerning the 'here'. We conclude that
the object exists in time and in space, and this just means that it is
not present to us immediately, but on the contrary is mediated through
what Kant called the "forms of intuition" of time and space. Mediation,
as Hegel argues in the Preface, presents the object not as simple being,
36
which is what is meant by sense-certainty, but as a "becoming", that
is as essentially temporal and spatial (though Hegel tends perhaps to
37
stress the former over the latter).
36. Phenomenology, p. 11.
37. Cf Kojeve, op. cit, Ch 5; and Phenomenology, p. 487.
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This recognition that what is true is universal in the widest sense, i.e.
in the sense that it is mediation, produces in Hegel's view the distinct
and new attitude of Perception. Perception, Hegel says punning on the
meaning of the German term for perception, 1 Wahrnehmen', takes the object
as it is in truth, that is as essentially universal. The truth of an
object then is to be found not in the immediate intuition of it but in
the universal predicates or 'properties' which may be assigned to it.
Perception therefore appears as the second distinct moment of conscious¬
ness, and as the result of the experience of sense-certainty.
Before he goes on to Perception, Hegel registers openly the contempt for
sense-certainty and the philosophy of common sense which has been fairly
apparent all along in his cursory treatment of it. Appealing to ex¬
perience in general, that is to "us" rather than to sense-certainty itself,
he says
"we can tell those who assert the truth and certainty of the
reality of sense objects that they should go back to the most
elementary school of wisdom, viz. the ancient Eleusinian mysteries
of Ceres and Bacchus, 38 and that they still have to learn the
secret meaning of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine".
(Phenomenology, p. 65).
This secret meaning apparently lies in that by consuming an object I
show that its apparent independence is illusory, and demonstrate my
39
power over it and independence of it by destroying it. Hegel goes
on to explain
38. In connection with which Hegel asserted later that "it is as
unhistorical as it is foolish to assume that profound truths
are to be found there". (Philosophy of History, p. 247). Cf.
also Gore Vidal, Julian, for a novelist's view of the Eleusinian
mysteries.
39. Cf. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit. p.8.
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"For he who is initiated into these mysteries not only comes to
doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of it? in part
he brings about the nothingness of Such things himself in his
dealings with them, and in part he sees them reduce themselves
to nothingness. Even the animals are not shut out from this wis¬
dom, but, on the contrary, show themselves to be most profoundly
initiated into it; for they do not stand idly in front of
sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but,
despairing of their reality and completely assured of their
nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up. And
all Nature, like the animals, celebrates these open Mysteries
which teach the truth about sensuous things", (ibid).




Although the experience of perception is reasonably straightforward, the
attitude of perception in general is harder to pin down. This is partly
due to a confusion of terminology, which may also be aggravated by
ambiguity in translation of Verstand.^ We noted earlier that "understanding"
is sometimes used by Hegel in a limited and more technical sense, and
sometimes in a more Kantian sense to indicate consciousness in general.
Here we may be more specific. In so far as it indicates consciousness in
general it is associated especially with perception; and Hegel sometimes
speaks of Wahvnehmendev Vevstand^ as a single attitude, rather than two
distinct attitudes as in the Phenomenology.
In the Philosophy of Mind he associates ordinary consciousness, and
especially the attitude of Kant's philosophy, and indeed science in
general especially with the attitude of perception.
"The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives
Spirit is perception: which is also the point of view taken by
ordinary consciousness, and more or less by the sciences".
(Philosophy of Mind, p.161 §420).
Perception in general is characterised by an opposition between the
universal and the particular, and a tendency to move from the particular
to the universal, to subsume the particular under the universal, or to
'classify'. For perception the particular data of the senses count as
nothing unless they have been broken down and recognised as examples of
universal characteristics, and suitably filed or "pigeon-holed", as
40. Q. Lauer, A reading of Hegel's Phenomenology, Fordham University
Press 1976, p. 70f. Wallace translates Vevstand as 'Intellect',
not Understanding.
41. Ibid. Lauer suggests that this is equivalent to gesundev Mens-
chenvevstand or 'sound common sense'.
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Hegel put it in the Preface, If perception is scientific (in the natural
scientific, not philosophical sense), it is only in this weak sense, that
it analyses and classifies, but not in the stronger sense in which natural
science sets out to 'explain' thing by reference to universal laws. This
latter attitude is restricted to and more or less defines the attitude
of Verstand in its more limited sense.
For us, the limitations of this approach are not hard to see. In its
analyses and its subsumption of the particular under the universal, the
particular itself is lost sight of. Anything which cannot be classified
under some universal heading becomes merely 'accidental', and of no
value. Individual living things cannot be grasped by perception, and
the notion of life eludes it. Indeed, as Kojeve remarks in a characteris¬
tically pithy footnote, it has no reason even to respect life, and every
reason not to do so.
"...a conceptual or "scientific" understanding of the dog
actually leads, sooner or later, to its dissection". (Kojeve
op. cit. p. 141n).
As we have already remarked, this lifeless and even murderous attitude
is a general characteristic of consciousness. It is especially visible
in perception. However, natural consciousness, which is limited to the
attitude of consciousness, is not able to grasp this as we are. We al¬
ready have the notion of and experience of life, and it is easy for us
to criticise perception from our privileged ' point of view. Perception
itself, however, need not acknowledge our point of view, and the point
is for us to lead it to such an acknowledgement through its own experience.
The purpose of the dialectic of the experience of consciousness is to do
this. It does not, however, result immediately in the experience of life,
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and this experience, which refers consciousness to self-consciousness,
does not occur until the end of Understanding. The dialectic of per¬
ception serves only to introduce the notion of Understanding. Formally
speaking, it follows fairly closely the pattern of sense-certainty. We
will summarise it here only very briefly as follows. Perception takes
the universal to be a property of the thing it perceives. In the form
of a property, the universal is essentially conditioned (bedingtby
the thing. Nevertheless, the universal property and the particular
thing are opposed to. each other, each being a different substance. The
universal is thought, the property matter, we might say. It follows
that in classifying the particular under the universal, perception relies
not on a rational or necessary connection of the one with the other,
but only on an empirical or synthetic connection. It is therefore liable
to error or 'deception', and it follows that in its own terms it is not
true.
Perception overcomes this difficulty eventually by regarding both the
particular and the universal as determinations of thought, so that they
are therefore compatible with each other. However, this means abandoning
the idea that defined perception, since the universal is no longer con¬
ditioned by the object, but is freely thought. It is no longer bedingt
but rather unbedingt, and we arrive at the notion of the "unconditioned
universal", which defines the attitude of the Understanding.
"These pure determinatenesses (of Perception) seem to express
the essential nature itself, but they are only being-for-self
which is burdened with being-for-another. Since, however, both
are essentially in a single unity, what we have now is unconditioned
absolute universality, and consciousness here for the first time
truly enters the realm of the Understanding" (Phenomenology, p.97).
42. Bedingt carries in German a connotation of uncertainty while the
the common expression "Unbedingtl" means unconditionally true,
and corresponds to the English expression "Certainly!".
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(d) Force and the Dnders.tanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World.
We have already mentioned the overall aim of the chapter on Understanding,
that is, to lead consciousness via the notion of life to the realisation
that it is essentially self-conscious. We may add here that, as commentators
have noted, the way Hegel had divided up his discussion of consciousness
suggests a particular concern with Kant's conceptual schema. Kant's
system begins, as does the Phenomenology, with intuition. It then adds
the conceptual framework of the Understanding, which in Hegel's inter¬
pretation also embraces perception. It then adds in also the "transcendental
unity of apperception; which corresponds to self-consciousness in Hegel.
The major difference between Hegel and Kant, then, can be seen in the
fact that while Kant adds these faculties together as independent entities
Hegel discovers them within eachother and shows their necessary relation¬
ship to each other, and therefore to the whole of which they are part or
in which they are related. Self-consciousness therefore is presented not
as an addition to consciousness, or as another object which it may per¬
ceive (though this is the way it appears to natural consciousness) but
as something which is itself within consciousness and is essentially a
part of all consciousness. Hegel wants not so much to reject Kant's schema,
as to break up its hard mechanical outlines, and to present instead a
warmer and more human picture of consciousness.
"The battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity
to which the understanding has reduced everything", (lesser
Logic, p. 52, §32) 43
If the general strategy of the section on Understanding is reasonably
clear, the more detailed points of the argument are less clear, especially
to the modern reader. The notion of the supersensible world in particular
has given rise to some confusion ,
43. Cf. Natural Law, p. 56.
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The supersensible world is the direct result of the notion of the un¬
conditioned universal. Unversals which are not conditioned by thinghood
must exist separately from it in a world which is not sensible but super¬
sensible. It is tempting therefore to identify the supersensible world
with the world of forms in Plato. Hegel himself suggests this connection
in the History of Philosophy, in the context of a discussion of Plato's
view of the immortality of the soul.
"The beautiful, the good, the like, being all simple, are in¬
capable of change •, that on the contrary in which these things
are, men, things, etc., are the changeable. They are perceptible
by the senses, while the former is supersensuous." (History of
Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 42).
The fact that in the Phenomenology the idea of the supersensible world
is introduced directly following on from an apparent reference to Plato's
44
"cave" strengthens this view.
However, if the platonic world of forms is supersensible, it would be
wrong to conclude that the reverse is also true, and that the super-
45
sensible world is the world of platonic form. The difference between
the two may be expressed by saying that platonic form is perceptible in
the phenomenal world, whereas the supersensible of the understanding
cannot be. In Plato's view, though the forms themselves are supersensible,
we need them in order to understand the phenomenal world, and understand
the phenomenal world through them and as a manifestation of them, or as
informed. I cannot recognise that an object is beautiful, for example,
44. Phenomenology, p. 88: "The result is of course, the same if a
blind man is placed amid the wealth of the supersensible world
... and if one with sight is placed in pure darkness", etc.
45. Gadamer, in Hegel's Dialectic, Ch.2 appears to take this view, in
his generally illuminating discussion of "Hegel's Inverted World".
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unless I. already haye an idea of what beauty is; but the object itself
nevertheless appears to be beautiful. The supersensible world of Under¬
standing, on the other hand, is essentially hypothetical. It is the
46
"self-existent inner being" of things. Since it is 'inner' we cannot
perceive it directly, and we accept that it is what it is only in so
far as it serves to explain what does appear. It is thus not so much form
47
as law.
The supersensible world of Understanding therefore, is essentially alien
and thinglike. Though we do not have to recognise it, in so far as we do
we are asked to recognise its laws as rigidly true. The scientist may
for example say, "if you wish to understand the phenomenon of electricity,
then you must understand and accept the law that electricity flows from
positive to negative poles". Such an argument cannot be proposed from
the standpoint of platonic form. Form is less alien and I recognise it
freely, not in virtue of some necessity. I may acknowledge beauty, for
example, but I also reserve the right to find ugly an object others find
beautiful. The supersensible world of understanding is, as an object of
consciousness, thinglike, and I am not part of it, while platonic form is
not alien in this sense. It belongs equally to me, I am part of it, and
in this sense we may say that in so far as it appears in Hegel it is as a
part of Reason rather than Understanding. However, if we recognise this
difference, we may then say that the purpose of the dialectic' of the ex¬
perience of understanding is precisely to lead beyond the alien notion
46. Philosophy of Mind, p.163 §422.
47. Ibid.
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of the supersensible, of Understanding, towards the more friendly super¬
sensible of platonic form or of the Idea, in which I find myself/ and
which therefore refers the Understanding to self-consciousness. The
objective world becomes thereby not so much a brute fact, whose existence
48
I must therefore simply accept, but something whxch contains an element
of myself and to which I may therefore more easily reconcile myself; though
this reconciliation does not in fact occur until self-consciousness has
developed into Reason.
The unconditioned universal in Hegel's account is represented as force,
which in so far asit is held to be present in all phenomena, cannot be




The experience of force leades natural consciousness through the experience
of the play of forces to posit the idea of the supersensible world which
we have just examined. It then discovers that since it has made this
world into a beyond, it cannot claim to know it,
48. This attitude may be observed for example, in Freud's notion of the
"reality principle": (see eg. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,
Pelican 1976, p.108). Freud's view conceives of Spirit not so much
from the point of view of perception, as does Kant, as from the point
of view specifically of Understanding; seeking not so much to categorise
or pigeon-hole, as to explain. ♦
49. The reference to the notion of force here is to Newton. Perhaps
Hegel might have modified his account in the light of modern natural
science. It seems strange to the modern reader to make the concept
of force so central. To his contemporaries this probably seemed less
arbitrary, and both Leibinz and Schelling, for example, used the
notion of force in order to reach the notion of life. (Hyppolite, op.
cit. p.121). In any case, to substitute more modern conceptions
of the supersensible would not affect Hegel's argument, which is
directed against the form of the supersensible, not its content.
50. Phenomenology, p. 87.
l bu-
"just because in the Void nothing is known, or, expressed from
the other side, just becausg this inner world is determined as
the beyond of consciousness". (Phenomenology p.88)
It therefore redefines the supersensible not as a beyond, but as
"appearance qua appearance".5l
Appearance qua appearance, however, lacks on its own any principle of
stability, and the understanding, which cannot tolerate such contingency,
introduces a stable principle which it discovered earlier as the principle
of unity in the universal flux of the play of forces. Here it becomes
the law of force, which for Hegel is "the stable image of unstable
52
appearance". The supersensible world thus becomes the unchangeable,
since it consists of the world of appearance, in so far as its laws govern
the behaviour of the flux of experience.
51. Heidegger and Sartre make the same move when they contrast to the
Kantian nuomenon the "phenomenon of being". This is opposed to the
being of the phenomenon in much the same way as a nuomenon is opposed
to a phenomenon, without yet being riuomenal and Sartre calls it




These two ideas., law and explanation, are the two most fundamental
53
concepts characteristic of Understanding, and with them Understanding
is in its element. The scientific attitude in perceiving a phenomenon
is not satisfied until it can say that, given certain circumstances,
this phenomenon had to occur. Understanding does not merely perceive
the apple falling from the tree, but also grasps that
"In the case of the motion of falling, Force is the simple
factor, gravity, whose law is that the magnitudes of the
different moments of the motion, the time elapsed and the
space travelled, and related to each other as root and square".
(Phenomenology, p.92)
We may note parenthetically that if this attitude is at home in natural
science, it may also be found in social science, and is objectionable
there in a special sense, in so far as the phenomenon it attempts to -
to explain in terms of law is a society made up of subjectively free
53. The term explanation (Erklaren) is used by Hegel here and generally
in a limited sense. It applies only to a 'scientific' style of
explanation, which tends to reduce the appearance to be explained
to an expression of the law governing its appearance. Hegel there¬
fore avoids using the term explanation in connection with Spirit,
since Spirit, because it is absolute, is precisely beyond any
such explanation. If explanation were allowed to include not
only 'scientific' explanation but also the kind of explanation which
is suggested by Aristotle's theory of causality, and which grants
independence to the phenomenon to be explained, this would not be
necessary. Further, we may note that within the scientific paradigm,
Hegel's notion of explanation appears to be limited to what Hempel
calls "deductive-nomological explanation", and does not include
"probabilistic" explanation which is causal but does not refer
specifically or directly to the notion of Law. See C.G.Hempel,
Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice-Hall 1966, Chapter 5.
Hegel can be found making some witty observations about 'explanation'
in a short article called "Who Thinks Abstractly?" which is included
in Kaufmann (op. cit. p. 461 ff,)and was probably written shortly
after the Phenomenology.
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individuals, who caus.e themselves, and cannot therefore adequately be
explained in terms of an external cause. This attitude may be seen
particularly clearly in Freud, where the supersensible appears as the
54
unconscious and rts law as the Oedrpus complex; and equally in Marx,
where the supersensible world is the world of value (as opposed to price),
and its law that it is determined by socially necessary abstract labour
55
time.
Understanding, then, wants to grasp appearance as necessary, but, Hegel
56
argues, "necessity here is an empty word". The type of explanation
Hegel has presented collapses into a simple tautology. The supersensible
world we have considered is a simple copy of the perceived world, and
rather than truly presenting phenomena as necessary, it simply describes
them in a different language.
"The single occurrence of lightening, eq. is apprehended as a
universal, and this universal is enunciated as the law of
electricity; the explanation then condenses the law into
Force as the essence of the law. This Force, the, is so
constituted that when it is expressed, opposite electricities
appear, which disappear again into one another; that is Force
is constituted exactly the same as law". (Phenomenology, p.95)
The inadequacy of this tautological type of explanation may be seen es¬
pecially clearly in the cases of Psychoanalysis and Marxism. Freud,
especially in his later work, argues that everyone has an Oedipus complex,
and the central aim of a psychoanalysis is to allow the patient to dis¬
cover this fact. The root and explanation of any neurosis as well as any
54. See Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Pelican 1976, pp.362-366.
55. See Marx, Capital, Lawrence and Wishart 1970, esp. Ch.l. and
pp. 51-53.
56. Phenomenology, p. 93.
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normal psyche is. held to lie in the Oedipus complex. Every psychological
phenomenon is therefore held to have the same cause. However, this just
means that no particular phenomenon has been elucidated. The theory is
then either merely a generalisation from experience, in which case it
is neither truly universal, nor capable of functioning as an explanation;
or it is something beyond knowledge, that is unconscious, and we may
legitimately ask how we may in that case claim to know anything about it.
In Marx, too, there are similar difficulties. What, really, is the re¬
lationship of price to value? On the one hand value may be a generali¬
sation or averaging of price. This seems to be what is normally meant
by the word, and is suggested by Marx's reasoning in so far as he defends
the labour theory of value by arguing that though in his view price and
value differ systematically, total price nevertheless equals total
value. On the other hand, he introduces the notion of value, and develops
it, quite distinctly from price, arguing that there is a necessary
57
connection between labour time and value, and that value ultimately
determines price. In this case, value is entirely separate from price,
and we must ask how, since it does not take phenomenal form except as
57. Marx shares the labour theory of value with the political economists,
and it is^ of course, equally objectionable in both cases, in so far
as it sets out to explain a subjective action without reference to
a subjective motivation. Only Marx, however, (perhaps sensing the
weakness of the theory) attempts to hoodwink us with a supposedly
necessary and purely logical deduction of the law of value.
(The 'deduction' may be found in Capital, Vol. I Lawrence and
Wishart 1974, p.46).
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price, is it possible in any sense to know it? If in the world of
natural science we may say that explanation does not express a truth
in the proper sense of the word, then, in social science we may say
that it is objectionable in a much stronger sense, and should be re¬
jected altogether.
If the explanations of Understanding are to have any value, then it is
necessary, in order to avoid the charge of tautology, to make the super¬
sensible world different from the sensible world, the cause different
from the effect. It makes sense to say that hunger causes me to eat,
but not that hunger causes me to be hungry. In order to be different
from the sensible world, indeed in order to be different from anything,
it is necessary that the supersensible world be not simply universal,
but capable of a specific content. As it stands, "the perceived world
59
still retains for itself the principle of change and alteration".
This principle must be given to the supersensible world , in order for
its explanations to be capable of any specific content. This may be
done in Hegel's view only if the supersensible world is held to contain
not only purely positive and abstractly universal concepts such as
Force, but also concepts which carry a negative significance, or imply
not just what they are, but also what they are not. Force is found
equally everywhere, but to explain or even to describe a phenomenon we
must have recourse to concepts which are found in specific ca^es only,
58. E. von Bohm-Bawerk, the Austrian political economist, has stressed
these points especially in his "Karl Marx and the Close of his
System". This is published together with an essay by Hilferding in
Bohm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx (ed. Sweezy) London, Merlin Press,
1974. Bohm-Bawerk's Capital and Interest is also of relevance, and
much of the essay on "Karl Marx etc." is taken directly from this
work.
59. Phenomenology, p. 96.
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and not in others.. This, .means including the idea of negation. As Hegel
comments in his Logic 1
"The foundation of all determinateness is. negation (as
Spinoza says, omnis determinatio est negatio)"
.(Lesser Logic, p. 135, §9) .
However, it is not strictly possible to introduce negativity into the
supersensible world. What must be introduced is after all precisely
what that world is not. For this reason, Hegel proposes the notion of
the second supersensible world. If a specific determination, such as
sweetness, is to be introduced into the super-sensible world, its
opposite, sourness must also be introduced; and because this is its
opposite it must be held to belong to a second and inverted world.
If somewhere we find sweetness and light,:we must also know that some¬
where else there is bitterness^0 and darkness.
This unfamiliar and perhaps also obscure idea is, as Gadamer has argued,^
the most important stage in the experience of Understanding. If Hegel
is right, it has been arrived at solely through the experience of Under¬
standing. Nevertheless, with the second supersensible world we have al¬
ready stepped outside the boundaries of consciousness. An explanation
which is offered in its terms is no longer the disinterested causal ex¬
planation of understanding, but is a judgement, and the ego is self¬
consciously involved in it. It confesses therefore that it i^ interested
in its explanation, and by this stroke the supersensible world of under¬
standing has been replaced with the "Idea" of Reason, which corresponds
to the world of platonic Form. It remains only to spell this out to
Understanding itself.
60. Or at least, non-sweetness.
61. Gadamer op. cit. p.35.
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Understanding cannot tolerate contradiction. However, as Hegel argued
in the Spirit of Christianity arid its Fate, "what is a contradiction in
6 2
the realm of the dead is not one in the realm of life". He has shown
to the Understanding in its own terms that it must think contradiction,
that this is a necessary part of any knowledge. He illustrates this by
taking an example from outside the strict limits of Understanding, of
law 'in another sphere', that is, as penal law. If we apply the attitude
of Understanding here, the result is a positivist thinking which cannot
distinguish crime from punishment, seeing only that both are equally
6 3
inflictions of injury. For understanding, summa ius est surrrma ini-ure.
Yet clearly this is inadequate, since, in spite of the pun, the injury
which is inflicted in punishment is held to be just. For the thinking
which accommodates the notion of the second supersensible world, however,
the fact that an injury can be both just and unjust is no contradiction.
"The punishment which under the law of the first world disgraces
and destroys a man is transformed in its inverted world into the
pardon which preserves his essential being and brings him honour."
(Phenomenology, p.97). 64
62. ETW, p. 261. In the Early Theological Writings, we should recall,
life is not differentiated from Spirit.
63. The greatest justice is the greatest injury. Cf. note 1 to this
chapter.
64. This, of course, relates to the notion of punishment as recon¬
ciliation which Hegel discusses in The Spirit of Christianity and
its Fate, and which was discussed in Ch. 1 above; and to the
notion of evil and its forgiveness discussed in the Phenomenology,
p. 383 ff.
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In thinking contradiction in this, way, Hegel argues, the limited and
finite thought of Understanding becomes capable of grasping the infinite,
65
or rather becomes infinite itself. The supersensible world taken as
a whole, or as the "inner world", includes within itself both the notion
66
of unity or self-identity and the principle of difference. And, as
Hegel says
"This simple infinity, or the absolute notion, may be called the
simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal
blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted
by any difference, but rather is itself supersession; it pulsates
within itself, but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at
rest". (Phenomenology, p.100).
We have arrived then at the notion of an independent existence which
transcends the Understanding's explanation, dscapes its reductions, which
is alive and which determines itself; and which, in relation to Under¬
standing is absolute. Such a being however, is not an object but
essentially a subject or an 'I'. We have therefore discovered within
the Understanding in the form of an object the principle which we know
to be lacking from it because we know it to be incapable of judgement:
that is the principle of self-subsistent individuality.
This means, in effect, that consciousness has become aware of itself.
Initially, and in accordance with the notion of experience, it has come
across itself as an object, as life. However, once it has discovered
i
itself as an object it is also in a position to recognise itself also
as being involved in all consciousness. All the concepts of the under¬
standing are in fact necessarily self-conscious. Laws do not belong to
a supersensible world but
65. Or, as Hegel says in the lesser Logic, p.49 §28, thought becomes
'Speculative". The notion of infinity here as unity-in-diversity
should be contrasted with the 'bad' or 'wrong' {Schtechte)infinity,
"an abstract way and away for ever and ever", (ibid) which Hegel
also discusses later on p. 137, §94 of the lesser Logic.
06. Phenomenology, p. 99.
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"...are determinations of the intellectual consciousness [Verstand]
inherent in the world itself, therefore the intellectual con¬
sciousness. finds them in its own nature and thus becomes objective
to itself". (Philosophy of Mind, p. 163 §422).
Similarly, explanation, properly understood, is a game consciousness plays
with itself.
"The reason why explaining affords so much satisfaction is just
because in it consciousness is, so to speak, commencing directly
with itself; although it seems to be busy with something else, it
is in fact occupied only with itself" (Phenomenology, p.101).
If we draw the curtain of appearance, then, in order to reveal a true
reality, what we find is neither a hypothetical nor anuomenal world, but
our own selves. However, this reveals self-consciousness only as something
isolated, "not yet as a unity with consciousness in general". In other
words, though we found characteristics of Reason in Hegel's description
of the second supersensible world, we cannot go on directly to consider
Reason in its own right. Firstly, we must consider self-consciousness
independently and in its own right, before we return to self-conscious
consciousness, or Reason.
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CHAPTER FIVE : Self-Consciousness
(a) Self-Consciousness in General
"With self-consciousness, we have entered the native realm of Truth".^
Consciousness defined its object as essentially or qualitatively different
2
from itself . Object and thought were different types of being, and it
followed from this that thought would only more or less accurately re¬
flect, mimic, or represent an object, but would never be identical with
it, so that its knowledge could not claim to be necessarily true. Self-
consciousness, by contrast, defines its object as itself, and since it
is evidently of the same quality as itself, it is possible for there to
be a true identity between its thought and its object, rather than a
mere correspondance. Its truth is in thought and it is capable therefore
of being represented as necessary. Self-consciousness, then is not a
certainty which should be opposed to truth,
"but a certainty which is identical with its truth, for the
certainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness is
to itself the'Truth". (Phenomenology, p.104).
As Descartes, whom Hegel acknowledges to be the father of modern philo¬
sophy, argued, it is reasonable to doubt my senses, but it would amount
3
to an absurdity to doubt my own existence. I am not merely probable,
nor even merely certain, but undoubtably true.
*
1. Phenomenology, p.104
2. On the relation of essence to quality see Lesser Logic p. 124 ff
and especially the Zusatz to §85.
3. See Descartes, Discourse on Method, especially the opening pages
of the Fourth Discourse (Descartes, Discourse on Method and The
Meditations, Penguin, 1968, p. 53 f). In the History of Philo¬
sophy Hegel comments that "it is not until Descartes arrived
that we really enter upon a philosophy which is, properly speak¬
ing, independent, which knows that it comes forth from reason as
independent, and that self-consciousness is an essential moment
of truth". (History of Philosophy Vol. 3, London 1896, p.217)
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rutting this same observation into the language of Kant and Fichte, we
can say that while consciousness is conditioned by its object, self-
consciousness is independent. Consciousness is essentially conscious
of something, and it therefore depends upon the thing of which it is
conscious. Self-consciousness by contrast depends only on itself, and
it follows that it is independent of external things. This is expressed
especially in Fichte's formula for self-consciousness, "I am I".
In Fichte, this independence is also freedom. However, Hegel argues
that if self-consciousness is expressed in this way it is in fact
neither free, nor even knowledge. Considered abstractly, self-
consciousness
"is only the motionless tautology of: "I am I"; but since
for it the difference does not have the form of being, it
is not self-consciousness". (Phenomenology, p. 105).
Fichte's "I am I" is an expression of identity, a relationship of a
subject to a subject. Knowledge, on the other hand, must be a relation¬
ship of a subject to a predicate. This relationship, in the case of
self-consciousness, will always be one of identity, beginning with the
words "I am", and its predicates will never be grammatically accusative.
It cannot say 'I am me' or 'me am I'. Nevertheless, it must take a
determinate objective form in order to know itself, and to be determinate
it must know what it is not. Its self-identity must contain difference?
or, it must be infinite or alive. For this reason the abstract inde-
<
pendence suggested by 'I am I' does not on its own count as freedom.
"A freedom involving no necessity, and mere necessity without
freedom, are abstract and in this way untrue formulae of thought
Freedom is no blank indeterminateness: essentially concrete,
and invaryingly self-determinate, it is so far at the same time
necessary". (Lesser Logic, p. 55 §35).
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Self-consciousness does in fact rise to the level of freedom in Hegel's
account, but only when it reaches its third stage, which indeed is
called Freedom of Self-Consciousness, or, as the corresponding section
in the Philosophy of Mind is headed, Universal self-consciousness. At
this level self-consciousness becomes free but still in a limited sense
because it is defined as arbeing which thinks. In this shape, self-
consciousness is
"aware of itself as essential being, a being which
thinks or is free self-consciousness.
For £0 think does not mean to be an abstract ' I' , but ap 'I'
which has at the same time the significance of intrinsic being,
of having itself fat object, or of relating to objective being
in such a way that its significance is the being-for-self of
the consciousness for which it is an object ." (Phenomenology,
p.120).
It is important therefore to distinguish the independence self-consciousness
4
achieves through mastery from the freedom it achieves through thought.
IfS so far as self-consciousness does eventually achieve freedom, and
also achieves truth, it may at first sight seem that we have already
4. Kojeve, for example, elides the two ideas. Shklar identifies
autonomy, independence, liberty, and self-sufficiency (op.cit pxv)
but distinguishes freedom from independence. Independence carries
a meaning similar to the Hobbesian notion of freedom, i.e. absence
of external limitation, while freedom carries a meaning closer to
Rousseau's, and is achieved through citizenship in spite of the
limitations which citizenship implies. For Shklar this latter
freedom is achieved in Hegel's state only in a limited form
through "membership of ethical groups" (op. cit. p.208). Hegel's
distinction of freedom and independence however is different.
Rousseau views freedom essentially as reason: it consists in the
dominance of the rational or general (the 'group') over the
individual. For Hegel, freedom is not reason but thought. In
reason, in Rousseau's interpretation, I am constrained by the
rules of reason; that is, I am constrained to think generally
and universally and to ignore anything particular, especially
my self. In simply thinking, however, no such constraint is
imposed. I can think as I like and am free in particular to
include my own personal interests and fancies.
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arrived at the end of the phenomenological development, which Hegel
earlier defined as the point where "Notion corresponds to object and
object to Notion".^ Hegel himself calls self-consciousness "the Notion
of Spirit", and seems to suggest that all that remains is to fill out
this abstract Notion.
"A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much 'I'
as object. With this we already have before us the Notion of
Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the ex¬
perience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is
the unity of the different independent self-consciousness which,
in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence:
'I' that is 'we', and 'we' that is 'I'. It is in self-
consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness
first finds its turning point, where it leaves behind the
colourful show of the here-and-noW and the nightlike void
of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual
daylight of the present". (Phenomenology, p.110 f) 6
However, as has already been argued, it would be mistaken to regard
self-consciousness as having an exalted position in Hegel's thought,
and self-consciousness should rather be understood as a moment of
Spirit which is neither more nor less significant than consciousness
and Reason. If self-consciousness is both free and true, there are
nevertheless distinct limitations both to its freedom, and its truth,
which we will consider before going on to look at its individual
moments.
*
5. Phenomenology, p. 51.
6. The Critical Philosophy, by contrast, in moving away from the
colourful diversity of nature stepped not into a spiritual day¬
light, but into a world of abstract universals, and thus "bade
men to go and feed on mere husks and chaff" (Lesser Logic, p. 48
§28).
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The freedom of self-consciousness is not the same as the freedom of
Spirit. Spirit and self-consciousness are both free, and it is in this
sense that self-consciousness is the Notion of Spirit. However, in the
Philosophy of Mind, Hegel calls Reason the^Notion of Spirit""^ for much
the same reason. This should not be interpreted as a change of position
(though it may well be a change in emphasis),because both self-consciousness
and Reason can be characterised as the Notion of Spirit, but in rather
different senses. Self-consciousness is free in so far as it has itself
for an object, or thinks. However, it is by definition incapable of
being consciousness of something other than itself, without thereby
ceasing to be self-consciousness and becoming Reason instead. If it has
the notion of freedom, then, it is nevertheless denied the dimension of
freedom in relation to an objective world, and it always encounters the
objective world as the opposite of itself, a limitation to its freedom.
It remains freedom of thought only, or the thought only of freedom. Reason,
which knows the objective world also as itself and which is essentially
a relation of consciousness to this woijd achieves this dimension of free¬
dom, in relation to the world and in this sense its freedom is more con¬
crete than that of self-consciousness. Its object is grammatically
accusative. However, the freedom of Reason too is limited, since it re¬
mains the freedom of a reasoning subject, and it is only Spirit's intui-
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tion of the Reason which it has as Reason which exists which gives free¬
dom in the full Hegelian sense of the word. The freedom of Reason and
the freedom of Spirit are therefore both qualitatively different from
the freedom of self-consciousness, and it follows that they cannot be
7. Philosophy of Mind, p. 157, §417
n?
reduced to expressions of the same freedom which is found in self-
consciousness.
The truth of self-consciousness is likewise limited. If self-consciousness
is the "native realm of truth", it is by no means on that account "the
g
height of knowledge". It is only knowledge of the self, and though
it may take the self as an object, its thinking nevertheless never
goes beyond the bounds of the merely subjective. In practice, it takes
up the standpoint of existentialism, and shares all the inadequacy and
conceit of that attitude which recognises only itself . Otherness,
except in so far as it may be regarded as an objectification of the Ego
through work or language, is simply alien . to it, and it therefore sees
it as merely contingent. In so far as it is contingent, it is unnecessary,
9
is not thought, and cannot therefore be said to be known. It does not
Reason. Similarly, when it looks at objective Spirit, it finds absurdity.
Objective Spirit is for it simply an objectification of the subjective,
and since the subject is free it follows that there is no ground for
saying that it should take any specific objective form, since this
would amount to a limitation on its freedom. It therefore does not
-their
recognise the ethical or political as having any value of own. Their
8. R. Aronson, Jean-Paul Sartre, London 1980 p.129.
I
9. In Sartre's Nausea, for example, Roquentin cannot find a word to
describe his awareness of being, and simply leaves a blank.
10. "It follows that my freedom is the unique foundation of values, and
nothing, absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that
particular value, this or that particular scale of values".
(Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit. p.38). Sartre attempted
to retract his nihilism later, for example in Existfehtialism and
Humanismf but succeeds only inSo far as he turns his back on some
of his earlier positions and adopts some orthodox Kantian ideas.
(Existentialism and Humanism, Methuen 1948 p. 32 and p.52).
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value, if they are admitted to have any, is always accounted in terms
of the subject.
The presentation of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology is divided
into three parts. The self for self-consciousness is an object, and it
therefore divides itself into the three aspects which are always chara-
cheristic of the object of consciousness. The first aspect, correspond¬
ing to sense-certainty, is Desire. It takes the ego simply as an object
or as life, and is the simplest and most general relation of conscious¬
ness to its object. The second aspect, corresponding to perception, is
Lordship and Bondage. Here the ego is regarded as a universal or
as a property of the object, and we see natural consciousness attempting
to possess this property. The third aspect, corresponding to Understand¬
ing, grasps the ego as an unconditioned universal or as freedom, and
considers the relation of self to self and to other, or mutual recogni¬
tion .
"Self-consciousness has in its culture, or movement, three
stages: (1) of Desire in so far as it is related to other
things: (2) of the Mediating relation of master and slave
(dominion and servitude)in so far as it is related to another
self-consciousness not identical with itself; (3) of the general
self-consciousness which recognises itself in other self-
consciousnesses, and is identical with them as well as self-
identical". (Propadeutic p.174)
We will consider each of these separately.
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(b) Desire and Life
"Self-consciousness is Pesire in general""'"''". Desire is the most general
and therefore also the most abstract characteristic of self-consciousness,
just as sensation is the most general and most abstract characteristic
of consciousness. If sensation gives a relation of an ego to an object,
desire turns consciousness towards itself, since it is its own desire,
and it is conscious that it must do something in order to satisfy it.
Desire, it is true, is a natural phenomenon, but Hegel does not accept
Plato's conclusion that in desire I am tied to natural being. Conscious¬
ness is tied to nature, but desire exhibits a freedom from nature, which
freedom we have already encountered at least once in Hegel's reference
to the Eleusinian mysteries, to the "secret meaning of the eating of
12
bread and drinking of wine". Desire is essentially my own, and a
desired object is not independent, but on the contrary exists only for
me, and to be consumed, so that its truth is not in its being but in its
destruction.
The desire which characterises self-consciousness is essentially the
13
desire of Spirit, not animal desire, as has been suggested. Kojeve
argues rightly that the discussion of desire cannot be intended as an
anthropogenesis, that is an account of the origins of the human within
%
11 Phenomenology, p.105.
12 In the Preface, (Phenomenology, p. 26) Hegel similarly calls the
truth "a Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk",
and goes on immediately to restate his view that knowledge must
be self-knowledge or recollection.
13 Kojeve op. cit.
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the natural. However, his objection to anthropogenesis is only a
weak one. In Kojeve's view, man is essentially free, and it follows
that he cannot be a product of nature. Nevetheless, in Kojeve's account
(which is in many ways illuminating on this point) Hegel's argument
is still presented as an account of the origins of human desire (that
is, desire for recognition) in natural desire, and the reason that
this account is not anthropogenetic is simply that the transformation
of animal desire into human desire is held to be indeducible, that is,
t "s.
to have come about purely by chance. This then commits Kojeve to the
view that the Hegelian system has a number of premises which are to be
found at this point. Hegel's argument then takes the form of an argu¬
ment that if we accept these hypothetical premises, then we will be able
to explain everything else in terms of these absolute premises. This,
as we have seen, is the approach of Understanding, and is not at all
philosophical, since premises and explanations are not truths, and
philosophy has to do with truth.
There is in fact a stronger reason why Hegel's account of desire cannot
be anthropogenetic. In Hegel's view Spirit cannot be generated at all.
It exists, and it may be known. The desire we are considering is the
desire of a being which is Spirit. Its experience then is not a learning,
in which by examining desire it comes across something new and which was
not there before,that is, 'generates' itfthough this is the way natural
consciousness looks at it), but a 'recollection' in which Spirit 'discovers',
14 Kojeve is perhaps thinking of the type of account Engels gives in
"The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man".
(Marx and Engels, Selected Works in One Volume, Lawrence & Wishart
,1968, p. 354 ff) (See Kojeve op. cit. p. 40).
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or better, 'realizes', what significance desire has for it. Hegel's
argument makes sense only if Spirit in-itself is 'presupposed', or only
on the basis of "the immanence of the whole in consciousness,"^ as
Hyppolite put it. In this case it will be possible to represent the
move from desire to recognition not as contingent, but as necessary;
but this necessity must be understood as a necessity of thought, not
primarily as a historical necessity. Indeed, there is no necessity which
is not in (free) thought.
The movement of desire may be characterised as a development from desire
in general as Epithwnia, towards the more specific and sublime desire
(
of Eros. The desire of Epithwnia reveals only a transitory self-consciousnes
and its aim is the destruction of this self-consciousness, and the return
to a peaceful, untroubled state of merely contemplative consciousness
in which the ego no longer has any cause to be self-aware. It is in
this sense that Freud, speaking of the conservative nature of the instincts,
characterises instinctual desire in general as the Death Instinct; the
desire no longer to desire. Epithumia rs Thanatos.^
15. Hyppolite op. cit. p.15.
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16 Freud's observations are scattered through his writings.
Civilisation and its Discontents is probably the most relevant
work here. I point out some parallels between Hegel and Freud
partly because they illumine Hegel's thought, and partly because
they illustrate that Hegel's psychology reaches a depth far
beyond the psychology of philosophers whose work is more self¬
consciously psychological; (E.g. Locke, Mill, etc.) I do not
mean to suggest however that Hegel's account is essentially
psychological: Hegel would certainly not wish to reduce philo¬
sophy to psychology, (cf. Faith and Knowledge, op. cit. p. 63).
I*z
In the desire of EroSy which Hegel interprets as the desire for recog¬
nition, self-consciousness exists in a permanent form. If I desire
recognition from another being, I have a desire which can never be fully
satisfied, since I cannot consume or destroy the desired object. It is
after all not strictly an object, but a subject which I desire, and my
desire has therefore undergone what Freud called sublimation, being
directed towards an object which is not naturally suited to its satis¬
faction. In Freud's account this is linked directly to the notion of
repression of the Oedipus complex. The infantile death wish against
the father is turned into a rivalry which seeks the recognition of the
father, or takes the conscious form not of a death wish, but its opposite,
Love. Sexual desire, then, is related to Thanatos or the death instinct,
while Erotic desire, which is expansive and life giving, is paradoxically
a repression of a death wish directed against the father. The conflict
of Eros and Thanatos becomes the basis of what Freud calls civilization.
In Hegel's account we find more or less the same picture, though it is
17 .
less specific. The desire for another self-consciousness is Erotic
and it is the basis of the will to do anything which cannot be understood
as the result of mere instinctual desire. In this sense it takes the
position which Plato gives to Andre -Lay and its ultimate aim, recognition,
is parallel to what the ancients called honour, we should not therefore
%
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regard recognition or courage^essentially different from desire, as Plato
does by making each into an element of the soul, but rather should regard
recognition itself as a specific form of desire. This does not mean that
the instinctual and Erotic aspects of desire are not opposed to each
other, but it does mean that they are not so rigidly separated that
their reconciliation is impossible.
17 Which Kojeve rightly characterises as the desire for a desire
(op. cit. p.5).
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Hegel's account of the experience of Desire may be summarised briefly
as follows.
Desire, in contrast to the Platonic view, is essentially negative: it
is awareness of a lack of something. This lack is contradictory to
the identity of the ego with itself, and "the necessity felt to cancel
18
this opposition is Impulse (or appetite)". In so far as this appetite
is directed towards an object, it produces that object as an object of
desire which is both independent of me in so far as I must act in order
to obtain it, and is also dependent on me and which I will eventually
19
destroy by consuming it. I need not physically destroy the object,
so long as I satisfy the desire, since then the object qua desired
object also disappears.
Like consciousness, therefore, desire produces an object which is am¬
biguously both independent and dependent. However, this ambiguity
here takes a more concrete form, since the object of desire is not like
the object of conscious a mere thing, which is either for itself or for
consciousness, but "a living thing", which exists in and for itself.
The independence of such an object is real, and the object subsists
until it is actually negated by self-consciousness. The opposition be¬
tween its independence and dependence is not a mere whim of consciousness,
but a matter of life and death.
18. Propadeutic, p. 74.
19. Similarly, in Freud, the infantile Ego emerges in the move from
the phase of 'autoerotism' to the phase of 'object choice'.
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Self-consciousness however is desire and it seeks satisfaction. In so
far as its object is a living thing, however, it cannot fully achieve its
satisfaction, since its unity with itself is contradicted by the existence
of living things.
"On account of the independence of the object, therefore, it
can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects
the negation; and it must carry out the negation of itself
within itself, for it is in itself the negative, and must be
for the other what it is". (Phenomenology, p. 109).
Because the object is independent and determines itself, it can be
satisfied only if the object determines itself in accordance with the
desire of self-consciousness. This satisfaction is possible only if
the object is not only alive, but also self-conscious. This incidentally
means that, as Freud understood, it is the object of sekual desire:
sexual desire is in fact the only desire capable of sublimation.
"Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in
another self-consciousness". (Phenomenology, p. 110).
This satisfaction, however, is one in which the object remains indepen¬
dent, and it is through this that desire is able to become creative,
rather than destructive, and its satisfaction life giving, not a petit
mort.
Hegel summarises the movement as follows:
"The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three
moments: (a) the pure indifferentiated 1I' is its first immediate
object (b) But the immediacy i5 itself an absolute mediation, it is
only as a supersession of the independent object, in other words, it
is Desire. The satisfaction of Desire is, it is true, the reflection
of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become
truth, (c) But the truth of this certainty is really a double re¬
flection, the duplication of self-consciousness. Consciousness has
for its object one which, of its own self, posits its otherness or
difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent. The
differentiated, merely living shape does indeed supersede its in¬
dependence in the process of life, but it ceases with its distinc¬
tive difference to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness,
however, is equally independent in this negativity of itself: and
thus it is for itself a genus, a universal fluid element in the
peculiarity of its own separate being; it is a living self-
consciousness". (Phenomenology, p.llO).
i et.
(c) Lordship and Bondage: Dependence and Independence of Self-
consciousness.
Lordship and Bondage is almost certainly the best known passage in the
Phenomenology, and it is also by some people the best liked. It has been
20
published separately in English translation on at least one occasion,
and its influence can be found in a wide variety of writing, much of which
takes little else from Hegel. Kojeve makes it the centre of his inter¬
pretation and turns it into an introduction to Hegelian thought - and uses
it for other purposes, for example as an analytical tool to analyse a
21
classical text. Sartre adopts it with some minor adjustments, and makes
22
it a central plank in his thought. Simone de Beauvoir applies it to
23
the study of sexuality, and this connection can also be seen in Sacher
24
Masoch and Pauline Reage. Marx too was profoundly affected by it when
he wrote the 1844 Manuscripts, though its influence on Marx has probably
25
been overstated.
20. In Connertorr (ed.) Critical Sociology, Penguin 1976, pp. 41-51.
21. Kojeve op. citj and Kojeve, "Tyranny and Wisdom" in Leo Strauss,
On Tyranny, MacMillan 1963, which is a translation and commentary
on Xenophon's "Hiero".
22. Sartre op. cit., esp. pp. 238-244.
23. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, Penguin 1977, see esp. p. 171ff
See also Carol Craig "The Use of Hegel's dialectic of Master and
Slave in de Beauvoir's The Second Sex", Edinburgh University Thesis
1980. (Lordship and Bondage is sometimes referred to as "Master and
Slave" or "The master-slave dialectic". I have preferred to keep the
former translation to avoid overstressing the connection to the em¬
pirical relation of master and slave, for reasons set out later in
this section).
24. Saoher Masoch alludes to Hegel by name in the opening pages of Venus
in Furs. Pauline Reage does not mention Hegel directly, but in Story
of 0 the influence of Hegel's Lordship and Bondage via the inter¬
pretations of Sartre and de Beauvoir is plain. Pauline Reage is a
pseudonym of an annonymous writer. Suggestions that she is in fact
de Beauvoir herself however, while plausible in terms of the content
of the book, seem unlikely for stylistic and other reasons.
25. See Marx, Early Writings, ed. Colletti, Pelican 1975 p. 379ff. Marx
calls the Phenomenology in general, not as Connerton (op.cit. p.40)
implies the passage on Lordship and Bondage in particular, "the true
birthplace and secret of Heglian philosophy", and as Lenin pointed
out it was Hegel's Science of Logic which particularly influenced
Marx, (see Kaufmann
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We may agree that Lordship and Bondage is a particularly striking part
of the Phenomenology. It is at this point that it first becomes apparent
that Hegel intends to transcend the dry intellectualism of the philosophy
of his day to bring in to philosophy the experiences and the problems of
everyday social life; and this is one of the most immediately striking
and attractive peculiarities of Hegel's thought. However, there is no
indication that Hegel thought that Lordship and Bondage had a special
position in his work. He barely mentions it again in the Phenomenology,
and certainly does not attempt to use it elsewhere as a tool for social
analysis, though we may presume that if he had intended to do so he would
have had ample opportunity, for example, in the Philosophy of History
or perhaps the Philosophy of Right. If a disproportionately large space
is devoted to it here, it is only because of the attention it has already
attracted, and because in virtue of this a number of issues of interpre¬
tation of the Phenomenology in general can be illuminated particularly
at this point.
Hegel opens his discussion of Lordship and Bondage with the words
"Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the
fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only
in being acknowledged." (Phenomenology, p.Ill)
Self-consciousness cannot be held to exist in the proper sense of that
2 5
word in a nuomenal or 'transphenomenal' fornu it exists"incahd for
itself only when it exists for another or is phenomenal. If self-
consciousness is essentially desire, it is equally essentially sublimated
25. Sartre, in order to distinguish his formula for self-consciousness,
the 'pre-refelctive cogito', from the nuomenal self of Kant and
Fichte, coined the term 'transphenomenal'. (Sartre op. cit. p. 9).
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desire or recognition. In so far as this recognition is of self-consciousness
as independent, we get Lordship and Bondagef'in so far as it is of self-
consciousness as free, we get Stoicism, Scepticism and what Hegel calls
the 'Unhappy Consciousness'.
Hegel's presentation of Lordship and Bondage divides especially neatly
into an introductory section which is "for us", and then a longer and
more detailed presentation of the same movement as the experience of
26
natural consciousness.
For us, self-consciousness, since it is self-identical, is independent.
This, however, is contradicted by the existence of other self-consciousness,
in so far as it is likewise independent and capable of acting as a limita¬
tion upon the independence of the first. Self-consciousness is therefore
moved to destroy the independence of other self-consciousness; and since
the other is independent it must do this by making it independently re¬
nounce its own independence, and recognise only the first as essential,
independent, and absolute. This produces the notion of recognition. We
know, however, that recognition is not limited to this blank opposition
of dependence to independence, but involves more specific determinations,
that is recognition of more specific qualities and virtues. In so far as
27
recognition is in this way not a blank opposition but a mediation between
*
26. The discussion 'for us' goes from §178 to §184 inclusive, and the
experience of natural consciousness from §185 to §196.
27. Elsewhere Hegel calls the independence of self-consciousness
"purely immediate freedom", and in this sense we should not
oppose independence to freedom but regard the former as the
immediate idea or the in-itself of the latter. (Philosophy of
Right, p. 48 §57).
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self-consciousnesses,we have moved beyond the attitude of Lordship and
Bondage to an attitude corresponding to Understanding where we find un-
2 8
conditioned "universal self-consciousness". Here we discover that
29
"they recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another".
The purpose of the presentation of the experience of natural conscious¬
ness of recognition is to lead it from the notion of mere independence
towards the notion of freedom which is expressed in mutual recognition.
Natural consciousness takes up the attitude of perception in Lordship
and Bondage, regarding independence as a property of self-consciousness
which can be separated from its essential being, and which it therefore
may or may not possess. However, since it defines itself as independent
it must possess this property which is not essentially its own, and it
therefore sets out to appropriate it. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel
shows his scorn for this attitude, if it is taken one-sidedly to be true,
saying that all justifications of slavery
"depend upon regarding man as a natural entity pure and simple,
an existent not in conformity with its concept ... The argument
for the absolute injustice of slavery, on the other had adheres
to the concept of man as Spirit, as something inherently free".
(Philosophy of Right, p. 48 §57).
The point here however is to demonstrate this inherent freedom to natural
consciousness which takes freedom only as independance and as a property
which is only accidentally, not inherently part of self-consci,ousness.
28. Propadeutic, p.78, Philosophy of Mind, p. 176 §436.
29. Phenomenology, p.112:
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To begin with, natural consciousness reacts to the independence of its
object by seeking its death - appropriately, since "the object in its
immediacy is here determined as Life".^° Its death wish against the
other also has an opposite significance for itself, for it cannot seek
the death of the other without risking its own life, or without courage.
This courage proves that it holds its own life to be of less value than
its independence, and shows that it is free in the platonic sense of
"fearing slavery more than death".^ Through its courage it therefore
experiences not only that it is independent of other self-consciousness,but
als o that as Spirit it is independent of nature in general and of the
natural form of itself in particular, that is, Life. This dual sense of
independence as independence of nature and of other self-conscious beings
recurs often in the Phenomenology.
However, if one self-consciousness actually succeeds in killing another,
it does not achieve what it originally wanted, which was recognition
of its own independence.
"Death certainly shows that each staked his life and held it
to be of no account, both in himself and in the other; but
that is not for those who survived this struggle". (Phenomenology,
P-114).
The survivor negates the other's independence, but does not succeed in
possessing it, and learns thereby that its independence is essentially
related to its Life, or that "life is as essential to it as pure self-
32





Republic, 387b; Cornford, op.cit. p. 75.
Phenomenology, p. 115.
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following reasoning - though Hegel does not give it directly. The
fight to the death is not to be regarded as a natural occurrence, but
as a fight which is essentially a fight for recognition of independence.
Independence must be at stake in the fight for it to have the value
Hegel imputes to it. If the fight is courageous, in other words, rather
than merely reckless, it must be courageous in face of a perceived danger,
that is of lossing its independence through losing the fight. In other
words, though its courage reveals its spiritual nature, it equally re¬
veals to it that in order to be spiritual it must be alive, and during
the fight it experiences the absolute terror of its own death - rather
than the lesser fear of some pain which we might impute to an animalistic
natural fight, which would not be a true display of courage. The result
is the same: life is essential to self-consciousness.
With this experience, it is possible to see how a fight for recognition
can result not in a murder, but a submission. Natural consciousness dis¬
covers for itself that its aim is not the death of the other, but recogn-
nition; and once fear is intuited as fear of death and hence loss of in¬
dependence in the form of life, it makes sense for the party which achieves
this intuition to submit and to recognise the other. The submission thus
divides self-consciousness into two distinct beings. The first being,
which is simply recognised, is the pure self-consciousness, self-consciousness
%
in itself, and corresponds to Fichtes 'I am I'; and the second being which
has understood the value of independence in the objective form of life, is
self-consciousness for another, or "consciousness in the form of thinghood".
33. He does, however, return to the distinction made below, between
mere fear[Angst] and absolute terror [Absolute Fuvchst]- incidentally
reversing the senses in which Angst and Fu.vch.st were later used by
existentialism. (Phenomenology, p.119, Sartre, op. cit. p. 29 ff).
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"The former is Lord, the other is bondsman".
We may note that lordship and bondage is a necessary result of this
fight, in virtue of what is at stake in the fight. This is the principle
of the independence of self-consciousness. The slave is the one who has
agreed to give up a claim to this independence for himself, and admitted
that he is tied to natural existence. He acknowledges in his submission
the pure independence of the master, who is above material things.
However, this acknowledgement is not at all specific, since nothing
specific was at stake in the fight. He does not recognise any particular
virtue in his master, but only his abstract independence. It is not a
verbal recognition, but a practical one, and the slave recognises the
independence of the master precisely through carrying out his desire,
since his independence is the independence of self-consciousness, and
self-consciousness is in general desire. As Aristotle said, a man "is
35
master not in acquiring slaves, but in using them". The submission in
this fight, then, is not the submission which lets the loser go free again,
not the surrender of modern warfare which ships the defeated army home,
36
but the absolute submission of the will of one to the other, in return
only for the life of the one; and to surrender in warfare in ancient times
was in general to become a slave.
34 Phenomenology, p.115. I have spent some time showing how the ex¬
perience of recognition for natural consciousness itself leads
directly and necessarily to the notion of mastery and slavery
partly in order to contradict Kojeve's interpretation, which holds
mastery and slavery to be the result of indeducible, contingent
events, for which there can be and in Hegel's view is no explana¬
tion (Kojeve, op. cit., p.43n).
35. Aristotle, Politics^bk.1,Ch 7; Penguin 1962 p.37. In Kojeve's
account work and recognition are only accidentally related, through
an 'also', not a 'must'. "The Master who was able to force the
Slave to recognise him as Master, can also force the slave to work
for him, to yield the result of his action to him." (op. cit. p.46)
36. More strictly, 'desire': the concrete will belongs to reason, and
the will of self-consciousness is only desire which is aware of
itself.
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In the relationship of lordship and bondage, it appears at first that
the master has achieved everything he wanted. He has made the indepen¬
dence of the other into his own property. This guarantees his own in¬
dependence in two senses. Firstly, while as we saw earlier the object
of desire presents itself in two aspects, one of which is independent
and the other which is dependent on the desire of self-consciousness,
now the master has only to concern himself with its dependent aspect,
and he leaves the aspect of its independence to the slave. The slave,
in other words, has to work, while the master is free to consume and
to enjoy. Secondly, the master is independent not only of nature but
also of the other self-consciousness, since the other has defined him¬
self as dependent and thinglike, recognising the autonomy only of the
master and ceasing therefore to pose any threat to him. Further, as
Hegel points out, these two aspects are not separate from each other
but complement each other, each being necessary to the other. It is
because the master has shown himself to be free of thinghood that the
slave, who is bound to things, is bound to the master: and it is becaus;
37
of the work of the slave that the master is free of things.
However, if the master thus appears as victor and the slave as vanquished,
Hegel goes on to point out in a famous twist that on closer examination s
the situation is not so simple as it seemed. The master is free through
%
recognition, but the slave who recognises him is no longer independent,
and what the master sought was the recognition of an independent being.
37. Phenomenology, p. 115f.
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"But for recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the
Lord does to the other he also do to himself, and that what the
bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other. The out¬
come is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal". (Phenomenology,
p.116).
The master thus finds from his own experience that he has failed to
achieve the result he originally wanted. In regarding independence
as a property of self-consciousness he succeeded in possessing it, but
just in possessing it it looses its essential characteristic, that is
38
rndependence. If self-consciousness were only accidentally free,
then natural consciousness could indeed have been satisfied with
possessing freedom, taking it away from another: but if self-consciousness
is essentially free then it cannot be satisfied with this. In demon¬
strating that the master cannot be satisfied, Hegel has demonstrated to
him in his own terms that self-consciousness is indeed essentially
free. The master cannot be satisfied, because he sought independence,
but the truth is that he is not only dependent upon the recognition of
the other - for he cannot be a master without a slave - but also that
this other who defines him or is his "truth" is itself the unessential
39
consciousness and its unessential action".
If we turn instead to the other side of this relationship, we will find
that the slave who appears to be absolute loser in fact gains a good
deal from the relationship. The master was free of nature and of the
38. We may remark that insofar as slavery exists as an institution
in the ancient world, freedom has this characteristic of being
something one either does or does not possess. Freedom in
general is not an issue: one is born free or born a slave, and
only in exceptional circumstances such as war does ones free-
dome become challenged, (cf Aristotle, Politics, Bk I)
39. Phenomenology, p.117.
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slave, while the slave is essentially relative to the master, recog¬
nising him, and to nature, upon which he works. However, although in
so far as in these relationships he is not independent but relative,
there is nevertheless an aspect of freedom which may be found within
them which is more concrete than the pure abstraction of freedom which
is achieved by the master. The slave works, and work transforms the
natural world and shapes it in accordance with a preconceived idea,
which demonstrates that the natural world has an aspect which depends
upon consciousness, that is, form. Further, in work, the slave con¬
fronts desire, and rather than allowing it as a natural necessity to
determine him, he holds it in check and acts independently of it.
If. this gives the slave a certain independence of nature, he also gains
a certain independence through his fear of the master, and in fact it
is only taken together with this fear that work can have the liberating
40
significance we have just mentioned. The fear of the master is, as
we have already said, not merely the fear of pain but the fear of
death, which means the loss of independence which is what was at stake
in the fight.
"In that experience it [the slaveJ has been quite unmanned, has
trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and
stable has been shaken to its foundations. But this pure uni¬
versal movement, the absolute melting-away of everything stable,
is the simple essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute
negativity, pure being for self which consequently is implicit
in this consciousness". (Phenomenology, p.117)
Further, this absolute negativity is not only implicit in the slave,
but also exists for him as an object, that is as the master.
40. Phenomenology, p. 119.
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Because through fear freedom is both implicitly and explicitly an
issue for the slave, it is possible for his work to lead him to ex¬
perience his freedom from nature, since as he may approach his work
with the question of his freedom in mind, and find the answer that
work "sets at nought" the alien being before which he had earlier trembled.
The answer only comes, however, to one who asks the question.
"If consciousness fashions the thing without that initial
absolute fear, it is only a self-centred attitude; for its
form or negativity is not negativity pen se, and therefore
its formative activity cannot give it consciousness of
essential being". (Phenomenology, p.119) 41.
Having a mind of one's own is, as Hegel goes on to point out, merely
42
self-will, not freedom. Discipline is also an essential moment of
freedom.
"Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains
at the formal stage, and does not extend to the known real
world of existence", (ibid).
For the slave's experience of liberation then, fear, discipline, and
work are all equally essential.
However, in sofar as self-consciousness remains within the limits of
the attitude of dependence and independence of self-consciousness, re¬
garding these as properties, the liberation which both master and slave
41. When Marx, in a well known passage from Capital (op. ci*t. p. 174)
says that "what distinguishes the worst architect from the best
of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in
imagination before he erects it in reality", he is presumably
drawing on his reading of Hegel. We should note, however, that
in Marx's account labour is human only because it has a con¬
ception of form, and that this leaves out the essential and
peculiarly Hegelian dimension that this form should be sub¬
jectively realized - that is, the dimension of freedom.
42. Hegel uses a pun: Der evgene Sinn ist iiEigensinn, "self-will
is stubborn capriciousness", opposing this to the freedom
achieved through discipline, (cf. Philosophy of History, p. 41)
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achieve is limited also to independence, and is not a true freedom.
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The master, as Kojeve argued, is in an "existential tmpasse",
achieving only at best a pure independence, but cut off by definition
from the liberating experience of the work of the slave. However, the
slave too is in a sense in an impasse. That is, his work may give him
an idea of independence, butin so faras he is limited to slavery it will
not produce freedom. We may note in this connection that where as
slavery is an absolute institution, in classical Greece, for example,
(but not in the Macedonian and late Roman empires, where it has lost
its absolute quality) no freedom at all seems to have been credited
to the slave. That the slave's work is held to have no liberating
value may be seen in the fact that Greek art, which was often produced
by slaves, is not held in any sense to be an expression of the free
individuality of the artist, though it may express in a general and
44
rather irrelevant sense his capability. Similarly there seems little
evidence that slaves in general greatly resented their lack of liberty,
though they may certainly, as in the case of the Thracian mining slaves,
have resented their abuse; while this indifference does not seem to be
characteristic of Roman life.
However, although in this sense the division of self-consciousness into
master and slave is an impasse, it does not follow that Spirit is stuck
%
with this impasse until some external force injects an imput which up-
45
sets it. In fact both master and slave have learned from the experience
43. Kojeve op. cit. p.46.
44. cf. note 38 to this chapter
45. In Kojeve's account this is Alexander the Great's foundation of
empire in which the distinction of master and slave is blurred,
since captives in battle were not necessarily enslaved but made
into members of a higher political unit, the cosmopolis (see
Leo Strauss , op.cit. p.181 ff).
of their self-analysis, and what they have learned is that independence
is not a property of consciousness but is a universal which applies
equally and necessary to all self-consciousness, or is unconditioned.
Far from being stuck, it has discovered within itself the principle
which makes self-consciousness truly free, not merely independent,
and in doing so it ceases to force self-consciousness to the extremes
of mastery and slavery and instead allows free thought to mediate
between these two extremes. It discovers, in other words, that recog¬
nition may be of something specific, which is a thought, some idea of
virtue or vice, some criticism; that is, it has discovered "mutual
recognition". In doing so, however, it has gone beyond the limitations
which defined the attitude Lordship and Bondage, and defined a new
attitude which Hegel goes on to discuss. Before we go on to consider
this attitude , we will consider an issue of interpretation which often
arises in connection with Lordship and Bondage: that is, to what ex¬
tent is it intended to be historical?
There can be no doubt that Hegel's discussion has and is intended to
have some historical relevance. We have already drawn some parallels
to the Hellenic period. In the following section the historical ref¬
erences are clearer; to Stoicism and Scepticism, which relate to the
Roman world; and to the Unhappy Consciousness, which seems%to refer
more to the Catholicism of the middle ages. The question we must
pose is whether Hegel intends his account of self-consciousness not
simply to relate to or to illuminate certain phenomena which appear
in certain historical epochs, but rather to function more strongly as
an explanation of these phenomena. Is self-consciousness itself a
kind of potted account of history?
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Kojeve's answer to this question is an unequivocal 'Yes'. In his account,
as we have seen, desire and life are held to be 'biological', that is as
part of a kind of state of nature. The fight also is something which
occurs in a state of nature (we may add that in so far as it may actually
46
occur as presented by Hegel, Hegel agrees). In so far as the fight
results in Lordship and Bondage, it has the significance of an original
47
contract which founds not so much political life, but society in general.
Lordship and Bondage then becomes an account of the Greek world, which is
the age of the dominance of the master. This stage is not itself historical,
because the master is in Kojeve's view "satisfied", and therefore does not
have any interest in changing the world. Freedom of Self-Consciousness
then describes the Judao-Christian world, which is dominated by the lib¬
erated slave, and it is historical because of the work of the slave which
historically transforms the natural world and creates a new, original,
artificial human world. The slave then is the cause of history, "the
48
source of all human, social, historical progress". History is essentially
an artefact, something which is freely created by the negating activity
46. Philosophy of Spirit, p.173 §432. In the Propadeutic, Hegel also
suggests that his account works only in total isolation from society
by referring not to historical examples of slavery, but to
Robinson Crusoe and Friday, (Propadeutic, p. 77)
47. It thus has the same significance as the "killing of tfle primal
father", Freud's version of Lordship and Bondage, of founding
Civilisation (See Freud, Totem and Taboo). In political theory
the social contract is generally the foundation of the state in
particular rather than society or civilization in general, though
it may be disputed to what extent this is the case in particular
authors. Kojeve does not talk explicitly of a state of nature,
but of "Societies that are dominated by Desire anterior to the
Fight for recognition: primitive societies and ancient Egypt"
(Op. cit. p.283)
48. Kojeve op.cit. p.22.
-z oo
which originated in slavery. This history, in Kojeve's view comes to
an end when the slave finally and fully emancipates himself in the
49
universal and homogeneous state which either has been or will be
founded at the end of history, in which all men are equally free.
Lordship and Bondage thus becomes what has been called a 'big bang
theory of history', an original explosion which sets the whole thing
in motion, and which will eventually subside, and calm and order again
be restored.
There are a number of reasons why we must reject this type of interpre¬
tation. To begin with, there are purely exigetical questions. If Hegel
means his historical allusions to be taken so seriously, then why does
he always leave them so vague, and almost always avoid any proper names?
Why in the Philosophy of History does he barely mention slavery in
connection with ancient Greece, and why does the idea of creative work
play such a small role? And why is it that in the Philosophy of Right
Hegel describes a state which is by no means universal and classless,
but on the contrary quite sharply and definitely divided into specific
51
Stande? If Hegel has in fact changed his position with age and lost
49. Kojeve's equivocation appears to be a result of attempting to
reconcile the Marxist notion that a classless state ought to
be established with Hegel's view that the ideal state,already
exists and was founded by Napoleon. He apparently moves away
from the Marxist view later, as may be evidenced by his famous
footnote to the second edition of his book (op.cit. p. 159ff).
50. Kelly, Notes on Hegel's "Lordship and Bondage", in A.MacIntyre
(ed.) Hegel, p.200. This essay is largely a criticism of Kojeve.
Q. Lauer also in his Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology, Fordham
U.P. 1976, pp.100-112 also usefully criticises Kojeve's reading
of Hegel.
51. On the question of whether Hegel's, views in the Phe nomenology -
are consistent with those in the Philosophy of Right see
Hyppolite, op. cit. pp. 326-330.
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some youthful insight, why does he not acknowledge his change of view?
We need not rely on such evidence, however. Let us consider the way
Hegel relates self-consciousness to history in the following passage,
which is the most specific and arguably the only clearly historical
M
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reference Hegel makes in Self-Consciousness.
"As a universal form of the World-Spirit, Stoicism could only
appear on the scene in a time of universal fear and bondage,
but also at a time of universal culture which had raised itself
to the level of thought". (Phenomenology, p. 121) 52
Firstly, we may note, this formulation does not suggest that the historical
situation is in any way caused by the development of self-consciousness
into Stoicism, but rather suggests the opposite, that the historical
development is independent of the development of self-consciousness, and
merely allows Stoicism to appear. More importantly, though, we should
observe that Stoicism is not held to exist only in the Roman Empire, but
to have become a "universal form of the World-Spirit" at that time. This
does not imply that it does not exist in other cultures. Since Stoicism
is defined by Hegel as thought, to assert this would amount to saying
that in other cultures which do not include stoicism, there is no thought.
Now, it is true that in lordship and bondage there is no thought,but it
is also true that neither Greek society, nor any other example of Spirit
is capable of existing without thought. Lordship and bondage can" avoid
thought only by abstracting away from Spirit, and its experience referred
it back from this abstraction to a recognition of thought. In so far as
Greek culture does not involve Stoicism, then, we must conclude not that
52. Hegel means in the Roman Empire: see Phenomenology, p. 290, and
Philosophy of History, p. 278ff,
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thought itself is absent, but that in Greece, Spirit did not yet know
itself self-consciously as thought. Here, as always with Hegel, the
experience of Spirit is not a generation of a new object, but the dis¬
covery of one which existed but which was not known by Spirit to be
part of its essence.
In the Philosophy of History, therefore, Hegel characterises history
as a development not of freedom but of the knowledge of freedom, or of
subjective freedom, (since freedom which knows itself as such is sub-
• . • ,53jective).
"The history of the World is the discipline of the uncontrolled
natural will, bringing it into obedience to a Universal prin¬
ciple and conferring subjective freedom. The East knew and
to the present day knows only that One is Free; the Greek and
Roman world, that some are free; the German world knows that Att
are free." (Philosophy of History, p.104)
- or knows "that it is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its
54
essence", as Hegel put it in the same context earlier in that work.
It is true that the development of the knowledge of freedom is equally
a real development of subjective freedom. Kojeve, however, sees freedom
only as subjective freedom and therefore sees freedom as something created,
rather than something merely discovered, which is Hegel's view. In Hegel's
view, then, it is possible for different aspects of self-consciousness to
be put in question and therefore revealed to knowledge in different
historical epochs, but not that self-consciousness in any of its partial
53. Subjective and substantial freedom are discussed in Ch. 7 below.
54. Philosophy of History, p. 18.
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forms may exist on its own in any epoch. A Greek slave may lack a
subjective knowledge of certain essential elements of self-consciousness.
As Aristotle comments, for example, a slave "participates in the reason-
55
ing faculty so far as to understand but not so as to possess it". All
the faculties of mind are present in the slave, but he is not subjectively
aware of them all. If Hegel is right, it must be possible to demonstrate
that all the moments of self-consciousness are present in any self-
consciousness, and not just in one which knows itself to be self-conscious,
or which has 'liberated' itself. In this sense, if the analysis of Lordship
and Bondage is not wrong, it should be possible to find its elements in any
indidivudal historical period. It is only subsequently and subordinately
that it may take an historical form as a "universal form of World Spirit",
and this form relates to its knowledge, not its existence.
There is a sense, then, in which freedom, or rather knowledge of freedom,
causes history. However, even if we accept a more moderate form of
Kojeve's view, that freedom is known (or discovered, realized, or
recollected) in history, but not generated by it, we should note that
the fact remains that this freedom is not identical with self-consciousness.
On the contrary, it is freedom in the fullest sense of Spirit, the freedom
of existing Reason, or of God. Hegel summarises his position by saying
that Reason (which in the sense used here is identical with Spirit) explains
history not in the manner of Understanding, but rationally in accordance
55. Aristotle, Politics, Bk I, Ch 4, op.cit. p.34. Similarly in Plato's
Meno, Meno's slave under the guidance of a free man (Socrates) is
capable of producing (or 'recollecting') a mathematical proof,
but is unable to do so alone.
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with Aristotle's theory of causality.
"Reason - and this term may suffice us here, without investi¬
gating the relation sustained by the Universe to the Divine
Being - is Substance as well as Infinite Pcnuev, its own
Infinite Material underlying all the natural and spiritual
life which it originates, as also the Infinite Form - that
which sets this material in motion (Philosophy of History, p.97)
The terms Hegel italicises in this passage correspond to Aristotle's
final, efficient, material, and formal causes respectively, and in each
56
sense divine Reason, not mere self-consciousness, is the cause of history.
It is concrete freedom, therefore, not the abstract freedom of self-
consciousness which causes history. At the level of self-consciousness
the notion of freedom always remains abstract, and this abstraction can
be expressed by saying that freedom for self-consciousness takes the form
of contingency. Consequently, in Kojeve's view, history is a "free con¬
tingent process". It is simply a series of free actions of free individuals,
and it has no overall sense or meaning, other than the emancipation of
slaves, the rectification of the original sin of slavery which started
the whole thing off in the first place.
If this is history, it is so only in a weak sense of the word. Sartre,
following a similar line of reasoning to Kojeve's prefers to deny the
57
notion of history and to assert instead that man is only temporal. That
is, since he is free, he is condemned to live in terms of a pAst which is
the objectification or solidification of past free actions, and of a future
56. See G.D.O'Brien, Hegel on Reason and History, University of Chicago
Press 1975, esp. p.44f.
57. Sartre, op. cit. p.l07ff and p. 233ff.
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which he will freely make. The past has the significance of 'facticity'.
It exists in objective form and it is in relation to it that I must assert
my freedom. However, there is no reason that the past should take the form
it does, and there can be no such reason since it is the result of free
actions. There can be no lessons of history since history has no meaning,
and any attempt to give history a meaning is in Sartre's view an attempt
to deny man's original freedom by suggesting a predetermined pattern for
his actions.
It may be suggested that Kojeve and Sartre arrive at their differing
interpretations of the significance of history through differing inter¬
pretations of Hegel, and especially of Lordship and Bondage. Sartre's
exegisis concentrates on the master, and Kojeve locates the source of
history not in the master but in the creative work of the slave. However,
it is more important to note that Kojeve and Sartre share in common the
idea that the past has the significance only of being an externalisation
of something essentially subjective, and that all past actions have mean¬
ing only in relation to this subject. The subject, in other words, is
absolute.
Hegel does not exactly disagree, insofar as History is certainly from one
period of view, an externalisation, and from this point of view it is in-
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deed a "free contingent process". At the end of the chapter an Absolute
Knowledge he says
"This sacrifice is the externalisation in which Spirit displays
the process of its becoming Spirit in the form of a free
contingent happening, intuiting its pure self as Time outside
of it, and equally its Being as Space". (Phenomenology, p. 492)
However, as Hegel goes on to explain in the paragraph following the one
just quoted, history is equally an internalisation or recollection. From
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this point of view it looses the characteristic of mere contingency
which it had for natural consciousness, and takes on the significance
of being a discovery of the true substance of Spirit. This discovery
cannot be made by natural consciousness without the help of the phenomenal
knowledge of the philosopher who recognises the Absolute and therefore
grasps not only Entausserung but also Erinnerung.
History is therefore in Hegel's view neither reducible to the subject,
in which case it would be contingent, nor to substance, in which case
it would be predetermined. Instead, it is neither of these things, but
also both of them: it is an ■ entity which has a meaning. This concurs
with the ordinary view that history is worth studying, which view may be
contrasted to the general views of both existentialism and Marxism which
would lead one to the conclusion that it is not; in the former case be¬
cause there is little to learn from it, and in the latter case because
the general course of history can be known in advance of empirical study.^
Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of History set out to establish the
value of the study of history in this way. However, to follow his argu¬
ment in any more detail would be beyond the scope of this work, and we
should rather return to Freedom of Self-Consciousness.
%
58. This is admittedly a generalisation, and certainly in the case
of Marx himself it may be admitted to be a misleading one. Al¬
though in such works as the 1859 Preface to the Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy, Marx appears to uphold this
crude view, it is clear from the chapters on "Primitive
Accummulation" in Capital that he does not hold that history is
simply predetermined. (See e.g. Capital Vol I op.cit. p.551, p.668,
p. 714).
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(d) Freedom of Self-Consciousness
In Freedom of Self-Consciousness, self-consciousness transcends the mere
independence of Lordship and Bondage towards freedom; and it does this
through mutual recognition or recognition in thought. This gives a
freedom which is real, but which at the same time is limited. That is,
it gives a freedom which exists 'socially', but not yet 'politically'.
In recognising freedom to be a universal property of self-consciousness,
self-consciousness becomes essentially social and therefore more real.
Society, however, is merely an aggregation of individuals. The individuals
are separate components and society is relative to and dependent upon them.
In the view of social contract theory this is also true of the state, but
in Hegel's view the state is a real existence which cannot be reduced to
the individual. Since "the idea of freedom is genuinely actual only as the
59
state", social freedom is not yet true freedom, and the freedom of self-
consciousness is always limited by its individualism and by the conceit
that nothing is greater or more powerful than itself. In particular it does
not recognise the independent existence of the state, and sees it only as
something relative to itself, a hinderance or a convenience, but not a
real individual being worthy of respect. In the Philosophy of History
Hegel writes
"The perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists
in regarding that term only in its format subjective sense,
abstracted from its essential objects and aims; thus a constraint
put on impulse, desire, passion - pertaining to the particular
individual as such - a limitation of caprice and self-will
[EigensinnJ is regarded as a fettering of Freedom. We should on
59. Philosophy of Right, p. 48, §57.
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the contrary look upon such limitations as the indispensible
proviso of emancipation. Society and the state are the very
conditions in which Freedom is realized". (Philsophy of History
p.41).
In Freedom of Self-Consciousness, self-consciousness achieves the dis¬
cipline of recognising that others are also essentially free, the dis¬
cipline of society; but does not yet recognise the independence of the
state, and by failing thereby self-consciously to accept the discipline
of the state, it fails to achieve freedom in its fullest or concrete
sense.
If we take Freedom of Self-Consciousness as a whole, we may say that in
it mutual recognition is achieved through the mediation of recognition
by thought. This allows recognition to be recognition not merely of
the abstract will, but of specific virtues. Recognition becomes real
or mutual through including the negative moment of criticism, which is
itself a result of the experience that the other is essentially free.
"Universal self-consciousness ... - is the form of con¬
sciousness which lies at the roof of all true mental or
spiritual life - in family, fatherland, state, and of all
virtues, love, friendship, valour, honour, fame." (Philosophy
of Mind, p. 176, 436) 60
Through the mediation of thought, then, recognition becomes recognition
of a specific content, and this content may be expressed as virtue.
%
In the Phenomenology, however, Hegel does not present Freedom of Self-
Consciousness as a whole, but instead divides it up into three distinct
moments, Stoicism, Scepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness. Mutual recog¬
nition is achieved only through each of these movements taken together
as a whole. In Stoicism, self-consciousness achieves only the most abstract
60. Hegel says almost exactly the same thing in the Propadeutic, p. 436.
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dimension of mutual recognition. That is, it recognises all self-
consciousness, "whether on the throne or in chains",^"'" to be free in its
own thought, but not necessarily in reality. Scepticism turns away from
this freedom in thought only, and, mocking its seriousness, turns away
from the self and sets out to realise freedom in relation to otherness,
by taking up "a negative attitude towards otherness, to desire and work".
Stoicism and Scepticism between them oscillate between the view that
thought is the home of true necessity, and that it is purely contingent.
It is only in the move to the Unhappy Consciousness, which corresponds
to the move to the supersensible world in Understanding, that thought
becomes capable of a specific content. This content then becomes the
Unchangeable; and although this is not the same as God, it is nevertheless
6 2
found as a dimension of religion. The unchangeable is the true and
positive content of virtue which make possible a concrete mutual recogni¬
tion. This content, however, is for Unhappy Consciousness an object, and
this means that self-consciousness has reverted to the standpoint of con¬
sciousness. In the final movement of Unhappy Consciousness, which corres¬
ponds to the introduction of the second supersensible world in understand¬
ing, and to the move from Catholicism to protestantism, self-consciousness
reintroduces the principle of its own freedom in to the objective Unchange¬
able world.^ This means however, that its object is an object of conscious-
61. Phenomenology, p. 121: This may be taken as a reference to two
famous Stoa, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, and the slave Epictetus.
62. Hegel discusses religion in its own right within the Phenomenology
only in the chapter on 'Religion'. As he sometimes stresses him¬
self (eg. Phenomenology, p. 322), although Unhappy Consciousness
and Faith are clearly dimensions of a religious attitude, they are
not themselves religion, and we should therefore take them as they
are. We should neither look for an account of religion as a whole
within them, nor neglect that they may occur as attitudes which are
not self-consciously religious - for example in political faith.
63. Phenomenology, p. 137
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ness which is also recognised to be self-consciousness, and this means
that self-consciousness has become Reason.
I do not propose to follow the experience of free or universal self-
consciousness in any further detail here. However, before going on to
consider Reason there are two points of interpretation I want to raise.
The first of these is relatively minor. It concerns the transition from
Lordship and Bondage to Freedom of Self-Consciousness. What is it in the
experience of the former which refers to the latter? Commonly it is held
to be the creative value of the slave's labour which leads to universal
self-consciousness. Hyppolite for example, writes of "the universal form
64
of self-consciousness which has gradually appeared in human labour".
Interpretations such as this are so widespread that we may call this a
traditional interpretation of Hegel's view. However, there is in Hegel
no explicit connection between universal self-consciousness and work, nor
any suggestion that it should gradually appear.
In fact, in Hegel's view, nothing which is universal may gradually appear,
since the universal is infinite, but if it is held to appear gradually it
is thereby related to something finite or appears not as a necessary uni¬
versal but a mere generalisation from experience. Universal self-consciousness
is strictly incompatible with slavery, since it is defined by^ the view that
fs
not some but all self-consciousness are free, or that freedom is an un-
•ly
conditional universal characteristic of self-consciousness. The experience
64. Hyppolite,op. cit. p.190.
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of Lordship and Bondage reveals this by showing to both master and slave
that both are essentially free beings. This means that freedom cannot
be a property specifically of either, so that the attitude which led to
Lordship and Bondage must be abandoned.
We may in other words force natural consciousness in its own terms to
abandon a domineering attitude and recognise instead the essential free¬
dom of self-consciousness. Subsequently we may choose to ask how this
experience may appear in a society based upon slavery, such as the Greek
poZis. However, from the point of view of self-consciousness alone we
will be unable to answer. Though the slave's work may prove his independence
to us, he remains in fact a slave, and no amount of work can alter the
fact that in the eyes of his master and his society he is not a free man.
Similarly, the master may be free in the most abstract sense of all, being
a "pure self-consciousness", but so long as he remains master he may not
realise this freedom through action, since even if he may work, he has
(unlike the slave) no reason to question his independence from nature,
and no need to prove it through work. Neither master nor slave, then,
can be postulated as historical cause of the emergence as a "universal
form of World Spirit" of the principle of free self-consciousness, and
if any explanation is to be given it must be offered on the level of
Spirit, taking into account historical, political, religious, and other
%
considerations, and not merely those of self-consciousness.
The second point of interpretation I want to raise is arguably more sub¬
stantial. It concerns the question of exactly what Hegel means by universal
or free self-consciousness and by mutual recognition. We may consider
first Sartre's interpretation, which sees mutual recognition as a solution
to the domineering attitude of Lordship and Bondage, and then argues that
1- > 2_
Hegel is being optimistic in suggesting that the domineering attitude can
in fact be overcome. Instead, he argues, we should accept that self-
consciousness is always domineering or 'imperialistic' and this attitude
can never be reconciled in a mutual recognition which respects the free¬
dom of the other because the other is necessarily a threat to my own free-
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dom and I must therefore always seek to dominate him.
However, Sartre misinterprets Hegel's meaning. His specific mistake is
to identify mutual recognition only with the most abstract principle of
stoical individualism, the idea of universal self-consciousness. In
mutual recognition, he says,
"there will appear a self-consciousness in general which is
recognised in other self-consciousnesses and which is identical
with them and with itself". (Sartre, op. cit. p.237)
Mutual recognition, then, consists simply in recognising that others like
myself are self-conscious and in that sense free. Sartre then objects that
in the relation of recognition it is not possible for both sides to be free.
Either I acknowledge the other and do as he wishes, or he recognises me and
does what I want. I may transcend Lordship and Bondage to the point of
recognising his freedom, but in Sartre's view this make is still more im¬
portant that I assert my dominance over the other.
As an expression of Sartre's own view, which is based upon the absolute
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character of the ego, or the prxmacy of existence over essence, this is
65. Sartre, op. cit. pp. 235-244: cf also Hyppolite, op. cit. p.324n
66. Sartre, op. cit, p. xxxii.
67. Sartre, op. cit. p. xxxix, p. 25, and Sartre, Existentialism
and Humanism,Methuen 1948, p. 26
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not unreasonable. However, as a criticism of Hegel it is erroneous. It
misses out in particular the dimension of mutual recognition contributed
by Unhappy Consciousness, that is, the dimension which brings to recognition
a concrete content. Mutual recognition for Hegel is not simply the abstract
recognition that all are free. This recognition does indeed take it away
from Lordship and Bondage, but mutual recognition proper involves specific
recognition of concrete characteristics of others. Hegel does not assert
that in this recognition self-consciousness ceases to be domineering, but
only that its domineering activity has the more positive value of being a
communication of things which self-consciousness takes to be valuable,
that is of virtue.
Mutual recognition therefore involves specific ethical ideas. However, as
Hegel pointed out in his essay on Natural Law, if these ethical ideas are
interpreted simply as subjective ideas which self-consciousnesses attempt
to impose on each other, or as 'relations of power', then they are self-
68
cancelling. What is ethrcal is simply the idea which succeeds in dom¬
inating, and this is not an ethical idea at all. This is more or less
69
Sartre's position; that there is no ethical value. Hegel rejects this,
and the purpose of Unhappy Consciousness in the Phenomenology is to intro¬
duce self-consciousness to the idea of a concrete ethical value.
Many French commentators on Hegel have, presumably for this reason, seen
fit to make not Lordship and Bondage, but the Unhappy Consciousness "the
fundamental theme of the Phenomenology".^0 This then leads to an
68. Natural Law, op. cit., p. 88f.
69. See note 10 to this chapter.
70. Hyppolite op. cit. p. 190. See also Lauer op.cit. p. 121 ff.
Jean Wahl's Malheur de la Conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel
has been .influential in developing this interpretation.
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interpretation of Self-Consciousness which is essentially theistic, in
Contrast totheatheistic approaches of Sartre and Kojeve. It is accepted
that in order for there to be any true communication between self-consciousnesse
indeed any recognition of freedom, it is necessary that self-consciousnesses
71
in general ascribe to a shared idea of humanity. Recognition which in¬
volves thought or which is critical is not possible except on the basis of
such an ideal, since criticism cannot be made except in the name of a
shared ideal, that is, a virtue. The general notion of virtue, that is the
good, becomes the Unchangeable of the Unhappy Consciousness, and this is
72
more or less identified with God.
This is certainly an advance on Sartre's position. However, it is as mis¬
taken to take Unhappy Consciousness as the fundamental theme of the
Phenomenology as it is to take Lordship and Bondage to be the focal point
for the same reason: it is Spirit, not self-consciousness, which is for
Hegel is the Absolute. The Unchangeable of Unhappy Consciousness is indeed
an intuition of a moment of God, but Hegel nevertheless is careful never
to make this connection explicit. There is for Hegel no way that the notion
of God can be deduced from self-consciousness. Indeed, as he says repeatedly
73
in the lesser Logic, He cannot be deduced at all. The Unchangeable is
simply an idea which can be revealed to the experience of self-consciousness,
and which can be used to force it to abandon its self-centred attitude and
%
move to the attitude of Reason, and thence to Spirit.
71 See eg. G. Bataille, "Sur Nietzsche"- Oevres Complets, Gallimard
1973, Vol. VI, esp. p. 42 and p. 48.
72. John Heckman's introduction to Hyppolite, op. cit., gives a use¬
ful general account of the various existentialist readings of
Hegel.
73. Lesser Logic, p. 49, see also pp. 5, 17, 30, 39, 81.
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Both theistic and atheistic versions of existentialism, then, regard
the achievement or non achievement of mutual recognition as a major
theme of and problem for the Phenomenology. In contrast to this we
should assert that Hegel does not intend to force a choice between a
godless world of domination and submission, and an alternative in which
this antagonism is resolved into a happy and peaceful co operation
through recognition of God. On the contrary, mutual recognition contains
both of these aspects, and is higher than both abstractions. This may be
expressed by saying that it is the "basis of all virtues, love, honour,
74
bravery, all self-sacrifice, all fame, etc". That is to say, it is
neither domineering, nor co-operative, but essentially courageous. Equally
it is not itself the whole of Spirit, but only one moment of it, and
courage is only one of Spirit's four virtues. We should seek neither
to overcome it, nor to make it dominant, but only to know it as it truly
is, as an essential moment of Spirit.
74. Propadeutic, p.78.
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CHAPTER SIX : Reason
(a) Reason and Rationalism
Reason is the third and final moment of subjective Spirit. Exactly what
Hegel means by Reason, however, is not immediately clear. He does not
seem to use the term in any special technical sense, and his description
of Reason as "the faculty of the Unconditioned""^ is both straightforward
and orthodox. However, under the heading of Reason in the Phenomenology
Hegel includes a number of attitudes - such as the pseudo-sciences of
physiognomy and phrenology - which are not obvious or conventional
examples of reasonable thinking. We should begin therefore by examining
2
Hegel's definition of Reason and asking exactly what attitudes it em¬
braces .
Reason, as has already been said, is a unity of consciousness and self-
consciousness .
"The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth ([i.e. Pheno¬
menology J are three in number: first (a) consciousness in general,
with an object set against it: (b) self-consciousness, for which
ego is the object; (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciousness,
where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself
implicitly and explicitly determinate as Reason, the notion of
Spirit". (Philosophy of Mind, p.157 §417).
As Hegel goes on to explain in the Zusatz to this paragraph, this unity
of consciousness and self-consciousness is not to be taken simply as a
1. Lesser Logic, p.72, §45.
2. Hegel, of course, will not attempt to impose a definition on
natural consciousness, but only to describe what in his view
Reason really is.
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combination of two separate elements. On the contrary, Reason is the
foundation of these elements, and they exist only as abstractions from
Reason. Even as abstractions, they are in Hegel'.s view implicitly Reason:
Reason however, is explicitly conscious and self-conscious. Thus, if we
take an example of consciousness, it must be possible to demonstrate to
it that it is implicitly Reason; but this will hot be a simple process,
and the Phenomenology, which sets out to do this, is not a simple book.
If we take an example of Reason, however, it will be more directly evident
that it is both conscious and self-conscious. If, for example, we con-
3
sider the idea of judgement, which is commonly taken to be an idea of
Reason, it is clear that it contains both consciousness (of the object
which I am judging) and self-consciousness (of my opinion in the matter).
As Hegel said in one of his Jena aphorisms.
"Reason without understanding is nothing, but understanding
in the absence of reason is still something", (quoted from
Rosenkranz in Lukacs, op. cit. p. 429).
Nevertheless, judgement cannot be reduced to these two moments, though
they may be observed to be essentially part of it. In judging I do not
simply apply my opinion to an object of consciousness: on the contrary,
as Hegel demonstrated towards the end of his discussion of Understanding,
in applying my opinion to the object I alter its essential character.
It ceases to be a mere 'thing', an object of consciousness, and becomes
instead something higher and more specific, for example a 'fact', and
thus becomes essentially an object of Reason. It is in this sense that
Reason is both greater than the sum of its parts, and autonomous in re¬
lation to them.
3. See lesser Logic, p.230ff, §166ff for Hegel's view of judgement.
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Reason is first revealed to self-consciousness in the Phenomenology in
the specific form of will. If self-consciousness is desire in general,
it discovers reason in so far .as it recognises not just desire, but the
will of others, which will has the significance of being universal and
essential.
The notion of will is introduced first as an alien will. Self-consciousness
sought mutual recognition, but could not find it because its essential
freedom did not allow it to be limited to a specific being which could
be recognised. In the form of Unhappy Consciousness it sought to over¬
come this difficulty by recognising a specific Unchangeable being and
sought to make this the essence of self-consciousness. It thus reverted
to the position of consciousness and made itself into a thing. In this
sense Unhappy Consciousness has much in common with the attitude of
4
'bad faith' in Sartre.
In order to achieve this Unhappy Consciousness sets out to become simply
an example of the universalUhchangeable being which it takes to be its
essence. Since this universal being, if it is to be universal, cannot
be the result of any subjective idea of Unhappy Consciousness, it places
a mediator between it and the Unchangeable and allows the mediator to
decide on its form. This structure may be seen especially in the
Catholic Church, whose saints and priests mediate authoritatively between
man and God. Hegel comments that through this structure Unhappy Consciousness
4. Bad faith, for Sartre, is the attempt to evade anguish by denying
the freedom which causes it by making oneself into an objective
being or what Sartre calls 'being-in-itself" - though this term
has a different meaning for Sartre than for Hegel, signifying
not potential being but unfree or thinglike being. See Sartre,
Being and Nothingness, Part 1 Ch. 2.
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is able entirely to rid itself of its. freedom.
"Through these moments of surrender, first of its. right to decide
for itself, then of its property and enjoyment, and finally
through the positive moment of practising what it does not under¬
stand, it truly and completely deprives itself of the conscious¬
ness of inner and outer freedom, of the actuality in which con¬
sciousness exists for -itself. It has the certainty of having
divested itself of its 'I' and of having turned its immediate
self-consciousness into a Thing, into an objective existence".
(Phenomenology, p.137).
However, this surrender of its own will is in Hegel's view equally a
recognition of an objective will.
"For the surrender of one's own will is only from one aspect
negative; in principle, however, or in itself, it is at the
same time positive, viz. the positing of will as the will of
an 'other', and specifically of will not as a particular, but
as a universal will" (Phenomenology, p.138).
For Unhappy Consciousness the universal will retains its alien form. In
the Philosophy of History Hegel comments that it was through the Reforma¬
tion that the subjective principle of internalisation was returned to the
notion of the Unchangeable.
"The Lutheran doctrine therefore involves the entire substance
of Catholicism, with the exception of all that results from
element of externality - as far as the Catholic Church insists
upon that externality". (Philosophy of History, p. 415). 5
However, although the reference to the Reformation here is clear enough,
it should not be overstated. We are not dealing with religion proper,
but only Unhappy Consciousness, and it would not be appropriate to seek
to resolve a theological issue at such an abstract grade of Spirit. The
important point Hegel wishes to draw out of his discussion is only that
5. See also lesser Logic, p.10 and Philosophy of Right, p.12 for
further comments on Luther whom Hegel of course admired greatly.
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in the notion of a universal will we find a "unity of objectivity and
being-fo.r-se.lf, which lies in the Notion of action",^ an aspect of the
self which is nevertheless (unlike desire) not attached to any particu¬
lar self, but is objective. This leads Hegel to a conclusion which may
be taken also as a definition of Reason:
"In this object, in which it finds that its own action and being
as being that of this particular consciousness, are being and
action in themselves, there has arisen for consciousness the idea
of Reason, of the certainty that in its particular individuality
it has being absolutely in itself or is all reality". (Phenomenology,
p.138).
Reason in this definition becomes specified as idealism. The world of
which it is conscious is not another world, as was the world of things
for consciousness, but its own world, formed and conditioned by Reason
itself. In a formulation which is crucial to the Hegelian notion of
Reason, Hegel says
"Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all
reality; thus does idealism express its Notion".
(Phenomenology, p.140) 7
Reason takes itself to be the being of its object: to him who looks
rationally at the world, the world looks rationally back. While con¬
sciousness was distanced from its object, Reason is essentially involved
in it.
For this reason, we may say that it is a universal and necesshry charac¬
teristic of Reason that it is interested, while consciousness was para-
0
digmatically disinterested and self-consciousness merely self-absorbed.
6. Phenomenology, p.138.
7. The same formulation appears again two pages later. Phenomenology,
p. 142.
8. Another way of putting this would be to say that Reason in general
is "possessive". As was remarked above (note 20 to Chapter 4)
Hegel expresses this in a pun, that Reason regards Sein as sein
that is, being as its own.
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"Reason now has. a universal interest in the world, because it
is certain of its presence in the world, or that the world
present to it is rational" (Phenomenology, p. 146.)
This comment refers in particular to Observing Reason, but if we take
the notion of interest in its broadest sense, we may say that it is al¬
ways part of Reason, though sometimes in different senses of the word.
Observation, then, is interested because unlike sensation, perception
or understanding, it takes up a questioning attitude to objectivity,
and it is naturally interested in the answers to its questions. A
scientist, strictly, should regard the disproof of a hypothesis as
being as valuable as its confirmation. An observer on the other hand
is frankly delighted to discover in reality something which confirms
an idea of its own (and the Idea is equally the property of Reason).
In leaving Observation and turning to what Hegel calls "The Actualisation
of Rational Self-Consciousness through its own Activity", we find the
notion of interest in a different sense. Here consciousness examines
the interests which motivate it to act, that is, its self-interests.
These are defined as pleasure, the law of the heart, and virtue. Finally,
turning away from itself and back to the world, it discovers first of all
g
die Sache Selbst, that is those objective matters in which it has a
8. Lesser Logic, p.72 §45.
9. This may reasonably be translated as "the fact itself". Most
translators, however, presumably in order to stress Hegel's
interpretation of "the fact" not, as may first seem to be the
case, as something objective, but rather as something which
essentially and actively involves the self-consciousness Ego -
have used the more circumlocution translations "the heart of
the matter" and "the matter in hand".
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personal interest, and then through the difficulty of conflicting interests
which this throws up, the idea of regulatiye law. as a resolution of this
conflict. The notion of interest, then, has three distinct but related
meanings which correspond to the three different aspects of the object
of consciousness.
Reason:'s idealism, however, can also have a negative aspect, which for
Hegel is expressed especially in Critical philosophy. This takes the
"abstract notion of Reason to be True"; and Hegel devotes some attention
to a criticism of this subjective idealism in the opening section of his
discussion of Reason, The Certainty and Truth of Reason - just as he
criticised Fichtes 'I am I' in the opening section of self-consciousness,
The Truth of Self-Certainty. His criticism is essentially the same as
his general criticism of Kantian philosophy which we saw in Chapter
Three; that it takes up the standpoint of consciousness only. Instead
of bringing together the unity of apperception and the diversity of sen¬
sations,
"... it s^fts from one to the other, and is caught up in the
spurious, i.e. the sensuous, infinite. Since Reason is all
reality in the sense of the abstract 'mine' and the 'other' is
for it something indifferent and extraneous, what is here made
explicit is the kind of knowing of an 'other' by Reason, which
we met with in the form of 'meaning', 'perceiving', and the
'Understanding', which apprehends what is 'meant' and what is
'perceived'." (Phenomenology, p. 144).
Viewed from this standpoint of consciousness only, however, Reason is
contradictory.
"It is involved in a direct contradiction; it asserts essence
to be a duality of opposed factors, the unity of apperception
and equally a Thing. (Phenomenology, p.145).
10. "Schlechte": this is Hegel's 'bad infinity'.
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This contradiction is perhaps most evident in the attitude of Critical
philosophy to the freedom of Reason. On the one hand, Reason as the
faculty of the unconditioned is free, because unlike the Understanding
it is not limited by an object. On the other hand, although Reason
is subjective, it is equally viewed as an objective thing, and in this
sense it is not free but constrained to conform to its notion, to be
rational. As Hegel commented in the Spirit of Christianity in a direct
reference to an argument of Kant's from Religion within the Bounds of
Reason Alone, the man who achieves the autonomy of Reason
"carries his Lord in himself, yet at the same time is his own
slave". (Phenomenology, p. 211) 11
Reason conceived of as a thing is as harsh and unyielding a
taskmaster as the Old TestamentGod and the positive Mosaic law. The
freedom which Reason has in virtue of the unity of apperception is
limited to the freedom to choose whether or not to obey this task master.
It is, as was remarked earlier, because of the existence of this freedom
that in Kant's view government is necessary, since it is unfortunately
necessary to force men to choose universal Reason, rather than particular
caprice.
We should not, however, take Hegel's criticism of the subjective idealism
12
of Critical philosophy to be a criticism of idealism in general.
*
11. See also Knox's note, ibid.
12. This appears to be Kojeve's interpretation (op. cit. p.269). and
Kojeve also asserts that Hegel's absolute Idealism has nothing
to do with what is ordinarily called "Idealism". And if terms
are used in their usual senses, it must be said that Hegel's
System is "realist", (op. cit. p.150). It is hard to reconcile
this view with the quotation from the Logic which follows here.
Hegel's position is that it is not the abstract notion of Reason, but
existing Reason or Spirit which is true. This position may be described
as the idealism not of the subject, but of Spirit, or, to use Hegel's
own expression, as absolute idealism.
"According to Kant, the things we know are to US appearances only,
and we can never know their essential nature, which belongs to
another world we cannot approach. Plain minds have not un¬
reasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its
reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world,
created by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is
rather as follows. The things of which we have consciousness are
mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the
true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to
have their existence founded not in themselves but in the universal
divine Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as
Kant's, but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the
Critical philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute
idealism, however, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism,
is by no means merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the
root of all religion; for religion too believes the actual world
we see, the sum total of existence, to be created and governed
by God". (Lesser Logic, p. 73, §45)
To use more modern language we could say that subjective and absolute
idealism are distinguished as rationalism and Reason. Rationalism,
which is the attitude of the "abstract Absolute""*"^, may be defined as
an attitude which takes Reason as it appears to consciousness, or as a
moment of subjective Spirit, to be True in its own right. Reason in
this sense is equivalent to the third moment of the Platonic soul, and
its virtue is discipline - as we just saw to be the case in Kant's view
of government. In rationalism, the organising discipline of Reason is
the highest form of Spirit, or is itself true.
In Hegel's view, however, as in Plato's, Reason is subordinate to Spirit
and to the virtue of justice, and absolute Idealism is the position which
13. See Ch. 1 above.
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understands this. It is not rationalist, but reasonable. The ultimate
aim of Hegel's discussion of Reason, then, is to refer rationalism to
the notion of justice, which will force it to abandon its one-sided and
subjective view and to recognise the existence of a higher form of it¬
self, Spirit."'"^ Appropriately, then, Hegel uses Antigone's recognition
of the principle of justice as independent of subjective Reason to intro¬
duce Reason to Spirit. Antigone's recognition of the independent existence
of divine laws -
"They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting
Though where they came from none can tell"
(Phenomenology, p. 261) 16
14. Michael Oakeshott's well-known essay on "Rationalism in Politics"
(M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other Essays, Methuen
1967) gives a useful general account of rationalism. His polemic,
however, is sometimes excessively critical, and we must comment
that he is mistaken in suggesting that Plato too can be tarred
with the rationalist brush. It is true that he says things which
may be interpreted as rationalist (Oakeshott op. cit. p. 5 cites
Republic 501 a), but in asserting the dominance of justice over
reason he transcends rationalism in the normal sense of the word,
though this does not mean that he abandons reason, as some romantics
(Oakeshott op. cit. p. 3 cites Keats) have done. We will return
to the question of Plato's alleged rationalism in Chapter 7. Here
we may cite Hegel's opinion, that "Plato's Republic, which passes
proverbially as an empty ideal, is in essence nothing but an inter¬
pretation of the nature of Greek ethical life". (Philosophy of
Right, p.10).
15. Thus the "universal class" in the Philosophy of Right (p. 131 ff)
which corresponds in some ways to the guardian class of Plato's
Republic, corresponds to the abstract idea of Reason, since it
is relieved of private interest by being supported by tHe
community in order to be able to work for the universal, and
since its purpose is rationally to organise and in this sense
to discipline the community. However, it is by no means the
apex of government, and has nothing to do with justice. The
civil service is always subordinate to sovereign government.
16. These lines are from Sophocles' Antigone, II 456-7. Hegel's
enthusiasm for them amounts to an obsession. He quotes them
again later in the Phenomenology (p.431), and in The Positivity
of the Christian Religion (ETW, p. 155) and again
twice in the Philosophy of Right'(p.115 and p. 259).
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is the transcendence of rationalism.
Natural consciousness of Reason is not so inconsistent as subjective
idealism, which asserts both that reason is all reality, and yet in
asserting that reason must dominate equally recognises the existence
of another reality which is to be dominated.
"Actual Reason ... is not so inconsistent as that: on the
contrary being at first only the cevtainty that it is all
reality, it is aware in this Notion that qua certainty^ qua 'I',
it is not yet in its truth reality, and it is impelled to raise
its certainty to truth and to give filling to the empty 'mine'".
(Phenomenology, p. 145)
Natural consciousness, in other words, simply takes up a rational atti¬
tude to the world, rather than making an abstract claim about the value
or truth of the rational. The rationalist view of Reason holds that
reason is only one part of reality, a part which ought to dominate
over others. If Hegel is right, that in truth Reason is all reality,
and not just part of it, he must be able to demonstrate that actual
Reason does in fact have this characteristic. He must show that actual
Reason is indeed an attitude which may be described as the certainty
that it is all reality, and he must also transform this certainty into
a truth by demonstrating it to be necessary. If actual Reason can be
demonstrated to be all reality, to include consciousness and self-
consciousness, and especially to include desire or passion, then the
rationalist assertion that Reason is separate from these aspects and
*
ought to dominate them falls. We may consider here what the conclusion
that Reason is all reality implies, firstly for the individual, and
secondly for the state, before we go on to examine Hegel's attempt to
demonstrate its necessity.
At the level of the individual, this conclusion means that we must
recognise that the rational man is also essentially self-interested or
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passionate. To regard him as rational only in so far as he is universal
or thinks in terms of abstract reason is to view him from the standpoint
of consciousness, to subsume his particular individuality under the uni¬
versal. In truth, however, a rational being is essentially individual,
and cannot be subsumed under the universal because he "has his centre in
18
himself", that is, because "man in general" is "an abstraction to which
19
no real existence corresponds. His whole being is rational, not just
one part of it.
At the level of the state a similar argument also applies. If we regard
the state simply as universal, and its citizens by implication merely as
particular, then we lose sight of the state as a real individual entity.
This may be seen in Hegel's comments on the notion of the separation of
powers.
"This point is of the highest importance, and, if taken in its true
sense, may rightly be regarded as the guarantee of public freedom
That is to say, the principle of the division of powers con¬
tains the essential moment of difference, of rationality realised.
But when the abstract Understanding handles it, it reads into it
the false doctrine of the absolute self-subsistence of these powers
against the others, and then one-sidedly interprets their relation
to eachother as a mutual restriction". (Philosophy of Right, p.175
§272) 20
17. Cf. Philosophy of History, p. 23. "nothing great.in the World has
been accomplished without passion." Hegel's World Historical
Individuals are individuals in the full sense; active, reasonable,
passionate men. By pointing to the significance of a man such as
Julius Caesar, Hegel is challenging the Kantian view that history
is simply the development of 'universal cosmopolitan existence'.
Caesar was not a bureaucrat trying to realise a universal plan
but a passionate and self-interested man. Will we say that be¬
cause of that his actions had no historical significance? (See
G.D.O'Brien, op. cit. pp.116-126): cf also the "right of Heroes"
mentioned in the Philosophy of Right, p.67)
18. Philosophy of History, p.17.
19. Ibid, p.24. Sartre meant much the same thing when he argued that
man is distinguished from other beings (whose essence lies outside
itself) by the fact that his existence preceeds his essence. (Sartre
Existentialism and Humanism, Methuen 1948 p. 26 ff; Being and
Nothingness op.cit. p.xxxi and p.25)
20. Hegel also discusses the separation of powers in the Philosophy of
Mind, p. 269 §541.
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The power of the state is. in this view, something particular and irrational
and which contradicts the idea of the rationality of the state. This
power must therefore be brought under the control of Reason, and this
is achieved through limiting state power by dividing it and setting the
powers against each other, that is, through 'checks and balances'.
The state is therefore deprived of its power to act as an individual.
21
This reaches its extreme in the French Revolution, and Hegel goes on
to comment that
"If the powers (e.g. what are called the 'Executive' and the
'Legislature') become self-subsistent, then as we have recently
seen on a grand scale, the destruction of the state is forthwith
a fait accompli(ibid).
This is essentially a result of making the legislature alone the rational
aspect of the constitution, in virtue of its universal application. In
Hegel's view, however, both the executive - the principle of power -
and the Crown - the principle of subjective individuality - are equally
22
essential elements of a rational constitution. Reason is in its nature
actively involved in the world, and just because of this it necessarily
involves not only the universal, but also the aspect of objective existence
23
or power, which pertains to consciousness and which makes it able to
act, and equally the subjective moment of being-for-self which motivates
24
and directs its action.
21. According to Knox this is the event referred to in the next quotation.
(Philosophy of Right, p. 367) Knox also points out two apparent
references to Kant in the passage we are considering (ibid).
22. Philosophy of Right, p. 273.
23. In the sense that Understanding is "absolute power" (Phenomenology,
p.18).
24. Phenomenology, p. 138 - the relevant passage is quoted in brief on
p. 2 2.o above.
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If w.e assert that the state is. rational in the sense of being universal,
general;cosmopolitan, classless, homogeneous, etc., we find that in fact
only part of the state in fact has this characteristic, and our assertion
is reduced to an abstract opinion that the state in general ought to be
25
brought under the discipline of this part. This means that the state
contains other parts which are essentially irrational, or that the state
in general is not rational. If on the other hand we assert that the state
is rational in the sense in which Reason is all reality, then this collision
of the 'ought' with the 'is' disappears, since there is nothing which is
26
not Reason. This is what Hegel means by his famous epigram, that
"What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational"
(Philosophy of Right, p.lO; also lesser Logic, p.9 §6)
This, of course, is easy to say, but has not yet been shown to be true.
As yet actual Reason is only the certainty that it is all reality, and
this must be demonstrated as a necessity and therefore as a truth. J.f
this can be achieved, however, it will have the significance of trans¬
forming Reason into Spirit, since "Reason is Spirit when its certainty of
27
being all reality has been raised to truth." Only natural consciousness,
that is, "actual Reason", is amenable to this demonstration. Subjective
idealism is merely a generalised assertion about the nature of Reason,
and this is not the same as the certainty of Reason. Both subjective
25. See for example Fichte, 'The Closed Commercial State' and 'On the
Creation of the Rational State'. In Reiss ed. The Political Thought
of the German Romantics, Oxford 1955 pp.86-102 and pp 118-124
26. See lesser Logic, p. 9 f §6.
27. Phenomenology, p. 263.
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idealism and natural consciousness view Reason from the standpoint of
consciousness, but while subjective idealism makes an academic statement,
natural consciousness is actually actively involved and interested in
the world; although it does not yet know that this active involvement
has the significance of being Reason. If Reason is indeed the certainty
of being all reality, then only actual Reason really is Reason, and sub¬
jective idealism is at most only its abstract notion. If it is easy
to show the inconsistence of subjective idealism, it is not possible
to gain a positive result from this criticism. In order to achieve a
"determinate negation" of Reason subjective idealism must be left behind,
and we must turn instead to the experience of the natural consciousness
of Reason, for only here do we find a certainty which is capable by deter¬
minate negation of being transformed into a truth.
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(b) The Experience of Reason
The natural consciousness or certainty of Reason displays nine distinct
rational attitudes. Since these are attitudes of consciousness, they
regard their objects as discrete things. Phenomenal knowledge must
dissolve this fixity and lead natural consciousness to experience its
objects as moments of Spirit.
In so far as natural consciousness does not have this experience it is
guilty of rationalism, or rather of nine distinct rationalisms. These
rationalisms however differ from the grand Kantian rationalism in two
respects. Firstly, as has already been said, they are practical attitudes,
and though we may show that they are based upon an implicit assumption
of the dominance of reason, they do not make this claim explicitly.
Secondly, while the rationalism of Critical philosophy and its forbears
is based upon a claim for the value of the universal, for thought in the
abstract, each of the attitudes of natural consciousness is already at
least one step removed from the universal. Each includes in some form
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a notion of individuatity, and various forms of the notion of character
in particular turn up often.
It is by making this notion of individuality explicit for natural con¬
sciousness that phenomenal knowledge will be able to lead it away from
the notion of Reason as something merely universal, and therefore unreal,
toward the notion of Reason as essentially individual, and therefore as
real. As we have seen, the notion that Reason is real is equivalent
to the notion of Spirit. It is by demonstrating that Reason in fact
or in practice is not merely a combination of a merely subjective
principle (the unity of apperception) with a universal principle (the
28. In the sense of the Greek Kyle.
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theoretical faculty), but something essentially individual which itself
is greater qpd more real than these two abstract moments of it, that
29
Hegel shows that Reason is in fact real, and is therefore Spirit.
Hegel's discussion of Reason is long, and in places obscure. Reason,after
all, includes within itself both consciousness and self-consciousness
and it is therefore more complex than either of these attitudes con¬
sidered in isolation - three times more complex, to be precise. However,
while it is therefore entitled to the amount of space and attention
Hegel devotes to it, it will be necessary to keep our discussion of it
here to a minimum, in order to leave space for Spirit.
This will be done only to save space, however, and two particular mis¬
apprehensions should be avoided. Firstly, it should not be assumed that
Hegel's argument in the chapter on Reason is less relevant because it
refers to some academic theories which are now out-dated and obsolete.
This may well be true of Schelling's Philosophy of Nature, which is
the central object of Hegel's criticism in "Observation of Nature","^0
and of Physiognomy and Phrenology. However, the attitudes in question
are held by Hegel to be essential moments of Reason, so that even if
the specific versions of the attitudes he criticises are no longer academicall
current or respectable, the attitudes in general must be recognised as
real. In fact in most cases where the specific attitudes Hegel refers
29. For Hegel's notion of individuality as a unity of university and
particularity, see lesser Logic p. 266 ff §§163-166, or Philosophy
of Right, p. 23 §7.
30. Hyppolite, op. cit. p.249.
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to are obsolete, others may be found without too much difficulty to have
taken their place. For example, in the place of Phrenology, which connected
criminal character to the shape of the skull, we could cite the modern
theory that criminal character may in some cases be the result of a
31
chromosome excess. This theory may well succeed in establishing an
empirical connection, where Phrenology presumably failed. However, its
implication that Spirit lies in the structure of a cell is formally
speaking no different from the implication of Phrenology, that Spirit
32
is a bone, and in this sense Hegel's arguments are equally relevant.
Secondly, Hegel's arguments are primarily arguments which will lead natural
consciousness through a series of necessary experiences towards Spirit,
and ultimately to the Absolute Idea, and only secondarily criticisms of
particular arguments. This means that what we most need is to understand
the structure of the whole argument, and that only once we understand the
point of the whole argument will we be able to understand the full signi¬
ficance of its details. We should not regard the particular arguments
Hegel presents as arguments which can be understood in isolation from
33
the general argument, which we may skip or take an interest in as we
please.
31. Taylor, Walton, and Young, The New Criminology, Routledge 1973,
p.44 ff. In the case of Physiognomy we may cite Lailan Young's
recently published book on the Chinese art of Sang Mien, The
Secrets of the Face (Hodder & Stoughton 1983)
32. Phenomenology, p. 208.
33. Alistair Maclntyre's article "Hegel on Faces and Skulls" in A.
Maclntyre, op. cit. pp. 219-237 seems to me to be guilty of this.
It is easy enough to criticise Physiognomy and Phrenology, but
quite another thing to use this criticism to lead natural con¬
sciousness towards the notion of Spirit, and it is the latter
aspect only, which Maclntyre ignores, which makes Hegel's argu¬
ment worth studying.
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The general structure of Hegel's presentation of Reason, then, is as
follows:
Firstly, Reason takes up the standpoint of consciousness, relating to
objective things (including people). Its attitude however, differs from
that of consciousness since it is now conscious of itself.
"Previously, its perception and experience of various aspects
were something that only happened to consciousness; but here,
consciousness makes its own observations and experiments.
'Meaning ' and perceiving, which previously were superseded
for US, are now superseded by consciousness itself. Reason sets
to work to know the truth, to find in the form of a Notion that
which for 'meaning' and 'perceiving' is a Thing; i.e. it seeks
to possess in thinghood the consciousness only of itself".
(Phenomenology, p. 146).
It is in this connection that Hegel comments that reason has a "universal
34
znterest in the world". It approaches the world in three different
ways, according to the three aspects of the object of consciousness.
Firstly, it regards it simply as an object, and is "Observation of
35
Nature". Secondly, it returns to observe the self, and discovers
"Logical and Psychological Laws". Thirdly, it turns to the unity of
the previous two moments and seeks in nature an expression of the inner
principle of the self, in "Physiognomy and Phrenology". Through this
movement it develops the idea of character from the simple idea of an
inner cause of an outer appearance up to the point where it is the cause
of an individual personality.
34. Phenomenology, p. 146.
35. In this and the following two paragraphs the words in quotation
marks, without references, refer to Hegel's section headings in
the chapter on Reason.
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The second major attitude of Reason is. the attitude of "Rational Self-
Consci.ousness". Here Reason abandons, the idea that an inner principle
determines character, and, turning in towards itself, considers the
motivations it may freely choose to regard as the cause of its own
actions. These divide again into three, since Rational self-consciousness
too is here an object for consciousness. They are firstly "Pleasure",
regarded as an objective determination or as "Necessity"; secondly, the
"Law of the Heart", that is, a subjective determination which is inde¬
pendent; and finally "Virtue" which contains both subjective and objective
36
moments and which is free. Through this movement the subjective
aspect of character rises to its highest form in which it is grasped as
an unconditioned universal, the principle of free individuality, and the
experience is gained that
"the movement of individuality is the reality of the universal".
(Phenomenology, p. 235).
The third and final attitude of Reason, then regards individuality not
merely as subjective, but as "Real in-and-for-itself", and takes the
subjective and objective sides as a unity, or from the point of view of
their relationship. This may be expressed in general by saying that its
37
object is neither nature nor the self, but the category which mediates
between them. In its objective mode, this appears as the notion of
38
character which we find in the great realist novels, as an inter-
39
play between an "original determinate nature" and a set of given cir¬
cumstances, and this produces the notion of die Sache Setbst, that is,
36. Phenomenology, p. 211.
37. Phenomenology, p. 236, cf Kant,
38. In the work of Hardy, Flaubert,
39. Phenomenology, p. 238.
Critique of Pure Reason, op.cit. p.113.
Zola, and Balzac, for example.
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of ' facts.' . The arbitrariness and ethical vacuity of this conception
refer it back to the subjective side, and here the category becomes the
categorical imperative, the foundation of a regulative law which will
make up for the deficiency of the "original determinate nature". This
however, since it is purely subjective, has no room for a concrete con¬
tent, and Reason therefore attempts not to deduce laws but to test the
rationality of laws which exist. In this, its final moment, it fails
to establish a rational test, but discovers through this failure the
41
notion of real ethical character, which is the basis of Spirit.
In the remainder of this chapter we will sketch in a few details to fill
out the experience of actual Reason. We will also point out in a general
way the directions which may be taken by the nine rationalist deviations
which take each of the moments of Reason respectively to be true in
their own right. We will see that the errors of rationalism extend in¬
to a wide variety of activities which may seem at first sight to be
quite innocent and respectable pursuits. That is, we will see the extent
of the dominance of the "abstract Absolute"; and we may comment in ad¬
vance that in virtue of this Hegel seems to have been excessively opti¬
mistic in imagining that the dominance of rationalism's abstract Absolute
had already subsided in his lifetime. Oakeshott's pessimism about the
42
possibility of resisting rationalism may well seem to be more realistic.
40. Cf. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, Methuen 1948, p. 42 f.
41. Phenomenology, p. 262 : Hegel's term is Gesinnung, which Miller
translates as 'disposition' and which also carries the significa¬
tion of 'sentiment'.
42. Oakeshott, op. cit. p.34f.
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(c) Observing Reason
Observing Reason feels at home in the world, but does not yet know the
world as its own. Just as natural consciousness earlier could not move
directly from consciousness to Reason without first passing through self-
consciousness, since it had to know itself before it could know its in¬
terest in the world; so observing Reason cannot reach self-knowledge
without first returning into and observing its own self.
"While at first it is only dimly aware of its presence in the
world, or only knows quite simply that this world as its own,
it strides forward in this belief to a general approportion
of its assured possessions, and plants the symbol of its
sovereignty on every height and in every depth. But this
superficial 'it is mine', is not its ultimate interest; the
joy of this general appropriation finds still in its possession
the alien 'other' which abstract Reason does not contain within
itself. Reason is dimly aware of itself as a profounder essence
than the pure 'I' is, and must demand that difference, that
being, in its manifold variety, becomes its very own, that it
behold itself as the actual would and find itself present as an
outer shape and Thing. But even if Reason digs into the very
entrails of things and opens every vein in them so that it may
gush forth to meet itself, it will not attain this joy; it must
have completed itself inwardly before it can experience the con¬
summation of itself". (Phenomenology, p. 146).
The simplest form of observation for Hegel is description. Even in this
nominalist form, however, Reason can be seen to contain a rational element.
It
"must at least be the remembrance [Gedachtnisj of the object,
which expresses in a universal way what in actuality is present
only as a single item". (Phenomenology, p. 147).
Remembrance is explicitly my own, and it is this subjective moment which
always distinguishes the object of Reason from the things which are the
objects of consciousness. It is for this reason that the platonic world of
forms, which also involves memory, belongs to Reason, rather than to the
supersensible world of understanding , which is explicitly alien, something
which is not remembered but discovered. In memory, Reason is on home ground.
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This nominalism develops into a version of explanation which differs
from the explanations of the Understanding in being teleological. As
Hyppolite says,
"Observing Reason now seeks a new kind of law, which may be
formulated as follows: the exterior is the expression of
the interior". (Hyppolite, op. Git. p. 249).
This type of explanation is indeed necessary to explain nature. We
need to be able to explain that the purpose of the pollen is to fertilise
the seed, the purpose of the seed to reproduce the plant, and so on.
Observing Reason, however, makes the mistake of regarding the inner
itself as real. Hegel is thinking especially of Schelling's philosophy
of nature, in which the inner dominates to the extent that it becomes
necessary that nature should exhibit the structures of thought in its
own being. This cannot be, since though nature exists for Reason in
one sense, there is also an aspect to its existence which is independent
of Reason. Nature is a living entity, which is therefore self-subsistent,
and its independence must be respected. Hoffmeister summarises the
difference between Schelling and Hegel on this point succinctly:
"Schelling thinks nature directly; Hegel thinks nature
through the knowledge of nature". (Hyppolite op.cit. p. 244).
We have already considered Hegel's view of Schelling's philosophy of
nature in Chapter One above. We may recall here that Hegel's objection
was, essentially, that, in spite of his efforts Schelling cannot succeed
in including any notion of difference or of quality in his account of
nature, since he wants ultimately to reduce it to a manifestation of
a single or self identical Reason - an A = A. The first error of
rationalism, then, is this reductionist attitude to nature, which turns
43
it into a "night in which all cows are black". This approach may also
43. Phenomenology, p. 9.
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be seen in Engels." Dialectics of Nature.
In the second moment of observing reason, the notion of the inner becomes
developed from the simple idea of potentiality into a universal law
governing the appearance of things. Here it encounters logical and
psychological laws, and in doing so becomes observation not of nature,
45
but of Spirit.
Hegel makes short work of logical laws. Laws of thought
"...are outside reality. To say that they have no reality
means in general nothing else than that they lack truth.
They are indeed, not supposed to be the entire truth, but
still formal truth. But what is purely formal without any
reality is a mere figment of thought, or pure abstraction
without that internal division which would be nothing else
but the content. ... It is sufficient here to have pointed
out the invalidity of the so-called Laws of Thought from
the general nature of the case." (Phenomenology, p. 180 and p.181)
The second error of rationalism, then, is to suppose that formal logic
46
is capable of expressing any truth whatever. What is logically
correct is not the same as what is true, since the latter must be
knowledge of something, or must involve the moment of consciousness.
44. Hegel also has been accused of holding to an absurd a priori
philosophy of nature (e.g. K.Popper, The Open Society an9 its
Enemies, Vol. 2, Routledge 1966, p.28). Though I cannot speak
for Hegel's own Philosophy of Nature, this seems unlikely on
the basis of what Hegel says in the Phenomenology.
45. Phenomenology, p. 147.
46. Those who seek to formalise Hegel's Logic for him might ask
whether Hegel would have thanked them. See e.g. Michael Kosok's
article "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic" in
Maclntyre, op. cit. pp. 237-287.
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Psychological laws., which are the actuality of logical laws, face the
same difficulty. In so far as observational psychology generalises from
its observations towards laws of behaviour, it looses its grasp of the
individual which it is observing, for the individual is after all both
specific, and not governed by laws, or is "spontaneously active in face
48
of them", as Hegel puts it. Psychology of this kind cannot claim
true knowledge of Spirit for the same reason that formal Logic cannot:
Spirit is individual and real, while the psychological law is purely
formal and incapable of any content. Behaviourism in general, then,
is a dimension of the second error of rationalism. Psychological laws
however, have the positive significance that in so far as natural con¬
sciousness perceives that they cannot be the cause of free Spirit, it
is referred away from the notion of the inner as a general law towards
the notion'of the inner as an individual character. Here it encounters
and observes
"the relationship of Nature and Spirit in the form of sensuous
being, and ... seeks itself as actuality in the form of immediate
being (Phenomenology, p. 147) .
This sensuous being is the inner principle of character which Physiognomy
and Phrenology take to be expressed in the face and the skull respectively.
We need not spend much time with these pseudo-sciences. Hegel himself
seems to find it hard to take them seriously. One of the reasons he gives
47. Phenomenology, p. 181.
48. Ibid, p. 182. Cf also p. l66fabove. Behavioural psychology
relates to psychoanalysis as Reason to Understanding - though
both in fact contain elements of the other, and may commit
each other's errors.
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them the amount of space he does, seems to be that he enjoys making jokes
about them. The main point of Hegel's argument is to push this attitude
to the logical conclusion of its deterministic view of character, that
49.
Spirit is a bone, that is a dead thing. Natural consciousness, however
is quite sure that it is alive, which is why, as Lichtenberg says, every
honest fellow will retort to physiognomy, and to phrenology, "with a box
5o
on the ear". The notion that it is alive, however, signals the end of
observation as an attitude, just as earlier life referred consciousness
to self-consciousness. Observation in general deals with the object only
as an object for Reason, but once it recognises life it must allow inde¬
pendence to its object, and it must therefore allow its character to be
not something fixed by the reason of the observer, but as something which
has the freedom to determine itself, or to actualise itself through its
own activity. If Spirit is a bone, this at least means that Spirit exists
The third error of rationalism, then, is evident enough. It is the error
52
of supposing that character is something fixed and even material, a
deus ex machina. Physiognomy and Phrenology are clearly only extreme
examples of this attitude, which is easy enough to criticse even in its
less extreme forms. Hegel's contribution is not so much to criticise this
view, as to grasp it as a miscomprehension of the essential nature of
Reason, a failure to understand Reason itself as Spirit.
49. Phenomenology, p. 210.
50. Hegel quotes this twice, once in the context intended by Lichtenberg,
that is, as an answer to physiognomy, and again later in the context
of phrenology. Phenomenology, p. 193, p. 205.
51. Phenomenology, p. 208; Hyppolite, op. cit. p. 275.
52. Hegel says " Brain fibres and the like" (Phenomenology, p.210):
today we might encounter more sophisticated views such as genetic
coding, or what one psychologist calls "parental programming",
(Sec E.Berne, Sex in Human Loving, Penguin, 1973 p. 144 ff).
"2.4-2.
(d) The Actualisation of Rational S.elf-Consciousness through its
own Activity.
The subjective element of Reason, its attitude to self-consciousness, has
been described as the active realisation of Reason, and as the seat of
53
individualism. We should, however, be cautious of such formulations.
54 55
Reason in its essence is active, and observation is also an activity,
and we cannot therefore distinguish the present attitude specifically as
an active one. Further, the whole Phenomenology is a realization, in
both senses of that word: that is, it both brings natural consciousness
through experience to a position of knowledge where it may say "I now realize
this to be the case", and gives an account of the realization of an idea
in an objective world, a realization which may be historical. In the
present case, we should say that we are dealing not so much with the
realization of reason, but with something more specific; the teleological
accounts which reason gives for the motivations of its own actions, that
is, for its inner self.
In this sense this attitude may certainly be individualist, if it supposes
that its own subjective motivations are the only factors which may account
for its actions. In acknowledging this, however, we must be careful not
to conclude that when in the following section it considers its relation¬
ship to other rational beings, it is any less individualist.^ This relation¬
ship is still conceived of as a relationship of rational subjects. Only
the individualist, who conceives of himself as absolute, has 'relationships'.
53. Hyppolite, op. cit. p.272 ff.
54. Phenomenology, p. 138.
55. Phenomenology, p. 147.
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It is only by recognising Reason as something which exists, or Spirit,
that we transcend individualism.
The first motivation Reason finds for its own actions is Pleasure.
Although Hegel is not explicit, it seems clear that he has "sensuous
c'6
love" in mind. Pleasure lies between the purely libidinal desire of self-
consciousness, and the spiritual love which is a moment of the family
and of the state, and which Hegel discusses in the context of greek
tragedy. Hegel does not approve of pleasure, and quotes Goethe:
"It despises intellect and science
The supreme gifts of man
It has given itself to the devil
And must perish". ^
(Phenomenology, p. 218)
While desire seeks to consume or destroy its object, pleasure wants
only to possess it, that is, to overcome "the form of its otherness or
independence".^ The sexual act, from this point of view, is not the
result simply of lust, but has the significance of being a union. This
union, however, is only temporary, and consciousness learns from experi¬
ence that the unity which it sought is not the unity of two merely
particular individuals, but two real individuals, each of which "is only
59
a moment, or a universal". This experience is sufficient to refer us
to the "law of the heart", which finds the universal within the individ¬
ual in the form of a purely subjective moral law.
56. Hyppolite op. cit. p.282; Taylor op.cit. p.163. Pleasure trans¬
lates "die Lust", which does not mean lust, but does nevertheless
carry some of the connotations of this English word.
57. For the significance of the contemporary references here see
Hyppolite, op.cit, p.36 and p.285 ff, Taylor, op.cit. p. 163,




The fourth error or rationalism., the failure to trans.cend the attitude
of pleasure, is not so much the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake,
i.e. hedonism, as the idea that pleasure can be the cause of phenomena
which belong strictly to Spirit, and in particular, of love. Pleasure
in fact, may be reconciled only within the family and the state. As
Hegel says later
"The individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individuality
finds it in the family, and the necessity in which that pleasure
passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his
nation" (Phenomenology, p. 276f).
The individual who takes the attitude of pleasure, by contrast, imagines
the reverse, that the purpose of the family is his pleasure, and that the
family therefore has no essential existence above this pleasure, no pur¬
pose once this pleasure has been satisfied.^
In this attitude, it becomes clear that what have been described here as
'errors' of rationalism have a further significance of being moral wrongs.
Specifically, they refuse to acknowledge the existence of Spirit, and in
the case of pleasure this is represented as not only an error but also a
wrong through the notion that it engenders the punishing necessity of fate.
Necessity is in Hegel's view the direct corollary of pleasure. If I
desire another solely as an object, then it follows that the subjective
element - who this object is - is irrelevant. Any object will do. This
arbitrariness and emptiness of content, Hegel says
"is just what is called necessity, for necessity, fate, and the
like, is just that about which we cannot say what it does, what
its specific laws and positive content are". (Phenomenology, p.219)
60. Cf Philosophy of Right, p. 262f, Addition to §163.
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Pleasure tried to possess life, but "in trying to do so it really laid
hold of death" for the individual who is possessed is no longer an
independent living being. This consciousness therefore find itself
in a position which is not so much contradictory as beyond its compre¬
hension, and it is thus cast at the feet of fate, condemned
"to become a riddle to itself, the consequences of its deeds ^
being for it not the deeds themselves". (Phenomenology, p.220).
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Pleasure finds itself confronted by an "abstract necessity" , which
"...has the character of the merely negative uncomprehended
power of universality, on which individuality is smashed to
pieces" (Phenomenology, p.221).
This abstract necessity, it is true, is not the same as fate, though
the necessity which results from pleasure is indeed a moment of fate
in the full sense. Its central function in terms of the experience of
natural consciousness is to refer it to the idea of the law of the heart,
64
that is, the principle of necessity within itself.
Self-conscious reason in this attitude rises above necessity and becomes
independent. Its own independence, however, is contradicted by the inde¬
pendence of others, and the law of its heart conflicts both with actual
law and with other subjective ideas of law. This leads it to experience
a number of contradictions. For example, in so far as it wants to realise
the law of its own heart, it regards real law as opposed to its own ideas;
61. Phenomenology, p. 220.
62. Cf. Phenomenology, p. 283. Oedipus
but must accept the consequences of
63. Phenomenology, p.220.
64. Phenomenology, p.221.
did not recognise his father,
having killed him.
yet this means that if it realises its own idea it thereby ceases to be¬
come the law of its heart and it stands opposed to it.^ The individual
must be the source of law, yet the intentions of other individuals must
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be opposed to the law of my own heart; and so on. The positive result
of this 'frenzy of self-conceit' is that natural consciousness is referred
to the notion of a moral law which is not merely subjective, but exists
in relation to the world. This is the notion of virtue. Just as self-
consciousness earlier achieved the freedom of mutual recognition through
the notion of virtue, so independent rational self-consciousness becomes
free by giving up the notion of the conditioned universal law of its own
heart in favour of the unconditioned universal notion of virtue.
The fifth error of rationalism, then, Hegel has identified as conceit -
specifically the conceit which holds its subjective evaluation of the good
to be superior to any other, or rather, which does not recognise any
other. This conceit may be found in general in writers who use the
metaphor of the social contract, those who find, in Hegel's words, "only
67
a universal resistance and struggle of all against one another".
65. Phenomenology, p.223.
66. Phenomenology, p.223.
67. Phenomenology, p. 227. This seems fairly clearly to be a reference
to Hobbes (see Leviathan, Ch. 13). Hyppolite (op.cit. p.285) suggests
that there are also references to Rousseau in this passage; though
we should not conclude that this passage is intended as a definitive
criticism of these authors. We may also notice some resonances
with atheistic existentialism - appropriately, since this passage
is parallel to Lordship and Bondage - and existentialism is cer¬
tainly conceited. Cf. Natural Law, p. 88: "the ethical order
posited according to relations alone, or externality and
coercion understood as a totality is self-cancelling".
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The metaphor of the soci.al contract implies that the state is a result
of the ideas and requirements of the individual, and that membership of
the state is something optional, whereas in fact the state exists
68
whether we like it or not. States are not, in general, founded by
agreements, but by acts of war, and historically speaking, great con¬
stitution makers and law givers are generally preceeded by great warrior
69
heroes. Thus, if pleasure imagined that the source of the relationship
of the family was his own lust, and failed to acknowledge the power of
the family as an institution, so the law of the heart imagines that the
state is the result of his own subjective deliberations, and fails to
acknowledge the state as an independent power. Its conceit is that mere
reason' is greater than actual law.
The third and final moment of rational self-consciousness, the attitude
of virtue, reverses this - thought it does not go so far as to acknowledge
the independent power of the state. For the virtuous consciousness,
individuality must be sacrificed to law.
"For the virtuous consciousness, law is the essential moment,
and individuality the one to be nullified, and therefore both
in its own consciousness as well as in the "way of the world".
(Phenomenology, p.228)
The attitude Hegel seems to have in mind is not so much the ancient idea
of virtue, as the modern idea of virtue of the "heroes of Romanticism".^
Since the principle of individuality had less value in the ancient world,
the idea of the sacrifice of individuality is proportionately less signifi¬
cant, and for this reason the virtuous idea of self-sacrifice is a modern
idea. The idea of virtue is the same in both cases, but only in the
68. Philosophy of Right, p. 59, §75.
69. Ibid, p. 245. (Addition to §93). See also Ibid, p.73 §l02,and
Philosophy of History, p. 251.
70. Hyppolite, op. cit. p.297.
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modern interpretation does, it become "generally perverted", and Hegel's
71
argument here applies, in general to this unreal form.
The value of virtue, for Hegel, is that it tempers the self-indulgence
and the self-conceit, respectively, of the previous two moments by in-
72
troducing the idea of disciplrne. However, while discipline is cer¬
tainly what is needed, Hegel regards this virtuous interpretation of it
as a sham. It is essentially personal, the subjective idea of dis¬
cipline only. True discipline can be achieved only by the individual
who acknowledges Spirit, and, like Antigone, is prepared to lay down
her life in the service of Spirit.
"True discipline requires nothing less than the sacrifice of
the entire personality as a proof that individual peculiarities
are no longer insisted upon". (Phenomenology, p. 228)
Virtue, by contrast, insists that its virtue is essentially its own,
and is opposed to the less moral "way of the world". However, as Bradley
once said, "to wish to be better than the world is to be already on the
73
threshold of immorality". and virtue is in this sense immoral. Thus,
in the Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, Hegel opposes the attitude
of virtue to the attitude of love.
"The virtues, because of their limits, always put something
objective beyond them, and the variety of virtues on all the
greater and insurmountable multiplicity of objectivity. Love
alone has no limits". (Phenomenology, p. 247).
Love, however, is something only Spirit can achieve, and Reason can
rise only at the most to self-love.
71. Hegel distinguishes ancient and modern ideas of virtue on p. 234
of the Phenomenology.
72. It will be recalled that the notion of discipline occurred
earlier in the move from Lordship and Bondage to Freedom of
Self-Consciousness, which is parallel to the move made here.
See p. 196 above.
73. F.H. Bradley. "My Station and its Duties" in Ethical Studies
H.S.King, 18/6, p. 180.
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The specific error of virtue - the sixth error or rationalism - is that
it tells the individual what to do, but without giving him any good
reason (other than self-love) for doing so. It abstracts away entirely
from his individual involvement! but, as we know, Reason is essentially
involved in the world. Virtue is always a contve COewe, demanding the
sacrifice of the individual to the universal, but giving the individual
no reason for wanting to do this, other than the blank assertion that
the universal is somehow better. This can be seen clearly in Rousseau,
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who having praised Montesquieu for making virtue the cardinal principle
of democracy, writes
"It is under this constitution before all others that the criticism
must be armed with strength and fidelity, and repeat from the
bottom of his heart every day the words a virtuous Palatine once
spoke in the Diet of Poland: 'Malo pericutosain libertatem quam
qwietwn servitum' ^better liberty with danger than peace with
slaveryj". (Rousseau, The Social Contract, op. cit. p. 113 f)
To use a modern term, then, we might say that virtue is guilty of being
75
1 ideological' .
The trouble with this attitude, which is experienced by natural conscious¬
ness, is that it is boring, and this contradicts an essential characteristi
of reason, that it is interested.
"The fatuousness of this rhetoric seems, too, in an unconscious way
to be a certainty for the culture of our time, since all interest
in the whole mass of such rhetoric, and the way it is used to
boost one's ego, has vanished - a loss of interest which is expressed
in the fact that it produces only a feeling of boredom" (Phenomenology,
p.234).
74. For Hegel's view of Montequieu's idea of virtue see Philosophy of
Right, p.177, §273, and Hyppolite op.cit. p. 367.
75. I use this term in more or less the sense used by Bernard Crick in
In Defence of Politics. Kojeve's view that this section demonstrates
"the impotence of non-revolutionary intervention" (op.cit. p. 273)
displays precisely the ideological attitude Hegel is criticising.
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The feeling of boredom, howeyer, is not the same as the attitude of
disinterest which characterises consciousness. To be bored is to want
to be interested, and this implies an awareness of the interest as some-
76
thing which has been lost, not something merely absent. From this
experience natural consciousness learns that
"the 'way of the world' is not as bad as it looked;
for its reality is the reality of the universal".
(Phenomenology, p. 235).
This, however, means that it is certain that reason is all reality,
77
which earlier was apparent only to us. It sees that "the movement of
7 8
individuality is the reality of the universal". Individuality thus
takes itself to be real in and for itself, and it remains to examine this
attitude, the totality of individuality, before going on to Spirit - for
real individuality is as yet only implicitly, and not explicitly Spirit.
76. Cf. Phenomenology, p. 49. For natural consciousness "the
realisation of the Notion counts rather as the loss of its
own self; for it does lose its truth on this path".
77. Phenomenology, p. 236.
78. Phenomenology, p. 236; p. 2.35 above.
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(e) Individuality which Takes itself to be Real in and for Itself.
The object of the third major attitude of Reason is not nature, or
79
Spirit, but the category which mediates between them. The individual
is now not merely an object, nor a subjective inner principle, but a
80
real living individual; and Reason is determined as practical Reason.
In the first moment of this attitude, individuality is reduced to a mere
relationship between these two aspects which are, properly understood,
only moments of it. Individuality is an interplay between an "original
81
determinate nature" and a set of given circumstances. In natural
consciousness, this appears as what may be termed a pragmatic attitude
to the world. It finds itself in a situation, and proceeds without
further ado to act in it.
The experience of this action leads it to a new object, dte Sache Selbst,
83
which, as Hyppolite points out corresponds to the Greek pragma.
It was argued earlier that a fact {Sache) is a 'thing' in which an in-
84
dividual has a special interest.- Natural consciousness, however, does
not to begin with see it this way. Its view is that the circumstances
it finds itself in are merely the objective conditions which it has
subjectively to deal with. They have the status of what Sartre calls
79. See note 37: to this Chapter.
80. Phenomenology, p. 267.
81. That is, character understood in the sense of Hardy's epigram
'Character is fate' - an interpretation of both character and
fate which Hegel would certainly have rejected.
82. See note 9 to this Chapter.
83. Hyppolite, p. 299.
84. Ibid. See also Phenomenology, p. 246.
"facticity". Natural consciousness, pretends to be the child of its
circumstances, and does not accept that the situation may itself be
affected by its own appreciation and evaluation of that situation. In
pointing to something as a fact, it is denying any personal involvement
or responsibility for that fact.
The specific error of this attitude, the seventh error of rationalism,
is that it forces an unreal division between fact and value. Its empiricism
is not true empiricism, but the empiricism only of understanding.®® The
seventh error of rationalism may be seen nowadays especially in the notion
of a value-free social science, or the view that the empirical and theo¬
retical aspects of social science are distinct and sometimes opposed
practices. In truth, however, a fact is essentially something which is
held to have a particular value. A truly value free social science would
87
have to be a knowledge not of facts, but of things; yet people/essentially
88
distinct from things in so far as they are self-contained. Similarly,
85.Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit. p. 259. Cf. p. 2 ©5 above.
86. See Ch. 4 above, p.l37ff; also Natural Law, p. 58, lesser Logic
p. 61, §38.
87. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1938. For Durkheim, a fundamental rule-of
sociological method is "Consider social facts as things"
(op. cit. p . 14) .
88. See notes lg and 19 to this chapter.
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any theoretical knowledge of the social must equally and essentially
contain an empirical element., otherwise it remains purely abstract
and cannot claim to be knowledge. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, we
may note in this context, attempts to achieve not an abstract idea of
politics, but a true knowledge of the state, and for this reason it
discusses its empirical existence, that is, its institutions. True
knowledge of the most trivial political fact can be achieved only through
the mediation of speculative philosophical knowledge of the political,
since the fact gains its true meaning only in relation to the political
system in which it occurs. To recognise this, however, is to transcend
the empiricism of understanding towards true empiricism.
Natural consciousness comes to experience this when it encounters an
alternative interpretation of a situation, another consciousness which
in the same 'things' finds different facts. If it is to maintain its
view of the facts, it must claim that its view of the situation is not
90
just a more accurate, but a better one than its opponents. With this,
however, it admits its interest, since it claims that its view of the
facts has a special value for it, while previously it held them to be
distinct from its judgements. This means, however, that what is objective
is also essentially for it qua self-consciousness, or is essentially
related to it as a subject; and the subject which in this way is
essential has the character of immediate universality.
"Thus the 'matter in hand' ^die Sache SetbstJ no longer has the
character of a predicate, and looses the character of lifeless
abstract universality. It is rather substance permeated by
individuality, subject in which there is individuality just as
much qua individual or qua this particular individual, as
90. Cf. Phenomenology: for naive empiricism good and bad is a mere
difference of quantity, that is, not an essential or qualitative
difference at all.
qua all individuals.; and it is. the universal which has being
only as this action of all and each, and a reality in the fact
that this particular consciousness, knows it to be its own
reality and the reality of all". (Phenomenology, p. 252).
Natural consciousness is thus referred to the second moment of real in¬
dividuality, the individual understood subjectively as something universal.
In this second moment, the category, which earlier was a specific mediation
between nature and Spirit, now takes on the significance of being universal.
It takes on the characteristics of necessity and of Law: that is, it is
the categorical imperative. This means that Reason takes up the attitudes
of Llawgiver and tester of laws. It holds that through the application
of a simple axiom, for example Kant's axiom "That a maxim of thy will
shall count at the same time as a principle of universal legislation",
it is possible for "the commonest untutored understanding" to deduce moral
91
law for itself. In this view, then, "sound Reason knows immediately
92
what is right and good", and knowledge of the good is no longer restricted
to philosophers who take the trouble to search for it, as in Plato's view,
but is open to everyone. Hegel criticises this general view of the cate¬
gorical imperative in two stages, firstly as applied to subjective moral
93
law, or as law giver, and secondly as applied to objective civil law,
or as testing laws, and we must take care to keep these two aspects
94
separate.
91. Both quotations are from Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Book I
Ch.l §7, and Book 1 Ch. 1 §4), and are quoted by Hegel in Natural
Law, p.76 and p.77.
92. Phenomenology, p. 253
93. In "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate", ETW, p. 2o9f).—/
Hegel distinguishes moral and political aspects of law in this way,
and counterposes Christ's teaching of love to both.
94. Elsewhere - for example in Natural Law, p. 76 ff - Hegel criticises
the categorical imperative in general without distinguishing its
subjective and objective aspects.
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To criticise the first view., Hegel takes an example which, as. we have
already seen, he used in his discussion of Kant's interpretation of the
95
Sermon on the Mount in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate: the
96
ethical commandment "Love thy neighbour as thyself". This, to be sure,
is at least a good sentiment. However, Hegel argues, since it is only an
abstract idea, a maxim, it is incapable of a concrete content, and this
means that it cannot be of any help in a specific situation. It is at
best vague, and may even be wrong. Thus, if I am to love my neighbour
actively - and love is essentially active - I must do him some good. In
order to do this it is necessary that I know what is good for him: "I must
97
love him i-ntelZigentty". It follows from this that the universal maxim
does not apply universally, but only in specific cases where I know what
is for his good. Further, if my neighbour were to be required to serve
the state, or to receive some just punishment, then to love him, which
would mean to want to protect him from the danger or injury involved,
would amount to a moral wrong - though as it happens the state in fact
98
has the power to prevent such wrong.
The lesson which natural consciousness learns from this is that maxims
such as this are not in fact laws at all, but merely commandments. Since
they are merely universal, and cannot apply to any particular case, they
do not have the form of necessity which is essential to law. As we saw
especially in Chapter 3 above, the whole Phenomenology is founded upon
the idea of necessity expressed in the notion that essence must exist;
and mere commandments are not by this criterion essential. Natural con¬
sciousness is thus referred to existing law in order to achieve a content
95. ETW, p. 213.
96. Phenomenology, p. 255
97. Phenomenology, p. 255.
98. Ibid.
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for its. universal ideas, and it limits, its own contribution to the idea
that it may subjectively test the rationality of existing law.
The eighth error or rationalism, then, is the supposition that subjective
reason alone is capable of producing actual moral ideas. Oakeshott
summarises this attitude as follows:
"The morality of the Rationalist is the morality of the self-
conscious pursuit of moral ideals, and the appropriate form of
moral education is by precept, by the presentation and explanation
of moral principles. This is represented as a higher morality
(the morality of the free man: there is no end to the clap-trap)
than that of habit, the unselfconscious following of a tradition
of moral behaviour; but, in fact, it is merely morality reduced
to a technique, to be acquired by training in an ideology rather
than an education in behaviour". (M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in
Politics, op. cit. p. 35).
This statement of the case seems to capture succinctly the mixture of
ethical arrogance and ethical indifference which in general characterise
this attitude.
In the final moment of Reason, 'Reason as testing laws', Reason limits
the categorical imperative to the status of a rational test of actual
law. Hobbes suggested such a general test for his Natural Laws (though
strictly these are only maxims and belong to Reason as lawgiver), in




Like the previous attitude, this one is not difficult to criticise. Hegel
considers the examples of the idea of property, and, later, Kant's
particular example of deposits. The notion of private property, Hegel
99. Hobbes, Leviatham, op. cit. p. 214.
100. Hegel had used both examples in his discussion of Kant in Natural
Law, p. 77-8.
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admits, passes, the Kantian test. It is non-contradictbry, and in
willing that my property be respected I can equally will that this should
count as a principle for universal legislation. However, I may equally
choose to will that I have no property, that goods be held in common,
and that this principle instead should apply universally. Non-property
is just as self-consistent as property, and Reason alone can find no
ground for distinguishing them.
This attitude also supposes that the ground of the value of the law, if
not the law itself, lies in my subjective will. This leads to the ninth,
and final error of rationalism, which Hegel characterises as insolence.
"The law, as a specific law, has a contingent content; this
means that it is the law of a single consciousness and has an
arbitrary content. To legislate immediately in this way is thus
the tyrannical insolence which makes caprice into a law and
ethical behaviour into obedience to such a caprice - obedience
to laws which are merely laws and not at the same time commandments.
So, too, the second moment, in so far as it is isolated, means
testing the laws, moving the immovable, means the insolence of
a knowledge which argues itself into a freedom from absolute laws,
treating them on an alien caprice". (Phenomenology, p. 260)
If Hegel has any particular example in mind in this passage it must be
the politics of the French Revolution; and he returns to a similar
argument in that context in a later section of the Phenomenology.
However, we may admit that the insolence Hegel talks about is more wide¬
spread.
»
If Reason cannot distinguish between two opposing laws which are self-
consistent, perhaps it may at least demand that law should not be in¬
consistent? However, in Hegel's view this is of no value. If someone
entrusts a deposit to me, and I later refuse to return it, I contradict
myself only in so far as I maintain the view that I ought in fact to
101. "Absolute Freedom and Terror", Phenomenology, pp. 355-363, esp. p.360.
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return it. This, presupposition, howeyer, is precisely what Reason must
establish; but Reason alone can giye no reason why I should not change
my mind, and it admits, after all, that I am a free agent. If I do not
change my mind, it must be not as a result of a process of ratiocination,
but in virtue of a relation of knowledge, that is, an acknowledgement of
the existence of another's property. This involves me in taking up an
ethical disposition which is independent of Reason.
"Ethical disposition consists just in sticking steadfastly to
what is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move or shake
it, or desire it. Supposing something has been entrusted to me;
it is the property of someone else and I acknowledge this because
it is so, and I keep myself unfalteringly in this relationship".
(Phenomenology, p. 262)
Natural consciousness comes to this position through acknowledging laws
as both substantial commandments and as subjectively valid laws, since
in this acknowledgement it is conscious of "law which has intrinsic
being". In this movement, Reason finally and in truth becomes a real
individual existence, indeed, all reality. It is no longer seen as a
mere property of consciousness, but is acknowledged instead to exist
absolutely in its own right, and in this sense Reason has become Spirit.
"The law is equally an eternal law which is grounded not in the
will of a particular individual, but is valid in and for itself;
it is the absolute pure will of ait which has the form of
immediate being. Also it is not a commandment which only ought
to be: it is and is Valid; it is the universal 'I' of the category
the 'I' which is immediately a reality, and the world is only
this reality. (Phenomenology, p. 261).
!
Natural consciousness too, then, has been led through its experience to
acknowledge the value and truth of Antigone's attitude, that what "is






the "absoluteness of the right", and in doing so it
abandons the attitude of Reason, which both in general and in each of its
nine specific forms is essentially immoral, and steps out into the
ethical substance, leaving behind once and for all what Hegel calls that
"foul existence" of an individuality separated from society, state, art,
i• • 106and religion.
This does not, of course, mean that it abandons the search for philosophical
truth. The ethical substances "is the essence of self-consciousness",
and if this were the whole story, then we should indeed conclude that we
should abandon philosophising and simply allow ourselves to become naturally
what we are in essence, allowing ourselves passively to be informed by the
ethical substance. We could agree with Lao Tzu, that
"All this talk of goodness and duty, these perpetual principles,
unnerve and irritate the hearer: nothing indeed could be more
destructive of inner tranquility. (Lao Tzu, quoted by Oakeshott,
op. cit. p.36).
This romantic view - which Oakeshott apparently endorses - must however,
be offset against the fact that ethical substance equally essentially
requires the subjective dimension of self-consciousness: "self-consciousness
is the actuality and existence of the substance, its self and its
will", (Phenomenology, p. 262). Spirit, in other words, is just as
much subject as substance; and we may say that the central purpose of
i
the entire discussion of Spirit in the Phenomenology is to bring to
Antigone's immediate intuition of ethical substance the mediating moment
104. Ibid.
105. Cf. ' ETW, p. 224.
106. R.Siebert, 'Hegel's Concept of Marriage and Family' in Hegel's Social
and Political Thought, D.P. Verne (ed.). Humanities Press 1976,
p. 193.
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of free, subjectiye self-conscious, and true knowledge, which is essential
to, indeed, identical with, the realization of Spirit. The most important





In the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel introduces the notion of objective Spirit
with these words:
"Objectiv<= Spirit is the Absolute Idea, but only existing
in posse : and as it is thus on the terrain of finitude its
actual rationality retains the aspect of external apparency".
(Philosophy of Mind, p. 241 §483.)
Before we consider the limitations of this form of the absolute Idea we
may first consider its positive significance. Spirit, for Hegel, is
essentially a manifestation of the absolute Idea in an objective form.
In the previous chapter, Reason was led through its experience to ack¬
nowledge this existence. Hegel showed that Reason, which is commonly
taken to be a particular faculty associated with the universal or the un¬
conditioned aspect of thought, is in fact (or for natural consciousness)
nothing less than all reality. This means that the truth of reason is
the individual who is both real and ethical, and this existence of ethical
substance in an actual individual is precisely Spirit.
In moving to Spirit, then, Reason has not turned to consider its relation¬
ship to other Reasons, as is sometimes suggested, but has acknowledged
the reality of Spirit as an objective and true existence (though only
phenomenal knowledge understands this as a manifestation of the absolute
Idea). We should not, therefore, describe 'Spirit' as a solution to .
1. In posse carries a double meaning. On the one hand it means
"potentially" - the opposite of "actually"or in esse. On the
other hand it can mean in the form of something powerful or
enforced - as in the Sheriff's posse. Hegel appears here to
have the second meaning especially in mind: Spirit is not so
much potential as potent.
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"the problem of multiplicity of self-conaciousness." or as dealing not
so much with an 'I' or a cogito as 'we' or a oogitamus, or again as a
view of human reality as a "transcendental intersubjectivity" or a
. 2
Heideggerian Mztsetn. Such formulations imply too strongly the domi¬
nance of the subject, and make 'Spirit' into a mere afterthought which
tackles some problems generated by previous stages of the Phenomenology
at a more social level. Spirit,however, is not an afterthought but
the essential reality, and the point of the Phenomenology so far has
been to demonstrate the necessity of acknowledging this fact.
The existence of the Idea in posse as Spirit i.e. in the form of objective
law, is nevertheless inadequate to the idea of Spirit, which is freedom.
Objective Spirit contains the ndtion of freedom, but
"Liberty, shaped into the actuality of a world, receives the
form of Necessity, the deeper substantial nexus of which is
the system or organization of the principles of liberty,
whilst its phenomenal nexus is power or authority, and the
sentiment of obedience is awakened in consciousness"
(Philosophy of Mind, p. 240 §484)
Freedom, in order to be substantial, must take the objective form of law,
(and law here must be understood in its general significance, to include
Nomos and Gesetz, moral, civil, human, divine, natural, positive and
any other form in which law may be said to exist, but not those abstract
forms of law we have encountered in Understanding and Reason in which
law has not yet achieved objective existence). At the level of Spirit,
then, freedom becomes an object to itself, and achieves a substantial
dimension which was absent from both self-consciousness and Reason.
2. All these views may be found in Hyppolite, op. cit. pp. 321-324.
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However, for freedom to become not just substantial, but truly real,
it must exist not only in the general form of a law, but also in a form
which includes a subjective element, or which is individual. In the
chapter on Spirit, Hegel addresses himself to the way in which the sub¬
jective element of freedom may be included in substantial freedom of
law. There are two distinct senses in which the subjective element
needs to be included; and in connection with each of these Hegel may
be seen to be criticising Plato, who in his view grasps freedom only as
3
substantial, not as subjective.
In the first place, the subjective principle must be included within law
itself. This must occur in two senses. Firstly, I must subjectively
know the law. This means that it must be limited to general forms which
I can know; whereas in the potis it existed as custom which I might not
4
know. This in turn means that law must be restricted and that there
must be areas in which I know that I am free from law; and for this
reason Hegel criticises Plato for extending the law over the whole
community, whereas certain areas - for example the choice of a position
3. Hegel usually applies this criticism specifically to Plato,
but he also means it as a general criticism of the life of
the poUp, and in particular also as a criticism of Aristotle.
"Freedom of the self was not truly known by the Greek,s, by
Plato or Aristotle". (Quoted from Hegel's Jena ReatphiZosophie
by Hyppolite, op. cit. p. 332).
4. Socrates, for example, did not know that he was liable to be
condemned, but only that he was liable to offend custom. He
was not charged with breach of a specific law. (See Plato
"Apology" e.g. The Last Days of Socrates, Penguin 1969, p.47,
p.54). As Foster (op. cit. p.H3f) points out, this is what
essentially distinguishes Nomos from Gesetz.
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in the community - should rightly be left to the choice of the individual.
Secondly, as well as knowing what the law is objectively, I must also
know it as a moment of my own self. Law, in other words, must be comple¬
mented by conscience, and this principle is equally absent from Plato's
5
state. In general, this criticism may be expressed by saying that in
Plato's view the state is perfect in so far as it embodies the form of
6
justice, and it is not required that thxs form be known by its citizens.
\
In the second place, the subjective principle must also transcen'd law, in
the same sense that Hegel argued in the Spirit of Christianity and its
Fate that love should transcend morality and legality. To include the
principle of subjective freedom within the notion of law does not by
itself overcome the fact that in law the Absolute exists only in posse.
If the good appears in the form of justice it appears as something I
must do, and this contradicts the essential freedom of Spirit. If Spirit
is free, it must be capable of knowing the good as it is in and for itself,
as an independent entity, while as justice it appears as something
dependent, either upon the state, or upon the conscience of the individual.
5. These two dimensions correspond respectively to what Foster
calls the 'economic' and 'moral' dimensions of subjective
freedom. (Op.cit. p. llOff) Hegel himself does not appear
to distinguish them so sharply, and in the Philosophy of Right
tends to complain generally of a want of subjective freedom in
Plato, without making it clear more specifically or systematically
what is meant by this. See Foster, op. cit. pp.101-109 for a
catalogue of Hegel's references to Plato and to subjective free¬
dom in the Phitosophie des Rechts.
6. Cf. Plato, 'Meno', in Potagoras and Meno, Penguin 1956, p.l48ff.
As Foster points out, there are exceptions to this generalisation
in Plato, and the subjective element does in fact appear in a
limited form at certain points of Plato's work (Foster, op.cit.,
p. 76).
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The good is. only presented as a truly independent entity, a living being
which I raay freely acknowledge, in the forms of Art, Religion, and
7
Philosophy. This dimension is also absent from Plato's thought, in
Hegel's view. It is true that a restricted and privileged class may
contemplate the idea of the good in itself in Plato's Republic, but even
in this case the good does not have an actual existence for itself, ex¬
cept in phenomenal forms such as justice which are thereby no longer
the good itself, but particular manifestations of the good. In Hegel's
thought, however, the good exists in and for itself in the form of
Religion, and Hegel comments that
"It was not vouchsafed to Plato to go on so far as to say
that as long as true religion did not spring up from the
world and hold sway in political life, so long , the genuine
principle of the state could not come into actuality".
(Philosophy of Mind, p. 290 §552.)
In addition to the freedom to know the good in the forms of law and con¬
science, then, I must also have the freedom to know the good as an inde-
existence
pendent/which transcends the limited form of objective Spirit. The
7. Art, in Hegel's view is part of Religion in so far as it is a
"representation of the Divine" or of "the Absolute", either
consciously, in religious art, or implicitly, in so far as it
represents beauty. (Philosophy of Mind, p. 293, §556;
Introduction to Aesthetics, p. 7). In one sense art and
religion are subordinate to philosophy. "Art, far removed
from being the highest form of Spirit, acquires its real
ratification only in philosophy (Introduction to Aesthetics,
p.13). On the other hand philosophy only ratifies and "religion
as such, and the state as such ... each contain the absolute
truth; so that the truth, in its philosophical phase, is after
all only in one of its forms". (Philosophy of Mind, p. 290 f,
§552).
chapter of the Phenomenology on Spirit will attempt to show the necessity
of these freedoms, in that order. Beginning with the substantial freedom
Q
of Sittlichkeit it will refer natural consciousness firstly to the know¬
ledge of the objective in Culture (Bildung), secondly to the notion of
conscience in Morality (Moralitat), and finally and ultimately to Religion.
This order of presentation is significantly different from that of the
Philosophy of Mind and the Philosophy of Right, where objective Spirit is
presented first as (positive) Law, secondly as Morality, and only finally
as Sittlichkeit. If Sittlichkeit is the most concrete determination of
objective Spirit, and is used in the same sense in both cases, then it
seems at first sight that in this chapter of the Phenomenology Hegel has
reversed his usual procedure. Instead of beginning with the most abstract
determinations and moving towards the more concrete whole, he begins with
the most concrete determinations and then moves to consider more abstract
aspects of the whole. Rather than moving from certainty to truth, he be-
9
gins with 'The True Spirit", and ends up in Morality with Spirit which is
only "Certain of Itself". °
8. Miller translates Sittlichkeit as 'ethical order', and Wallace
gives 'ethical life' (which means that die Sittlichkeit cannot
be distinguished from das Sittliche Leben or 'social ethics'
(which fails to distinguish the objective from the merely inter-
subjective 'social'). Die Sitte may be translated as 'custom' or
'habit' and relates in Hegel's opinion to the Greek 'ethos'.
(Natural Law, p.112).
9-. Phenomenology, p. 266.
10. Ibid, p.364.
This difference, however, is. not so great as may at first seem to be the
case. SZttZZehkeZt in the Phenomenology is at first only an immediate
truth,^ and it is only through the mediating development of Culture and
Morality that it will become a concrete truth which is known to be the
ground of these abstract moments of it. In this sense, Hegel's procedure
is no different from that in the rest of the Phenomenology and we may re¬
call in this connection that sense-certainty or "immediate knowing" is
also the general characteristic of all knowledge, so that Absolute Know¬
ledge is after all only a mediated form of sensation. What we need to
know, then, is the difference between the immediate StttZZchkeZt of the
Phenomenology and the mediated SZttZZchkeZt of the later works.
SZttZZchkeZt is essentially both objective, and ordered, and the difference
between immediate and mediated SZttZZchkeZt may be seen in both of these
aspects. Objectively, immediate SZttZZchkeZt is a system of individuals,
groups and classes each of which is essentially related to and subordinate
12
to the community as a whole. In the mediated SZttZZchkeZt of the modern
world, by contrast, the significance of individuals, groups, and classes
is not limited to their significance for the community as a whole; and
while they remain essentially part of the community as a whole, that is
of SZttZZchkeZt, they nevertheless also have an independent aspect. The
individual is not obliged to participate in political life, and is still
i
acknowledged as essentially valid in his own right if he does not; and
classes become estates which both have their own raZson d'etre independently
of their purpose for the state, and also transcend the limitations of a
11. Ibid, p. 265.
12. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, Bk 1, Ch.2, op.cit. p. 29. This also
applies to the objective aspect of modern SZttZZchkeZt: see
Philosophy of Right, p. 259, Addition to §145.
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particular political community - in the sense that 'chivalry', for
example, is a universal code, which should be applied equally to members
of different states.
From the point of view of the order of Si-tt Zichkeit, this difference may
be expressed by saying that the order of immediate SittZichkeit is given
as human and divine Law, while in the mediated SittZichkeit of the modern
13
world it is given as natural and Civil Law - or as something similar.
The essential difference between these two principles of order can be
expressed by saying that only the latter pair of principles of law con-
14
tains a distinction between the public and the private. The human
law of the ancient world is the law of the community rather than the
family, but its jurisdiction nevertheless extends over the whole community,
and its central task is to maintain the balance of the parts of the
community, including the family. Divine law, likewise, has its seat in
the family, but nevertheless rules throughout the community. When we
look at the way these two laws appear to natural consciousness we will
see that each takes itself at first to be independent from and superior
to the other, and learns on the contrary that each is equally essential.
13. In the Philosophy of Right, for example, Hegel distinguishes
natural and positive law as the two basic aspects of the order
of mediated SittZichkeit; but the essential distinction is not
changed. (Philosophy of Right, pp.14-20, p.134)
14. Norman (op.cit. p.82) falsely distinguishes the divine and
human law as private and public - thus missing the central
point of Hegel's discussion. The topic of SittZichkeit
becomes in his interpretation the conflict of the private
individual with the state. Not surprisingly, then, he con¬
cludes that "The section is marred by Hegel's emphasis on
the 'Antigone' example", (p. 86).
Natural law., although often associated with the Diyine, differs from
divine law in that it is generally held to apply in cases which do not
come under the direct jurisdiction of civil law (although it is generally
also held that civil law ought to be based upon or accord with the moral
principle of natural law). This implies that civil law is equally limited
to a distinct sphere of application, in contrast to human law which
applies throughout the community. This sphere, which may be called 'public
corresponds to the aspect of individuals, groups, and classes which is
subordinate to and dependent upon the state. Natural law, by contrast,
governs the aspect of individuals, groups and classes which is independent
of the state, or is private. Thus Foster, for example, concludes a dis¬
cussion of the relationship of the classes of Plato's Republic to the
estates of Hegel's Philosophy of Right with these words:
"Each estate in being freed from its unity with the other two
is freed from its local limitation. The first becomes a
catholic brotherhoood, the second a world-wide chivalry, and
the third a system of private property, safeguarded by a
universal code of law. None of these societies is any longer
political; each is based upon a law which is in one or other
of the senses of the term, a natural law". (Foster, op.cit. p.67).
This distinction between public and private, between civil and natural
law emerges first of all within Sittlichkelt itself in the form of
14
Rechtzustand. This is the attitude to law which is found especially
15
in the Roman world. While the greek community was regarded as natural,
the Roman "state of law" is to be opposed to a state of nature, and
consequently the positive law of the community to natural law. ^
14. Phenomenology, p. 290. Rechtzustand may be translated as
"legal status" or the "state of law".
15. Aristotle, Politics, loc. cit.
16. Natural Law, pp. 63-66.
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Howeyer, although it is. the. distinction between pos.itiye or civil and
natural law which leads natural consciousness to the realization of the
subjective dimension of SittZiahkeit, this dimension is not exhausted
in that distinction. Natural and positive law must be understood not
as absolute distinctions, but as moments of Spirit, and Hegel sets out
to show this in the chapters on Culture and Morality.
The movement of Culture, then, can be characterised as bringing back to
the alien positive law the subjective moral element which is associated
with natural law. Culture exhibits especially clearly the double move¬
ment of Entausserung amd Erinnerung which characterises the whole Pheno¬
menology. Positive law is an alien form which natural consciousness
can become reconciled with only by alienating or externalising its own
17
self. However, this alienation has for us equally the opposite signi¬
ficance, that in alienating itself, natural consciousness is overcoming
the alien form of positive law. From being the arbitrary dictate of
the "lord of the world", law becomes intuited as the externalisation of
ethical substance, which substance is the essence of the natural con-
18
sciousness and the basis of the notion of natural law.
The recollection of this externalisation, however, cannot take place until
the externalisation is complete, and this does not occur in Hegel's view
until after the French Revolution, which is the ultimate attempt to base
positive law on natural right. The failure of the revolution shows that
both aspects of law are equally essential, and leads in practice to a re-
establishment of a developed SittZichkeit which contains both principles,
17. Phenomenology, p.294f. Hegel uses both the terms Entfremdung and
Entausserung here.
18. Phenomenology, p. 295.
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and, yet as an individual and powerful ethical order (i.e. the Napoleonic
19
state) transcends them both.. Through this experience natural conscious¬
ness discovers its own absolute freedom within the sphere of positive law
which appeared at first to be its absolute limitation and condition. This
absolute freedom, however, transcends the 'political' standpoint of Culture,
and when it is taken in its own right as the relationship of the sub¬
jectively free individual to the ethical substance, it gives the third
moment of Spirit, that is, Morality, and the notion of conscience.
Morality, which introduces the second aspect of subjective freedom, is in
a sense a development of the notion of natural law. However, it has been
shown to be an attitude which includes both aspects of Culture,- that is,
20
the individual and the universal will - and it is therefore not com¬
plementary to positive law, but above it.
Hegel's discussion of it sets out to show how morality, which takes it¬
self to be purely subjective, is led to the recognition of the objective
existence of evil, which is equally the notion of its forgiveness, since
21
forgiveness is a reality only if evil is also a reality. It thus returns
to Antigone's acknowledgement of the actual existence of ethical sub¬
stance. However, this acknowledgement is not merely intuitive, as it
was in Antigone's case, but self-conscious, and the ethical substance
is therefore not merely felt, but known.
I
19. Phenomenology, p. 361. (Hegel does not mention Napoleon by name,
but the allusion is clear, and is made explicit in the Philosophy
of History, p.451).
20. Phenomenology, p. 363. Cf. History of Philosophy Vol. 2, p.108:
"Morals cannot be independent of institutions ... For institutions
must be looked upon as the very first condition of morality, for
this is the manner in which institutions are subjective".
21. Sin, in other words is inevitable or original: "only a stone is
innocent". (Phenomenology, p. 282, cf. Hyppolite, op.cit. p.502
and Romans v-vii)
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The notion of eyil and its. forgiveness, then, has the significance of
being the atonement of all that has gone before. To acknowledge it is
to discover
"God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves
in the form of pure knowledge" (Phenomenology, p.409).
The Phenomenology, from this point is virtually over, and all that remains
is to show the development of consciousness of absolute being in and for
itself in the form of religion up to the point where this consciousness
22
too is transformed into the knowledge of "The Revealed Religion" - a
development which, as has been said, we will not follow here.
Ultimately, then, in Hegel's view, the objective existence of the state
is to be reconciled with the freedom of the individual through knowledge,
morality, and religion. Hegel closes his discussion of objective Sjbirit
in the Encyclopardi a with the following view of the union of these elements.
"Thus, ultimately, in the Protestant conscience the principles
of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one
and the same: the free spirit learning to see itself in its
reasonableness and truth. In the Protestant state, the con¬
stitution and the code, as well as their several applications,
embody the principle and the development of the moral life,
which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion,
when reinstated in its original principle and in that way as
such first become actual. The moral life of the state and the
religious spirituality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees
of strength". (Philosophy of Mind, p. 291 §552) 23
To demonstrate something like this is also the aim of the chapter of the
t
Phenomenology on Spirit, and in connection with this we may recall Foster's
24
general criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. This was, in a nut¬





cf Philosophy of Right, pp. 166ff.
Ch. 2 above; Foster, op.cit. eg. pp. 126-8.
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at the "economic" leye.l of desire (which would correspond roughly to the
level of Culture here), and at the "moral" leyel of reason, i.e. conscience;
but not at the level of the individual will which would correspond to
self-consciousness or to the spirited element of the soul, since the in¬
dividual will does not have in Hegel's state the significance of being a
creative sovereign power.
If this criticism is to be accepted for the Philosophy of Right, then it
must also be accepted here. There is no more room in the account of Spirit
in the Phenomenology for the notion of a sovereign individual will than
there is in the Philosophy of Right. In Hegel's view, culture will always
display an opposition between the individual and universal will, which
can never be overcome within culture itself, but only by taking up instead
the attitudes of morality and religion. Subjective freedom, therefore,
can be achieved in the same senses as it may be achieved in the Philosophy
of Right, viz, through the knowledge of and limitation of the extent of
the state, through the principle of conscience, and through religion, but
never within the institutional structure of the state itself. In Foster's
view, however, a modern and christian view of the state should be capable
of accommodating the notion of popular sovereignty by giving the will of
every single individual sovereign power in a popular assembly; while Hegel
25
denies the validity of this notion of popular sovereignty.
9
We may question, however, whether this criticism is valid in Hegel's own
terms. Foster's case rests on the presumption that subjective freedom
must be included at each of the three elements of the soul, and takes
25. Hegel explains exactly the extent to which he is prepared to accept
the notion of "the sovereignty of the people" in Philosophy of
Right, p. 182f.
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these to be desire, self-consciousness, and Reason. As we have seen,
however, this is mistaken, and the moments of Spirit for Hegel are in
fact consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason,and Spirit. If we take
it that Hegel's view is, or at least would be, that subjective freedom
must be included at each of these levels, then we may conclude that this
is indeed the case in both the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right.
The subjective dimension of consciousness is satisfied in so far as it
may know Sitttichkeit, which also means that Sittliohkeit must be
specific and limited and that the individual is in certain respects free
from it. Self-consciousness is satisfied in so far as through the ex¬
perience of culture it discovers SittZichkeit to be an externalised form
of its own essence, and does not therefore experience it as a limitation
upon its freedom, but as an expression of it. Foster's criticism in
this respect may be said to rest on a rejection of this view of Hegel's
and an assertion instead that anything which self-consciousness does not
actually control is a limitation of its freedom - an assertion which dis¬
plays the attitude of Lordship and Bondage but not of Freedom of Self-
Consciousness. Reason, thirdly, is satisfied as it is in Foster's account,
through the notion of conscience which allows it to be master of its own
self to the point where it may give reasons for its own acknowledgement
of the value of Sittlichkeit - though it may not go so far as to express
sittliohkeit as the result of these its subjective reasons,( as do so many
2 6
so-called "theories on the grounds of political obligation." Finally,
Spirit is satisfied through the acknowledgement of good and evil as
actual living existences and ultimately as manifestations of God, so
that it is able to relate to Sittlichkeit as one concretely free being
26. See D.D.Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, MacMillan 1976,
pp. 78-114.
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another, as. Spirit to Spirit. It i.s arguable therefore, that far from
remaining confined within a Platonic view, which limits the freedom of
the individual to the freedom to be informed by the objective good of
the state Hegel succeeds in transcending this conception at every level
of SittZichkeit, and indeed, that to do so is the central aim of this
passage of the Phenomenology.
«
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chapter seven : Die Sittlichkeit
Sitttiohkeit, ds it first appears in the Phertbmeriblogy is "the simple
substance of Spirit".''" The subjective element which is explicitly a
moment of Sittlichkeit in its developed form is only implicitly present
here, and must be made explicit. The experience of SittZichkeit, there¬
fore must be shown to reveal that this subjective element is indeed
essentially and necessarily part of SittHchkeit.
For the active natural consciousness, SittZichkeit appears in three
aspects. Firstly it appears as an objective existence, an ethical world
divided into distinct ethical substances; secondly as individuals who
act ethically in that world; and finally as the principle of law govern-
2
ing the relation of individuals to the ethical world.
Hegel presents this development through an account of Greek tragedy.
He alludes to Aeschylus' Eumenides and Sophocles' Oedipus Rex,but focusses
especially on Sophocles' Antigone, which, he appears to regard as a
paradigm of ancient tragedy.^ As he says in the Aesthetics,
1. Phenomenology, p. 267
2. Ibid, p. 266.
9
3. Aristotle also chooses to refer to Antigone several times in his
Poetics, though we may presume that a much wider selection of
Sophocles work was available to him than to us, since only seven
of the 123 plays attributed to Sophocles by ancient sources have
survived intact. (See B.Knox's introduction to Sophocles, The
Three Theban Plays, trans. Fagles, Allen Lane 1982, p.13;
see also p.21).
"Of all the glories of the ancient world - I know pretty well
all of it, and one should and can know it - the Antigone
appears to me in this, respect as the most excellent and satis¬
fying work of art" (Paolucci & Paolucci, op. cit. p. 74).
Hegel first considers the ethical situation of tragedy, that is, the
ethical substance in the form of human and divine law. In so far as
these are presented as things, they will appear to be discrete existences
which can have no cause to conflict with each other, and seem therefore
to be harmonious. Action, however, reveals that this attitude like
4
Perception is deceptive; and that human and divine law are not in fact
discrete things, but moments of the ethical substance which therefore
contain aspects of each other. They therefore conflict; and this con¬
flict, which is the basis of tragedy, is the subject matter of the
second moment of SittZ-ichkeit . The lesson which is learned from tragedy,
that is, the experience gained from it, is that law is not in its
essential truth conditioned, as it appears to be in the forms of human
and divine law, but unconditioned and universal. This universal form
of law appears first immediately in the positive law of the Roman world,
and is the third and final moment of SZttZ-ichkeit.
This realization has, more concretely than any previous experience,
the significance of having been an actual movement in the historical
realization of Spirit; namely, the collapse of the Greek poZis and the
emergence of the Roman order.
"In point of fact, the ethical substance has developed through
this process into actual self-consciousness: in other words,
this particular self has become the actuality of what it is
in essence; but precisely in this development the ethical
order has been destroyed". (Phenomenology, p. 266). 5
4. Phenomenology, p. 267.
5. Cf. Philosophy of History, p. 106f.
i. nq
Indeed, as we shall see, Hegel effectively goes so far as to argue that
the experience of tragedy is itself instrumental in the collapse of
the polis - though of course a full explanation of such an event would
have to include an account of historical details, especially in this case
6
the actions of Alexander the Great which effectively brought the days
7
of the city-state to an end in practice.
t
6. Hegel discusses Alexander in the Philosophy of History, pp.271-4,
and apparently alludes to him on p. 289 of the Phenomenology.
7. See E. Barker, Greek Political Theory, Methuen 1960 p. 24.
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(a) Human and Divine Law
Human law is in Hegel's view straightforward. It exists in "the light
of day", and there is no need to go into any detailed analysis or inter¬
pretation of it, since it is simply the prevailing law and custom of the
community which is known without complication by all its members.
"In the form of universality, it is the known law, and the
prevailing custom; in the form of individuality it is the
actual certainty of itself in the individual as such, and
the certainty of itself as a simple individuality is that
Spirit as government. Its truth is the authority which is
openly accepted and manifest to all; a concrete existence
which appears for immediate certainty in the form of an
existence that has freely issued forth". (Phenomenology,
p. 267f).
Human law alone, however, is not enough to constitute an ethical community.
If it is to be more than merely arbitrary, the law and custom which merely
happen to exist, then it must have a substantial ethical basis. This is
provided by divine law, which is
"the inner Notion or general possibility of the ethical sphere
in general, but on the other hand equally contains within it
the moment of self-consciousness". (Phenomenology, p. 268).
In this sense divine law is to human law what natural law is to civil
9
law , that is, its moral basis. However, human law differs from civil
law in so far as its jurisdiction extends over the whole community and
does not leave any specific sphere to the individual; and divine law
t
likewise differs from natural law in that it is not the law of the indi¬
vidual, but the law of the family. Furthermore, if the law of the family
from one point of view complements human law, in so far as it actually
exists it stands opposed to the human law.
9. For example, in Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit. p. 223f.
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"The Family, as the unconscious still inner Notion of the ethical
order stands, opposed to its actual, self-conscious, existence;
as the element of the nation's actual existence, it stands opposed
to the nation itself; as the immediate being of the ethical order
it stands over against that order which shapes and maintains itself
by working for the universal; the Penates stand opposed to the
universal Spirit" (PhehOmeholbgy, p. 268).
Divine law is by no means so straightforward as human law. It is "locked
up in the darkness of the nether regions","'"0 and is not known in any
philosophical or subjective sense, but only revealed through seers and
Oracles. Plato therefore declines to give an account of it in the
Republic, and instead simply acknowledges its authority as follows:
"Then, what is there left for us to do in the way of
legislation?
For us, nothing; but there are institutions of the highest
worth and importance that must be left to the Delphian Apollo
What are they?
The founding of temples, sacrifices, and the cults of gods,
demigods, and heroes; the burial of the dead, and services
to propitiate the powers of the other world. These are
matters we do not understand ourselves, and in founding our
commonwealth we shall be wise to consult no other religious
authority than our national divinity. Indeed in religious
matters, the authority of this god, from his seat at the
very navel of the earth, may be said to extend to all mankind."
(Plato, Republic, 427b; Cornford op. cit. p. 115f).
Hegel, however, is less deferent, for reasons which he explains in the
Encylopaedia:
"the summons to the Greeks of the Delphic Apollo, Know thyself,
does not have the meaning of a law externally imposed on the
human Spirit by an alien power; on the contrary, the god who
impels to self-knowledge is none other than the absolute law
of Spirit itself" (Philosophy of Mind, p.l §377).
10. Phenomenology, p. 280.
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The divine law. too, then, must be open to self-conscious knowledge, and
need not be merely fatali.sti.cal.ly accepted; and Hegel sets out in the
Phenomenology to show how its truth may be revealed to experience. This
involves discussing the structure of the family, in which divine law is
seated.
It is important to be clear that Hegel's discussion of the family here
focusses on its objective side, and not on the subjective element of
feeling. He is concerned with the way the structure of the family con¬
ditions the actions of its members, and not with the subjective motiva¬
tions individuals have for actions involving the family, i.e. love.
"because the ethical principle is intrinsically universal,
the ethical connection between the members of the Family is
not that of feeling, or the relationship of love".
(Phenomenology, p. 209).
Love, within the confines of the family, is after all secondary to the
duty required by the family itself. Antigone's explanation for her
devotion to her dead brother is not 'I love him', but "I know my duty,
where true duty lies"."'""''
The opposition between human and divine law therefore, should not be
taken as a conflict between abstract or positive right and love. We
are not on the same ground as the Early Theological Writings, where
Hegel upheld Christian love as higher than both moral law i/i the form
of commandments, and positive civil law. Here, right or duty and love
are not opposed. In the human law, the notion of right is more or less
entirely absent. The individual in immediate SittZiohkeit, and in the
actual ethical life of the poZis, cannot be said to have any rights, if
11. Antingone, L.103, from Sophocles, The ThebanPlays, trans.
Watling, Penguin, 1947, p.129.
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a right is something whi.ch is guaranteed to him automatically, in every
case, and without his having to particpate in the political life of the
community in order to obtain it. Rights and duties, in other words,
belong to positive law, and in immediate SittZiohkeit are submerged in
custom. Only in divine law does the individual have rights, and these
are always connected not with the family, not the state. They include
rights of inheritance and succession, and, above all, burial rights.
These are granted universally, that is irrespective of any peculiarity
or action on the part of the individual by the family whose duty it is
to fulfil them; and this duty is not opposed to love but, if anything,
higher than it. The subjective side of love, which includes its physical
aspect, is subordinate to and conditioned by the law of the family"^ -
14
or, in so far as it is homosexual, to the law of the community.
It is mistaken, therefore, to attribute to Hegel in this context the
view that "the family as such has love for its essential determination".^
Love, in Hegel's view, is a subjective feeling, and as such it is inde¬
pendent of the family. It follows that it is not possible to deduce the
family from the notion of love, or to make love the cause of the family;
and it is rather objective Spirit as a whole which forms and conditions
subjective love. The fact that, from the point of view of objective
Spirit, love is of little concern, however, has not prevented some
commentators from putting it at the centre of their interpretation of
12. Phenomenology, p. 269: cf Charles Taylor, op.cit. p.173.
13. See Philosophy of Right, p.262f, additions to §§159, 161, 162
163, 164 and 165.
14. See Plato, Republic 468b; Plato's Symposium, and H. Ellis', The
Psychology of Sex, Heinemann 1933, p.189 and p.278.
15. R. Siebert, "Hegel's Concept of Marriage and Family: The Origin
of Subjective Freedom" in Hegel's Social and Political Thought,
Humanities Press 1980, p.178.
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Spirit, and before we return to Hegel's, account we may consider a par¬
ticularly sophisticated example of such an interpretation which has
been put forward by Kojeve.
Love, in Kojove'n account, is essentially the desire for recognition,
posed at a more concrete level. It thus reproduces the contradictions
of Lordship and Bondage. In love, the individual seeks recognition
from the lover in two contradictory senses: (a) unconditionally, or
universally in virtue of what he simply is, and (b) conditionally or
specifically, in virtue of what he does and of his specific qualities.
In immediate SittiL'ichke'Lt, these two aspects of love become separated.
The unconditional aspect of love becomes the basis of the family: "a
mother loves her son in spite of his faults".^ The second aspect is
then the foundation of the basic relationship of the political life
of the community, in which individuals relate to each other as indepen-
17
dent beings who seek "admiration" or "recognition" from their fellow
citizens. This leads to a conflict between family and community which
is the basis of Greek tragedy. The family, since it is concerned only
with the simple being of its members, requires above all that they stay
alive. The political community, by contrast, is concerned with the
actions of its members, and action involves risk, ultimately the risk
of life in war. This risk, in Kojeve's account, is not ba^ed upon any
patriotic love, but on the master slave relationship, since the citizen
had to be ready to prove that he 'feared slavery more than death'. This
courage is both a condition and the cardinal virtue of his citizenship,
16. Kojeve, from Leo Strauss op.cit. p.165.
17. Ibid.
and to fail to exhibit i.t is to cease to be a free citizen and instead
to become a slave.
The citizen thus feels a contradictory tension: from equally valid points
of view he is told to risk nothing, and to risk everything. This tension
serves not only to explain tragedy, but also the political decline of the
potis. The tension, as it stands, gives the impulse towards what Aristotle
18
called deviant constitutions, and in particular to tyranny. The tyrant
seeks to overcome the tension between family and community by making the
state his own property, and therefore also the property of his family.
Nevertheless, he cannot easily achieve this, since the community is not
yet a discrete entity which could be possessed, is not a state in the
modern sense of the word. Furthermore, if he succeeds in making the
interest of the family the interest of the state, he is still subject to
the law that the citizen must be courageous, so long as the community
is still divided into masters and slaves. The 'corruption' of tyranny
can have a positive result, therefore, only if it succeeds both in
establishing a new political form and if it breaks down the universality
of the relation of master and slave. This is done by Alexander, who
19
"succeeded where Alcibiades had failed", in founding an empire, in which
conquered people were no longer enslaved, but dissolved into a new
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political unity.
i
However, while this account may have some value, it cannot in general
terms be squared with Hegel's. It is true that, in Hegel's view, "love
18. Aribtotle, Politics, Bk.III, Ch. 7.
19. Kojeve, in Leo Strauss, op.cit., p. 180.
20. Ibid, p. 181.
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is the most tremendous contradiction", but this is only the case when
22
it is seen from the standpoint of Understanding, which
"cannot resolve it since there is nothing more stubborn than
this point of self-consciousness which is negated and which
nevertheless I ought to possess as affirmative". (Philosophy
of Right, p. 261 f, addition to §158).
From the standpoint of Spirit, however, the contradiction is resolved,
or rather
"Love is at once the propounding and the resolving of this
contradiction. As the resolving of it, love is the unity
of an ethical type", (ibid).
This is because Spirit does not attempt to explain love by reducing it
to a manifestation of self-consciousness, but instead acknowledges its
independence, and seeks only to know how it is formed by the structures
of objective Spirit. In Kojeve's account, divine law is reduced to
familial love which in turn is reduced to self-cpnsciousness, while in
Hegel's account the divine law is an actual existence, and the structure
of the family and the further moments of love and recognition are only
9
21. Philosophy of Right, p. 261, Addition to §158.
22. In this connection we may also recall Freud's view, which 'Under¬
stands' civilization in a way very similar to Kojeve, as a con¬
flict between the life and death instincts, Eros and Thanatos.
moments which may be abstracted from it, not in any sense its causes.
Hegel explains the family teleologically, in terms of its end, which
24
itself is a realization of ethical substance. It has both negative
and positive ends or purposes. The negative end of the family, what is
is not, is its relationship to the community, and
"consists in expelling the individual from the Family, sub¬
duing the natural aspect and separateness of his existence,
and training him to be virtuous, to a life in and for the
universal". (Phenomenology, p. 269).
The family, then, is not a self subsistent entity, but requires the
community in order to exist: without the community the family has no
25
purpose.
The positive end of the family, what it is in its own right, is the in¬
dividual as universal, or irrespective of particular qualities or attributes.
23. It may be that Kojeve is attempting to do more than simply reduce
divine law to the relations of the family, and in trying also to
proceed from family relationships to divine law. This approach
has been suggested by Marx, and Kojeve may have Marx in mind.
(cf. note to Ch.2, or Kojeve op.cit. p.32). In Capital,
Marx wrote "It is in reality much easier to discover by analysis
the earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than, con¬
versely, it is, to develop from the actual relations of life the
corresponding celestialised forms of those relations. The latter
method is the only materialistic and therefore the only scientific
one". (Capital Vol.1 op.cit. p.352). If divine law c^n be 'developed'
from self-consciousness, however, it follows that it is contained
within it, and such an account is therefore just as reductionist
as its reverse. If the divine exists, Marx's "scientific method"
will not be able to reach it, while if it does not, Marx's method
will be unable to conceive it.
24. Phenomenology, p.266.
25. In the historical period Hegel is alluding to, the family and the
community had only recently been distinguished as moments of
objective Spirit, earlier Greek societies being essentially
patriarchies which elide this distinction. See E.Barker, Greek
Political Theory, op.cit. p.26ff).
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"The positive End peculiar to the Family is the individual
as such" (Phenomenology> p- 269).
If this is true, then it follows that any action
which the family does for the sake of its members which is to be truly
ethical - that is to count as the duty of the family - must be related
not to any accidental characteristic of a particular individual, but to
the essential individuality which is characteristic of all particular
individuals.
"The content of the ethical action must be substantial or
whole and universal: therefore it can only be related to
the whole individual or to the individual qua universal". (ibid).
The positive end of the family may be regarded as the teleological or
final cause of the various forms of familial or divine law - which are
perhaps better known to us as taboos - and Hegel goes on in a striking
26
and much admired passage to elucrdate them thus.
If the ethical end of the family is the individual as such, it cannot
be at the same time the welfare of its members. Welfare, that is, is
27
accidental, not essential to the family. Any action which the family
carries out for the benefit of its members is subject to limitations.
It may fail to have the desired effect, but on the other hand, if it
does have the desired effect then action is no longer needed, and the
26. C.Taylor, op. cit. p.173; A.C. Bradley "Hegel's Theory of Tragedy"
in Paolucci and Paolucci, Hegel on Tragedy, Harper & Row 1975,
p. 367. — — -
27. Welfare - as we saw earlier (Phenomenology p.255; p 255f above)
is an essential dimension of love, and in making it accidental
to the family Hegel is thereby also making love inessential to
divine law.
family looses its purpose. If welfare is the end of the family, then
the family is dependent for i.ts existence upon the. contingency that its
members need its help; but if the family is indeed essential, then it
must be understood to exist necessarily and independently of such con¬
tingencies. If the individual as such is the end of the family, then
any action the family carries out on his behalf must be related not to
any particular aspect of his being, but his being in general, the individual
qua universal. The living individual, however, is always a particular
being, and becomes universal only in death, which takes away the contin¬
gency of his natural being, and leaves only the universal form of the
memory of his existence, his existence as a member of the community of
the dead.
The true purpose of the family, then, is in Hegel's account fulfilled only
in the death rites and burial ceremonies it carries out on behalf of its
29
dead members.
28. cf. Natural Law, p.91, where Hegel equates death, or the ability
to die, with pure freedom (cf. Romans vii, 7-8). "Death is
the absolute subjugator" (ibid), and in the modern world this
is acknowledged in so far as the burial ceremony is essentially
the same (though perhaps more or less grand) for each individual.
This was not necessarily the case in earlier historical periods
in which in Hegel's account the knowledge of freedom was not yet
universal. The ancient Chinese emperors, for example, merited
very individual burial ceremonies, sometimes involving the
slaughter of their entire personal staff who would be'entombed
along with them; and the Egyptian Pharoahs were similarly privi¬
leged.
29. Hegel gives a more precise account of these duties in §452 of the
Phenomenology, p.270f.
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"This last duty thus constitutes the perfect divine law; or
the positive ethical action towards the individual. Every
other relationship to him which does, not remain one simply of
love but is ethical, belongs to human law and has the negative
significance of raising the individual above his confinement
within the natural community to which he in his natural existence
belongs". (Phenomenology, p.271).
If death rites are the perfect divine law, we may also conclude that
the converse is also true, that is, that a murder committed within the
family, such as Oedipus' parricide,would be the ultimate crime against it,
or the ultimate taboo. It may at first seem that divine law is powerless
to punish such transgressions, and the dead individual powerless to
strike back. Lacking the physical power of the state, it may appear as
Hobbesian natural law to be like a "Covenant without the Sword", "of no
strength to secure a man at all".^° This, however, will turn out to be
31
illusory, and even the dead individual "is not without power".
"The individual himself is the power of the nether world,
and it is his Erinys, his 'fury' which wreaks vengeance.
For his individuality, his blood, still lives on in the
household, his substance has an enduring reality".
(Phenomenology, p.277).
Human law, and its individual form, government, relates to divine law,
and its individual form, the family, in the following way. Government
allows the individual who is a member of the family to take a specific
and acknowledged individual form as a member of the state. The individual
as such, that is to say, exists only on the foundation of actual individuals
9
who cannot exist except as members of one or other of the various classes
30.
31.
Hobbes, Leviathan, op.cit. p.223.
Phenomenology, p.273.
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of the state, as men, women, slaves, artisans, citizens and so on. It
is likewise the basis of the organised system of needs and the system of
property which are equally essential to the existence of the family.
However, from this point of view it may seem that government exists
only to serve the ends of the family, whereas the truth is rather that
is independent of the family, and the family by contrast can exist only
by the grace of the community.
"In order not to let them the various parts of the
community^ become rooted and set in isolation, thereby
breaking up the whole and letting the communal spirit
evaporate, government has from time to time to shake them
to their core by war". (Phenomenology, p.272).
Government, then, asserts its independence by demanding the individual's
life, and in so far as it succeeds it proves that it does not exist merely
for the individual's benefit. However, we can see that this also has the
opposite significance, since it is death, the power of divine law,
which has made the individual feel his dependence on the community, and
it follows that far from being independent,
"The community therefore possesses the truth and the confirmation
of its power in the essence of the Divine Law and in the realm
of the nether world". (Phenomenology, p.273)
Human and divine law, in other words, both seem from certain points of
view to be independent of each other, yet each in fact needs the other,
and both are rightly understood only abstract moments of the ethical
substance of Spirit.
It remains to be seen how this may be experienced by natural consciousness.
It is apparent that since human and divine law appear as distinct entities,
they may each require specific actions from the individuals under their
jurisdiction, but that since they are not in truth distinct but related
to each other, it is also possible that their claims will conflict, and
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that the claims of both will be in their own terms right. A conflict
32
of right against right., duty against duty, is in Hegel's view comic.
It is arbitrary, and does not involve fate. As-Hegel says in Natural
Law
"comedy so separates the two zones of ethical life that it
allows each to proceed entirely on its own, so that in the
one the conflicts and the finite are shadows without substance,
while in the other the Absolute is an illusion". (Natural Law,
p.108).
However, if this same conflict is regarded as a conflict not of ethical
laws but of ethical characters who identify themselves with those laws,
then it becomes tragedy, which involves the experience of fate, which
experience can have the positive significance of reconciling the in¬
dividual with the Absolute.
"Tragedy consists in this, that the ethical nature segregates
its inorganic nature (in order not to become embroiled in it),
as a fate, and places it outside itself; and by acknowledging
this fate in the struggle against it, ethical nature is recon¬
ciled with the Divine being as the unity of both". (Natural
Law, p.105).
It is the tragic experience, therefore, which will be of value. In
32. As, for example, in Aristophanes' Lysl3trata. Let us note here
that in so far as ancient drama deals with a conflict of ethical
forces, these forces are always human and divine law. It is
quite anachronistic, therefore, to interpret it as expressing
a conflict between the individual and the state, natural and
civil law, feminine pacifism with masculine aggression, or
any other modern opposition.
33. Tragedy, which corresponds to stoicism, is in Hegel's account
prior to comedy, which corresponds to scepticism. (Phenomenology,
p.449f, Hyppolite, op. cit. p.186).
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order to undexstand it, we w.ill need to look, more closely at the notion
of ethical character as it is expressed in divine law.- through the
various relationships of the family.
There are three essential relationships within the family, of husband and
wife, parents and children, and brothers and sisters. The first of these
relationships is not purely ethical, since it comes into being only as a
result of the contingent premise that two individuals happen to be
attracted to each other.
"the relation of husband and wife is in the first place one
in which one consciousness immediately recognises itself in
another, and in which there is knowledge of this mutual recog¬
nition. Because this recognition is a natural and not an
ethical one, it is only a representation, an image of Spirit,
not actually Spirit itself" (Phenomenology, p.273).
The relationship between parents and children, on the other hand, is
not a natural relationship, but one which exists only through and be¬
cause of the family. One does not create it, but is born into it, and
in this sense it is independent. Nevertheless it is still tainted by
particularly, firstly, from the parents' point of view, by the fact
that the child represents the union which they cannot achieve on their
own, so that they have their own personal stake in the relationship;
and secondly, from the point of view of the child, because as a child
he is dependent on the family and he must break this dependence in order
f
to become an individual in his own right. Because of this need for the
child to become independent, any aspect of physical love within this
relationship which would aim at achieving a union, rather than the
separation which is necessitated by Spirit, is directly opposed to
the Divine Law. Incest between parents and children is strongly taboo.
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The relationship between brother and sister is a calmer affair. They
cannot achieve any more solid or objective relationship than the one
they are born into, and neither does it have any inherent need to develop
35
or decay. "Therefore, they do not desire each other"; since they can¬
not hope to achieve any higher unity than the one they already have, and
since as brother and sister they have no individual personality which they
36
could surrender to each other to form such a union. The taboo against
incest between brother and sister, however, is less strong than the
taboo between parents and children, since to offend it is merely to act
irrelevantly, to seek a union which already exists; while to offend the
latter taboo is to resist a development which is required by Spirit.
Brother and sister, however, are not in Hegel's view equivalent, since
only the brother will enter the life of the community, where he "acquires
the right of desire and, at the same time, preserves his freedom in regard
37
to it". The sister remains within the sphere of the family, and she
retains a pure, but by the same token immediate and undeveloped relation
35. Phenomenology, p.274.
36. Philosophy of Right, p. 115 §168. See also Phenomenology, p.85.
In connection with another version of this argument, Goethe commented
"I should think that the love of a sister for her sister would be
still purer and more sexless! And we should not forget that there
have been innumerable cases in which, known and unknown, the most
sensual affection occurred between brother and sister" (quoted
in Kaufmann, op.cit. p.166). Hegel's argument, however, is by
no means that physical considerations prevent incest between
siblings, and he expressly criticises this view in the Philosophy
of Right (loc.cit.). On the contrary, a taboo is much more than
a mere absence of desire, and presupposes rather some desire which
is to be prohibited. Divine law is concerned precisely with the
regulation of existing desire to accord with the objective and
highly restrictive structures of the family, and Goethe's rather
glib comment misses this essential point.
37. Pheryomerplogy, p. 275. cf. Philosophy of Right, p.263, Addition to
§164.
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to Sittti-chkeit and "has the highest intuiti-Ve awareness of what is
"38
ethical . She is: concerned directly with the members of the family
in their universal significance as its members, that is, as husband,
brother, son, daughter,etc.irrespective of any of their individual
characteristics. Since her relation to her brother is the purest of
these ethical relationships,
"the loss of the brother is therefore irreparable to the
sister and is the highest". (Phenomenology, p.275)
As Antigone herself said,
"A husband dead, there might have been another.
A child by another, too, if I had lost the first.
But mother and father both lost in the halls of Death,
No brother could ever spring to light again".
(Antigone, 1. 910) 39
The notion of ethical character is complete when the essential difference
between the brother and sister as followers respectively of human and
divine law is regarded equally as a natural difference, as the result
not only of something ethical, but also of the different "originally
40 41
determinate natures" of men and women. If man is defined as by
nature follower of human law, and woman as by nature follower of divine
law, then the separation of the two into discrete beings is pushed to its
38. Phenomenology, p.274 •
39. This translation is from Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays, trans
Fagles, Allen Lane 1982, p.88.
40. Phenomenology, p.276: cf p.238
41. Hegel stresses in several places that there is no reason for the
assignation of human law to man and divine law to women, so that
it is in truth essentially arbitrary.
Lib
extreme, and the falsity of this separation becomes something which may
be experienced by these ethical characters as the fatal destruction of
42
what they took to be their essential being. Further, since the rigid
separation of human and divine law depends upon their being regarded
passively as discrete things, and since character on the other hand is
essentially active, it follows that ethical character not only may but
necessarily will experience this its fate.
To demonstrate this, and thereby to force each of the individual ethical
characters to acknowledge the validity of the other, is the purpose of




The specific inadequacy in the harmony of the ethical order, that is,
the failing which will be experienced by natural consciousness, is that
it has no place for the principle of particular individuality, which is
nevertheless as we know an essential moment of Spirit. Sitttichkeit con¬
tains both the elements of universality and particularity in both human
and divine law, but these elements are always separated , not merely in
theory (as we might say they are in Kant's ethics) but in practice the
life and structure of the community, and do not come together in a par¬
ticular individual.
"The way in which the antithesis is constituted in the ethical
realm is such that self-consciousness has not yet received its
due as a particular individuality. There it has the value, on
the one hand, merely of the universal will, and on the other, of
consanguinity. This particular individual counts only as a
shadowy unreality". (Phenomenology, p.279).
Particular individuality, moreover, is not merely absent from the ethical
world, but absent in a positive way, so that its absence may be felt. In
tragic drama, particular individuality is not simply not present, but is
42
absent in a way which conditions the whole drama. This may be seen in
the way in which the notion of character is used in tragedy. Individual
42. Sartre (Being and Nothingness, op.cit. p.10) distinguishes a real
absence from an abstract absence. The absence of his.friend Pierre
from the cafe where he was expected to be is a real absence which
conditions the perception of the whole scene, whereas the absence
of the Duke of Wellington in the same circumstances has no such
effect. Hegel's distinction here is similar, but differs in that
a real absence for him is not so much an absence of something which
an individual arbitrarily happens to be looking for, a perceived
absence, but an absence of a principle which is in fact an essential
moment of Spirit, which therefore must necessarily be present, and
which the individual (obeying Appollo's command "know thyself")
must be looking for - a necessity which appears here as destiny.
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characters are used, and in some cas.es. are quite vividly portrayed, but
character is inessential and subordinate to the essential principle of
43
action. In contrast to some modern tragedies, such as Hardy s, which
are essentially descriptions of character, in ancient tragedy
"they do not act in order to portray the Characters; they
include the Characters for the sake of action ... a tragedy
is impossible without action, but there may be one without
character". (Aristotle, Poetics, 1450a)
In so far as character is present in ancient drama, and means something
more than the contingent characteristics of a particular individual, it
44
is defined not subjectively but objectively, by the two ethical powers.
Characters are distinguished essentially as followers of either divine
45
or of human law - but not of both. They are subjectively free only
in the limited sense that they may choose in a limited sense to value
one principle higher than another. At the beginning of Antigone, for
example, Ismene chooses to obey the human law rather than the divine
law; but as a woman her essence lies in divine law and she later acknow¬
ledges this, and it is clear that she obeyed the human law only out of
46
fear, and does not acknowledge it in any fuller sense.
43. Aristotle, Poetics, 1450a . As Hegel points out, in Greek drama,
but not in modern theatre, masks may be used to conceal the in¬
dividual features of the actors; yet, at the same time, these
masks were not simply abstract, but often incorporated,very in¬
dividual characteristics of the people they represented. (Paolucci
and Paolucci, op.cit. p.39).
In one sense, character must always be defined as objective: It
is the direct opposite of the subjective principle of "Gemuth",




46. Antigone, 1.79 and 1.535.
Once the characters are committed to their respective ethical powers,
their individuality is o£ no importance, and they have no choice but to
47
follow the dictates of their ethical law. This fact must account in
large part for the formal precision of Greek tragedy, and its sense of
48
completeness which is rarely a characteristxc of modern literature.
As Aristotle put it, a tragedy is an imitation of an action that is com¬
plete in itself, and
"A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end"
(Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b).
49
The characters in ancient tragedy then, are essentially good, (unlike
Macbeth, for example, who deserved his fate), but not essentially moral,
since in their own eyes they have no choice but to obey their respective
ethical powers. However, in the experience of tragedy they will discover
the principle of evil also within themselves, and that they therefore
50
have a real choice between good and evil. They loose their child-like
innocence and move towards the christian adulthood which begins with the
recognition of the principle of original sin. They discover that
"innocence is merely non-action, like the mere being of a
stone, not even that of a child". (Phenomenology, p. 282).
Oedipus' guilt, then, is not that of a wrong which might have been avoided,
that of "a simpleton" , but
"the most exalted form of guilt, the guilt of innocence"
(Phenomenology, p. 233).
and Oedipus (in Oedipus at Colonnus)
9
47. Cf. A.C. Bradley in Paolucci and Paolucci, op. cit. p. 374.
48. Existentialist literature sometimes provides and exception to this
rule, and this is often connected with either the absence of the
principle of character (for example in Pauline Reage's Story of 0)
or its destruction (for example, in Sartre's Nausea).
49. Aristotle, Poetics, 1454a.
50. "Subjective freedom", Hegel said, "is the fruit of the tree of
knowledge of good and evil" (History of Philosophy, Vol.1, p. 446).
Cf. also Philosophy of Right, p. 102n.
51. History of Philosophy, Vol. 1. p.445.
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"resembles Adam, loosing his. happiness when he obtains the
knowledge of good and evil". (Quoted from the Aesthetics
by Paulucci and Paolucci, op. cit. p.xxvi). 52
It is the emergence of this principle of unhappiness which is Hegel's
central concern in this section of the Phenomenology. We may note in
this connection both that Hegel is not attempting here anything like a
full account of tragedy, such as the account he gives the Aesthetics,
and that his account also has wider significance than being simply an
interpretation of tragedy. It is, namely, an account of the origins of
philosophy itself in the decline of the Greek spirit. Hegel described
the Greeks as the happy people of history, in contrast to the Jews who
are history's unhappy people; and the breaking down of the harmony of
the Greeks' life in tragedy is the end of their happiness, and the be¬
ginning of true philosophy. "Bifurcation is the source of the need for
philosophy", Hegel wrote at Jena, as we have seen already. Or, as
Augustine put it, "there is no need to philosophise, except with a view
, . • „ 54to happiness .
52. According to Freud, St. Paul makes a crime similar to Oedipus'
the root of original sin: "It is because we killed God the father
that we are so unhappy"; and Jesus' sacrifice is the atonement
of this crime. (Freud, Moses and Monotheism, Hogarth 1939, p.213)
Socrates' sacrifice may similarly be regarded as an atonement for
the guilt of the Greeks. (Cf. Paolucci and Paolucci, op.cit. p.363f)
53. Plant, op.cit. p.79. »
54. Schumacher, Guide to the Perplexed, frontispiece.
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Socrates may be described in this context as the first true philosopher.
As Hegel wrote in the Philosophy of History,
"it was in Socrates, that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
War, the principle of subjectivity - of the absolute inherent
independence of Thought - attained free expression. He taught
that man has to discover and recognise in himself what is the
Right and Good, and that this Right and Good is in its nature
universal. Socrates is celebrated as a Teacher of Morality,
but we should rather call him the Inventor of Morality. The
Greeks had a customary morality; but Socrates undertook to
teach them what moral virtues, duties, etc. were. The moral
man is not he who merely wills and does that which is right -
not the merely innocent man - but he who has the consciousness
of what he is doing". (Philosophy of History, p.269).
If it is true that the origin of this thinking is to be found in the loss
of innocence which finds expression in tragedy, then we may also expect
that such thought will also seek in some way to overcome the disharmony
of tragedy, and to recapture the happiness which is lost in it. As will
be argued later, it is especially important to bear this in mind in
connection with Plato's Republic, which may be interpreted precisely as
a political scheme which attempts, per -impossibile, to prevent the con¬
flict of human and divine law.
For the active ethical consciousness, human and divine law are distinguished
as the known and the unknown, just as from the point of view of substance
55
they are distinguished as the conscious and the unconscious. How-
I
ever, if from the point of view of substance it was the divine law which
represented the force of the unconscious, for the active consciousness
both human and divine law have known and unknown aspects.
55. Phenomenology, p.280.
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"Since it sees right only on one side and wrong on the other,
that consciousness. w,hi.ch belongs, to the diyine law sees in
the other side only the yiolence of human caprice, while that
which holds to human law sees, in the other only the self-
will with disobedience of the individual who insists in being
his own authority". (Phenomenology, p.280).
It is impossible, however, for one character at this stage to know both
laws at the same time, since one cannot be both a man and a woman. The
exception to this rule is the blind prophet Tiresias. According to
various legends, Tiresias had once been turned into a woman, and then
returned to his original sex, whereupon he gained the gift of prophesy.
He is also credited with a special knowledge of the underworld, either
through his mother, the nymph Chariclo, or more significantly for us,
56
through being the only one to have "kept his wits" in the underworld,
57
to have avoided being immersed in the waters of oblivion. With this
experience and this 'recollection' behind him, then, he is uniquely
placed to foresee the fatal collision of human and divine law in tragic
destiny.
We saw earlier that the substance of divine law, which expresses itself
positively as a duty towards the dead members of the family, can be ex¬
pressed negatively as a prohibition especially of incest and of murder
within the family. Expressed thus it is identical to what Freud calls
the "Oedipus complex", and since Hegel here makes it explicit that the
•
56. Plato, Meno, lOOA, Penguin 1956, p.157 - reporting the Homeric
legend.
57. See Encylopaedia Brittanica, 1974, Macropaedia Vol.X p.l for a
brief account of some of the legends associated with Tiresias.
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divine law like the. Oedipus, complex is unconscious, we can hardly avoid
comparing the two author's accounts of the Oedipus legend, before going
on to consider tragic action itself.
The essential difference between the two accounts, which are otherwise
virtually identical, may be expressed in their differing views of the
significance of guilt. Freud's attitude, as has already been said, be¬
longs essentially to Understanding, and he therefore sets out to 'explain'
guilt. In order to do this he sets out an imaginary scenario of a
'primal horde' dominated by a single male, in which the subordinate
males, the brothers, once collectively murdered and ate their 'primal
father', in order to gain sexual access to their sisters which previously
was the fathers privilege, and subsequently suffered guilt for the
murder and for their incestuous desires. This original action is then
imprinted in some kind of race memory, or passed on telepathically, and
is the source of all subsequent guilt, as well as of various ceremonial
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purges of guilt, such as the totem feast and the holy communion.
Expressed in this way, Freud's account reduces to a tautology, since the
explanation of guilt is simply that the primal brothers felt guilty,
while what we wanted to discover was the source of this guilt. We might
reply with a comment Hegel made in 'Force and the Understanding': "It is
an explanation that not only explains nothing, but is so plain that,
while it pretends to say something different from what has already been
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said, really says nothing at all but the same thing".
58. Freud, Totem and Taboo, Routledge 1919, esp. p.234ff.
59. Phenomenology, p.95.
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Freud's, explanation however, does go further than this, and explains
guilt as a result of the "ambivalence of the emotions". This does not
transcend the attitude of Understanding, but does come close to it,
since it effectively introduces the notion of what Hegel calls the
"second supersensible world". The implication of 'ambivalence', that
is, is that within the unconscious every emotion implies equally its
opposite, life implying death, love implying hate, and so on. It re¬
quires only one further step to transcend the attitude of Understanding
altogether, and to intuit guilt not merely as a result of ambivalence,
but as the result of the knowledge of a living entity, ethical substance
itself. This, of course, is Hegel's position.
In order for the active natural consciousness to gain the full experience
of tragedy, three further moments are necessary. Aristotle distinguishes
them as Peripaty, Discovery, and Pathos,and Hegel follows this dis-
4-" 4-- 62tmction.
In the first place, Hegel argues, it requires a natural or contingent
60. Freud it not unequivocal on this matter. Sometimes he seems
to regard the unconscious as hypothetical, something which
we accept on the basis of its explanatory powers only. Some¬
times, however, he seems rather to regard it as an implicit
part of consciousness, as something which may be brought to
knowledge by a process rather like Platonic recollection, so
that a successful analysis should end with a phrase feuch as
'I have known this all along'. Nevertheless, in his writings
on religion Freud consistently argues that religious phenomena
can be explained in terms of the psychological needs of the
individual, and to this extent his view is the direct reverse
of Hegel's, in which guilt as an acknowledgement of ethical
substance has the ultimate significance of being a revelation
of divine Being, a being which is as we have seen beyond the
explanatory powers of the Understanding.
61. Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a-6.
62. Though he does not actually use the first two of these terms.
event to throw the human and diyine principles into opposition, to change
suddenly the character's fortune. The ethical characters, after all,
are not merely rational entities, but also natural living beings. Aristotle
cites as an example of such a chance event or 'peripaty' the fact that
the Messenger in Oedipus Rex, who intends to bring good news, accidentally
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reveals the secret of Oedipus' birth. Hegel refers instead, obliquely
but unmistakeably, to the Antigone , where it is the natural contingency
of birth which puts Eteocles and Polynices in conflict with each other,
each having an equal right in divine law to the succession of the throne
in Thebes.
"But that [the youthj still belongs to Nature from which he
wrenched himself is evidenced by the fact that he emerges in
the contingent form of two brothers, each of whom with equal
right takes possession of the community". (Phenomenology, p.205)
This contingency ultimately leads Eteocles and Polynices to a gross
offence against the divine law by killing one another in battle, which
event sets the scene for the Antigone.
This event brings the human and divine principles into opposition in
the tragic form of a conflict between two ethical characters, Antigone
and Creon, in the following way. Polynices has offended the human law,
since he has taken up arms with Argos against his native Thebes in an
attempt to win the throne from Eteocles permanently. Creon therefore
I
decrees that since he is a traitor, he is not entitled to burial rites.
However, in the eyes of the divine law all are equal in death, and it
is purely arbitrary to hold that the brother who happened to hold power
63. Ibid.,and Oedipus Rex, 1. 924 ff.
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in Thebes should be accorded a ceremonial burial which is to be denied
to the other. For Antigone, therefore, who follows the divine law, it
is quite clear that Polynices must be accorded the same burial rites as
his brother Eteocles, in spite of Creon's ban.
Both parties, it may be stressed, are morally right from their own
point of view. Modern interpretations of Antigone, such as Brecht's
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or Anouilh's, which make Antigone into a white heroine and Creon into
a black dictator miss out an indispensible condition of comedy as well
as tragedy, that there be a conflict not of right and wrong, but of
right and right.
"Creon is not a tyrant, but really a moral power; Creon is
not in the wrong; he maintains that the law of the Sate,
the authority of government, is to be held in respect, and
that punishment follows the infraction of law", (from the
lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in Paolucci and
Paolucci, op.cit. p.325).
Neither, incidentally, is it the case that for Hegel "the struggle
between Antigone and Creon is meant to foreshadow all the subsequent
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wars between religion and politics". The conflict of divine and human
law is specific to Greek life, and quite distinct from the later medieval
separation between church and state.
In the second place, the tragic experience requires a discovery. As
9
Aristotle says,
"A Discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from
ignorance to knowledge, and thus either to love or hate,
in the personages marked for good or evil fortune".
(Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a).
64. Fagles, The Three Theban Plays, Allen Lane 1982, p.22.
65. Judith Shklar, Freedom and Independence, op.cit. p.44.
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In Hegel's interpretation, such a discovery can only be the discovery
of the true value of the other ethi.cal principle, since each character
knows his own ethical principle, but does not know the other.^
In the Antigone, it is Antigone herself who first makes this discovery.
As her punishment for administering burial rites to Polyraices she is
immured. This is not exactly the infliction of the death sentence which
Creon originally threatened. Instead, Antigone is merely isolated from
the community, and left to choose her own destiny. As Creon says:
"Wall her up in the tomb, you have your orders
Abandon her there, alone, and let her choose -
death or a buried life with a good roof for shelter.
As for myself, my hands are clean. This young girl -
dead or alive, she will be stripped of her rights,
her strangers rights, here in the world above"
(Antigone _, 11 970-6, trans. Fagles, op.cit. p.87)
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Antigone s choice, of course, is suicide. Her suicide, however, is
68
not merely an anticipation of her death, but has the greater significance
of being an acknowledgement of the value of human law. While earlier she
had held that she was indifferent to the law of the community, in choosing
suicide she admits that a life cut off from the community is worth nothing,




67. This event had a tragic echo in Hegel's own life, when
his own sister, Christianne, committed suicide shortly after
Hegel's death, and apparently for reasons not unconnected with
it. (See Kaufmann, op.cit. p.142 and p.298). However the
parallel should not be over emphasised, and Antigone's suicide
should not be seen as a result only of grief for her brothers.
68. A.C. Bradley in Paolucci and Paolucci, op. cit. p.371 offers
this interpretation, apparently as Hegel's view.
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Finally, in order to have its full significance, this discoyery must be
accompanied by 'pathos', that is, by a suffering which can engender our
69
pity. Only in this case does the acknowledgement of the value of the
other law become more than an academic discovery, and take on the signi¬
ficance of the revelation of the "guilt of innocence". Hegel illustrates
this point with a line from Antigone
"Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred".
(Phenomenology, p.284). 70
If Antigone's pathos has the significance of an acknowledgement of human
law by divine law, it still remains for the human law to acknowledge the
divine. If this occurs, then the tragedy is complete, and the necessity
which previously lay with the characters and their known laws takes on
instead the character and power of blind Destiny.
"The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat
of the other would thus be only the part and the incomplete
work which irrisistably advances to the equilibrium of the
two. Only in the downfall of both sides alike is absolute
right accomplished, and the ethical substance as the negative
power which engulfs both sides, that is omnipotent and righteous
Destiny, steps on the scene". (Phenomenology, p.285).
This does indeed occur in the Antigone, and Creon, who first attempts
to deny, and then to resist the fate of which Tiresias forewarns him,
69. In modern tragedy, by contrast, pathos is lacking - though
there are exceptions to this. (cf. ETW, p. 205). f
70. Antigone 1 926. Hegel is perhaps stretching the translation
a little to make his point. Both Fagles and Watling render this
line in conditional mood. Watling's translation reads
"If this is God's will, I shall learn my lesson
In death, but if my enemies are wrong
I wish them no worse punishment than mine".
(Sophocles, The Theban Plays, Penguin 1947, p.150)
Antigone, in other words, does not fully acknowledge her guilt
in life, but declares that only in death will she find the answer.
However, if we take it that the essential point of pathos is not
so much that Antigone herself should suffer, but that the audience
should experience her suffering as both deserved and equally at
the same time undeserved, that is, as pathetic, then Hegel's
interpretation stands. "Never has innocence suffered", Hegel wrote
at Berne,"every suffering is guilt". (ETW, p.233).
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finally acknowledges his own guilt too.
With the appearance of Destiny, the movement of tragedy is complete.
However, even in Destiny the subjective element of particular individuality
which according to Hegel is absent from immediate S'ittlichke'it, is not
experienced directly. Indeed, it is precisely this fact which distinguishes
the ancient notion of necessity as Destiny from the modern view often
associated with Boethius of necessity as consolation. In the ancient
view, the individual simply accepts his fate, and though destiny may
appear as an alien power, the individual who accepts it does not feel
any sense of bondage to it, since he has not yet opposed himself as a
particular individual to objective necessity. "Personal subjectivity"
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Hegel argues "has not yet acquired its infinite significance", and an
individual who does not take himself subjectively to be free has no
difficulty in accepting fate, and no need for consolation. In the Christian
worlds, by contrast, the opposite is true.
"Christianity, we know, teaches that God wishes all men to be
saved. That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite
value. And that consoling power of Christianity just lies in
that God himself in it is known as the absolute subjectivity,
so that inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particu¬
larity OUT particular personality too is recognised not merely
as something to be solely and simply nullified, but as at the
same time something to be preserved". (Lesser Logic, p.210, §147).
71. Antigone, 1. 1321. Cf. Paolucci and Paolucci , op. cit., p. 73 f
and p. 186 for further remarks by Hegel on Creon's pathos.
Aristotle argues that Sophocles' portrayal of Creon as having
"full knowledge on the point of doing the deed" is bad poetry
because it diminishes the element of pathos. (Poetics, 1454 a)
72. Lesser Logic, p. 210, §147.
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The Destiny which Hegel describes in the Phenomenology .lies in point of
fact midway Between the tw.o conceptions of necessity which he outlines
in the lesser Logic. From the subjective point of view, Destiny does
indeed refer the individual away from human and divine law and back to
himself. However, objectively speaking the fact remains that the human
and divine law still exist, and that ethical action can only exist through
the mediation of these forms of law. This tension between an emergent
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principle of self-sufficient individuality" which is perhaps not known,
but at least felt ^ in some way, and an objective Sittlichkeit which
cannot accommodate this principle, is responsible for the whole
decay of Greek ethical life. It is illustrated dramatically in the con¬
demnation of Socrates, who personifies the principle of subjectivity which
will cause the collapse of Greek life, on the one hand, but the necessary
development of free indidivuality on the other.
"The sentence bears on the one hand the aspect of unimpeachable
rectitude - in as much as the Athenian people condemns its
deadliest foe - but on the other hand, that of a deeply tragical
character, inasmuch as the Athenians had to make the discovery
that what they reprobated in Socrates had already struck firm
root amongst themselves, and that they must be pronounced guilty
or innocent with him." (Philosophy of History, p.269).
The objective form of Sitttichkeit which can accommodate the principle
of subjectivity is, as we have seen, the type of positive law which emerges
in the Roman world, which (a) respects the individual universally and
irrespective of his particular characteristics or actions, simply as a
'person', and (b) makes a distinction between public and private life,
73. Philosophy of Right, p.124.
74. For example, in Socrates' "divine sign" (Philosophy of Right, p.184).
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and allows the individual subjectively to realise his moral freedom in
the latter sphere. It remains, to be seen how this form can be grasped
as a necessary result of the experience of ethical action.
tlegel identifies within the ethical world of human and divine law a
principle of corruption. The source of corruption is not so much the
private interest of particular individuals, but the interests of the
family and of its private property. Creon repeatedly and hopelessly
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complains of these corrupting forces in Antigone, and the political
thought of both Plato and Aristotle may be seen as in large part a
response to them. The corrupting impulse comes not from any individual
greed, but specifically from woman.
"Womankind - the everlasting irony f^in the life] of the community
- changes by intrigue the universal end of the government into
the work of some particular individual, and perverts the property
of the state into a possession and ornament for the Family".
(Phenomenology, p.288).
This corruption may at first seem to be something which the community can
contain by using its power to suppress it, just as it can contain and
suppress criminal behaviour in general. However, Hegel argues that the
principle of individuality which is manifested in corruption is a prin¬
ciple which the state itself requires this ame principle, and its power
is based upon it. Just as the family needs and expects its brave young
I
men to further and protect its interests, so the state too gains its
power only through its brave guardians.
75. Antigone, 11. 181, 222, 293, 677, and 1055, for example
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"The brave youth in whom woman finds her pleasure, the
suppressed principle of corruption, now has his day
and his worth is. openly acknowledged". (Phenomenology,
p.289).
Both the family and the community therefore turn out to depend upon
the same source of power. In repressing corruption, the community re¬
presses itself. It becomes a matter of luck which side will win; but
this contingency is equally from another point of view the necessity
of the decay of the ethical world.
"Because the existence of ethical life rests on strength
and luck, the decision is already made that its downfall
has come". (Phenomenology, p. 289)
In the Philosophy of History, Hegel identifies Alexander as the "brave
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youth" who brings about the actual downfall of the ethical life. In
the Phenomenology Hegel describes the downfall of ethical life only from
the formal point of view of the experience of Spirit which may be said
to result from it.
"Just as previously the Penates succumbed to the national
Spirit, so now the living Spirits of the nation succumb
through their own individuality and perish in a universal
community, whose simple universality is soulless and dead,
and is alive only in the single individual qua single. The
ethical shape of Spirit has vanished and another takes its
place". (Phenomenology, p. 289).
»
76. Philosophy of History, pp. 272-4. Hegel goes so far as to make
Alexanders youthfulness a necessity. "Alexander had the good
fortune to die at the proper time; i.e. it may be called good
fortune, but it is rather a necessity. That he may stand before
the eyes of posterity as a youth, an early death must hurry him
away". (ibid).
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In other words, precisely in so far as the principle of subjective
individuality succeeds in establishing itself in an objective form,
so the distinction between human and divine law disappears, and is
replaced instead by the unconditionally universal law of the Roman
world, which includes both human and divine principles, and yet
leaves room for the individual to act ethically independently of
those principles, and
"the simple compactness of their individuality [i.e. of the
ethical characters} has been shattered into a multitude of




From the subjective point of view, Reohtzustand is the legal status
which in Roman law is given equally to every citizen, and expressed
in the phrase 'oivis Romanus sum'. Here
"What counts as absolute essential being Is the sheer
empty unit of the person", (phenomenology, p.291)
This status is given by the new form of universal law which has emerged
from the collapse of the potis , and from this point of view Reohtzustand
is better translated as the state of law, and understood as the opposite
77
of Natuvzustand, the state of nature.
Hegel has very little to say in favour of this final moment of Sittlichkeit.
The individual counts only as a person, and
7 8
"to describe an individual as a 'person' is an expression
of contempt". (Phenomenology, p.292)
All are equal as persons, and in this sense Rechtzustand signifies the
end of the division of society into two separate classes, masters and
slaves. This, however, signifies not so much the end of slavery, as the
79
end of mastery, the "loss of freedom", and the establishment of a
77. Werke, Berlin 1845, p.329.
•
78. Hegel is perhaps thinking of the french expressions 'type' and
'espece ' , which reduce an individual to a manifestation of a
species. Cf. Phenomenology, p.298 where Hegel quotes from
Diderot's Rameau's Nephew,(Penguin 1966, p.108).
79. Natural Law, p.lOl.
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"universal private life, and the situation in whi.ch the nation consists
00
solely in a second class". Ih Natural Law. Hegel quotes Gibbon to show
the decay which gradually results from the reduction of individuality to
personality.
"This long peace, and the uniform government of the Romans,
introduced a slow and secret poison into the vitals of the
empire. The minds of men were gradually reduced to the same
level, the fire of genius was extinguished, and even the
military spirit evaporated... The most aspiring spirits
resorted to the standards of emperors; and the deserted provinces,
deprived of political strength or union, insensibly sunk into
the languid indifference of private life". (Natural Law,
p.lOlf).
Destiny, in the ethical world, was the negative power of the ethical sub¬
stance. In the Roman world, this negative power is intuited again as
also essentially subjective, and
"that very necessity of blank Destiny, is nothing else but
the 'I' of self consciousness". (Phenomenology, p. 290).
This gives rise to a new and modern conception of Destiny, which Napoleon
once expressed in a conversation with Goethe by saying that"La politique
/ 0^
est la fatalite". This is in Hegel's view the conception which governs
the Roman world, a conception which has none of the ethical value of the
Greek principle of destiny, and yet none of the freedom of the modern
world.
"The distinction between the Roman and Persian principles is
exactly this - that the former stifles all vitality, while the
latter allowed of its existence in the fullest measure. Through
its being the aim of the State, that the social units in their
moral life should be sacrificed to it, the world is sunk in
melancholy: its heart is broken, and it is all over with the
Natural side of Spirit, which has sunk into a feeling of un-




Philosophy of History, p.278. ("politics is fate").
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In the phenomenology Hegel traces, the development of this, unhappiness
through the notions of Stoicism and Scepticism to Unhappy Consciousness .
The Unhappy Consciousness in the Roman world - which has much in common
with the Hobbesian world - regards the emperor as the principle of unity
of the otherwise disconnected subjects of the polity, as the essential
"lord and master" (who takes himself to be "an actual living god")
and himself as inessential and slavish. The collapse of the happy and
beautiful life of the Greeks is in this sense a return to the unhappiness
of the Judaic view, which regards the whole world and even God himself
82
as entirely aliexi. There is no pathos in this harsh world.
"The great tragedy of the Jewish people is no Greek tragedy;
it can arouse neither terror nor pity, for both of these arise
only out of the fate which follows from the inevitable slip of
a beautiful character; it can arouse horror alone. The fate
of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who stepped out of
Nature itself, clung to alien beings, and so in their service
had to trample and slay everything holy in human nature, had
at last to be forsaken by his gods (since they were objects
and he their slave) and he dashed to pieces on his faith itself".
(Phenomenology, p.205).
The Roman world, however, wretched though it may be, differs from the
Jewish world in that the former contains the seeds of reconciliation.
The misery of the Roman world is not the misery of a self which does
not know its essence, but of a self which has lost its essence, and
"only from this feeling could arise the supersenousus,
the free Spirit in Christianity'.' (Philosophy of History, p. 278)
The experience of Greek tragedy, the loss by the self of its essence,
therefore, effects a transition from the Jewish world to the Roman world.
82. Phenomenology, p. 293f
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The Roman world is. a continuation of the Jewish Spiri.t but with the
addition of an implicit principle of subjectivity, and the two worlds
therefore relate to each other exactly as the Old Testament relates to
the New.
In the Phenomenology, Hegel expresses this by saying that the alienation
which is experienced in the Roman world is capable of being intuited as
externalisation of the self. In this intuition we leave the world of
Sittlichkeit altogether and move to the world of Culture. In S'ittt'ichhe'it
as a whole, the ethical essence was still immediate, and did not find ex¬
pression as a knowable object. In the Greek world it exists only as cus¬
tom, and in the Roman world the "universally acknowledged authority" is
intuited not as the authority of the self, but as an alien authority.
Culture however, in the Christian world, is capable of bringing these
subjective and objective moments together and of intuiting objective
authority as an externalisation of the ethical essence of the self.
"...this activity and process whereby substance becomes actual
is the alienation of the personality, for the self that has an
absolute significance in its immediate existence, i.e. without
having alienated itself from itself is without substance, and
is the plaything of these raging elements. Its substance there¬
fore is its externalisation [Entaussevungl and the externalisation
is the substance, i.e. the spiritual powers ordering themselves




Before going on, I want to make a digression from the text of the
Phenomenology to look further at the connection between Greek tragedy
and the political theory of Plato's Republic.
^ l 8
(d) The ancient and modern views. of corruption: Plato's Republic
as a response to the tragedy of Greek ethical life.
Hegel's view of the corruption and downfall of SittHchkeit may be taken
as a criticism of the romantic idealisation of ancient Greece and repub¬
lican Rome. Hegel's interpretation has two implications which contradict
the romantic view, one general and one more specific. At a general level,
he has made it apparent that the harmonious aspect "of immediate SittZichkeit
which was admired by the romantics also has a negative aspect, which is
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expressed by the fact that action reveals a discord in the form of
tragic destiny. This destiny is not only undesirable, but also both
unavoidable and a cause of the necessary collapse of the ancient ethical
order, which henceforth cannot be retrieved. At a more specific level,
Hegel's interpretation implies that ancient political theory, which is
widely taken to be an attempt to describe a perfect political order, is
likely at least in part to be a reaction to specific difficulties which
appear only in the ancient world. Any attempt to evaluate ancient political
thought in the modern world should therefore account for this. It is this
83. It may perhaps be worth noticing that in Greek music, which is
modal, 'harmony' has the meaning of concord only, and there is
no harmonic movement; whereas in modern music, which is diatonic,
harmony is not static but must involve a movement from discord to
concord, so that both discord and concord are essential to harmony.
In music, as in Spirit, we may say that harmony for the Greeks is
immediate, while in the modern world it is mediated. This may
seem to be an arcane connection, but there are nevertheless many
ways in which music exhibits structures of Spirit, and Hegel's
view that art is essentially a representation of the divine may
also, as many musicians know intuitively, hold good for music.
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second implication I want to develop here, especially in connection with
Plato's Repuhll.c .
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel comments that
"Plato's Republic, which passes proverbially as an empty
ideal, is,in essence, nothing but an interpretation of
Greek ethical life". (Philosophy of Ricjht, p.lO. Preface).
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However, although Hegel makes similar remarks elsewhere, he nowhere
develops this interpretion of the Republic in any detail. Even in the
History of Philosophy, his comments on the Republic do not go much beyond
the general assertion that the principle of subjective freedom is absent
or suppressed.^ This assertion does indeed express Hegel's criticism
of Plato at every level, from the most general level, that is, the theory
of form, down to the most specific details of the Republic. We should
not imagine that we will be able to distinguish acceptable from un¬
acceptable aspects of Plato. Hegel's criticism is directed at his entire
thought, not at parts of it only. Nevertheless, the absence of subjective
freedom in general may be seen to condition Plato's most specific propsals
in a very particular way, which has not often been understood.
The most specific proposals of the Republic are concerned with the abolition
of the family and private property for the guardian class. Modern commen¬
tators tend quite generally to assume that Plato arrives at these proposals
9
as a result of a process of pure reason which has no connection with any
particular details or difficulties experienced in Greek life. Barker, for
84. e.g. Philosophy of Right, p. 124. §18g; Paolucci and Paolucci,
op.cit. p.190; Philosophy of History, p. 267f (where Hegel des¬
cribes Aristotle's approach to the study of constitutions not
as we might expect, as a response to corruption, but as itself
a symptom of corruption, "the principle of decay").
85. History of Philosophy, Vol.2, p.90ff, esp. pp. 104-115.
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example, attributes, to Plato a "theory of communism" and sets out to
discover whether this theory is indeed a "logical deduction from his
87
own premises". He summarises Plato's view as follows:
"Not only is communism a necessary condition of the rule of
reason, but reason issues in communism". (Barker, op. cit.
p. 243).
Similarly, he regards the purpose of Plato's proposal to abolish the
88
family as "the emancipation of women". In both cases, it is assumed
that Plato's ideas are indeed no more than "empty ideals", and the
possibility that they involve not only reason, but also an "interpretation
of Greek ethical life" is not even considered. The Republic, as Skinner
89
would argue, is treated as an eternal or sacred text, and it is there¬
fore assumed that its universal reasoning will not be tainted by any im¬
pure temporal concerns. We will see, by contrast, that Plato's reasoning
is not at all abstract, but is closely related to specific difficulties,
and that it is greater philosophy because of this.
We may demonstrate this by considering the meaning of the idea of corruption
in the ancient world, and contrast it to the modern notion of corruption.
A good deal of ancient political theory, perhaps even all of it, may
be regarded as in some sense a response to the problem of political
corruption. Aristotle's Politics, in particular illustrates this, if we
take his distinction between good and deviant states to be 'equally a
86. E.Barker, Greek Political Theory, Methuen I960, p.250.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid, p.255.
89. See Note 1 to Ch. 1 above.
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distinction between honourable and corrupt states; and the same theme
may be discerned elsewhere, for example in Xenophon's Hiero and
Cyropaedia.
In the ancient view, all intrusion of private interest is regarded as
corrupt. As Aristotle put it
"It is clear then that those constitutions which aim at the
common good are right, as being in accord with absolute justice;
while those which aim only at the good of the rulers are Wrong".
(Aristotle, Politics, op. cit. p.115).
If corruption is defined in these sweeping terms, it is also defined as
a threat to the very existence of a political community.
"For the real difference between man and other animals is that
humans alone have a perception of good and evil, right and
wrong, just and unjust. And it is the sharing of a common
view in these matters that makes a household or a city"
(Ibid, p.29) .
The predominance of a particular view of what is good over others, by
implication, is the destruction of the ethical community, and the reduc¬
tion of the potin to a mere aggregation of individuals.
The particular source of the principle of corruption is identified in
varying ways. Sometimes it is located simply in desire, especially in
the desire for wealth and in sexual desire. Sometimes it is located
more specifically in the desire of the family and in the influence of
9
women within the family upon men within the community. In one passage
in the Republic, for example, Plato identifies the influence of women
on young men as a source of the corruption of the timocratic character,
in a way which is strongly reminiscent of Hegel's characterisation of
corruption.
I T-T-
"He may be the son of an excellent father who, living in an ill-
governed state, holds aloof from public life because he would
sooner forego some of his rights than take part in the scramble
for office or be troubled with going to law. His son's character
begins to take shape when he hears his mother complaining that
she is slighted by the other woman because her husband has no
official post. She sees too that he cares little for money, and
is indifferent to all the scurrilous battle of words that goes
on in the law courts; she finds him always absorbed in his
thoughts, without much regard for her, or disregard either.
Nursing all these grievances, she tells her son that his father
is not much of a man and far too easy-going, and has all the
other weaknesses that the wives of such men are fond of harping
on". (Plato, Republic, 549d; Cornford op. cit. p.266).
In Hegel's view, as we have seen, the corruption of the ancient world is
founded specifically in the conflict between human and divine law. Plato
does not go so far as to acknowledge this. He apparently accepts the
two principles of law as given, as substantial existences which are in¬
dependently real, beyond rational doubt, and which he therefore has no
right to question. Nevertheless, if we go beyond Plato's explicit comments
on corruption, and ask instead what kinds of difficulties might be resolved
by the kind of specific proposals Plato makes, then we may confirm that
in nearly every case the adoption of these proposals would have the effect
of preventing the conflict of human and divine law, and particularly of
the influence of the divine law in the affairs of the state.
We may consider for example, the proposals to include women in the guardian
class and to abolish family relationships. The first of these is intro-
»
duced with a semblance of a rational argument, which says that since the
differences between men and women appear to be accidental, not essential,
there appears to be no reason for excluding them from citizenship. We may
doubt however, whether Plato takes this reasoning seriously. He does not
hold to the view in general that because all people are rational there
should be no distinctions at all within the state, and on the contrary
his state displays rigid class distinctions. If women are to be excluded
from being a particular class., it cannot be because Plato opposes class
in general. Similarly, though there is a feeling that women may gain
status through citizenship, there does not seem to be any indication
that they gain freedom, or that freedom in any concrete sense is some¬
thing which might be valued by a guardian, and it seems implausible that
Plato is concerned to 'emancipate' women.
In the second proposal, to abolish familial relationships - or rather,
to broaden them to the point where they have no value as particular ties,
which as Aristotle rightly points out means that they have no value at
90
all - Plato s purpose becomes clearer. It is the influence of the
family tie which will lead the guardains to neglect the interests of
the state in favour of the interests of their beloved. This means in
particular that they will be liable to lose the cardinal virtue of the
guardian class, that is, courage. If on the other hand they can be made
to direct the love they would normally feel for particular individuals
towards the community as a whole, then their courage will be guaranteed,
since the desire to stay alive for the benefit of particular individuals
within the community will be replaced by the desire to protect the
community from others at all costs. Plato reinforces this inversion by
90. Aristotle, Politics, p.60f. One of Aristotle's complaints against
Plato is that his proposals concerning the organisation of marriage
or mating ceremonies does not guard sufficiently against the
possibility of certain types of incest, i.e. against the possibility
of offending divine law.
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suggesting that courage in battle should be rewarded by sexual favours,
inverting the actual pressure to the contrary, which Aristophanes por¬
trayed in LysiStrata, where the women of Athens refuse sexual favours
until their men agree to give up their current campaign, for no other
reason than that they would rather their spouses were at home than away
92
risking their lives and their family's livelihoods in war.
Similarly, if we consider Plato's proposal that the guardians should
have no private property, we find something quite different from a
"logical deduction from his own premises". This proposal is in fact
made along with several other proposals, which concern the manner in
which the guardians will live. Again, the most evident factor involved
in general is not the absence of private property, but the absence of
any family ties. Plato proposes
"First, none of them must possess any private property beyond
the barest essentials. Next, no one is to have any dwelling
or stone-house that is not open for all to enter at will.
Their food, in the quantities required by men of temperance
and courage who are in training for war, they will receive
from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship,
fixed so that there shall be just enough for the year with
nothing over; and they will have meals in common and all
live together like soldiers in a camp"(Republic, 416 d;
Cornford, op. cit., p.106)
91. Plato, Republic, 468 b. Plato also in the same passage explicitly
prohibits Creon's offense of divine law: "So we will have no
stripping of the slain and we shall not prevent their comrades
from burying them". (469 e) .
92. Lysistrata, we may note, is in this sense no more pacifist than
Antigone: both sides are right from their own point of view, and
the position of the women is essentially a defense of the interests
of the family, rather than a moral condemnation of war.
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As a reason for this, Plato gives, the following:
"If they should come to possess land of their own and houses
and money, they will give up their guardianship for the manage¬
ment of their farms and households and become tyrants at
enmity with their fellow citizens instead of allies", (ibid).
We should not, therefore, regard this as a theory of communion. It is
a theory, if anything, of a military life, and is valuable in a situation
where any influence of the interests of the family in politics is a
threat to the very existence of the political community.
In the modern world, by contrast, the notion of corruption has a quite
different significance, which we may observe, for example, in Machiavelli.
It is still defined in terms of the interests of the individual and the
state, but the individual has a different significance, since in addition
to the implicit recognition of his individuality in the family, he has
also an explicit recognition of individuality in the sphere of civil
society, which was absent from Greek ethical life, and in the natural
or moral law which governs it. This affects the notion of corruption in
a number of ways.
Firstly, corruption in the modern world is a problem which the state can
contain. Private interest as such is not corrupt, and on the contrary,
politics is moved by the private interests of the members of the polity:
private and public interests advance hand in hand - though i^ot without
the occasional disagreement. Corruption is the attitude which places
the aims of the individual above the aims of community. Thus, in The
Prince, for example, Machiavelli distinguishes those who come to power
by prowess and fortune (virtu and fovtuna) from those who come to power
by criminal or nefarious means. The former are certainly self-interested,
and may, like Cesario Borgia, be quite ruthless, but they are motivated
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by gloria, a desire for fame, and this ensures that their actions are
93
done for the sake of public above priyate interests. The latter do
not desire fame, but only power, and their actions are, like those of
94
Agathocles of Syracuse, dishonourable and corrupt.
The judgement of an action as corrupt, then, lies outside the sphere
of the political itself. To be corrupt is not to offend a civil law -
especially not in the case of sovereign princes who are in a certain
sense above civil law - but to be judged abhorrent in virtue of some
moral or natural law. A corrupt action may indeed offend civil law -
Richard Nixon and Jeremy Thorpe both did this - but it does not have to,
and in so far as it does, the state should have no more difficulty in
containing it that it does with any other criminal behaviour. Essentially,
however, corruption belongs to the realm of moral law and lies outside
the jurisdiction of civil law. The state both should not and need not
trouble itself with it. What is Caesars should be given to Caesar, and
95
what is God's given to God.
Corruption understood as the predominance of private over public interests,
then, is a peripheral concern for modern political thought, while it was
absolutely central for the ancients. On the other hand, especially during
this century, we have experienced a different form of corruption of the
political, which may be defined as the extension of the sphere of juris¬
diction of civil law into spheres which belong rightly to moral law, i.e.
totalitarianism. This has lead to a charged re-evaluation of classical
thought about corruption, which treats it as though the principle of
93. Machiavelli, The Prince, Bks. VI and VII, Penguin 1961, pp.49-61.
94. Ibid, Bk. VIII, pp 61-66.
95. Cf. ETW, p. 281ff-
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corruption were the same in both the ancient and modern worlds. The
attitude to classical thought may be either positive or negatiye. Leo
Strauss, to cite an example of the first, argues that though the tyranny
of the modern world is distinct from ancient tyranny, it nevertheless
96
"cannot be understood adequately except within the classical framework".
On the other harid, many commentators have chosen to criticise Plato
sharply on the grounds that his proposals to extend the jurisdiction of
the state into areas where we feel it does not belong, such as education,
family life, censorship of literature, and so on, sounds suspiciously like
97
modern totalitarianism, and should not be tolerated. Hegel himself
98
has been tarred wxth the same brush.
We may agree that Plato's proposals would be 'totalitarian' if they were
to be put into political practice in the modern context. However, we must
deny that they are totalitarian in Spirit, for a number of reasons. To
begin with, we may observe that in modern totalitarianism is in general
aware that it demands the sacrifice of individual freedoms and justifies
this in some way, as the means to some end, or as valuable for its own
99sake. The same cannot be said of Plato's proposals. The freedom of the
individual does not appear to be something that Plato and his contemporaries
valued; and although Plato responds to the possible objection that the
96. Leo Strauss, op.cit. p.190.
97. R.H.S. Crossman, Plato Today; K.Popper, The Open Society and
its Enemies, Vol.1 Routledge 1966 e.g. p.5 and p.86 ff.
98. Popper, op.cit. Vol. 2, e.g. p.31.
99. As, for example, in the attitudes of "virtue". See Phenomenology
p. 288 and Ch. 6 above.
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guardians may be unhappy because of the austerity of their life, he does
not even raise the question of whether their subjective freedom may be
limited, for example by their being unable to choose their social class
More concretely, we may say that if the 'totalitarian' proposals of the
Republic are designed to avoid the tragic conflict of human and divine
law, they have a purpose which is both more noble than modern totalitarianism,
and relevant only in the situation where such a conflict is likely. Modern
commentators often fail to understand the Republic in this specific con¬
text, and therefore assume that Plato's proposals are arrived at through
the same kind of reasoning which more modern thinkers use to arrive at
similar proposals. In particular, Plato is often interpreted as upholding
the idea of the rule of reason, in the same way as Rousseau or Marx may
be said to do. The family and private property should be abolished because
they are particular things, and according to the notion of reason, only
the universal should rule. Plato, however, is far from upholding this
rationalist view (which was criticised in Chapter 6 above) and holds that
not reason, but justice should rule, or, to say the same thing differently,
that not bureaucrats, but philosopher kings, individual political men who
are acquainted with the form of justice should be at the head of the ideal
state. If the proposals to abolish family and private property are under¬
stood as particular proposals to avoid (per impossibile) the power of
destiny, then there is no need to account for them as a rationalist de¬




Philosophy of Right, p. 133 and p. 195.
This does not, of course, mean that Plato's proposals are acceptable,
even in his own day. They do indeed attack subjectiye freedom, not
just accidentally, but quite centrally.
"According to the conception of subjective freedom, however,
the family is just as necessary, yea, sacred to the individual
as is property". (History of Philosophy, Vol.2, p.112)
There can be no justification for suppressing something which is an
essential moment of Spirit, and though we may plead mitigating circum¬
stances on Plato's behalf, we cannot expect him to be acquitted. However,
if we were to find a thinker who made proposals similar to Plato's -
perhaps derived from them - in a situation in which subjective freedom
is known to exist, and as a response not to a particular difficulty, but
simply to an abstract idea, then we would have to say that these proposals
would become very much more objectionable than anything we find in Plato.
Such thinking, in Hegel's view, is characteristic of the Enlightenment
in general, and may be found in Rousseau's political theory in particular;
and the following section of the Phenomenology, on Culture, is intended
in good part as a criticism of such thinking. Having explained carefully
in SittZichkeit why Plato's ideas may not be applied in any direct way
to the modern world, Hegel goes on to explain carefully what happens if
anyone should be so foolish as to try.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONSCIENCE
There are, in Hegel's account, three forms of the spiritual self, and
three corresponding spiritual worlds. They are the abstract self or
'person' of Rechtzustand} the self of Culture which has externalised
itself and has itself for an object; and the self of Morality, which
lets the objective self of culture go free and thereby gain a living
positive content."'" The knowledge of good and evil which emerges from
the tragic experience of Sittlichkeit, then, appears firstly as abstract
positive law, secondly as the objective structures of the state, custom,
and belief, in a word, the Culture of the community, and thirdly as the
individual's notions of duty and conscience in Morality.
I do not intend to examine the last two forms of the spiritual self in
any detail here. The main thrust of my argument has been concerned with
the structure and spirit of the Phenomenology, and while there is certainly
more to be said on these points, some of which could be said in connection
with Culture and Morality, I do not feel that the returns would justify
my inflicting upon the reader an exegisis of the long and complex movement
of Culture, or the details of the chapter on Morality. The final movement
of 'Morality', however, titled 'Conscience', has a special structural
significance, and I want to conclude with a brief discussion of this section.
We have already seen that the idea of conscience is especially important
2
to Hegel , even in his earliest writings.
1. Phenomenology, p. 384
2. Chapter I above, esp. pp 19-24- .
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In the Phenomenology, however, it has an additional significance, for as
well as being an important idea in its own right, it also has the signifi¬
cance of completing the development of subjective and objective spirit,
3
and preparrng consciousness for the atonement of all its previous shapes
in the form of religion. In quite a strong sense, therefore, the dis¬
cussion of Conscience is the end of the Phenomenology.
To say this is not to belittle the significance of religion. It has already
been argued both that Hegel's entire thought must be understood in terms
of its religious aims, and that Hegel's view of religion may be differ¬
entiated from Plato's in that Hegel makes religion an independent object
of knowledge, while Plato makes it an object of faith which may be reached
only through phenomenal knowledge of non-religious things, not known in its
own right. However, although religion for Hegel may be known as a phenomenon
and in this sense has its place in a phenomenology, nevertheless this
knowledge is no longer simple consciousness, but specifically seZ-/"-consciousness
4
of Spirit. Since phenomenology is defined by the attrtude of consciousness,
it follows that religion is beyond the bounds of phenomenology in its strict
sense. Specifically, while in each of the moments of the Phenomenology
prior to religion we are dealing with a specific aspect of Spirit which has
been isolated by the analytical activity of consciousness, in Religion
we find for the first time the whole of Spirit presented as a single living
entity. Whatever the significance of this may be, I have elected to restrict
3. "Atonement", of course, is the same as the movement which is described
by Lukacs and others as "totalization". The term "atonement", however,
has the advantage of avoiding tRe arithmetical implications of "totalization"
and of suggesting instead a becoming at-one; and the disadvantage, for
those who prefer the idea of "totalization", of having an historical
currency with religious connotations. Hegel's notion of "reconciliation"
(Versohnung) carries a similar meaning.
4. Phenomenology, p. 411f; Hyppolite op. cit. p. 535ff.
5. Phenomenology, p.414
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my study to Hegel's analysis of the twelve parts of Spirit, and this analysis
ends with Conscience.
In order to understand the significance of Conscience, it will help to
recall Hegel's views on the Kantian interpretation of the relationship of
morality to religion. These views are set out especially in Faith and
Knowledge■
In Religion with the Limits of Reason alone, Kant had regarded God as a
"postulate" of reason, that is, as "a demand of reason which need not be
met".^ Moral reason may well imply or even require the existence of a
divine being who commands that which moral reason concludes, but it does
not follow from this need of reason that such a being does in fact exist.
Since divine being therefore cannot be known to exist by reason, it follows
that "knowledge" of such a being must be relegated (or exalted, depending
upon one's viewpoint) to the level of faith. God, in other words, is
nuomenal. Faith becomes an adjunct to morality, which will certainly be
adopted by the most noble and enlightened minds, but is in no sense
necessary to morality.
"Hence, for its own sake, morality does not need religion at all
(whether objectively, as regards willing, or subjectively, as re¬
gards ability); by virtue of pure practical reason alone it is
self-sufficient". (Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason alone
trans. Greene and Hudson, Harper Torchbooks, New York I960, cited
hereafter as Religion, p.3).
Morality, on the other hand, both points towards and is enriched by
religion.
"If morality finds in the holiness of its law an object of the
greatest respect, then at the level of religion it presents the
ultimate cause, which consummates those laws, as an object of
adoration and thus appears in its majesty", (ibid, p.7)
6. Lauer, Hegel's Concept of God, State University of New York Press
1982, p. 24.
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Further, there can be two approaches to religion, namely, Biblical theology
and philosophical theology. These belong to strictly defined faculties
at the University, and presumably likewise to separate mental faculties,
to wit, faith and knowledge, each having its own legitimate sphere of
7
activity.
Kant's own text, is, of course, mainly what he would call philosophical
theology. It deals rationally with the notion of original sin, the con¬
flict of good and evil, and the possibility of the victory of the good
over the evil. However, Kant also appends to each of the four sections
of his philosophical discussion a "General Observation" which goes beyond
the limits of the purely rational towards a position which requires faith.
Thus, for example, he concludes his discussion of 'Radical Evil in Human
Q
Nature" with an observation that is a cornerstone of Lutheran faith, that
to become morally good in the eyes not of law but of religion requires not
only good action but a change of heart, which cannot be produced by reason
alone and must therefore be a "work of grace". He concludes
"Hence we can admit a work of grace as something incomprehensible,
but we cannot adopt it into our own maxims either for theoretical
or for practical use" (Religion op.cit. p. 49)
In spite of his own protestant faith, Hegel finds this reasoning objectionable.
It depends upon regarding reason as a discrete faculty of mind, while, as
we saw in Chapter 6 above, Hegel's view is that reason is the certainty of
g
being alX reality, and that Spibit is the knowledge of this certainty.
7. Kant, Religion op.cit. pp. 7-10.
8. Which evil, in Kant's interpretation, has its origin not in human
nature but in the will, and consists "in maxims of the will which
are contrary to the moral law" (Religion, op.cit. p.27)
9. Thus, in Faith and Knowledge p.102 Hegel argues that "Kant's view
that faith is non-cognitive is grounded only in his misjudgement
of the rational as such ...".
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In Faith and Knowledge, therefore, he criticises Kant especially for his
view that beauty is quite distinct from reason,"'"0 and for the view that
reason is opposed to nature."'"''" On the latter point, in connection with
Kant's "doctrine of faith in God", Hegel has the following to say:
"Kant, to be sure, recasts this speculative idea £of the identity
of thought and beingJ into the humane form: morality and happiness
harmonise. This harmony is made into a thought in its turn, and
the realisation of this thought is called the highest good in the
world - something as wretched as this morality and this happiness
the highest good ... If Reason were to arrive at the intuition and
knowledge that Reason and nature are in absolute harmony and are in
themselves blissful, it would recognise its wretched morality which
does not harmonise with happiness and the wretched happiness which
does not harmonise with morality as the nothings that they are".
(Faith and Knowledge, p.95) 12
Later, in the lesser Logic, Hegel argues more plainly that since religion
is an attribute of man alone, this must be in virtue of the essential
nature of humanity, which is Spirit or self-conscious Reason.
"These ideas would put feeling and thought so far apart as to make
them opposites, and would represent them as so antagonistic, that
feeling, particularly religious feeling, is supposed to be con¬
taminated, perverted, and even annihilated by thought. They also
emphatically hold that religion and piety grow out of, and rest
upon something else, and not on thought. But those who make this
separation forget meanwhile that only man has the capacity for
religion, and that animals no more have religion than they have
law and morality". (Lesser Logic, p.4, §2).
I
The obvious objection to this is that if religion is to be reduced to
reason, then it looses precisely the differentia speoifiea of its trans-
13
cendence, and ceases to be religion at all. If God is indeed Absolute
10. Faith and Knowledge, p. 8G.
11. Ibid., p. 94f.
12. Hegel is referring to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason,
Bk II Ch II section V.
13. This objection has been raised specifically against Hegel by Paul
Ricoeur. See Lauer, Hegel's Concept of God, op.cit. p.4.
3S 5
Being, then he cannot be made to be in any way dependent upon our reason,
because this would detract from his absolute character. This attitude is
especially familiar to us in Scotland through the Calvinist doctrine of
the "elect", which argues that since we can have no subjective reason to
believe in God, if we nevertheless do, it must be because God has chosen
to give us faith, or more strictly, because he has chosen to make us choose
to believe.
Properly understood, however, Hegel's view does not destroy faith by re¬
placing it with a rational knowledge, but rather alters the character of
faith so that it may be reconciled with knowledge. If knowledge is
achieved purely through subjective ratiocination, then it follows that an
object such as God is beyond knowledge. If knowledge,on the other hand,
is understood essentially as knowledge of something which really exists,
and this something is conceived along the lines of the platonic theory
of form, as existing reason, then knowledge itself always involves an
element of faith, since its object always maintains a degree of independence
14
from the knowing subject. Reason itself is ultimately divxne, and this
means that an acknowledgement of its truth is ultimately an act of faith
which is arguably more profound than the "leap in the dark" of faith in
something explicitly beyond knowledge, and which yet is not opposed to our
own rationality. Hegel's panlogism does not so much reduce God to the
level of merely human reason, as intuits and believes in reason itself as
,, . 15dxvine.
14. Cf. Faith and Knowledge, p. 124
15. For a further discussion of these issues, see Lauer's excellent
"Hegel's Concept of God".
If this is indeed the case, and moral reason can be reconciled with religious
faith, then it must be possible to discover religious faith itself within
the attitude of moral reason. In Kant's view, moral reason is independent
of religion: if it is possible to demonstrate that on the contrary the
notion of religion is indeed essential to the attitude of morality from
within the limits set by the attitude of morality itself, then it will
follow that Kant's view is false, and that morality and religion can indeed
be reconciled. We will be able to
"... re-establish for philosophy the Idea of absolute freedom and
along with it the absolute Passion, the speculative Good Friday
in place of the historic Good Friday". (Faith and Knowledge, p.191).
This is what Hegel sets out to do in the chapter of the Phenomenology
on Morality
In Morality, Spirit rises for the first time to a Weltanschauung, a view
of the world.^ its attitude may be summarised in the statement "there
is a moral consciousness'.' The ethical attitude of Reason defined the
moral as that which according to the principle of the categorical impera¬
tive is non-contradictory. However, "a contradiction must be a contradic¬
tion of something, i.e. of some content presupposed from the start as a
17
fixed principle", and reason alone cannot provide such a principle, and
cannot therefore ground a moral judgement. The moral world view takes a
step beyond this dilemma, and asserts that the moral consciousness wills
duty for duty's sake - the position which, of course, was taken by Kant.
16. Hyppolite op.cit. p.469f.
17. Philosophy of Right, p.90, §135
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The moral world-view, therefore, advances beyond the viewpoint only of the
categorical imperative, and locates morality not simply in the individual's
reason, but in a universal moral self-consciousness, which it holds to be
a real existence. Nevertheless, its move away from the individual is only
a move towards the intersubjective or the social, and not truly a move
towards Spirit. Its attitude coincides with the attitude of those inter¬
preters of Hegel who see the 'solution' to the Hegelian problem as
'mutual recognition', in which the problems of individualistic morality
are resolved with reference to the social field.
The assertion of a universal morality, however, implies a recognition of
the actual existence of its opposite, just as earlier we saw that the
assertion that the state ought to be rational - rational being understood
in this case as general or universal - implied that the actual state is
irrational, or contains a moment of particularity. It follows that the
moral world view implies its opposite, that the universal moral conscious¬
ness which ought to exist does not in fact exist, or, that the moral world
view will develop antinomies. The sections of the chapter on Morality prior
to Conscience develop these antinomies with a degree of detail Hegel does
not repeat elsewhere. In the Philosophy of Right he refers to this passage
as follows:
"The further antinomies of this never-ending ought-to-be, in
which the exclusively moral way of thinking - thinking in terms
of relation - just wanders to and fro without being able to resolve
them and get beyond the ought-to-be, I have developed in my
Phenomenology of Mind". (Philsophy of Right, p.90 §135).
We will not follow this development here, but move instead directly to the
position which in Hegel's view results from the experience of the antinomies
of duty, the attitude of Conscience.
3 3.2
We will not dwell on the general meaning of Conscience. It is "Spirit that
18
is directly aware of itself as absolute truth and being", or, as Hegel
19
puts it in the Encylopaedia, "pure self-certitude". It is the certainty
that the individual himself knows the real existence of and is responsible
20
for the choice between good and evil. We will understand the significance
of this more clearly if we move directly to consider the experience of
Conscience by natural consciousness as it is set out in the Phenomenology.
In general, the experience of Conscience may be summarised as the same as
the experience of ethical order, namely the experience of the reality of
good and evil; but while the experience of tragedy reveals this to a naive
consciousness, Conscience reveals this to one which has already had this
experience, but which has lost it again by allowing the notions of good and
evil to ossify into things. This distinction corresponds, of course, to the
general distinction Hegel makes between the respective aims of ancient and
modern thought, the task of the latter being to free "determinate thoughts
from their fixity so as to give actuality to the universal, and impart to
21
it spiritual Life".
Natural consciousness arrives at the notion of Conscience through rejecting
the Kantian projection of morality onto a universal moral self-consciousness
which is associated with the notion of God, and instead taking responsibility
for its own action in a concretely individual way. In the opening sentences
of Conscience the reference to and rejection of Kant's Religion is clear;
18. Phenomenology, p. 384
19. Philosophy of Mind, p. 252, §511.
20. Ibid.
21. Phenomenology, p.19, cf Ch.4, p.5) above. When Hegel discusses
Conscience in the Philosophy of Right, he refers both to the
passage of the Phenomenology on Sittlichkeit, and (twice) to
the passage on Morality. The fact that there are in general
very few references to the Phenomenology in Hegel's later
work may perhaps add to the significance of these ones here.
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"The antinomy of the moral view of the world, viz. that there is a
moral consciousness, and that there is none, or that the validation
of duty lies beyond consciousness, and conversely, takes place in
it - these contradictions were gathered up in the idea in which the
non-moral consciousness has moral validity, its contingent knowing
and willing are assumed to have full weight, and happiness is granted
to it as an act of grace [aus Gnade zuteil wurde]. Moral self-
consciousness did not accept responsibility for this idea, but
shifted it on to a being other than itself". (Phenomenology, p. 383)
This reflection of morality back into the individual is not a return to the
individualism of, for example, the categorical imperative. It has resulted
from the experience specifically of moral consciousness, and it is precisely
a reflection into the self of the moral consciousness which from the stand¬
point of duty was a postulate of reason, which, as a postulate, did not
necessarily exist. It is ethical substance intuited as subject or self,
and the individual who knows this is not the abstract individual of reason,
but the concretely moral individual of Spirit.
"It is, when thus returned into itself, concrete moral Spirit, which,
in the consciousness of pure duty, does not give itself an empty
ariterion to be used against actual consciousness; on the contrary,
pure duty, as also the Nature opposed to it, are superseded moments.
Spirit is, in an immediate unity, a self-actualizing being, and the
action is immediately something concretely moral". (Phenomenology,
p.385).
Properly understood, then, Conscience is in itself nothing less than absolute
Spirit. It remains only to demonstrate this as a necessity to natural
consciousness, and the phenomenological development of subjective and ob¬
jective Spirit will be complete.
The experience of Conscience passes through three phases. The first corres¬
ponds to the reaction to Kantian morality exemplified by the work of Jacobi,
whom Hegel discusses immediately after Kant in Faith and Knowledge. This
introduces to morality the subjective element of moral feeling which was
absent from Kant's duty for duty's sake.
"In Kant's philosophy finitude and subjectivity have an objective
form, the form of the concept. Jacobi's philosophy, on the contrary
makes subjectivity entirely subjective, it turns it into individuality.
This subjective core of the subjective thus regains an inner life
so that it seems to be capable of the beauty of feeling LEmpfindung}'.'
(Faith and Knowledge, p. 97)
In the Phenomenology, this attitude, which is indeed the beginning of
conscience, is described as conviction, which
"is simple action in accordance with duty, which fulfils not this
or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right"
(Phenomenology, p. 386).
Conviction, as Hegel goes to some lengths to explain, has a greater value
than duty, for two reasons which may be mentioned here. Firstly, its
22
pragmatic attitude allows it at least to act in good faith, while duty
was always duplicitous. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it raises
the idea that the criterion of its moral worth lies not in some abstract
moral law, but in the recognition it is accorded by others.
The weakness of conviction, however, is that it may turn this last virtue
on its head, and argue that its own conviction of good faith absolves it
from any external criticism. In the 'Confessions of a Beautiful Soul',
Goethe has his heroine express this attitude: "In the face of public opinion,
23
my profoundest conviction and my innocence were my surest guarantees".
This attitude may display a vulnerability and a humanity which is absent
from Kant's unbending conception of moral law, but at the same time it pro¬
tects itself against this vulnerability by using as a defence its own conviction.
22. A good faith which is more concrete than the empty "honest con¬
sciousness" exemplified by the narrator of Diderot's Rameau's Nephew,
which Hegel discussed in "Culture" (Phenomenology, p. 138 and p.389)
23. From Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, quoted by Hyppolite, op. cit. p.501.
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The admission that all action must be justified turns into a justification
of any action, and what seemed like an acceptance of responsibility in the
public eye turns into a denial of the same thing. Conviction may be
acknowledged, indeed must be acknowledged, since it is an essential moment
24
of self-consciousness (ie., universal self-consciousness) , but this
does not apply to specific actions, which are "not identical with the
element of everyone's self-consciousness, and therefore not necessarily
25
acknowledged"
This, of course, is a difficulty which will have to be faced by any attempt
to ground ethics in conviction or recognition, and it leads Hegel into the
second phase of his discussion of Conscience. Here he moves from the reaction
to Kant found in Jacobi to a second reaction to Kant's enlightened pro¬
testantism. This is the romantic restatement of the value of religion,
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and Hegel appears to have Novalis especially in mind. This movement
may be summarised very briefly as follows.
The blank oscillation of conviction between recognition and non-recognition
which recalls the earlier oscillation of dependence and independence in
Lordship and Bondage, refers consciousness to the medium which relates
these two extremes, that is languange. In the language which Goethe's
heroine disdains, conviction become actual, and the actual moral conscious¬
ness becomes committed to a specific action. Just as earlier thought
made self-consciousness universal, so here languange makes Spirit universal.
24. Phenomenology, p. 388.
25. Ibid, p. 394.
26. Kojeve, op.cit, p.282. See also Novalis' "Christendom or Europe",
in Reiss, ed. The Political.Thought of the German Romantics,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1955.
At the same time, however, language brings to morality specific moral
content - just as Unhappy Consciousness earlier brought a content to
free self-consciousness. Language here is therefore presented as playing
a double role. On the one hand, it plays the part of mediating reason,
making concrete recognition a possibility. On the other hand, it con¬
tributes what moral reason in the form of duty lacked, a specific and
concrete content, which is both freely intuited by the individual and
yet equally acknowledged by the community. The rational and the divine
aspects of language, in other words, are intuited as one, and we have
come full circle back to the intuition of the first moment of Spirit,
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of the divine nature of language. Against the iconoclasm of the reform¬
ation it is asserted that the rich imagery of religious mythology is not
incompatible with individual reason, and that both aspects are equally
2 8
essential moments of language. "Phantoms rule where there are no gods"!
Hegel writes
"Conscience, then, in the majesty of its elevation above specific
law ■ and every content of duty, puts whatever it pleases into its
knowing and willing. It is the moral genius which knows the inner
voice of what it immediately knows to be a divine voice; and since
in knowing this, it has an equally immediate knowledge of existence,
it is the divine creative power which in its notion possesses the
spontaneity of life. Equally, it is in its own self divine worship
for its action is the contemplation of its own divinity.
This solitary worship is at the same time essentially the divine
worship of a community, and the pure inner knowing and perceiving
of itself advances to the moment of consciousness. (Phenomenology,
P- 397) . " " ""
27. Phenomenology, p. 66.
28. Novalis, in Reiss (ed.) op.cit. p.138. Cf C.G. Jung, Collected Works
Vol. 9 Part I, p. I2ff.
However, the synthesis of religion and subjective morality, or of religious
and philosophical theology, to use Kant's languange,has not yet been achieved,
since this attitude is not yet aware that what it is conscious of in religion
is indeed its own self - and vice-versa.
"In so far as this conscience still distinguishes its abstract
consciousness from its self-consciousness it has only a hidden
life in God, it is true that God is immediately present in its
mind and heart, in its self; but what is manifest, its actual
consciousness and the mediating movement of that consciousness,
is for it something other than that hidden inner life and the
immediacy of God's presence". (Phenomenology, p. 398).
It is only once these two sides are brought together that Conscience is
completed, and the Protestant view restated at a higher level, indeed,
at the highest level, of Absolute Spirit itself.
This leads Hegel to the third and final phase of the development of con¬
science, which will bring together the subjective attitude of Jacobi with
the romantic view of objective reality (especially the reality of the
Catholic church) of Novalis.
This phase begins with a romantic attitude which we have already encountered,
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the attitude of the 'beautiful soul' of Goethe and Holderlin. This
attitude is a result of the notion of the previous attitude that the divine
is essentially only the inner self, or what is known as the soul. With
this attitude, natural consciousness - like unhappy consciousness before it
- stands back from the outer world, since contact with this world can only
detract from the purity of its inner spirit.
29. See Ch.l p.15 above, and Hyppolite op. cit. p. 501. In the final
chapter of the Phenomenology, Hegel says that the beautiful soul
is "not only the intuition of the Divine but the Divine's intuition
of itself" (loc.cit. p.483).
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"It lives in dread of besmirching the splendour of its inner being
by action and an existence; and, in order to preserve the purity
of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world, and
persists in its self-willed impotence to renounce its self which
is reduced to the extreme of ultimate abstraction, and to give
itself a substantial existence, or to transform its thought into
being and put its trust in the absolute difference between thought
and being ." (Phenomenology, p.400)
The beautiful soul stands opposed to the consciousness which has conviction,
and calls it both evil and hypocritical. It is evil because its own con¬
scientiousness is not the same as the universal of morality, and hypo-
30
critical because rt nevertheless clarms that this is so. Therefore,
the beautiful soul, which itself disdains action, sets out to demonstrate
the hypocrisy of acting conscience.
To begin with, the conflict between these two attitudes appears beyond re¬
conciliation. One can either act, and do the best one can, or do nothing,
and remain inwardly perfect. However, the perfection of the beautiful
soul is evidently inadequate to its idea of itself, for moral perfection
must involve moral deeds. Further, its accusation of hypocrisy soon ring
hollow, as it becomes evident that it does not mean that the consciousness
with conviction is hypocritical in this or that respect, but generally
hypocritical. The emptiness of such a criticism is evident, and Hegel
comments - giving a gloss to a statement of Napoleon's, which later in-
31
spired Goethe - that
"No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is
not a hero, but because the valet - is a valet, whose dealings
are with the man, not as a hero, but as one who eats, drinks,
and wears clothes, in general, with his individual wants and
fancies. Thus, for the judging consciousness, there is no action
in which it could not oppose to the universal action, the
personal aspect of the individuality, and play the part of the
30. Phenomenology, p.401
31. Hyppolite, op. cit. p. 522
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movat valet towards the. agent". (Phenomenology, p. 4o4).
When the acting consciousness perceives this in the judgemental attitude
of the beautiful soul, it perceives that this apparently perfect being is
in fact just as flawed as its own self:
"it £the consciousness that judges] is recognised by the
latter ^conviction] as the same as itself."(Phenomenology, p.405)
Once conviction perceives its critic to be imperfect, it is able to
communicate with it, and confesses its own inadequacy, expecting that
the other will do likewise and forgive his imperfection in the light of
his own acknowledgement of it.
To begin with, however, the beautiful soul had no such intention, and
takes the latter's confession of his human weakness only as confirmation
of its own superiority. Like the Jewish people, who in Hegel's view
could love only perfect being, that is God, and not imperfect men, it
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remains "hard-hearted". But, Hegel argues, the very hard-heartedness
of this attitude is also its destruction, and the more unrelentingly it
sticks to the immediacy of its beautiful soul, the more it experiences
its own need to externalise itself. It would be unable to resolve this
contradiction on its own, but it has before it the example of one who
has confessed his own imperfection, and has changed his empty conviction
- the conviction of his innocence - into a concrete conviction which
acknowledges his own evil and intends to fight against it.
33. ETW p. 187, and p.217
I
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Seeing this change in the nature of the conviction of conscience, it
extends forgiveness towards it: but this forgiveness is not something
abstract, a mere absolution, but is for the beautiful soul a renunciation
of its own self, and reconciles it as well with the consciousness which
has conviction, and henceforth there is no distinction between them.
"The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit,
which beholds the pure knowledge of itself qua universal essence,
in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself qua absolutely
self-contained and exclusive individuality - a reciprocal recog¬
nition which is absolute Spirit". (Phenomenology, p. 408)
Conscience, then, in its fully developed form is the acknowledgement of
the real existence of sin, which acknowledgement is from another point of
view the forgiveness of sin, and also has the significance of being
absolute Spirit. The doctrine of the forgiveness of sin, then, is in
Hegel's view rightly understood as the reconciliation of man with man
through God. The notion of sin is itself defined not by an abstract
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moral law, as it was by Kant, nor by a mediator, as it is perhaps
in the Catholic faith, in certain practices if not necessarily in its
actual doctrine, but by a mutual recognition of the existence of God
within the community. Morality, therefore needs religion, and the world
of knowledge becomes at one with the world of faith.
"The reconciling Yea, in which the two 1I's let go their antithetical
existence is the existence of the 'I' which has expanded itself into
a duality, and, in its complete externalization and opposite, possesses
the certainty of itself: it is God manifested in the midst of those
who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge". (Phenomenology,
p. 409).
The teaching of a 'fisher of men', therefore, is the conclusion of this
last, Piscean stage of Spirit.
34. Kant, Religion, op.cit.p.27.
CHAPTER NINE : CONCLUSION
If we have followed Hegel this far, we should be fully initiated into
1
the idea of philosophy. Examining each of the twelve partial manifesta¬
tions of Spirit, we have found that the truth of each lies not in itself
but in something higher, and we have finally arrived at the stage where
knowledge is explicitly acknowledged equally to be faith in Religion.
The truth, therefore, has been established both as something which exists
in the form of an infinite being which can never be fully possessed, and
yet at the same time as something which is by no means simply beyond our
knowledge. From the point of view of Understanding, this is simply a
contradiction: truth both can and cannot be possessed. From the point
of view of Spirit, however, this contradiction expresses something with
which we are quite familiar, namely, love. If Hegel is right, therefore,
philosophy, which is the love of truth, has been established as a valid
and indeed necessary attitude. As Hyppolite says:
"Philosophy is not a logic, an organon, which before knowledge,
deals with the instrument of knowledge. Nor is it love of truth
which is not the possession of truth. It is science, and, as
Schelling claimed, science of the absolute". (Hyppolite, op.cit.
p.5)
1. The figure of twelve is arrived at by taking sense-certainty;
perception; Understanding; desire; Lordship and bondage; free
self-consciousness, observing Reason; actualisation of rational
self-consciousness; individuality which takes itself to be read
in and for itself; SittZiohkeit •, culture; and morality respectively
to be the essential moments of Spirit. (Cf. note 4 to Part 2).
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The introduction therefore is complete, and we may therefore proceed to
philosophy proper - in this case to the Sdierice of Logic - with the
certain knowledge that what we are doing is worthwhile.'
/
This leaves the chapter on Religion to account for, and I hasten to
reiterate that by declining to discuss it in detail I do not want to
belittle its significance. As Lauer says,
"It would be worse than arbitrary to look upon Chapter VII
[Religion] as either a parenthesis between chapters V CSpirit]
and VIII [.Absolute knowing] or as not really saying what
it purports to be saying, that is, that religious conscious¬
ness, which has God as its object, is indispensible to
philosophical thinking and knowing." (Lauer, Hegel's Concept
of God, op.cit. p.23).
I have already given some reasons for leaving an exegesis of Religion
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out of my account of the Phenomenology, and I will add two further
reasons here. Firstly, it seems to me that Religion in the Phenomenology
is amongst the least interesting and worst written passages in Hegel's
work, and simply does not repay the reader for detailed study. Secondly,
since I myself am not generally inclined towards religion, or at least
was not until I embarked on this work, I am disinclined to pass judgement
on its content. However, as I hope has been made clear, Hegel's attitude
to religion is by no means merely an adjunct to his philosophical thought,
nor even an aspect of it, but its very foundation. As Fackenheim says:
"In the Hegelian system, religion appears as one among other
forms Of spiritual life. This must under no circumstances
obscure the fact that it is also the basis and the condition
of the possibility of the system in its entirety". (Emil
Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1967).
I would like to conclude, therefore, by offering a few comments on the
significance of Hegel's identification of truth with Absolute Being,
that is, God.
2. See P. 3 31 above.
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Some commentators, have taken Hegel's attitude to be radically atheist.
Hegel is interpreted as identifying man and God, and this means that
there is no difference between the two. Man is God, or God is man - it
makes no difference. Religion is an attitude which has not yet grasped
this identity. Thus, for example, Kojeve argues that
"while in fact talking about himself the religious Man
believes that he is talking about God." (Kojeve, op. cit.
p.71)
Further, Hegel is in Kojeve's view the first philosopher to realize this.
"God and the afterlife have always been denied by certain men.
But Hegel was the first to try to formulate a complete philosophy
that is atheistic and finitist in relation to Man (at least in
the great Logik and the earlier writings). He not only gave a
correct description of finite human existence on the "phenomenologi-
cal" level, which allowed him to use the fundamental categories of
Judaeo-Christian thought without any inconsistency. He also tried
(without completely succeeding, it is true) to complete this des¬
cription with a metaphysical and ontological analysis, also radi¬
cally atheistic and finitist. But very few of his readers have
understood that in the final analysis dialectic means atheism".
(Kojeve, op.cit. p.259n)
Bendetto Croce makes a similar argument, describing Hegel's philosophy as
"radically irreligious, because it is not content to oppose itself
to religion or to range it alongside itself, but resolves religion
into itself and substitutes itself for it". (Bendetto Croce,
quoted in P.Singer, Hegel, op. cit. p.82).
Nor is it only people who are themselves committed to atheism who inter¬
pret Hegel in this way. Paul Ricoeur, for example, complains that
"A teleology carried out in Hegelian style does not have as
eschaton, as final term, the sacred delivered in myth, cult,
belief. Of itself, what this teleology envisions is absolute
knowing, not faith; and absolute knowinq bespeaks no transcendence
pnly the subsumption of all transcendence in a thoroughly mediated
self-knowledge". (Ricoeur, quoted in Lauer, Hegel's Concept of God,
op.cit. p.4).
TO
It would be possible to cite a multitude of similar opinions. However,
there are few people who would go so far as to say that Hegel himself was
self-consciously opposed to religious faith, and anyone who did make such
an assertion would have to account for a vast number of passages in his
writing which explicitly and firmly assert the value and truth of religious
faith.
The real difficulty, so it seems to me, lies not so much in establishing
what Hegel says, as in establishing precisely what is meant by the
question of whether or not God exists - a question which Hegel never raises,
at least not in this form.^ It is natural enough, of course, in view of
the fact that the conclusion of the Phenomenology appears to be that truth
is God, to ask what is meant by God - but how could such a question be
answered?
There is, in Hegel's view and in my experience only one way, and that is
concretely, through a phenomenological description of the experience of
absolute Being in the life of any "natural consciousness". If there were a
shorter way, Hegel presumably would have taken it. As things stand, it
appears that any shorter route is bound to become an abstraction from the
truth, which, as Hegel says, is the whole, and such an abstraction, because
it is abstract, is bound to lead to contradictory interpretations, such
as those cited above. Ultimately, we will be able to deduce from any one
the antinomy that God both exists, and does not exist. What, after all,
is Kant's assertion that the Divine is beyond knowledge, but an antinomy?
3. Hegel on occasion speakes of God's Dasein, but not of his Existenz,
which would impute to him a finite thing-like being. See Lauer,
Hegel's Concept of God, op.cit. p. 206.
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For if the Divine is, beyond knowledge, how is it that we are able to
give it a name? Kant's view can be expressed as "we know what is beyond
knowledge", or that "we both know and do not know the Divine". To Hegel,
this suggests that the question is being both posed and answered in an
abstract form, which, as he has demonstrated with each of the abstract
forms of Spirit throughout the Phenomenology, will lead it into self-
contradiction.
It is necessary, then, to understand the entire Phenomenology as being
an answer, and perhaps the only answer, and perhaps only the answer to
the question "does God exist"? This is not necessarily to denigrate faith,
which does not necessarily seek a true answer to such a question. In this
sense, there is a short cut to knowledge, a "royal road", as Hegel says.
The faith of an uneducated man may be every bit as good as the faith of
a philosopher.
"This common road can be taken in casual dress; but the high sense
for the Eternal, the Holy, the Infinite strides along in the robes
of a high priest, on a road that is from the first no road, but
has immediate being as its centre, the genius of profound original
ideas and lofty flashes of inspiration. But just as profundity of
this kind still does not reveal the source of essential being, so,
too, these sky-rockets of inspiration are not yet the empyrean.
True thoughts and scientific insight are only to be won through
the labour of the Notion. (Phenomenology, p.43)
To establish scientifically the existence of absolute truth, then, the
royal road will not do. We must follow the entire development of the
Phenomenology, and see for ourselves how at every stage the experience
of natural consciousness demonstrates as a necessity the existence of
absolute Being. We should be clear, however, that this does not mean that
the experience of the Phenomenology is itself to be identified with
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absolute Being. Hegel's view is not the pantheist view that "all is God",
4. P.Singer op.cit. p.81. Cf also Philosophy of Mind p.305,§573 and
p.31 §398 - where Hegel comments "Pantheism fails altogether to
organise and systematise its content".
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and it is partly for this reason that it is significant that Hegel includes
in the Phenomenology a chapter on Religion.
The chapter on Religion, then, gives what is absent from Plato's philosophy,
namely, an account of "absolute Being in and for itself, the self-consciousness
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of Spirit" as it is presented to consciousness by the great religions
of the world. This does not mean that it is merely an adjunct to the rest
of the Phenomenology. In particular, it is worth stressing again that it is
not simply a solution to the problems specifically of Morality. Religion
is not simply - as has been said - a language which makes possible a recon¬
ciliation between people which the purely moral attitude could not bring
about on its own. The attitude of forgiveness does not require the language
of religion - this would be the Kantian view which 'postulates' religion -
but, in Hegel's view, presents to natural consciousness which questions its
experience the reality of God "manifested in the midst of those who know
themselves in the form of pure knowledge". While this experience may occur
directly only at the level of morality, it is nevertheless the case that
Religion is in Hegel's view the result of all that has gone before, and
not simply of Morality. Religion is "the perfection of Spirit into which
its individual moments - consciousness, seIf-consciousness, Reason, and
Spirit - return",^ and "presupposes that these have run their course and
7
is their simple totality or absolute self".
5. Phenomenology, p.410.
6. Phenomenology, p. 413.
7. Ibid.
However, this does not mean that Hegel has identified philosophy and
religion. They are both concerned with absolute being, but in religion
absolute being still appears as an object. Hegel's view, however - and
this is perhaps the most slippery of all his ideas - is that what appears
in religion as an object is capable also of being intuited as the thought
of a subject. Once we have been initiated by the Phenomenology into the
notion of the Absolute, we no longer need actual experience in order to
know it. This assertion makes sense only on the basis of the identity
of Divine Being and self-conscious Reason, thought and being - an identity
which, as has been argued, implies in this case not a reduction of Divine
being to Reason, but an elevation of Reason to Divinity. Knowledge of God
in the proper sense of the word knowledge is therefore to be achieved
through logic, and phenomenology leads us only to an acknowledgement of
his existence. This leads to the position which Kaufmann calls "on the
g
face of it, perhaps the maddest image in all of Hegel's writings", and
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which has already been cited above.
"The Logic is thus to be understood as the system of pure reason,
as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without
any shroud in and for itself. One might therefofe say that this
content is the account of God3 as he is in his eternal essence before
the creation of nature and any finite Spirit". (Science of Logic,p.60)
It seems clear to me that this view is neither atheism, nor orthodox
christian theology; though I believe that Hegel thought it was compatible
with christian theology. Whether or not it is mad, I do not know. However,
if we reject Hegel's conclusion that Reason itself is Divine, then I do
8. Kaufmann, op.cit. p.195.
9. P. 29 and p. 127 above.
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not see any alternative but to accept that the Divine is beyond philo¬
sophical knowledge, and that faith is essentially irrational. If faith
is indeed irrational, it follows that there is no point in arguing about
it, since individuals who accept or reject it will not be using rational
criterea. Philosophy in particular, then, would have no business in inter¬
fering with faith, and it would have to find some other purpose. In such
a case, I personally would be inclined to doubt that it could find a valid
raison d'etre, and to agree with the young Marx, that it is no more than
an empty idealist pursuit which serves only the negative purpose of
directing our attention away from more pressing issues.
s<rs~
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